The American Political Science Review

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Articles and Essays by David Collier and Richard E. Messick, M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, J. Weinberger, Paul R. Schulman, Fred I. Greenstein, Nancy I. Lieber

Susan Blackall Hansen
Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence

Austin Sarat and Joel B. Grossman
Courts and Conflict Resolution

Christopher H. Achen
Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response

Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, Howard S. Bloom and H. Douglas Price, Saul Goodman and Gerald H. Kramer
Economic Variables and Congressional Elections

Douglas W. Rae, Gordon Tullock
The Limits of Consensual Decision

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Vol. LXIX December 1975 No. 4

CONTENTS

1177 Editorial Comment

1181 Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence — Susan Blackall Hansen

1200 Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication — Austin Sarat and Joel B. Grossman

1218 Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response — Christopher H. Achen

1232 The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections — Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer

1240 Comment — Howard S. Bloom and H. Douglas Price

1255 Comment — Saul Goodman and Gerald H. Kramer

1266 Rejoinder — Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer

1270 The Limits of Consensual Decision — Douglas W. Rae

1295 Comment — Gordon Tullock

1298 Rejoinder — Douglas W. Rae

1299 Prerequisities Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption — David Collier and Richard E. Messick

1316 Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations — M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi

1336 Hobbes's Doctrine of Method — J. Weinberger

1354 Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm — Paul R. Schulman

1371 The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies — Fred I. Greenstein

1399 Communications

1406 Book Reviews and Essays

1406 Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay — Nancy I. Lieber

1539 Index to Volume LXIX

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ARTICLES

1181 **Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence.** Under what circumstances do citizens in a democracy influence their leaders? This paper uses an index of citizen-leader agreement on community problems to examine the effects of political factors on linkage. This index, termed concurrence, was based on parallel questions on community problems asked of citizens, government heads, and other local leaders sampled in sixty-four smaller American communities.

Concurrence was significantly higher in communities with high levels of citizen participation, contested elections, partisan ballots, and active political parties. Regression analysis showed that while voting rates had the largest direct impact on concurrence, participation had more impact when salient electoral alternatives were available. Partisan, contested elections also were associated with higher concurrence between leaders and persons of low socioeconomic status. Political factors also affected concurrence rates in both consensual and nonconsensual communities.

Alternative explanations for these findings (popular control of leaders, leaders' efforts to influence citizens or manipulate participation) are considered. Since concurrence scores of nonelected local leaders were also higher in participant communities with contested elections, it is suggested that political factors may affect citizen-leader agreement by facilitating communication between leaders and citizens, as well as by aiding electoral accountability.

By Susan Blackall Hansen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.

1200 **Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication.** This article attempts to assess the role of courts and other adjudicative institutions in the definition, interpretation, and management of conflict. Understanding the function of courts requires an understanding of a society's entire range of conflict management mechanisms. Particular emphasis is placed on those variables most likely to determine where and how conflicts will be solved.

Adjudicative institutions can be effectively differentiated by a typology which measures the level of formality in procedures and the degree of "publicness." The structure of a dispute-resolving institution will have an important effect on which disputes are presented to it and how they are decided. The nature of the dispute, goals of the disputants, social context, and political culture are also important variables.

Government has an important stake in the manner in which disputes arise and are resolved. It may promote or require the resolution of some disputes in the courts while allowing others to be resolved in less public and formal arenas. Formal litigation may provide a model for private dispute resolution. It may also absorb and deflect grievances before they escalate into more organized and intense demands on the political system. Finally, litigation may have an important effect on system stability by promoting support for regime values.

By Austin Sarat, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Amherst College and Joel B. Grossman, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

1218 **Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response.** Students of public opinion research have argued that voters show very little consistency and structure in their political attitudes. A model of the survey response is proposed which takes account of the vagueness in opinion survey questions and in response categories. When estimates are made of this vagueness or "measurement error" and the estimates applied to the principal previous study, nearly all the inconsistency is shown to be the result of the vagueness of the questions rather than of any failure by the respondents.

By Christopher H. Achen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

1232 **The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections.** This paper uses rational voting behavior as an organizing device to develop a framework within which to consider the effect of economic aggregates on voters. Unlike most previous studies, ours permits the voter to vote for candidates of either party or to abstain. A principal finding is that the effect of the main economic aggregates on the participation rate is much clearer than the effects on either party. Our results deny that an incumbent administration can affect the control of Congress by stimulating the economy. Voters appear to make judgments about inflation, unemployment and economic growth. We investigated on the basis of long-term, not short-term performance.

By Francisco Arcelus, Assistant Professor of Economics and Commerce, Simon Fraser University, and Allan H. Meltzer, Maurice Falk Professor of Economics and Social Science, Carnegie-Mellon University.

Comment. By Howard S. Bloom, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Economy and Government, Harvard University, and H. Douglas Price, Professor of Government, Harvard Univesity.

Comment. By Saul Goodman, L.L.B. Candidate, University of Virginia Law School and Gerald H. Kramer, Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

Rejoinder. By Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer.

1270 **The Limits of Consensual Decision.** This essay criticizes the ideal of consensual decision as it appears in liberal political theory. A historical survey begins with Locke's view of consent, its criticism and extension by 19th century figures such as Godwin, Calhoun, and Mill, its reappearance in the guise of economic efficiency within the works of Wicksell or Buchanan and Tullock and as moral autonomy in Wolff's *Defense of Anarchy*. The paper offers a structural account of political decision making in which vulnerability to the authority of others seems inescapable and in which neither unanimity nor a universal right of consent is possible. On this telling, consensual decision is logically unattainable and misdirects constitutional theory.

By Douglas W. Rae, Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

Comment. By Gordon Tullock, University Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Rejoinder. By Douglas W. Rae.

1299 **Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption.** Cross-national research has, with a few exceptions, dealt exclusively with hypotheses that focus on causal relations within nations. It is increasingly clear both on substantive and methodological grounds, however, that diffusion effects among nations must also be considered. The present research combines these alternative perspectives in an analysis of the timing of the first adoption of social security in nations. It is found that not only prerequisites explanations—which focus on causes within each nation—but also spatial and hierarchical diffusion effects must be considered in explaining patterns of social security adoption. The most important overall pattern, which appears to result from diffusion, is the tendency for later adopters to adopt at lower levels of modernization. This finding is interpreted as being due in part to a general tendency toward a larger role of the state in later developing countries—involving an important difference in the *sequence* in which different aspects of modernization occur—and in part to special characteristics of social security as a public policy.

By David Collier, Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, and Richard E. Messick, Research Assistant, Energy Policy Research Project, George Washington University.

1316 **Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: a Longitudinal Study of Two Generations.** This paper utilizes a national panel study of two biologically linked generations to study political change and continuity between 1965 and 1973. Four basic processes and combinations thereof are posited: absolute continuity, generational effects, life-cycle effects, and period effects. Data at the aggregate level give strong support for each type of change and continuity progression, depending upon the substantive political orientation examined. There are also strong traces of hybrid effects, especially the combination of period and life-cycle processes acting to propel the younger generation at a faster clip than the older. Over the eight-year span the absolute cleavage between the generations tended to decline, the major exception occurring with respect to specific issues and partisanship. The anomaly of this strain toward convergence in the light of the generation gap controversy is discussed.

By M. Kent Jennings, Professor of Political Science and Program Director, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, and Richard G. Niemi, Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester.

3236 **Hobbes's Doctrine of Method.** A persistent problem in the interpretation of Hobbes's self-proclaimed founding of modern political science is the nature of the link between that political science and Hobbes's understanding of modern natural science and scientific method. The intention of this essay is to suggest that Hobbes's doctrine of method reveals the unity of his teaching about science, man, and politics. The unifying role of the doctrine of method can be understood only as a function of Hobbes's intention to reform what he saw as the previously defective relationship between practice and theory. In the light of this intention, the doctrine of method will be shown to consist in a new rhetoric which links the resolution of the human problem to the conquest of nature facilitated by the new science of nature. This rhetoric will be shown to be the substantial core of the doctrine of method itself.

By J. Weinberger, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

1354 **Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm.** Much of the literature of policy analysis and public administration is dominated by incremental and "divisible goods" paradigms. Policy is assumed to be a process of marginal and adjustive decision making in which benefits are dispensed piecemeal—proportionate to prevailing distributions of power or publicized need. This essay asserts the existence of a class of nonincremental, indivisible policy pursuits for which the analytical weaponry of political science is largely inappropriate. Such policies display a distinctive set of political and administrative characteristics. These characteristics are explained and examined in connection with manned space exploration policy. An assessment is offered of the challenges posed by nonincremental policy to contemporary outlooks in political science.

By Paul R. Schulman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.

1371 **The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies.** This analysis of open-ended interviews conducted in 1969–70 with small samples of English, French, and white and black American children focuses on orientations toward the heads of state of the three nations and the Prime Ministers of Britain and France. The English children exhibit remarkably positive views of the Queen. Many of them believe her to be the nation's effective leader rather than a figurehead. Any political animus they express is directed toward the Prime Minister. The French children tend to describe the President of the Republic positively when they express feelings toward him at all but expect him to behave harshly and arrogantly in actual situations. Their descriptions of political leaders exude authoritarian imagery and perceptions; they perceive the President of the Republic in an impersonal, undifferentiated manner, and are only barely aware of the Premier. The general descriptions of the President of the United States by white American children interviewed in 1969–70 are remarkably similar to the benevolent-leader perceptions of children in the Eisenhower-Kennedy years, but the 1969–70 children exhibit much less idealized views of a president depicted as a law-breaker. A post-Watergate white American comparison group interviewed in June 1973 is generally aware of, but puzzled by, the Watergate events. At this early stage in the Watergate revelations, white children were only slightly less likely than the 1969–70 respondents to idealize the President, but were substantially more likely to perceive the president depicted as a law-breaker in terms implying that the President is "above the law." The American black comparison group, which is too small and special in its geographical circumstances to offer more than suggestive findings, is the most negative of the four groups in general responses to the head of state, but is more like the white American group than like the English or French children in expectations about the actual behavior of the leader. Even though the black and white American children seem to be similar in their expectations about how certain political encounters would ensue, interpretations of encounters are strikingly different.

By Fred I. Greenstein, Henry Luce Professor of Politics, Law, and Society, Princeton University.

1399 COMMUNICATIONS

From Richard G. Hutcheson III, Jerome R. Corsi, Peter G. Stillman, Wallace J. Thies, Jack Woddis, Bernard S. Morris, David R. Godschalk, Judith V. May

1406 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay. Jean-Marie Borzeix, *Mitterrand lui-même* Pierre Guidoni, *Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste;* André Laurens and Thierry Pfister, *Les nouveaux communistes*; Georges Marchais, *Le Défi démocratique;* Francois Mitterrand, *La Rose au poing;* Francois Mitterrand, *Ma part de vérité;* Didier Motchane, *Clefs pour le socialisme; Programme commun de gouvernement: Parti socialiste, Parti communiste, Mouvement des radicaux de gauche.*

By Nancy I. Lieber, Lecturer in Political Science, University of California, Davis.

1420 Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology

Evan Bitsaxis, *Welfare Versus Freedom.* William M. Leiter, p. 1420

Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology;* Nikolai Bukharin, *Imperialism and World Economy;* N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (1966 edition); and N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (1969 edition). Stephen F. Cohen, p. 1421

Richard Gombin, *Les Origines du Gauchisme.* Roy Pierce, p. 1423

Z. A. Jordan, *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis.* Timothy O'Hagan, p. 1424

Allen C. Kelley, Jeffrey G. Williamson, and Russell J. Cheetham, *Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History.* Gustav Ranis, p. 1425

Hans Kelsen, *The Pure Theory of Law*; and Hans Kelsen, *What is Justice: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science.* H. W. Harris, p. 1427

Lennart Lundquist, *Means and Goals of Political Decentralization.* Karl W. Deutsch and Manfred Kochen, p. 1429

Francis E. Mineka, ed., *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848;* and Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, eds., *The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849–1873.* Joseph Hamburger, p. 1430

Claus Mueller, *The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation.* Murray Edelman, p. 1432

T. L. S. Sprigge, ed. (Vols. I and II) and I. R. Christie, ed. (Vol. III), *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham.* Ian Budge, p. 1433

Ross Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times.* Alan Ryan, p. 1435

Heinrich Winnik, Rafael Moses, and Mortimer Ostow, *Psychological Bases of War.* John Gunn, p. 1436

1437 American Government and Politics

Henry J. Aaron, *Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing Policies?* and R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, *The Politics of Land Use: Planning, Zoning, and the Private Developer.* and Joseph L. Stevens, p. 1437

The American Political Science Association, *Political Science and State and Local Government.* Ira Sharkansky, p. 1439

Leland D. Baldwin, *Reframing the Constitution: An Imperative for Modern America*) Carl Baar, p. 1439
Jewel Bellush and Stephen M. David, *Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-making*. Paul Kantor, p. 1440
Richard Burt and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., *Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy, 1947–1971: An Annotated Bibliography*. William I. Bacchus, p. 1441
The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, *State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness*. William J. Keefe, p. 1442
Joon Chien Doh, *The Planning—Programming—Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies*. Allan Schick, p. 1443
Anthony Downs, *Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America*. Harlan Hahn, p. 1444
Julius Goebel, Jr., *The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. I, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801*. David Fellman, p. 1445
Harlan Hahn, *Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics of Change*, C. Edwin Gilmour, p. 1447
L. G. Hines, *Environmental Issues: Pollution and Economics;* and E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered*. Harold Sprout, p. 1448
James Willard Hurst, *The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays*. Marvin R. Summers, p. 1449
Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Schaefer, and Susan O. White, eds., *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. Joel B. Grossman, p. 1450
Seymour Martin Lipset, *Rebellion in the University*. Philip G. Altbach, p. 1452
David Price, *Who Makes the Laws*? John F. Manley, p. 1453
Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820*. Edgar J. McManus, p. 1454
Charles Sackrey, *The Political Economy of Urban Poverty*. Seymour Z. Mann, p. 1455
David Curtis Skaggs, *Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753–1776*. David A. Bohmer, p. 1456
Robert Sobel, *The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914–1970*. Jonathan Hughes, p. 1457
Stephen P. Strickland, *Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy*. Jerry L. Weaver, p. 1458
Martin and Susan Tolchin, *To The Victor . . . : Political Patronage From the Clubhouse to the White House*. James E. Piereson, p. 1459
Joseph S. Wholey et al, *Federal Evaluation Policy: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs*. Joel R. Dickinson, p. 1460

1461 Comparative Government and Politics

Weston H. Agor, ed., *Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence, Analyses for Nine Countries*. Kenneth L. Karst, p. 1461
Robert J. Alexander, *Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre*. Harry Kantor, p. 1462
Oton Ambroz, *Realignment of World Power: The Russo-Chinese Schism Under the Impact of Mao Tse-tung's Last Revolution*, Vols. I and II. Gaston J. Sigur, p. 1463
Harvey A. Averch, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton, *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines*. Mohd. A. Nawawi, p. 1464
Henry Barbera, *Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War*. Arthur S. Banks, p. 1465
Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai*. Sheldon Appleton, p. 1466
R. M. Berndt and P. Lawrence, eds., *Politics in New Guinea*. Peta Colebatch, p. 1467
Jean Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures*. Lawrence C. Dodd, p. 1469
C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*. William L. Cleveland, p. 1470
William Derman, *Serfs, Peasants and Socialists: A Former Serf Village in the Republic of Guinea*. Victor D. Du Bois, p. 1471
Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*. Marianne Bastid, p. 1472
Marcus F. Franda, *Radical Politics in West Bengal*. Ashis Nandy, p. 1473
Andre Gunder Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment: Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America*. Arturo Valenzuela, p. 1475
Martin Harry Greenberg, *Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study*, Clarence E. Thurber, p. 1476
Paul M. Hayes, *Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling*, Thomas Chr. Wyller, p. 1477
Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, ed., *Social Change in Angola*. Ronald H. Chilcote, p. 1478
Francis G. Hutchins, *India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement*, Raghavan Iyer, p. 1479
Doreen Ingrams, compiler and annotator, *Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict*. Norman Rose, p. 1480
Fuad Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies*. Jacob Reuveny, p. 1481
Naum Jasny, *Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered*. Alfred Zauberman, p. 1482
Katherine Marshall Johnson, *Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casablanca*. Remy Leveau, p. 1483
Ilpyong J. Kim, *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets*. Albert Feuerwerker, p. 1484
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, *Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina*. David C. Jordan, p. 1485

Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa.* Okwudiba Nnoli, p. 1486
Roger Lumley, *White-Collar Unionism in Britain.* David Coates, p. 1487
Adrian Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929.* Roland Sarti, p. 1488
J. Michael Mahar, ed., *The Untouchables in Contemporary India.* W. H. Morris-Jones, p. 1489
Ellen Mickiewicz, ed., *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data.* William A. Welsh, p. 1490
Alfred Morris, *The Growth of Parliamentary Scrutiny by Committee: A Symposium.* Lyndelle D. Fairlie, p. 1493
Lutz Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter Amerikanischer Besatzung.* C. Bradley Scharf, p. 1494
Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki, *Area Handbook for Algeria.* Clement Henry Moore, p. 1495
Karl J. Pelzer, *West Malaysia and Singapore: A Selected Bibliography.* Robert O. Tilman, p. 1496
Nageshwar Prasad, *Decentralisation in Yugoslavia and India.* A. H. Somjee, p. 1496
Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics.* John C. Courtney, p. 1497
R. M. Punnett, *Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Cabinet and the Shadow Government in British Politics.* Jorgen S. Rasmussen, p. 1499
Alvin Rabushka, *Race and Politics in Urban Malaya.* Felix Gagliano, p. 1500
W. W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth.* Ronald Rogowski, p. 1501
Philippe C. Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives.* Liisa North, p. 1502
Benjamin I. Schwartz, ed., *Reflections on the May Fourth Movement.* T. K. Tong, p. 1504
Robert Jones Shafer, *Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis.* Robert T. Aubey, p. 1505
Mauricio Solaun and Michael Quinn, *Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America.* John S. Fitch III, p. 1506
David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler, *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History.* Cecil Hobbs, p. 1507
Jürg Steiner, ed. with Erwin Bucher, Daniel Frei and Leo Schürmann, *Das Politische System der Schweiz.* Benjamin R. Barber, p. 1508
Seymour Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas.* June Teufel Dreyer, p. 1510
Martin L. Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy, 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue.* Dan P. Silverman, p. 1511
Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt, *Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States.* Richard P. Taub, p. 1511
Svetozar Vukmanović [Tempo], *Revolucija Koja Teče—Memoari* [*Memoirs on a Flowing Revolution*]. Milos Martic, p. 1514
Dov Weintraub, Miriam Shapiro, and Belinda Aquino, *Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines.* John E. Koehler, p. 1515
Alexander Barton Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.* Gareth Porter, p. 1516
Jen Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement.* Eugene Boardman, p. 1517

1518 International Politics, Law and Organization

Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic.* Paul Seabury, p. 1518
Dennis L. Bark, *Die Berlin-Frage, 1949–1955;* and Hans Herzfeld, *Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945–1970.* Richard L. Merritt, p. 1520
James Barros, *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925.* R. P. Barston, p. 1522
Donald T. Fox, ed., *The Cambodian Incursion—Legal Issues.* Burns H. Weston, p. 1522
Laszlo Gorgey, *Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964–1971.* Gerald Freund, p. 1523
Michael Haas, *International Organization: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography.* W. Andrew Axline, p. 1525
Baymirza Hayit, *Turkestan zwischen Russland und China.* George Alexander Lensen, p. 1525
Michael H. Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* Warren I. Cohen, p. 1526
Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921.* Howard M. Sachar, p. 1527
Bruce Kuklick, *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations.* John W. Keller, p. 1528
Charles Melchior de Molènes, *L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une première expérience de parlementarisme international.* D. Bruce Marshall, p. 1530
I. W. Moomaw, *The Challenge of Hunger: A Program for More Effective Foreign Aid;* and Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline.* Richard L. Clinton, p. 1531
Robert E. Osgood et al, *Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration.* H. Bradford Westerfield, p. 1533
Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers.* George Modelski, p. 1534
~~I. M. Sinclair, C. M. G., *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.* Gerard J. Mangone, p. 1536~~
Herbert K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment.* Stephen J. Cimbala, p. 1537

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INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, 94720, and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 150 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page, and should also be double-spaced. Manuscripts that do not follow this format will be returned to the authors for retyping.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Philip Siegelman, *American Political Science Review,* 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsjournal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

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EDITORIAL COMMENT

Changing the Guard. Starting January 1, 1976, all new manuscripts should go to the managing editor elect, Professor Charles O. Jones, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260.

Current management will receive complaints and correspondence about all issues up to and including the issue of September, 1977. After January 1, Professor Jones will be making all decisions about the contents of forthcoming issues of the *APSR.*

Charles O. Jones. The process prescribed by the Association's Constitution and by-laws is now complete, and the choice of the Council for Managing Editor of the Review 1977–1980 has fallen upon Charles O. Jones, Maurice Falk Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Professor Jones was born in 1931 in Worthing, South Dakota, and is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of South Dakota, where he learned political science from an extraordinary teacher, William O. Farber. Professor Farber sent Jones on to graduate work at the University of Wisconsin, where he earned master's and doctoral degrees. His work at Madison was punctuated by a year's study at the London School of Economics and Political Science. At Wisconsin, Jones studied with Leon Epstein and Henry Hart, among others, and he wrote a distinguished doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Ralph K. Huitt, describing the patterns of interest group access to the Agriculture Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, and showing how these patterns of access influenced the organizational structure of the committee.

Professor Jones's teaching career has provided him with an unusually wide range of experiences, including service at Wellesley, a small liberal arts college in New England, at the University of Arizona in Tucson, a middle-sized Western public university, and at Wisconsin, one of the great institutions of the Middle West. The University of Pittsburgh, his present academic home, is a semi-public institution which draws its character from its unmistakably urban milieu. The Department of Political Science is one of the larger and better known departments of the University, and houses a number of scholars having national reputations in several subfields of the discipline.

The scholarly work for which Professor Jones is best known falls approximately into three clusters of articles and books. One cluster concerns the organization and functioning of Congress, with special attention to the constraints upon and opportunities for policy leadership that exist for party leaders and committee leaders. A second cluster is concerned with the prospects for the vitality of the American two-party system in light of the evolving character of the Republican party as a semi-permanent minority party. A third cluster explores diverse public policies and political reforms—including the four year congressional term, the revision of the Hatch act, and alternative solutions to the problem of air pollution. This last work, which has most recently engaged his interest, has carried Jones into an examination of the functioning of American federalism, and into the appraisal of economic and technological trade-offs in the formation and execution of public policy.

Professor Jones's organizational skills were developed in the course of a sojourn as Associate Director of the National Center for Education in Politics, and the American Political Science Association has at various times called upon his services as member of the Council, Treasurer, Chairman of the Association's Trust Fund, and twice as member of the Program Committee for the Annual Meeting.

The foregoing description can properly be characterized as a portrait of an indecently full, distinguished, and well-rounded curriculum vitae, but, of course, it fails utterly to capture the human qualities that make Charles O. Jones such a felicitous choice as managing editor. A number of these qualities have impressed Jones's colleagues as they have come across him in a variety of settings. That he is energetic and efficient in the use of his time can of course be ascertained by a glance at the enormous variety of things he has accomplished in his career so far. Nobody who participates in the selection process can fail to attend to the presence or absence of the gift of sheer working capacity in a prospective *APSR* managing editor.

Those who know Charles O. Jones best, however, pass over this gift lightly in order to call attention to other, subtler qualities. He is a man of the most exquisite sensitivity about other human beings, and the predicaments, large and small, of human existence on this planet. This sensitivity leads him to restraint and moderation in the expectations he entertains about others, to a gentle pessimism about large and pretentious enterprises, and to a thoroughgoing toleration of all sorts and conditions of people and their works.

To be even superficially acquainted with Charles Jones is to realize he has an ample fund of common sense. To know him a little better is to see that behind this fund there stands a veritable Fort Knox of human insight that can only have arisen from a capacity to observe his fellow creatures with a steady and sympathetic eye, and to think long and hard about what he sees.

An active manifestation of this quality is his scrupulous sense of responsibility—toward family, friends, colleagues and profession. The fair-mindedness and balance that inform his intellectual judgments arise not out of indifference but out of careful attentiveness to the essential task of playing by rules of the game that give a just weight to the needs and expectations of others.

Best of all, however, Charles O. Jones is that precious rarity, a joyful man, someone to sit next to while a dull meeting drones on, someone who can perceive the music as well as the words in the messages we send. He brings the solace of laughter with him, reducing tension, lightening the load.

With the future of our common enterprise in the hands of Charles O. Jones, we could rest easy if we wanted to. But of course under his leadership it will be far more fun to join in than to hang back.

Another Tribute. We are always on the prowl for unobtrusive measures of the impact of the *APSR*. One of the best such measures is the appearance of the *APSR* in a starring role in foolish statements by political scientists, especially in carelessly drawn indictments of the discipline at large. Here is one recent example (readers are invited to send in others):

> In one of the recent issues of the *American Political Science Review*, 162 pages were devoted to articles; about two-thirds of this space dealt with voting, elections, and Congressional representation, even though the profession as a whole is well aware that there are many more significant phenomena.*

Typically, statements such as these are embedded in arguments deploring the marshalling of quantitative evidence in the course of political inquiry. And no wonder, since the talisman of the *APSR* can be so readily invoked to ward off charges of sampling error. We can hardly imagine a higher or more ingenuous tribute.

Articles Accepted For Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan and Bert A. Rockman, University of Pittsburgh, "Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy"

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas"

John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

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* Citation cheerfully furnished on request.

Richard M. Bank, University of California, Santa Barbara and Steven R. McCarl, University of Denver, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics: Revisited"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A and M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U. S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Jonathan D. Casper, Stanford University, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making"

Roger Cobb, Brown University, Jennie-Keith Ross, Swarthmore College, and Marc Howard Ross, Bryn Mawr College, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Richard K. Dagger, University of Minnesota, "What is Political Obligation?"

Fred R. Dallmayr, Purdue University, "Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics"

John P. Diggins, University of California, Irvine, "Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan"

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

George Edwards, Tulane University, "Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Norman I. Fainstein, Columbia University and Susan S. Fainstein, Rutgers University, "The Future of Community Control"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

Robert C. Fried, University of California, Los Angeles, "Party and Policy in West German Cities"

John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubison, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

Benjamin Ginsberg, Cornell University, "Elections and Public Policy"

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"

Robert W. Jackman, Michigan State University, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World"

Bryan D. Jones, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Russell Hardin, University of Pennsylvania, "Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition"

Fred M. Hayward, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"

David K. Hildebrand, University of Pennsylvania, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Prediction Analysis in Political Research"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

David G. Lawrence, Fordham University, "Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment"

James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer, University of California, Berkeley "Primary Rules, Political Power and Social Change"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey, Carnegie-Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, With Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria"

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, University of Lancaster, "The Relationship of Performance Attributes to Military Coups and Military Regimes"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of

Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University, "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine and Thad A. Brown, University of Michigan, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support"

Helmut Norpoth, University of Cologne, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes"

Fritz Nova, Villanova University, "Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

Karen Orren, University of California, Los Angeles, "Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts"

Benjamin I. Page, University of Chicago, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity"

Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"

James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

David Resnick, Cornell University," Crude Communism and Revolution"

Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"

Michael J. Robinson, The Catholic University of America, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of *The Selling of the Pentagon*"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of *The New Atlantis*"

Lynn T. White III, Princeton University, "Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case"

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"

Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence*

SUSAN BLACKALL HANSEN

University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana

The authors of *The Civic Culture* have stated, "Unless there is control of governmental elites by non-elites, it is hard to consider a political system democratic."[1] In theory, citizen participation should play an important role in democratic control over political leaders. Yet while many studies have considered factors that affect participation rates (individual attitudes, social class, political setting)[2] few have examined the impact of participation on the political system: certainly serious theoretical and methodological problems would have to be solved before linkage could be established.

It is the premise of this paper that the setting within which citizen participation takes place must be examined before we can establish connections between citizens' preferences and leaders' actions. I will compare citizen-leader agreement on the salience of local problems in a sample of American communities with various political structures and levels of participation, in order to suggest conditions under which participation is most likely to influence leaders' attitudes and behavior.

Citizen participation can influence the behavior of political leaders in two ways. First, the threat of being evicted from office (or the lure of attaining office) may induce political leaders to anticipate and to respond to popular demands. Voting is the form of participation most likely to exert such influence, but other activities by citizens may also provide evidence of support or opposition to leaders' policies.[3]

Whether voting and elections actually operate to control leaders' behavior, however, is a difficult question: the answer depends on the voters' level of information and interest,[4] the electoral situation (whether opposition is present or whether alternatives exist),[5] and the political ambitions of public officials seeking election.[6] Even if conditions for strict electoral accountability are not met, however, participation may affect leaders' behavior in another way: by *communicating* information about citizen preferences.[7] Without this information, even leaders who wish to act responsively may be unable to do so; the term "mandate uncertainty" has been suggested in this regard.[8] Under certain conditions (such as referenda) voting may provide specific information regarding citizen preferences. But usually, elections are too blunt an instrument to convey anything but the most general information; forms of participation which provide for more direct citizen contact with leaders may offer more detailed information about issues and alternatives.

In *Participation in America*, Verba and Nie found that citizen participation was associated with greater citizen-leader agreement on community problems. This was the case especially for voting, but also held for the other modes of participation they described: campaign activity, citizen-initiated contacts with public officials, and cooperative participation in organized groups.[9] Several problems must be considered, however, before one attempts to interpret this as evidence of leaders' responsiveness:

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* The data used in this analysis were made available by Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, directors of the Cross-National Project on Political Participation and Social Change. Facilities, assistance, and computer time were provided by the National Opinion Research Center and the computing centers of the Universities of Illinois, Washington State, and British Columbia. My thanks to Norman H. Nie, Taketsugu Tsurutani, and Wilfred J. Hansen for their comments and suggestions.

[1] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), p. 341.

[2] See Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), and William H. Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1968), for a summary of this literature.

[3] These include demonstrations, rent strikes, nonvoting, and threats of violence; and may be used by groups excluded from the electoral system. See Jerome Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), and William F. Mullen, "Community Control and Black Political Participation," in *Participatory Democracy*, ed. Terrence Cook and Patrick Morgan (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971), pp. 256–265.

[4] An early critique of the "rational-activist citizen" was provided by Walter Lippman in *The Phantom Public* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925). Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, has reviewed survey and other data about the electorate's political intelligence. See also V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[5] As Kenneth Prewitt and Norman H. Nie noted, "Rather than probe and probe into the rationality of the individual voter, it may be more fruitful to inquire about the choices available under present conditions." "Election Studies of the Survey Research Center," *British Journal of Political Science*, 1 (October, 1971), 493. See also John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, "Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1256–1268.

[6] Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambition, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," *Amerian Political Science Review*, 64 (March, 1970), 5–13.

[7] Different channels for citizen influence are discussed by Stein Rokkan in "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Participation," in *Political Sociology*, ed. Lewis A. Coser (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), pp. 101–131.

[8] This term was first used by Kenneth Janda, "Democratic Theory and Legislative Behavior: A Study of Legislator-Constituency Relationships" (Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1961), pp. 169–179. Cited in Heinz Eulau, *Micro-Macro Political Analysis: Accents of Inquiry* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 99.

(1) Verba and Nie found that voting rates showed the strongest association with their "concurrence index" of citizen-leader agreement on community problems.[10] This is somewhat paradoxical, since concurrence depended on responses to openended questions about a very wide range of problems: just the sort of specific information about citizen priorities that is unlikely to emerge from most elections. Other forms of participation which should provide more information to leaders (such as citizen contacts with officials) had an impact on concurrence only within communities with high voting rates.[11] This suggests that we should look more closely at kinds of electoral alternatives available to voters in these communities.

(2) One might predict that popularly elected heads of local government would respond to electoral participation. But the leadership sample used by Verba and Nie included school, business, political-party, and communications leaders: the various modes of participation might affect these people differently or to a lesser extent.

(3) The correlations noted between participation rates and citizen-leader agreement, while statistically significant, were only moderate. There was a considerable range of concurrence scores across the communities described in *Participation in America*, and only a small part of the variance in concurrence was due to participation.[12] Other factors must be found to account for the variance in concurrence not explained by participation.

(4) Verba and Nie found marked differences in the social-class background and in the policy concerns of different types of participators.[13] Citizen-leader agreement may depend on whether community political processes aggregate conflicting interests, exacerbate conflicts, or encourage participation by particular social groups.

(5) No causal pattern has been established. A positive association between participation and concurrence could indicate that citizen activity was inducing leaders to respond. But it could also mean that participation makes citizens more open to persuasion by political leaders.[14] Examples abound: political machines have been built and maintained because they could "deliver the vote" and use this resource for their own ends.[15] The War on Poverty has also been accused of manipulating participation for political reasons.[16] Mobilization of the masses under the guidance of a leadership cadre is one purpose for which political parties have been created in many countries.[17]

In order to sort out the causal patterns at work in these communities, additional data should be considered on local leaders and on the political and social setting within which leaders and citizens interact. The more we can learn about the circumstances under which citizen participation is associated with citizen-leader agreement, the more plausible will be the causal inferences that can be drawn.[18] Community *political structure* should be examined in order to specify those conditions under which participation may have an impact on citizen-leader agreement. By "political structure" I mean both legal-institutional factors (partisanship, type of government) and noninstitutionalized aspects (party and organizational activity, electoral competition). Each may affect the choices available to citizens, the ways in which citizens can communicate their preferences to community leaders, and leaders' potential for structuring citizen preferences.

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[9] Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 44–81. These modes, based on a factor analysis of fifteen participatory acts, are also described in Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, *The Modes of Democratic Participation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 15–19.

[10] Verba and Nie, pp. 299–333.

[11] This index is described in Verba and Nie, Chapter 17 and Appendix I. A parallel measure will be used in this paper: see below and Appendix.

[12] The exact proportion of the variance in concurrence explained by participation depended on the mode of participation and on community consensus. See Verba and Nie, pp. 326–332.

[13] Citizen consensus and the "responsiveness to whom?" question are discussed in *Participation in America*, chaps. 17–19.

[14] See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 188–194, and Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 219–225.

[15] Numerous examples of such activity are offered in Mike Royko, *Boss* (New York: New American Library, 1971), and H. F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937).

[16] As Dolbeare has suggested of the poverty program, "maximum feasible participation" of the poor may have been used as a device to give deprived groups a stake in the established system. Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "Public Policy Analysis and the Coming Struggle for the Soul of the Post-Behavioral Revolution," in *Power and Community*, ed. Philip Green and Sanford Levinson (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. 106.

[17] See Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[18] Verba and Nie considered some of these possibilities: they found that such aspects of the community setting as its wealth and its insulation from the larger society did not affect the association between participation and concurrence on community problems. *Participation in America*, pp. 329–330. See also Susan B. Hansen, "Concurrence in American Communities: The Response of Local Leaders to the Community Political Agenda" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1972), chap. 9, for a fuller discussion of the relationship between concurrence and community setting.

Political Structure and Concurrence: Some Hypotheses

Previous research has suggested that political structure can affect city policies and the orientations of local governmental officials. Lineberry and Fowler found that "reformed" and "unreformed" governments differed in taxing and spending policies.[19] Hawley showed that certain groups of citizens benefit from partisan as opposed to nonpartisan local elections.[20] Yet even communities with the same formal structures may have different levels of party activity, or varying degrees of electoral competition. As Eulau and Prewitt noted in their study of California city councils (all nonpartisan, five-member groups), the effectiveness of local elections influenced the representational styles adopted by the councils.[21]

A community's political environment may affect citizen-leader agreement in several ways:

(1) Concurrence should be higher where citizens have a *choice* among contending leaders or policies. Elections may more effectively influence officeholders if they are frequently and vigorously contested, if the races tend to be close, or if incumbents are at least occasionally turned out of their positions.[22] Conversely, where one party or faction dominates local politics, elected officials have less to fear from adverse public opinion when they follow their own inclinations or the counsel of groups which support them.

(2) Concurrence should be greater the more *visible* the alternatives available to citizens. The presence of party labels on local ballots can help voters identify candidates with their records in office or their policy stands. Direct election of the local governmental executive should increase his responsibility and his salience to citizens.[23]

(3) Competitive elections, partisanship, and direct election of heads of government may affect concurrence by making it easier for citizens to hold their leaders accountable. But the political environment can also aid the *communication* of citizen concerns to local leaders. Active political parties and community organizations can aggregate individual opinions into coherent policy proposals, and can articulate these to local political elites. Contested local elections may generate citizen interest and encourage community-wide discussion of local issues.

(4) The political structure of a community may affect concurrence by *impeding or facilitating participation.* Some forms of participation (writing letters to public officials, for example) take place entirely at the initiative of the citizen, at the time and place he chooses, and on whatever topic he picks. Yet according to Verba and Nie, voting and campaign activity have the greatest impact upon concurrence; and electoral participation does not depend entirely upon citizen initiative. Highly restrictive voter registration laws may limit the electorate to a great extent.[24] By juggling the voting hours, form of ballot, and location of polling places, local officials can further limit people's opportunity to vote.[25]

5. The *impact* of participation may also be influenced by political factors. People should be more inclined to vote if something is at stake, or if some contest is involved. Even if registration and voting conditions are not restrictive, people have little incentive to participate if the outcome is already established, or if no alternatives are salient. If no real choice is available, participation may play only a symbolic or supportive role, rather than influencing leaders or policy.[26]

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[19] Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (September, 1967), 701–716.

[20] Willis D. Hawley, *Nonpartisan Elections and the Case for Party Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).

[21] Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Matrix and Political Representation," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (June, 1969), 427–441. See by the same authors *The Labyrinth of Democracy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).

[22] These dimensions of electoral competition are those used by Eulau and Prewitt in *The Labyrinth of Democracy,* pp. 229–235. The importance of opposition is also stressed in *Political Opposition in Western Democracies,* ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[23] See Donald B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain, "Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluoridation Decisions," in *City Politics and Public Policy,* ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 217–242, for a discussion of the importance of the mayor's office and of his role as a focus of local decision making.

[24] The importance of registration has been emphasized by Stanley Kelley, Richard E. Ayers, and William G. Bowen in "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (June, 1967), 359–379. See also Jae-On Kim, John R. Petrocik, and Stephen N. Enokson, "Voter Turnout among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components," *American Political Science Review,* 69 (March, 1975), 107–124.

[25] An example of this is offered by Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 20. The local political leaders deliberately timed elections so as to discourage voting by people who worked in nearby cities and who had interests quite different from those of the local farmers and businessmen who dominated politics in Springdale.

[26] On "pseudo-participation," see Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior,* pp. 217–225. Several researchers have suggested that citizen participation does have a

In terms of effects on concurrence, then, the *communication* functions of political structure may be as important as the *control* functions. Various communications theories of the political process have stressed the importance of information flows, feedback, and the structures that channel these.[27] A highly developed local political life could play a significant role in reducing "mandate uncertainty" and in giving local leaders a better idea what programs have popular support.

This paper will analyze both the communications and control aspects of political structure and participation, and will assess their relative impact on concurrence. I will use the data Verba and Nie reported in *Participation in America*, plus additional information on local leaders and community political structure. The next section will describe the data, concurrence index, and level of analysis used in this study. Then the relationship between participation and concurrence will be compared for two types of community leaders.

The effect of political factors such as partisanship, party activity, type of government, and electoral competition on concurrence and participation, will be examined, and several models of the concurrence process will be evaluated. The differential impact of participation and political structure on leaders' agreement with social-class and participatory subgroups within each community, and the implications of these results for theories about democracy and participation, will be the topic of the concluding section.

Data, Methods, and Level of Analysis

Under some circumstances, on some issues, the sanctioning effect of citizens' votes or opinions on an individual officeholder or on the party in power may be demonstrated. But in a complex modern society, with representation based on arbitrary geographic units, with collective groups of representatives at several levels of government considering a large number of issues at any given time, it is a difficult task to establish linkage between citizens and their leaders. The choice of an appropriate indicator of linkage poses major theoretical and methodological problems for the researcher.[28]

Ideally, direct comparisons of citizens and leaders should be made. But attention should also be paid to the interaction between these two groups, and to the context within which their interaction occurs. Such analysis was made possible using a concurrence measure based on parallel surveys of citizens' and leaders' views of community problems. As part of the Verba-Nie data gathered for *Participation in America*, interviews were conducted in 1967 with a sample of 1438 citizen respondents in sixty-four randomly selected communities less than 60,000 in population.[29] In each of these communities, several local leaders were chosen on the basis of their purposive roles (heads of government, Democratic and Republican party leaders, school officials, newspaper editors, and businessmen). Between three and seven interviews were conducted per community, the exact figures depending on the number of roles that were occupied in a given community. The total elite sample size was 306 persons.[30]

No attempt was made to identify those local leaders who were in fact most influential in community decision making. For a large survey of this type, this would have been difficult. But by choosing respondents with backgrounds in a variety of social sectors, it was expected that many persons with a high potential for influence in local affairs would be included. Several roles were selected, as many researchers have found that governmental officials share responsibility for public policy with other community leaders.[31]

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rational basis, and that a decision to vote is predicated on the perceived probability of one's preferred candidate winning, the size of the difference between alternatives, and the costs involved. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), and William E. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 25–42.

[27] See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963).

[28] Different models and indicators of linkage have been reviewed by V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 411–431; Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970); Norman R. Luttbeg, *Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 1–9.

[29] These sixty-four communities include half of those under 60,000 that fell into a standard multistage area probability sample used by the National Opinion Research Center for its amalgam surveys. Within these communities, quota sampling was used (quotas based on census tract statistics on age, sex, race, and employment) to select interviews from the noninstitutionalized population over age twenty-one. Between twenty-five and thirty interviews were conducted in each community. See Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, Appendix A, for a full description of sampling methods.

Because of the quota sampling used, sampling errors cannot be computed directly. Substantial correlations, however, were noted between sample and population data (the latter based on the census and on election statistics) with respect to voting turnout, age, race, income, education, percentage in white-collar occupations, and ethnic background. For this reason the citizen sample can be considered a fairly reliable estimate of the population.

[30] The elite sample is discussed in Verba and Nie, Appendix H, and in Hansen, dissertation, chapter 2. The N of 306 includes 56 heads of government, 77 school officials, 61 business leaders, 56 party leaders, and 56 newspaper editors.

[31] See Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press,

In each community, citizen respondents were asked,

> "What is the most important problem facing this community?"

The community leaders were asked the same question. They were also asked,

> "What does the average person around here think are their problems and needs?"
>
> "Are there some community problems that you have been particularly active in trying to solve—which are the problems to which you have given the most time and effort?"

For each problem which an elite respondent mentioned, he or she was given a concurrence score based on the percentage of community citizens who mentioned that particular problem. Thus the more problems a leader mentioned that were also mentioned by one or more persons in the community, the higher the score.[32] These three sets of problems (those which leaders either mentioned, perceived as citizen problems, or worked on) have been considered separately elsewhere. Since only minor differences in emphasis were noted they have been averaged together for the purpose of this paper.[33]

This concurrence index considers only one facet of the complex process of linkage: whether citizens and leaders agree on the issues facing their communities. Other analysts have considered whether citizens and leaders agreed on specific policy alternatives for issues. But it has been suggested that biases in the types of issues which reach the public agenda may be more important and extensive than differences of opinion on the way specific issues should be handled.[34] For this reason, I have been concerned with relative *priorities*. The interviewers did not probe for policy dimensions in the open-ended questions on community problems. A detailed community-by-community check on the open-ended responses, however, indicated that citizens and leaders who mentioned policy alternatives did tend to define local problems in the same way. The major exception (citizens' complaints about high taxes as opposed to leaders' desire to provide better community services) was coded separately in constructing the concurrence index.[35]

Another aspect of linkage involves policy *outcomes*. Analysis of the disposition of issues, however, would require detailed case studies and analysis over time: both tasks were beyond the resources of this study. The concurrence index I have used is concerned with leaders' awareness of community problems and their efforts to solve them, not their rate of success: as many students of local government have stressed, even leaders who try to be responsive to citizens may be constrained by state laws and scarcity of local resources.[36]

Stokes and Miller have observed that the process of representation may vary depending on the issue being considered.[37] For this study, because of the large number of issues cited and the small number of respondents in each community, I preferred to use agreement across all issues rather than selecting particular issue areas for comparative analysis.[38] This approach might miss some differences in political factors across issue areas, but it has the advantage of using more of the available data, and does not require the researcher to decide which issues are "important" in each community.

This concurrence index of citizen-leader agreement on community problems offers many advantages. An open-ended approach to defining the local political agenda mitigates the problem of examining community political processes in relation to issues or policy alternatives chosen by the researcher. Citizens as well as leaders have the opportunity to mention problems, so even issues not currently under consideration by the local leadership may be raised. Most important, concurrence in a large number of political units may

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1963); M. Kent Jennings, *Community Influentials* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

[32] See Appendix for more detailed description of the construction of the concurrence index.

[33] See Hansen, doctoral dissertation, chapter 4.

[34] The classic statement is E. E. Schattschneider on the "scope and bias of the pressure system," in *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960). See also Roger Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972); and William Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 12 (November-December, 1968), 15–21.

[35] The original research design called for specific questions on policy dimensions. Several of these were inadvertently omitted from the elite questionnaire. Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, pp. 267–285, and Hansen, chapter 4, have reported on those that could be used to compare leaders' and citizens' opinions. Agreement on these was greater in participant communities with competitive political structures, the same setting that was associated with agreement on the salience of issues.

[36] See discussion by Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, *Urban Politics and Public Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), chapter 2.

[37] Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56.

[38] See Susan B. Hansen, "Citizen-Leader Concurrence on Community Problems" (mimeo, University of Illinois, 1974) for discussion of concurrence in different issue areas. Agreement on the salience of economic and welfare problems is more likely in competitive—participant—communities, while political factors are less important for concurrence on public services.

be compared even if the issues that concern each community are different.

Even if it were possible to determine whether citizens and leaders agreed on some question of public policy, simple association indicates nothing about the direction of causality. As V. O. Key has cautioned,[39] "One must discard simplistic conceptions, such as the notion that in some way public opinion exudes from the mass of men and produces guidelines for governmental action. A complex interaction occurs . . . " The factors that may be associated with high levels of citizen-leader agreement in a polity may tell us something about the process of linkage and enable us to make plausible causal inferences. Using a standard index of concurrence in a variety of communities makes such a comparative analysis possible.

The concurrence index could also be used to compare individual local *leaders* with respect to their agreement with citizens concerning community problems.[40] My purpose here, however, is to compare the extent to which *communities* vary in concurrence, and to focus on interaction between leaders and citizens within a particular political setting. For this reason, concurrence scores were averaged across sets of leaders interviewed in a given community. This enables me to consider the relationship between citizen opinion, on the one hand, and the attitudes of the *collective* leadership of political units, on the other. Eulau and Prewitt have used a similar approach in their analysis of the representational roles of city councils,[41] following the suggestion of Hanna Pitkin that "representation must be understood at the public level."[42]

Data concerning the economic, social, and political characteristics of these communities were also gathered.[43] The communities vary considerably in political form, degree of electoral competition, party activity, and levels of citizen participation. By using the standardized concurrence measure for all communities, citizen-leader agreement on local problems can be compared under these varied conditions.

Participation and Concurrence: A Closer Look.

If the concurrence scores of elected officials were higher in communities with contested elections and active citizen participation, this would suggest that political structure aided the process of electoral influence over leaders by citizens. But if concurrence scores of nonelected officials were also higher in such communities, this would support the notion that political structures and processes can help communicate citizen preferences to leaders. These two patterns can be compared since the tenure of the elected heads of government in this study depends upon the electoral process, but the other community leaders are not accountable to voters.[44]

Table 1 shows the Pearson correlations between concurrence scores and participation rates for the two groups of leaders, using both election statistics and community averages of citizens' scores for each mode of participation.[45] Elected and non-elected leaders do not differ significantly in their levels of agreement with citizens: concurrence scores average 18.8 for heads of government and 18.0 for the other elite respondents. Participation is positively associated with the concurrence

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[39] Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy,* p. 410.

[40] See Hansen, chapter 4. The different types of leaders in this study did not differ significantly in levels of concurrence, although there were some minor variations among leaders across the three sets of problems considered.

[41] Eulau and Prewitt, "Political Matrix and Political Representation."

[42] Hanna F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 224.

[43] Reports of NORC interviewers and of the elite respondents were used as sources of information on the sixty-four communities in the study, as were the following published sources: *The Rand McNally Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide* (Chicago, 1968); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1960* and *Census of Government 1962* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963); *The County and City Data Book* (U.S. Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract Supplement, 1967 and 1968).

[44] NORC interviewers were instructed to interview the "elected head of local government," who could be the mayor, first selectman, justice of the peace, or township trustee. Eight of them were picked from the members of an elected board (councilmen, county supervisors), the rest elected directly by citizens. One might well argue that the Democratic and Republican party leaders should be considered together with the heads of local government; while the party officials are not officeholders, in many ways they must be sensitive to political processes and to elections. In contrast, the business, school and newspaper elites are further removed from accountability to voters.

The analysis reported here was repeated considering three groups of leaders instead of two: heads of government, party leaders, and other leaders. But political structure and electoral participation had less impact on party leaders' concurrence than on the scores of elected officials. In fact, there was little difference between party officials and nonelected leaders in these respects. A strict definition of electoral accountability was therefore adopted, and those officials whose jobs depended upon election were considered separately from the others.

[45] The election statistics for the most recent local election were obtained by NORC interviewers from the local government heads. For the sample data, each cross-section respondent was assigned a score on the four modes and an overall index of participation. The portion of each respondent's score that could be attributed to social class was then partialled out, and the averages for these residual participation indices were computed for all the respondents sampled in a given community. These procedures are described more fully in Verba and Nie, pp. 309–314.

Table 1. Pearson Correlations: Community Participation Levels and Concurrence Scores of Local Leaders

	Correlations with Concurrence Scores	
	Heads of Government	Other Local Leaders
Cross-section Sample Data: Community Averages of Participation Indices, 64 Communities		
Voting	.40**	.36**
Campaign Activity	.30*	.23*
Cooperative Participation	.06	.05
Citizen Contacts	.08	.12
Overall Index	.30*	.27*
Election Statistics for Last Local Election, 39 Communities		
% Voting	.13	.27*

* Significant at .05 level
** Significant at .01 level.

scores of both groups. Voting and campaign activity have strong correlations not only with concurrence scores of elected heads of government, but also with the scores of school officials, party and business leaders, and newspapermen. Voting turnout in the last local election is more strongly linked to the concurrence scores of the nonelected leaders than to those of heads of government.

The expected differences between the communications and control aspects of participation, then, did not appear. Although citizen contacts are more highly correlated with nonelected leaders' concurrence scores, and electoral participation is somewhat more salient for heads of government, the differences between the two groups are not significant.

These results suggest that *both* the communications and control aspects of participation are important for understanding linkage. The concurrence scores of both types of leaders are significantly associated with citizen electoral activity. Specific issues are rarely clarified in election campaigns, and the information that citizen voting or electoral activity communicate to local leaders may not be very precise. Nevertheless, evidence of citizen *interest* in local elections may persuade elected officials to make more of an effort to find out what citizens of their communities are concerned about.[46] Nonelected leaders may try to maintain access to those holding formal political power by making sure their opinions and actions are in tune with those of successfully elected leaders. Educational, business, and economic leaders might gain influence with elected officials if they could demonstrate that their policies have the support of involved citizens, parties, or organizations. Popular support can be important for both governmental and nongovernmental leaders as a resource in the political bargaining process.

Let us now turn to the political setting within which participation takes place in order to test some additional hypotheses about the process of linkage.

Political Structure: Effects on Concurrence and Participation

As suggested earlier, community political structure may affect concurrence in several ways: by making alternatives more or less salient; by offering citizens a choice among candidates and policies; by facilitating communication between citizens and leaders; and by encouraging participation. Let us consider each of these in turn. As before, the concurrence scores of elected government executives will be contrasted with the scores of other types of community leaders, in order to give a clearer indication of the dynamics of the processes involved.

Salience of Alternatives. Two aspects of local governmental structure may make electoral alternatives more visible to voters: presence of party labels on election ballots, and direct election of the head of local government. Concurrence, it is hypothesized, should therefore be higher in communities where elections are legally partisan, or where the mayor or other governmental executive officer is elected directly by the voters.

As Table 2 indicates, this is the case, but the relationships are stronger (as might be expected) for heads of government than for the nongovernmental leaders. In those twenty-two communities which are legally partisan, concurrence scores of local government heads are significantly higher than in nonpartisan communities. The scores for the other local leaders vary in the expected direction, but the difference is not significant.

Proponents of electoral reform have long argued that direct election of officeholders would give the electorate a better basis for voting decisions than elections which only ratified decisions made by party caucuses or by appointive boards. Present data do not permit a direct test of citizen awareness of the local government's chief executive or of his policies. Nevertheless, concurrence scores of directly elected executives (including mayors, first selectmen, and town supervisors or township trustees) are significantly higher than the scores of those selected from the membership

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[46] In communities with high voting rates, these nonelectoral forms of participation do make a difference in concurrence (Verba and Nie, p. 326).

Table 2. Concurrence, Partisanship, Type of Election

	Mean Community Concurrence Scores		
	Heads of Local Government	Other Community Leaders	*N*
Local elections:			
Partisan	22.4	18.7	23
Nonpartisan	16.2*	17.1	32
Method of Election of Local Government Executive: All			
Direct (by popular vote)	19.6	18.2	47
Indirect (chosen by membership of elected council)	11.4*	17.7	8
Mayors only:			
Directly Elected	21.8	19.1	31
Indirectly Elected	11.5*	12.9*	6

* Difference of means significant at .05 level (*t*-test).

of a local council or board. Scores of nongovernmental elites are slightly higher in communities with elected heads of government, and significantly higher if that governmental head is a mayor. At least for elected heads of government, then, concurrence scores are higher the more visible the alternatives presented to citizens.

Availability of alternatives. Formal-legal structure is only the skeleton of a community's political system. Opportunity for popular election of a mayor, or legal partisanship, may have little meaning for voters if there is no choice among candidates, parties, or policies. The absence of contending groups, such as political parties or organizations concerned with community problems, may limit the discussion of alternative policies in a community.

Ideally, any index of competition or of the availability of alternatives should incorporate data from several elections over a period of years.[47] Two limited indicators of competition are available for these communities, however. One is the percentage of votes received by the runner-up in the most recent election of the head of local government (available for 35 communities). The other is an assessment by the local government executive of the frequency of contested elections in his community. These two indicators roughly correspond with two of the methods Eulau and Prewitt used to assess the competitiveness of local political systems: closeness of vote and frequency of contests (or more accurately, *perception* of frequency of contests.)[48] Data on their third measure, incidence of incumbent eviction, are not available here.[49]

As Figure 1 indicates, there is a moderately strong association between each of these indices and the concurrence scores of local leaders—elected or not. Where elections are seldom contested, concurrence scores average 13.7 for elected local officials and 15.0 for other leaders. But where elections are contested often, concurrence scores average 23.1 and 21.1 for the two groups, respectively. The same pattern holds for the communities where data are available on the last local election. The closer the outcome of that election, the more likely *both* types of local leaders were to share citizen perspectives on community problems. The Pearson correlations are significant at the .05 level.

Prewitt and others have suggested that electoral accountability cannot operate unless the political ambitions of elected officials are taken into account.[50] Electoral sanctions presumably apply

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[47] One such measure (the mean deviation of the vote among all candidates for city council across five elections) was used by Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Coice and the Role of Structural Incentives," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 147. A classic index of party competition is that suggested by Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 44–67, 114–132.

[48] Perceptions of competition for office by candidates may be as important as the actual level of competition. See John W. Kingdon, *Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies* (New York. Random House, 1968), pp. 147–150; David Leuthold, *Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), pp. 20–30.

[49] Eulau and Prewitt, *The Labyrinth of Democracy*, pp. 229–235. It is possible for a community to be competitive in one sense (that there are at least two candidates for office in most local elections) but not in others (incumbents may very seldom be turned out of office, or the proportion of the vote received by the challenging party or faction may be quite small).

[50] Prewitt, "Political Ambition"; Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).



* The correlation coefficients (Pearson product-moment) are all significant at about the .05 level.

Figure 1. Concurrence and Electoral Competition*

only to the elected governmental heads in these communities, but there is no reason to assume these are effective. Data on whether these heads of government plan to continue in office or to seek higher office are not available. How, then, can one explain the significantly higher concurrence scores for *both* elected and nonelected officials that occur in competitive communities?

Competitive elections do not induce local leaders to share citizen priorities only by making it easier for citizens to hold leaders accountable. Both the direct and indirect functions of elections should be considered.[51] Perceptions of competition for office, or close elections, could persuade community leaders to expend more effort to find out what concerns citizens have. Their success in this enterprise, however, may depend on how local political processes affect the communication of citizen preferences.

Communication of Citizens' Views. Political parties and local organizations can articulate citizen demands, aggregate conflicting interests, and otherwise facilitate communications between citizens and their leaders. But party and organizational activity may also be the expression of divisions within a community, or may stimulate controversy. If a community is deeply divided along political, economic, or ethnic lines, leaders will not be able to please everyone. Thus a curvilinear relationship might be expected between concurrence and party or organizational activity. Nonexistent political parties and inactive organizations cannot function to aggregate or articulate interests. If these groups are moderately active, concurrence should be higher. But where both parties are active, or if numerous organizations become involved in local politics, considerable diversity of interests among citizens is likely, and concurrence may suffer as a result.[52]

The predicted relationship does not appear when the involvement of organizations in community affairs (specifically, whether they take stands on local issues rather than functioning purely as social or professional groups) is considered in relation to concurrence. This may be due to the limitations of this index of organizational activity.[53] Or the impact of organizations may lie in their encouragement of electoral competition (more frequent in communities with active organizations), rather than in their direct effects on citizen-leader agreement.

But as Table 3 shows, the predicted curvilinear relationship does appear when concurrence scores are compared across communities with varying levels of party activity. In many of these small

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[51] See Pomper, *Elections in America*, p. 13 ff., for a comparison of long and short-term election effects.

[52] See discussion by Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," in *Political Sociology*, ed. Coser, pp. 132–145. Rossi suggests that patterns of community power (caucus rule, polylithic, amorphous, or pyramidal) may be related to coincidence of party, class, and ethnic cleavages.

[53] Neither the presence of these organizations in the community nor leaders' membership in such organizations proved to bear any relationship to concurrence. More complete data on organizational membership or activity, of course, might show some relationship to concurrence. The scale used here is a simple count for each community of the number of local organizations (business, labor, farm, professional, or nationality groups) which took stands on local issues or backed candidates.

Table 3. Political Party Strength, Organizational Activity, and Concurrence

	Average Community Concurrence Scores			
	Heads of Local Government	*N*	Other Local Leaders	*N*
Organizations Take Stands on Local Issues:				
Never	10.1	14	16.8	14
Seldom	23.8	15	19.9	15
Sometimes	16.8	13	15.0	13
Frequently	21.3	14	19.4	14
Pearson *r*	.17		.04	
Political Party Activity				
None	16.0	26	16.7	28
Both parties weak	16.3	6	18.2	8
Republicans active	24.6	8	19.2	9
Democrats active	28.8	7	19.7	9
Both parties active	15.8	9	19.0	10
Pearson *r*[a]	.16		.12	

[a] Since the relationship is clearly curvilinear, the interclass correlation should be used. This is .37 for heads of government; and since this is more than twice the Pearson correlation, considerable curvilinearity is indicated. For other local leaders, the interclass correlation is nearly identical with the Pearson correlation (.14) indicating the relationship is essentially linear, although extremely weak.

communities, there is no indication of party activity (and the fact that over half of these communities are nonpartisan certainly does not encourage party activity).[54] Where one party is quite active and the other much less active, the concurrence scores of heads of government are considerably higher. Where the parties are equal in strength (whether both are active, weak, or nonexistent), citizen-leader agreement tends to be lower than in predominantly one-party areas. A similar pattern holds for nonelected local leaders, but the relationship is much weaker.

A curvilinear relationship might have been expected also between community concurrence scores and the indices of electoral competition discussed earlier. If a community was closely divided over an election, concurrence should be relatively low; whoever won the election would have the support of only a bare majority or plurality of citizens. In relatively homogeneous communities, the presence of competition could encourage all candidates to ascertain citizen priorities. They might well reach similar conclusions, and competition would focus on candidates' personal appeals or administrative competence (campaigns characteristic of many suburbs and small towns.) But if electoral competition coincided with party or class cleavages, competition should lead to *lower* overall concurrence.

To test for this possibility, another community agreement score was calculated, analogous to citizen-elite concurrence, but measuring how well the priorities of active citizen participators agreed with those of less active citizens.[55] The relationship between electoral competition and concurrence was then plotted for communities ranking above and below the median on this index of consensus among citizens.

The results are shown in Figure 2. In low-consensus communities, the predicted curvilinear relationship between competition and concurrence does appear, although it is very weak. In high-consensus communities, however, citizen-leader agreement increases as the frequency of contested elections increases.

Of all the aspects of community political structure considered thus far, *electoral competition* appears to have the greatest impact on the concurrence scores of local leaders, elected or not. But the degree of competition, and its effect on citizen-leader agreement, is dependent on many aspects of community political life. Where elections are partisan, political parties are active, and organizations are politically involved, the probability of electoral competition is significantly higher.[56] All this political activity may encourage

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[54] The indices of party activity were computed from information supplied by local party leaders on party resources (money, staff, volunteers); efforts to recruit candidates; and activity in local elections. Fifty-five per cent of the partisan communities in this sample have one or both local parties active, as compared with only thirty-four per cent of the nonpartisan communities.

[55] This measure was used by Verba and Nie, and is described in *Participation in America,* chapter 19, p. 320.

[56] Gamma correlations between frequency of contested elections and other political factors are .59 for partisanship, .42 for direct election of government executive, .32 for organizational involvement, and .21 for party activity.



Figure 2. Electoral Competition and Concurrence in High and Low Consensus Communities

communication and help citizens hold their leaders accountable. But such activity may also be the expression of divisions within a community. In that case, leaders can only be responsive to some of the citizens.[57]

Political Setting and Participation. Previous research has suggested that the political setting of a community can affect rates of citizen participation.[58] Alford and Lee found that voting turnout was substantially higher in communities with partisan elections, mayor-council form of government, and ward rather than at-large representation.[59] Political party activity may also increase voting turnout in local elections, especially primaries and referenda.[60]

In these communities also, citizen participation (particularly voting) is affected by the local political environment. Partisanship, political party activity, and electoral competition encourage campaign activity as well as voting by citizens, as the simple correlations in Table 4 indicate. Organizational involvement and direct election of the head of government seem to have little effect on any mode of participation.

Table 4 also shows the independent effect (indicated by beta coefficients) of each of the political structure variables on participation, controlling for other structural variables. Electoral competition and partisanship have the largest independent effects on voting and campaign activity. Party and organizational activity have a negative impact on voting turnout when the effects of the other factors are controlled. About twenty-six per cent of the variation in citizen voting can be explained by political structure.

As might be expected, information on a community's political structure does not help us as much in predicting nonelectoral participation as it does with voting. Citizens can be active in organizations and contact public officials on their own initiative, regardless of the legal or institutional environment. Political structure explains less than ten per cent of the variance in participation other than voting. Citizens' organizational activity and rates of contacting, however, are greater in partisan communities, while communal participation rates are *lower* in communities with active political parties: perhaps organizational involvement substitutes for party activity for some people.

Another important influence on participation is the degree of coincidence of state and national elections with local contests. Citizens participate more when other elections do coincide. Even within such communities, however, the local po-

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[57] Charles F. Cnudde has examined linkages between policy outputs and public opinion structures in the American states: he also notes a curvilinear relationship with party competition. "Public Opinion and State Politics," in *State Politics: Readings in Political Behavior,* ed. Robert Crew (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 165–184.

[58] Some of the relevant literature is reviewed in "Political Participation as a Function of Political Setting," chapter 4 of *Political Participation,* by Lester W. Milbrath (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (December, 1968), 1192–1206.

[59] Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee noted correlations between voter turnout and partisanship ranging from .28 to .43 in their sample of American cities over 25,000 in population. "Voting Turnout in American Cities," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (September, 1968), 1192–1206.

[60] Leuthold found this to be the case in his comparison of competitive and non-competitive congressional districts: *Electioneering in a Democracy,* p. 120.

Table 4. Political Structure and Participation: Correlation and Regression Coefficients for 53 Communities

	Partisanship	Frequency of Contested Elections	Party Activity	Organizational Involvement	Direct Election of Head of Government	R	R^2
Voting							
r^a	.32*	.38*	−.15	−.07	.10		
B	.21*	.39*	−.25	−.15	−.04	.51	.26
Electoral Participation							
r	.15	.19	.17	.02	.02		
B	.08	.16	.13	.06	.04	.25	.06
Communal Participation							
r	.12	−.03	−.19	−.15	−.03		
B	.18	−.01	−.19	−.14	−.09	.29	.08
Citizen Contacts							
r	.10	−.04	.03	.07	.11		
B	.13	−.17	.01	.13	.12	.21	.04
Overall Participation							
r	.25*	.19	−.06	−.08	.04		
B	.23*	.17	−.11	−.12	−.08	.32	.10

[a] r = Pearson correlation; B = standardized regression coefficient (beta).
* Significant at .05 level.

litical environment affects voting turnout and other types of citizen participation.[61]

Models of Concurrence

Both participation and political structure are related to concurrence. Let us now turn to a question raised earlier: under what conditions will participation have the greatest impact on community leaders' agreement with citizens? Several models may be suggested:[62]

(1) Concurrence may be high in communities with certain political structures, whether or not people participate.

(2) Participant communities may have high levels of concurrence, regardless of the political structure.

(3) The conjoint influence of participation and political structure may have a greater effect on concurrence than either alone.

Several methods are available for testing alternative hypotheses. Path analysis and Simon-Blalock techniques for causal modeling were considered.[63] Because of the number of variables in the models, the generally low levels of the correlations, and the evidence (considered below) of strong interaction effects, efforts to establish or eliminate alternative causal paths within these models proved inconclusive.[64] I have chosen multiple regression in order to evaluate the first and second models and to establish the relative importance of several factors associated with concurrence. For the third model, levels of concurrence in communities with varying levels of participation and competition will be compared.

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[61] Alford and Lee and others have found turnout to be higher when local elections are held at the same time as state or federal elections. This holds for these communities as well: even controlling for overlap with other elections, local political environment still affects participation. This problem is discussed in "Citizen Participation, Political Parties, and Democratic Theory. An Analysis of Local Politics in England," by Paul E. Peterson and Paul Kantor (paper presented at the American Political Science Association convention, Los Angeles, Sept., 1970), pp. 3–5, 17–20.

[62] Other models could be postulated that might apply to these data. Concurrence between leaders and citizens might encourage participation, or might affect political structure. Without time-series data, these alternative models cannot be fully evaluated. The models discussed here are more logical in temporal sequence: political structure and participation rates are relatively stable features of community life, while the substance of local issues, and citizen-leader agreement on them, may vary considerably over time. As Arther S. Goldberg has suggested, "Scientifically relevant causal explanations inhere only in our theories." "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966), 913.

[63] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology,* 72 (July, 1966), 1–16. This and several other articles explaining techniques applicable to social science are included in *Causal Models in the Social Sciences,* ed. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971). The technique developed by Blalock (*Causal Inference in Non-Experimental Research,* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), and Herbert M. Simon (*Models of Man,* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), relies on partial correlations.

[64] See Hugh D. Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (December, 1968), 1258–1264, for a critical analysis of multicollinearity and the reporting of assumptions as conclusions.

Table 5. Regression Analysis: Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence for 53 Communities

	Heads of Government			Other Local Leaders		
Independent Variables:	*b*	*B*	sig.	*b*	*B*	sig.
Voting	1.70	.38	.001	1.15	.38	.001
Electoral Competition	*		n.s.	1.41	.19	.10
Partisanship	*		n.s.	−2.34	−.13	n.s.
Party Activity	1.09	.10	n.s.	1.16	.15	n.s.
Organizational Activity	2.14	.18	.10	.13	.02	n.s.
Direct Election of Head of Government	6.69	.19	.10	*		n.s.
Intercept	17.84			14.09		
R	.46			.46		
R^2	.22			.21		

* *F*-level too low for computation of regression coefficients.

The *b* and beta coefficients[65] in Table 5 indicate the independent contribution of voting and various political structures[66] to the concurrence scores of elected and nonelected leaders. Frequency of contested elections shows some independent association with concurrence for nonelected leaders, as do organizational activity and type of election for elected leaders. Otherwise, none of the other political-structure variables have much relationships to concurrence for either set of community elites. The beta for participation, however, is highly significant when the effects of political structure on concurrence are controlled.[67]

One might have expected that political factors would be more important for concurrence with elected leaders. For organizational activity and type of government, this is the case, but party activity, partisanship, and competition show larger regression coefficients for nonelected leaders. The beta coefficient for voting (.38) is the same for both groups, and about 21 per cent of the variance in concurrence for each set of leaders is explained by participation and political structure.

One might well conclude on the basis of Table 5 that Model 2 is most reasonable. Voting has a significant direct relationship with concurrence, accounting for approximately fifteen per cent of the variance in the scores of both groups of leaders. An additional five or six per cent of the variance can be explained, however, by including political structure.

Nevertheless, the linear additive statistical model which was assumed in computing the regression coefficients in Table 5 does not give a complete picture of the relationships in the data. It has already been shown that political structure (especially electoral competition) influences participation rates. This suggests that participation may have a greater impact on concurrence within competitive communities: that there may be some *interaction* between political structure and participation. To test for this, concurrence scores for the two groups of leaders were computed in four types of communities: "apolitical" (low participation, infrequently contested elections); "competitive elitist" (contested elections, relatively low participation); "nonpartisan" (high participation, but few contests for local office); and finally, "competitive democracies" (active participation and frequently contested elections).

As can be clearly seen from Table 6, it is the interaction between participation and competition which most influences concurrence. There is

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[65] Blalock has argued that unstandardized regression coefficients may offer certain interpretive advantages ("Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, 61 [March, 1967], 130–136). Duncan, ("Path Analysis") and Sewall Wright ("Path Coefficients and Path Regressions," in Blalock, *Causal Models in the Social Sciences,* 1971, pp. 101–114) prefer beta coefficients. I have reported both here, but because I have used a variety of scales and dummy variables, the beta coefficients can be more readily interpreted for these data. See also Susan B. Hansen, "Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association conference, New Orleans, 1973), where a path analysis of these data is reported.

[66] The indices of electoral competition and organizational activity have been described earlier. Because of the curvilinear relationship noted between party activity and concurrence, dummy variables could have been used for different categories of party strength. But to reduce the number of variables required, a unidimensional party scale was used (both parties absent, both weak, one strong, both strong).

[67] Citizen voting (the residual factor index based on cross-section sample data) was used to indicate participation rates in communities. The relationships observed here do not depend upon the indicators of political structure or participation that are used. If the percentage of votes received by the runner-up is taken as an indicator of competition, and if overall participation or campaign activity is used as an indicator of community participation, the same pattern holds. Modes of participation other than voting explain less of the variance in concurrence, however.



Table 6. Mean Concurrence Scores of Local Leaders by Political Typology of Communities

very little difference in concurrence for either set of leaders among the apolitical, nonpartisan, and competitive-elitist communities (although scores for nonelected leaders are somewhat higher in competitive-elitist communities). The highest concurrence scores for both groups of leaders are found in *competitive democracies* where citizens are active and elections are contested. High participation has little effect if there are no alternative outcomes available; and competition among a small group of activists is not sufficient to influence the agreement of local leaders with citizens. The political structure of a community, then, serves to create conditions under which citizen participation may have the greatest impact on concurrence.[68]

Differential Concurrence as a Function of Political Setting

In terms of concurrence with local leaders, which groups benefit the most from different political structures? Not all citizens participate at the local level: voting turnout in local elections is often extremely low. When few participate, persons of fairly high social status are most likely to be active and thus to reap whatever benefits may be gained from participation. If high and low participators generally agreed on community problems, participation would increase concurrence to all. But if less active persons had different policy priorities, conditions that encouraged their participation should also lead to higher concurrence for them. It has been suggested that lower classes should benefit from "unreformed" political systems.[69] The classic argument of V. O. Key in *Southern Politics* is that not only blacks, but lower-class whites are adversely affected by one-party politics, factionalism, and restricted opportunities for participation.[70]

We have so far examined the level of community agreement between *all* citizens and two groups of local leaders. But it is possible to test the effects of participation and political structure on concurrence for different groups within each community by calculating concurrence scores separately for persons of different social classes, or different levels of political activity.

The first row of figures in Table 7 represents community averages of concurrence scores for persons of lower, middle, and upper socioeco-

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[68] Interaction could also be demonstrated by using dummy variables or interaction terms within the multiple regression equations. Because of the number of variables, large number of potential interactions terms, and relatively few cases, this was not feasible. If a simple model was used (voting and rates of competition, plus a product of these terms to indicate interaction), the resulting beta coefficients were voting, —.29; competition, .11; interaction term, .71; $R^2 = .25$. Thus the *interaction* between participation and competition explains more of the variation in concurrence than either alone.

[69] Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policy."

[70] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1949), pp. 307–310, 655–661.

Table 7. Political Structure and Concurrence to Socioeconomic and Participant Citizen Groups

	Community Concurrence Scores						
	Social Class[a]			Participation Level[b]			No. of Communities
	Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High	
Average Across All Communities	21.	23.	27.	23.	23.	28.	64
Elections Contested:							
Never	16.	19.	26.	18.	19.	22.	13
Sometimes	19.	16.	26.	19.	23.	20.	10
Usually	14.	20.	24.	20.	18.	25.	12
Always	29.	32.	30.	29.	29.	37.	20
Pearson *r*	.25	.31	.08	.22	.21	.38	55
% of Vote Received by Runner-up:							
0–20%	14.	21.	21.	22.	17.	29.	5
20–33%	16.	24.	30.	23.	23.	29.	11
34–40%	22.	20.	26.	19.	21.	23.	11
41–49%	40.	37.	24.	30.	36.	40.	8
Pearson *r*	.36	.25	.07	.13	.33	.22	35
Partisanship							
Absent	19.	21.	29.	22.	22.	26.	32
Present	24.	27.	24.	23.	25.	30.	22
Pearson *r*	.12	.16	−.13	.03	.08	.11	54
Political Parties:							
Neither exists	16.2	22.9	28.7	19.5	22.3	23.4	28
Both Weak	19.2	22.3	30.7	20.2	24.6	27.3	8
Strong Rep.	25.0	23.5	31.6	25.1	28.3	32.4	9
Strong Dem.	29.3	30.0	27.3	30.0	26.1	33.3	9
Both Strong	24.7	21.2	24.2	18.8	23.7	30.3	10
Pearson *r*	.25	.02	−.05	.08	.08	.23	64
Multiple R for Political Structure	.32	.35	.25	.25	.22	.43	—

[a] Education, income, and occupation weighted equally: scale divided in thirds.
[b] Based on three equal divisions of overall participation index.

nomic status; and for persons scoring at three different levels on the overall Verba-Nie index of participation. First, looking at the average concurrence scores for the three socioeconomic groups across all communities, one can see that persons of higher social status are more likely to find local leaders in agreement with them. This pattern may occur because local leaders themselves are drawn from the upper social strata, and could be expected to have better communications with, and be more sympathetic to, the desires of this stratum. Also, upper-status persons participate more: they have more of a say in local elections and in political parties and local organizations.[71]

But these advantages of upper-status citizens may be overcome to some extent by community political structure. In Table 7, subgroup scores are averaged within communities with different political structures. Consider the concurrence scores for the three social classes in communities with varying degrees of competition, party activity, and partisan local elections. Competition benefits *all* social groups to some extent. But persons in the lowest third of the SES scale benefit the most. Where elections are infrequently contested, concurrence between all local leaders and this group averages 16.6; where electoral contests are frequent, the average jumps to 29—very little different from the concurrence scores of the middle and upper classes. The pattern is even more striking when closeness of election outcomes is considered: leaders' concurrence with lower-status persons' increases from 14.4 to 40.0 as electoral competition increases. The middle SES group also benefits from competition, while upper-status citizens benefit very little from increased electoral competition. Also, active political parties help lower-status persons more.

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[71] See Verba and Nie, chapter 17, for a fuller discussion of the relationships among social class, participation and concurrence; and chapter 19 for a more detailed discussion of the "who benefits" problem with reference to types of participators.

Both the lower and middle SES groups fare better in terms of concurrence in partisan communities. But as Lineberry and Fowler's analysis suggested, partisanship has a *negative* effect on the concurrence scores of upper-status persons. The regression coefficients indicate that political structure explains more of the variation in the concurrence scores of lower- than of upper-status persons.

Turning now to concurrence scores of participatory subgroups, we see that the most active participators (those in the upper third of participators according to the Verba-Nie index) tend to agree with local leaders somewhat more strongly. Since in devising the participation index used here to divide the citizen sample the effects of social class were partialled out, this differential advantage may be presumed to be due to the greater participation of this group rather than to their social class (although of course many of these active citizens do score at a high level on the SES scale).

But in this case the differential impact of political structure does not overcome the advantage in concurrence held by active participators: rather, they benefit *more* in partisan, competitive situations. All participants benefit from electoral competition and partisanship; each group's scores average about ten points higher on the concurrence index in communities with active parties and contested elections than in areas where elections are seldom contested. Increased electoral competition, nevertheless, tends to *augment* the differences in concurrence among these three subgroups: the correlations between concurrence and political structure are higher for active participators.

To some extent, then, community political structure can serve to overcome the advantage of greater agreement with leaders that upper classes have. Participators (no matter what their social class) find that their advantage over nonparticipators is increased in a competitive political setting. Active participation seems to make little difference in an amorphous political environment where policy alternatives are not available or are not salient. This evidence confirms that reported earlier: concurrence is highest with participators in "competitive democracies."

Where there is disagreement between active and less active participators, leaders may only concur with a portion of the citizenry; and active participation may make class, race, or ethnic differences more salient. How might political structure affect the relationship between citizen consensus and citizen-leader concurrence?

Table 8 compares the impact of voting rates and political structure on citizen-leader agreement in high- and low-consensus communities. As Verba and Nie reported, electoral participation has little effect on concurrence in low-consensus communities.[72] Here a negative relationship holds for heads of local government, and essentially no relationship for other local leaders. But political structure *is* associated with citizen-leader agreement in low-consensus communities, especially for local government executives ($R=.42$). This could be due to either information or influence: even if citizens do not agree, political factors may help communicate at least some of their concerns. Or competition may appear more threatening in a divided community, and may lead to greater efforts to ascertain citizen preferences.

Table 8. Political Structure, Participation, and Concurrence in High- and Low-Consensus Communities

	Multiple Regression Coefficients	
	Heads of Government	Other Local Leaders
Low Consensus Communities ($N=29$)		
Political Structure[a]	.42	.34
Voting rates	−.20	.02
Both	.43	.37
High Consensus Communities ($N=26$)		
Political Structure[a]	.39	.51
Voting Rates	.50	.46
Both	.54	.68

[a] Includes electoral competition, partisanship, political party activity, organizational involvement, and method of selection of head of local government.

In high-consensus communities, on the other hand, voting increases concurrence with both groups of leaders. For elected officials, the impact of political structure on concurrence is about the same in both high- and low-consensus communities (multiple R's of .39 and .42 respectively): participation, however, improves concurrence only when citizens agree. For other local leaders, political factors have a greater impact on concurrence in high- as compared to low-consensus communities (multiple R's of .51 and .34 respectively.) This again emphasizes the role which political factors play in communicating citizen views even in communities where citizens share common concerns.

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[72] Verba and Nie, pp. 320–327. There they describe the measure of consensus used here, analogous to the concurrence index, but indicating agreement between those ranking in the top third on overall participation and other citizens. Electoral participation shows about the same relationship as that reported here. Nonelectoral forms of participation have a negative effect on concurrence in low-consensus communities. But since that relationship was not affected by political structure, only voting has been reported here.

Concurrence and Causality

The relationships observed in this paper suggest that participation and political structure affect local leaders' responsiveness to citizens. But the relationships that I have observed could also be due to manipulation of participation, political structure, and the community agenda by local leaders. They might be motivated by strong political beliefs, desire for power, quest for economic advantage, or simply a wish to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis county, state, or national leaders (Mayor Daley's use of the Chicago Democratic machine as a source of national political clout was an example of the latter). Any modern government has vast resources to create issues, justify its actions, and win approval for its policies and leadership. Consider Dahl's use of the term "political entrepreneur" to describe Mayor Lee's salesmanship in convincing New Haven citizens of the benefits of urban renewal.[73] Consider, too, large sums spent by the Army on public relations and on publicizing its assessments of defense needs,[74] or the efforts of Candidate Nixon's campaign committees to rally public support for his issue stands.[75] Citizen-leader agreement on the local political agenda, then, could be due to elite influence; and might be diagrammed as follows:



This is not to attribute wholly Machiavellian motives to local elites. Many hard-working community leaders have a greater knowledge of what projects are possible, and what sorts of support from other levels of government and civic groups might be available, than does the average citizen. They are in a better position to *articulate* vague discontent and desires for local improvements into clearly stated proposals or policies. Given elites' greater command over political resources, it is more than likely that at least part of the time they will be able to affect the choice of issues, and the issue alternatives, facing the community.

As a cynical Missouri newspaper editor in the elite sample remarked, "The average person around here doesn't know what he wants. He has to be told." Few citizens may be interested in community affairs, and participation in local elections is often dismally low. By default, then, local leaders may develop the political agenda: citizens can only ratify or reject it.

Several major difficulties arise, however, when one attempts to sort out the causal patterns at work here. First, additional information on local leaders' efforts to influence political decision making or mobilize public opinion would have to be considered. Some have argued that adequate data on mobilization of bias or non-decision making are impossible to find.[76] I do not take this position, but I would certainly concede that survey research has its limitations in this regard.

The elite interviews did include questions on leaders' attitudes, activities, and organizational activity. If leaders' efforts to communicate with citizens, or their work in local organizations, or their efforts to encourage citizen participation, proved to bear closer relationships with local concurrence levels than did the indicators of citizen participation, this might constitute evidence that citizen-leader agreement was due to leaders' efforts to influence citizen opinion or activity. But only one of the indicators of leaders' activities that were available for this analysis demonstrated any strong association with concurrence: leaders' attitudes toward citizen interest and participation. Leaders who saw their fellow citizens as interested and involved were more likely to concur with citizen priorities. It is difficult to consider this as evidence of leaders' efforts to manipulate popular opinion since the more competitive the elections in a community, the more likely leaders were to perceive and to support citizen involvement.[77]

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[73] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1961). Motivations and strategies of community leaders are discussed in Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (November, 1958), 251-261; and Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*.

[74] Evidence presented by the controversial 1971 CBS television documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon."

[75] Joe McGuinness, *The Selling of the President, 1968* (New York: Trident Press, 1969).

[76] Raymond E. Wolfinger has summarized the ongoing debate over the utility and practicability of analyzing nondecisions in "Non-Decisions and the Study of Local Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 1063–1080.

[77] The relationship between leaders' activities and concurrence was discussed in Verba and Nie, p. 331 ff., and in the author's dissertation, chapter 6.

Many local leaders mentioned their efforts to encourage citizen participation. This could be an indication of desire to reduce "mandate uncertainty;" it could also represent efforts to round up support for elites' issue preferences. Again, I do not have adequate information to draw any firm conclusions about the causal processes involved. However, leaders' efforts to encourage participation were *not* correlated with community participation rates.[78]

A second major problem in causal interpretation is that the relationships I have observed may be due to nonpolitical variables not examined in this paper. Concurrence may be high in communities which for a number of reasons (economic structure, population, rural-urban quality, social integration) may have leaders recruited from a consensual citizen population. These aspects of the community setting might account for the apparent link between political factors and concurrence.

A number of such possibilities (community size, wealth, urbanization, and geographic isolation) were examined, and it was found that many aspects of the community setting do contribute to concurrence. But controlling for these did not appreciably diminish the linkages between political structure or participation and concurrence.[79] The systematic variation attributable to political factors would indicate that these operate independently of the community social or economic structure. The evidence presented here on the differential impact of political structure on concurrence with social class and participant subgroups within a community constitutes further evidence for the importance of political factors,[80] and suggests that they may give lower-status citizens a better chance to influence their leaders.

Third, data on the policy-making process over time would be required for causal analysis. The concurrence score can only compare communities with respect to citizen-leader agreement on priorities: decisions and outcomes should also be compared before we conclude whether leaders influence citizens or vice versa.

And finally, one important condition for political accountability is the desire for reelection by officeholders. Prewitt has suggested that incumbent eviction is rare and that political ambition may not always govern leaders' actions at the local level:[81] information on these factors would be required before one could conclude that citizen participation and political opposition operate as democratic theory predicts in holding elected community leaders accountable.

But electoral accountability is not the only means of citizen influence over leaders—fortunately so, since important political decisions are often made by nonelected officials, and since many elected officials do not desire reelection or are legally barred from doing so. This paper has explored the influence and information aspects of political structure and participation by using a standard concurrence score to compare two groups of local leaders in a variety of communities. Concurrence scores of elected local officials are significantly higher under conditions favoring citizen input into local politics: high participation, active political parties, partisanship, and competition for local office. But the impact of such factors on agreement between nonelected leaders and citizens indicates that political factors which facilitate communication between leaders and citizens can also increase leaders' responsiveness to citizen concerns.

Such a conclusion may offer grounds for optimism: democratic practices such as participation and competition for office operate as they should to improve linkage between leaders and citizens. But the long-term outlook is less optimistic. Trends toward nonpartisan elections, atrophied political parties, and lack of electoral competition at the local level suggest that conditions for effective citizen participation in American communities may no longer obtain. Despite increased use of "home rule" in some states, local governments remain legally and financially dependent on state or federal governments, and community leaders' ability to meet citizen demands is correspondingly limited. Efforts to encourage participation in such a context may lead to increased citizen frustration rather than more effective control over leaders' actions. Finally, researchers' efforts to measure or model linkage must deal with changing political structures and the complexities of federalism as well as with the actions and expectations of leaders and citizens.

APPENDIX

Computation of Concurrence Scores

The citizens and leaders interviewed for this study were asked open-ended questions about community needs and problems, with possibilities for multiple responses. The verbatim responses, coded according to a comprehensive master codebook, provided a huge variety of response, but in fact responses by both leaders and citizens tended to cluster around certain problem areas. Therefore, in order to compute the concurrence scores used as an index of citizen-leader agreement, the hundreds of possible answers were divided into twenty-five categories. These represent the set union of the problems mentioned most frequently by citizens and leaders across the sets of "needs and problems" questions mentioned in the text. The categories are:

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[78] See author's dissertation, chapter 8, for further dicussion of leaders' attitudes toward participation.

[79] Verba and Nie, pp. 329–330, found that neither wealth nor community isolation "explained" the association between participation and concurrence; controlling for these did not significantly diminish the original relationship. The author's thesis, chapter 9, considered several elements of the community setting (population size and stability, communications, ethnicity) that contributed to concurrence. But these factors also did not diminish the relationships observed between concurrence and political structure.

[80] G. Bingham Powell has developed several models of electoral aggregation which demonstrate the importance of political structure for representation. "Citizen-Elite Linkages in Austrian Communities" (paper presented at the 1974 APSA annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois).

[81] Prewitt, "Political Ambitions."

1. Jobs, unemployment
2. Inflation
3. Lack of income, poverty
4. Housing
5. Subsistence needs (food, clothing, welfare)
6. Education
7. Taxes too high
8. Road construction, maintenance
9. Sewerage, waste disposal
10. Power and water supply
11. Recreational facilities
12. Money for community needs
13. Community services (general category covering police and fire protection, zoning, planning, administration)
14. Health, medical facilities
15. Problems of the aged
16. Family problems: marriage, children
17. Crime (violence against persons or property), law and order
18. Moral issues (drugs, alcohol, pornography)
19. Noise and nuisance
20. War in Viet Nam
21. The draft
22. Political participation, community involvement
23. Politics and government: structure, personnel, administration
24. School integration
25. Racial problems (other than school integration)

These categories covered more than over ninety per cent of all responses, and solved several problems in analysis. Respondents in a number of instances mentioned a broad category of problems (such as education) rather than specific ones (higher teacher salaries, more classrooms, sex education, etc.). This could be because they felt the whole area they mentioned was worthy of concern; it could also mean (more likely the case for cross-section than elite respondents) that they were not well informed or articulate enough to specify the problem area more precisely. Problems also arose in fitting more detailed responses into discrete coding categories. The final coding procedure made it possible to look at issue areas of general concern to both groups.

The number of mentions of a particular problem category by community citizens was counted. Then for each problem a local leader mentioned (as a community problem, focus of his activity, or perceived citizen concern), he was given a score equal to the number of citizens who mentioned that problem in his community. If a leader mentioned more than one problem in a given question set, his score was for the problem which the greatest number of citizens mentioned (rather than counting both responses, which would have inflated the concurrence scores for leaders who happened to mention more than one problem). This score was divided by the total number of citizen respondents in that community, as shown below. The scores could range from 0 (no leader agreed with citizens) to 100 (all leaders and citizens in a community agreed).

Example of Computation of Concurrence Score

Problem	X No. of Mentions by Community Citizens	Y Mentioned by Leader (0 = No, 1 = Yes)	$X \times Y$
1	5	0	0
2	3	1	3
3	0	1	0
4	1	0	0
5	2	0	0
			3

N = Number of citizens in community = 15
Concurrence = $(X \times Y)/N = 3/15 = .20$
Scores were multiplied by 100 for table presentation

Some citizens made no codable responses to the open-ended problem questions. They either said they had no problems or made a very general statement that "I have many personal problems" or "things could be better." Such people were included in the compilation of the concurrence scores (as a divisor, that is, the total sampled in a community) so that elite concurrence scores would reflect concurrence with the whole population, not just with that articulate majority who made codable responses. Local leaders who mentioned no problems (or gave responses that could not be coded) were given a concurrence score of zero.

The purpose of this paper was to compare *communities* and to look at some ways in which community political structure and participation affected agreement between local leaders and citizens. For this reason, concurrence scores were averaged for all of the leaders interviewed in a given community. Thus if two or three of the leaders and several of the cross-section respondents mentioned the same problem, a community would have a higher "concurrence score" than a community where only one leader recognized a problem cited by several citizens.

Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication*

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If, as Edward Banfield and James Wilson suggest, politics " . . . arises out of conflict and . . . consists of the activities by which conflict is carried on,"[1] then political science should be concerned with the way conflicts are defined, interpreted for public consumption and managed in society. Traditionally, political scientists have concentrated on describing and analyzing the manner in which political institutions react to conflicts.[2] More importantly, when they have tried to measure and assess the role which those institutions play in social processes of conflict and conflict management, political scientists have generally operated in a limited comparative context. They have either compared different political institutions within a single society or similar political institutions across several societies. In either case, their method of comparison has been largely horizontal.

Two generic types of conflict-resolving tenencies in political institutions have been identified. The first, with which political scientists are most familiar, is *nonadjudicative*. Institutions which are primarily nonadjudicative are concerned with the formulative and prescriptive aspects of lawmaking. Conflict resolution in nonadjudicative institutions, such as legislatures, tends to be universalistic—more concerned with general rules or standards for future application than with the equities between two or more parties currently in dispute. Additionally, nonadjudicative institutions deal with the needs of broad and unnamed classes or groups rather than of individuals, with "issues and symbols" rather than specific pronouncements, and with general, often imprecise, claims of deprivation or need. They are concerned with individual problems only insofar as these are symptomatic of social problems which are visible, intense and broad in scope.

Institutions which are primarily *adjudicative* deal with conflicts through third party intervention. Often the parties in dispute participate in its resolution through presentation of reasoned arguments. Adjudicative institutions such as courts are particularistic in form and process, and most often concerned with individual level disputes. The impact of adjudicative decisions initially extends only to the parties in dispute, although it may also have much broader policy implications. Theoretically, adjudicative institutions are more concerned with enforcing existing norms than with creating new ones.[3] Furthermore, they are almost totally "reactive."[4] Unlike nonadjudicative bodies, which also search out or try to anticipate problems before they arise, adjudicative institutions rely on private individuals or groups or other government agencies to bring problems to their attention. They rely on the initiative of private parties to set the agenda of issues on which public officials act. They can take no part in defining, interpreting, and managing conflict until they are "mobilized."[5] As a result, adjudicative institutions are not well suited to resolving problems that private parties do not or cannot perceive, or wish to ignore.

The distinction between adjudicative and nonadjudicative types of institutions is imperfect, since institutions identified primarily as one or the other may display a mix of adjudicative and nonadjudicative functions.[6] Political scientists have recognized this problem and have examined the similarities and differences among adjudicative, nonadjudicative and mixed types of governmental institutions.[7] What has not been done, however, is to examine the similarities and differences among governmental institutions and nongovernmental institutions which, in different ways, perform similar—even symbiotic—conflict resolving functions. There is an impressive body of data on the operation of political institutions in many different countries; but we have yet to develop an approach which would emphasize both public and private processes of defining, interpreting, and managing conflict and the "vertical" relationships which exist between them.

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[1] Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Vintage, 1963), p. 7.

[2] This kind of concern is reflected in most studies of the decision-making processes of political institutions. For one of the best of these studies see Raymond Bauer et al., *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963).

[3] See Herbert Jacob, *Justice in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

[4] This term is used by Donald Black to describe one aspect of the legal process, specifically the dependence of some institutions on citizen initiated complaints. See "The Mobilization of Law," *Journal of Legal Studies*, 2 (January, 1973), 128.

[5] Mobilization refers to the process through which adjudicative institutions become involved in the definition, interpretation and management of conflict. Litigation refers exclusively to the mobilization of courts.

Our concern in this paper is with the role of the courts in the process of conflict resolution.[8] In trying to assess that role, we compare courts with other public and private adjudicative institutions which traditionally have not been of much concern to political scientists. The discipline has shown considerable interest in the role of courts in solving interest-group conflict, and in the reciprocal role of litigious interest groups in structuring some of the major political issues of our time. But the emphasis on a few litigious groups has fostered two misimpressions—first that the major political function of courts is to arbitrate group conflict; and, second that most litigation of the "individual" variety is inherently nonpolitical. These individualized disputes were, if recognized at all for their political content and impact, relegated to the dark side of the public law—private law dichotomy. As Shapiro[9] and others have noted, this artificial exclusion has fostered a number of inaccuracies in our understanding both of how adjudicative institutions work and of the extent of their political role.

In this paper, we explore the management of conflict by a variety of adjudicative institutions, both public and private. We look for a common thread of dispute-solving techniques in institutions with different legal statuses and formal structures, varying degrees of visibility and extending over a wide range of substantive areas. Our comparison of courts to other types of adjudicative bodies is designed to show both similarities and differences of task, and to underscore the interrelated nature of their functions. Additionally, since all types of adjudicative institutions are dependent ultimately on the initiative of outside parties, we examine the conditions which facilitate or inhibit their involvement in defining, interpreting and managing conflict. Our intention is to highlight the consequences of judicial resolution of some disputes, but not others, by describing the kind of institutions which deal with these "other" disputes, how such disputes are settled, and why people choose (or are required to use) particular adjudicative mechanisms when the need for dispute settlement arises.

Courts and Other Adjudicators

The very attributes which distinguish courts from other political institutions—their particularized focus and their reactive nature—are most useful in connecting judicial functions and those of nongovernmental dispute-resolving institutions. Yet adjudicative bodies also differ among themselves. Their differences, as we shall suggest, may be especially important in determining the conditions under which courts and other adjudicators are mobilized and involved in conflict and conflict resolution.[10]

With any particular dispute settlement institution comes a special set of participants, perhaps a different set of rules, and a distinctive style. Each alternative may provide its own kind of "justice"; some proceed without reference to general rules which are known and articulated in advance; others operate according to such rules. Some provide a process of judgment in which it is the status of the parties in dispute, or the preferences of the judge, which determine the outcome; others require impartiality. Courts, for example, generally emphasize greater procedural regularity than do other adjudicative institutions. Furthermore, public adjudicative decision making is, in theory, supposed to encompass the marshaling of reasons and justifications by an impartial arbiter.[11] Yet reasoned decisions and equitable results are not the uniform product of public dispute settling, nor are they uniquely found in the public arena.

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[6] A particularly interesting description of the mix of adjudicative and nonadjudicative functions in a single political institution is provided by Philippe Nonet, *Administrative Justice* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

[7] For a comparison of courts, legislatures and executives see Kenneth Dolbeare, *Trial Courts in Urban Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 117.

[8] We realize that courts do more than just settle disputes or resolve conflict. As Friedman argues, the most time-consuming activity of trial courts may involve record keeping and other administrative functions. See Lawrence Friedman, "Functions of Trial Courts in the Modern World" (presented at a Conference on Sociology of Judicial Process, University of Bielefeld, German Federal Republic, 1973).

[9] See Martin Shapiro, "From Public Law to Public Policy, or the 'Public' in Public Law," *PS*, 5 (Fall, 1972), 410–418.

[10] The similarities and differences among courts and other dispute-settling institutions have recently been the subject of an extensive treatment by Richard Abel, "A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society," *Law and Society Review*, 8 (Winter, 1974), 217–347.

[11] For a discussion of these distinctions see Lon Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (unpublished essay, n.d.).

The structure of a dispute-resolving institution may have an important influence on the way the dispute is presented; indeed it may affect the basic nature of the dispute itself. This is as true in moving from informal to more formal means of conflict resolution as it is recognized widely to be true in moving from the trial to appellate stages of litigation.[12] Finally, any particular institution may also carry with it some limitations on the available remedies, and thus indirectly affect the nature of the settlement which is possible. Participants have to agree to play by the rules of the institution; often this requires that they redefine their interests, goals and strategies.[13]

Variables which have been used to distinguish among adjudicative institutions include the level of coerciveness, the scope and severity of available sanctions, the applicable norms, and the extent of third party intervention.[14] We have chosen two other variables which appear to differentiate particularly well among the most common adjudicative alternatives. These variables are the level of formality in the procedures used and the degree of "publicness." The level of formality is defined by the presence of a specialized judicial role, specialized rules of evidence and procedure, written records, established channels of appeal and the swearing in of witnesses.[15] An institution is considered public if it is part of the established government apparatus and if the coercive power of the state can be used to enforce its decisions.

The four-cell table presented below depicts, somewhat artificially, four "ideal types" of adjudicative dispute-settling alternatives; each represents a combination of our key variables, hence the cell labels: Private-Formal, Private-Informal, Public-Formal, and Public-Informal. The categories are not pure types, merely regions sliced from a graph of two continuous variables. We are looking for the predominant characteristics of each type of adjudicative alternative while recognizing the impurities in the forms which we have assigned to each. Below we elaborate on these characteristics and we illustrate the way differences among adjudicative institutions may help account for differences in the way they are mobilized and involved in conflict and conflict management.

Private-Informal Dispute Settlement. The simplest form of private-informal dispute settlement occurs in the interaction between two individuals or groups.[16] Conflicts generally arise in these dyadic settings, and the first attempts at resolution also generally occur at this level,[17] usually in the form of direct negotiation and two-party bargaining. Only if such efforts prove unsuccessful, or if the expectation of failure in this context is so great that no attempt at direct negotiation is made, does

Table 1. A Typology of Adjudicative Dispute Resolution

	Formal	Informal
Public	Court trials/some types of administrative agency procedures, e.g., wage-price boards	Police in family quarrels/plea bargaining/administrative agency inquiries (hearing examiners) and consent agreements, such as the resolution of most tax disputes and anti-trust actions/pre-trial conferences/parole boards/state civil rights commissions/juvenile courts pre-*Gault*/police review boards
Private	College disciplinary boards/rabbinical or other ecclesiastical courts/arbitration of labor disputes /some bar association grievance committees	Settlement of automobile accident claims/ /marriage counseling/debt adjustment/reconciliation by family, community, or religious leader

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[12] Richard Richardson and Kenneth Vines, *The Politics of the Federal Courts* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1970), and J. Woodford Howard, "Litigation Flow in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C., 2nd and 5th Circuits" (paper delivered at the 1971 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association).

[13] P. H. Gulliver, "Negotiations as a Mode of Dispute Settlement: Towards a General Model," *Law and Society Review,* 7 (Summer, 1973), 667–692.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] William L. F. Felstiner, "Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing," *Law and Society Review,* 9 (Fall, 1974), 63–94.

[16] We recognize that many "potential" disputes are either suppressed by the individual feeling aggrieved or are displaced onto others not directly involved. This self-suppression or displacement is often practiced by people who fear being labeled as troublemakers. It is exemplified when people complain about family life while at work and about work life while at home but never make their feelings known in the appropriate setting.

[17] A study of consumer disputes in Philadelphia reports that most consumers first try to settle disputes with businessmen by negotiating directly with the retailer. Only when and if that fails do they seek other remedies. See John Steadman and Richard Rosenstein, "Small Claims Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Municipal Court," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review,* 121 (June, 1973), 1331.

third party resolution within an adjudicative context become relevant. When a third party is called into the dispute he may act as a "judge," or mediator, but may not necessarily be bound by any formal, codified rules.[18]

Of course there are rules which he must follow, but they will not predominate; at most they may provide a context of expectations in which private, informal settlements may occur. The adjusters of disputes in a private, informal setting will not have any formal connection with the state, although in some cases they may have to be licensed by the state or by a quasi-private organization of professionals which exercises a delegated licensing function. The third-party mediator may be chosen because he has status, position, respect, power, money or the alleged power to invoke sanctions in behalf of a deity or some other supra-human force. Or he may have none of these but simply be the designated agent of an organization set up to handle specific disputes. The technique of bringing disputes to a third party may be the choice of both disputants, or of one but not the other party to a conflict, or it may be the result of private norms or expectations of a subcultural group which "require" that disputes be settled, as much as possible, within the group.[19]

Private-informal dispute resolution is found in all societies. In the United States, it is found in religious and ethnic communities,[20] in the work of trained professionals such as marriage counselors,[21] in various commercial relationships,[22] and even in supermarkets.[23] In all of these settings, private-informal adjudication is based on the assumption that the parties to a dispute will agree about what matters are in dispute and will trust the person called upon to act in an adjudicative role.

Societies differ in the extent to which private, informal modes of dispute settlement predominate, and in the extent to which the norms of private settlement affect the operations of more public and formal institutions. Japan, for instance, seems marked by the ubiquity of such private-informal conflict resolving devices. Henderson reports that private adjudication in Japan has been and still is effective " . . . in settling the vast majority of disputes."[24] The third party is generally a man of higher social status than the disputants, and the role of the adjudicator or mediator is enhanced by the persistence of remnants of traditional social deference. It is promoted by a strong cultural preference for harmony and saving face over claiming one's "rights." In Japan, in contrast to the United States, law and right are entirely different concepts and not just two sides of the same coin.[25] Similarly, Hahm notes the strong cultural preference for private-informal settlement in Korea. The goal of this kind of dispute settlement in Korea is the restoration of normal relations between the disputants as fast as possible. As a result, " . . . the central concern is to discover what is proper and decent, not so much what is legal. . . . A good, and therefore a right, solution is what the parties can agree on and approve."[26]

Private-informal dispute settlement has also been found to be relatively most extensive in primitive or underdeveloped societies. In such societies, dispute settlement most often occurs within primary groups or within a village setting.[27] A respected elder intervenes and after listening to the disputants makes a decision. His decision will be accepted by the disputants out of respect for his position or because of their allegiance to a close knit social community.[28]

In both underdeveloped and developed societies, private-informal processes may be favored over litigation because of their "proximity" to the disputants. This proximity facilitates dispute settlement by allowing people to work out their problems without clearly having to acknowledge that their relationship is "in trouble." This is especially attractive to people who are reluctant to declare trouble because they fear being labeled troublemakers or fear being held responsible for not preventing the trouble.[29] Members of distinct subcultural groups may feel more comfortable being judged by "their own kind" or at least by someone perceived as close to their own lifestyle and values. They may be reluctant to participate in formal processes of adjudication because they lack faith in the fairness and justice of results which might be obtained from these processes.[30] This lack of faith is accentuated where public dispute settlers (including lawyers) are predominantly of a different race, religion, ethnic group or social status from that of the disputants.

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[18] See Torstein Eckhoff, "The Mediator and the Judge," in *Sociology of Law*, ed. Vilhelm Aubert (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969).

[19] For a description of this phenomenon as it applies to organized crime in the United States, see Donald R. Cressey, *Theft of a Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), chapters 8 and 9.

[20] "Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Courts and the Law of Marriage," *Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems*, 7 (Spring, 1971), 230.

[21] Robert Coulson, "Family Arbitration—An Exercise in Sensitivity," *Family Law Quarterly*, 3 (March, 1969), 22.

[22] Mary Cameron, *The Booster and the Snitch* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 121. See also Stewart Macaulay, *Law and the Balance of Power* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), p. 153, and "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 55-67.

[23] Spencer MacCallum, "Dispute Resolution in an American Supermarket," in *Law and Warfare*, ed. Paul Bohannon (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1967), pp. 293-294.

[24] Don Henderson, "Law and Political Modernization in Japan," in *Political Development in Modern Japan*, ed. Robert Ward (Princeton: Princeton Universiy Press, 1969), p. 449.

[25] See T. Kawashima, "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan," in *Law in Japan*, ed. Arthur Von Mehren (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); and Henderson, p. 448.

[26] Pyong-Choon Hahm, "The Decision-Process in Korea," in *Comparative Judicial Behavior*, ed. Glendon Schubert and David Danelski (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 36.

[27] Leopold Pospisil, *Kapauka Papauns and Their Law* (New Haven: Yale University Publications in Anthropology, 1958), pp. 254-255 and *passim*.

[28] The importance of community allegiance and group norms in facilitating acceptance of judgments, a common observation throughout this literature, seems analogous to the findings of political scientists about the importance of community and peer-group pressures in determining individual attitudes toward acceptance of Supreme Court decisions specifically and toward legal compliance generally.

Public-Informal Dispute Settlement. Adjudication of disputes also proceeds through public-informal methods. These methods involve the informal intervention by agents of the state to solve disputes. Such dispute resolution is utilized to complement the needs of public, formal institutions by reducing their operating burdens through the delegation of discretion to actors whose behavior in working out disputes is less often guided by standardized norms or procedures than by role relevant routines. Likewise, dispute settlement in this context reflects not only official norms of substance and procedure but also, within broad limits, the organizational commitments of the public agents involved. Thus, the needs of the police to maintain order have been shown often to be incompatible with the norms of enforcing the law, and both are not necessarily consistent with due process rights of arrested persons and rules defining proper police behavior.[31] Wilson argues that when a choice must be made, most policemen will choose the order maintenance orientation, which gives them "substantial discretion over matters of greatest importance in a situation that is, by definition, one of conflict."[32] This choice is perhaps best illustrated when police are called upon to act as resolvers of marital disputes. More often than not the officer acts to "cool things off" rather than to make an arrest. He does not see it as his primary duty to determine who is right and who is wrong; indeed to do so might only exacerbate the disturbance he is trying to quell. Rather his main concern is to restore calm and find a way "of mollifying everyone." He can act this way because his presence carries with it the authority of state power and the threat of arrest, although he does not follow the procedural regularities that would be observed in a more formal setting.[33]

Avoidance of procedural regularity in the pursuit of more immediate and more efficient conflict resolution is also characteristic of plea bargaining, of what used to be the norm of informality in juvenile courts before the United States Supreme Court's *Gault* decision,[34] and in the pretrial conference which has come to play an increasing role in facilitating the settlement of civil suits in the United States. In the case of plea bargaining and juvenile justice, the defendant is induced to settle his "conflict with the law" through an informal, bargaining process. Thus plea bargaining may be less like other types of adjudication, in which the roles of "judge" and adversary are clearly separated, than the kind of dyadic negotiations which often precede resort to adjudication. Plea bargaining is best seen in the context of exchange theory.[35] The defendant concedes his guilt and accepts some predictable punishment in exchange for reduction in the number and seriousness of charges against him or the promise to recommend a light sentence to the judge. He also avoids the predictably harsher sentence he would receive if convicted by a jury. The public prosecutor becomes the "dispute settler" and "has virtually complete discretion" as to whether to prosecute or on what charge. He has available both the coercive power of the state (in the form of a probable guilty verdict if the case goes to trial) and the discretion to work out an acceptable compromise. Mediating toward a compromise is also in the prosecutor's interest. It reduces the political risk of (too many) acquittals, it enables him to keep up with his caseload, and it gives him better control of the outcome. His role becomes managerial and bureaucratized. In place of the formality of court adjudication of guilt or innocence, the prosecutor becomes the manager of a ritualized conflict resolution ceremony.[36] While in some ways his handling of guilty pleas resembles the resolution of private-informal disputes, it is much less open-ended. The prosecutor is a public official designated to resolve such conflicts and the defendant cannot simply opt out of the exchange relationship.

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[29] In our discussion we take the presence of trouble or conflict as a starting point. We realize, however, that the willingness of people to engage in conflict or acknowledge trouble is itself a variable. Where people are reluctant to declare trouble, they may continue in a relationship in which one or both members perceive that something is wrong without communicating this perception to the other party or to any third party. They may, however, allow the tension built up in such situations to be released in other relationships.

[30] See David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn, *Minorities and the Police* (New York: Free Press, 1968), and Charles E. Reasons and Jack L. Kuykendall, eds., *Race, Crime and Justice* (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear, 1972). See also Kate Claghorn, *The Immigrants' Day in Court* (New York: Arno Press, 1969), p. 147. Suspicion of the motives or values of public dispute settlers, so characteristic of ghetto dwellers today, was a widespread phenomenon among immigrant groups in the early part of the 20th century. In addition to avoiding contact with feared outsiders, people may feel more comfortable being judged by "their own kind," by someone perceived as closer to their own life style and values.

[31] Jerome Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 6–9.

[32] James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 21.

[33] *Ibid.*, chapter 4 and *passim.* Wilson notes the variety of factors which enter into a policeman's discretionary decision as to how and whether to enforce the law to the letter.

[34] *In Re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

[35] George F. Cole, "The Decision to Prosecute," *Law and Society Review*, 4 (February, 1970), 313–343. Also see Lief H. Carter, "The Limits of Order: Uncertainty and Adaptation in a District Attorney's Office" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1972).

The emerging institution of the pretrial conference performs essentially the same function for civil cases.[37] If the parties are unable to resolve their differences privately, the judge, in chambers, will informally discuss the case with both sides in the hope that a compromise will emerge. The judge cannot announce in advance of trial how he would decide the case. But, based on his experience, he can suggest possible outcomes which would ensue if the case went to a jury or suggest the limits of damages "normally" awarded in similar types of cases. The judge has no power to compel an agreement, but "helping" the parties to do so is certainly in his interest. The pretrial conference is considerably less ritualized and the role of the judge as mediator less managerial than that of the prosecutor in plea bargaining. But it serves a comparable function in allowing the judge to keep up with his caseload while reducing the costs and risks to the disputants. This is not just an American phenomenon. Japanese courts are noted for their emphasis on pretrial influences leading to settlement without invoking the formal procedures or coercive power of the state.[38]

The common thread connecting all public-informal methods of dispute resolution is their proximity to the formal arena of the courts and to third-party adjudication by a judge or other public official, as well as their reliance on private bargaining within this context. There are no formal "rules," but a set of norms and mutual expectations gives these processes some structure. Indeed, in some cases, of which plea bargaining is the best example, the process by which informal settlements are reached has itself become bureaucratized. A relatively small group of actors is involved in any one jurisdiction, regularized relationships and mutual dependencies develop, and the needs of the bureaucracy for compromise and accommodation frequently predominate.[39]

In both plea bargaining and pretrial conferences, the process of mobilizing the judicial process and of litigating a dispute has already begun. Unlike private-informal alternatives, which act to deflect disputes from formal processes before they are carried into litigation, these examples, although not all, of public-informal processes act to deflect disputes from formal processes only after the process of mobilization has been initiated. In a sense, these devices do not act as alternatives to such formal adjudication; they function instead to reduce it from a highly conflictual process to one in which all that is sought is certification of an informally agreed upon solution.

Private-Formal Dispute Settlement. In this category the dispute settlers remain private actors but they carry out their functions in accord with certain agreed upon and standardized procedures. They are more likely to act as "judges" than mediators, although role definitions may be fluid. Such formal but private tribunals are found within the confines of private organizations or associations, professional groups, as well as within certain subcultural groups. These tribunals exist to settle conflicts between group members, conflicts which cannot be settled informally but which, for some reason, the parties are reluctant to move into the public arena. Where group membership is conditioned by a voluntary or imposed acceptance of certain norms, or a code of conduct, the enforcement of such norms will typically be handled at several levels within the group. Those breaches which cannot be settled or sanctioned informally will usually have to be settled by more formal means. Although the rules and procedures followed by such tribunals may bear some resemblance to those of the courts, those rules and procedures remain private and often diverge substantially from those employed in the public sector.

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[36] It is now commonplace to describe the reality of the criminal justice process in terms of a "crime-control," "bureaucratic," or "dispositional" model which diverges from the ideal "due process" or "adversarial" model. See Abraham Blumberg, *Criminal Justice* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967); Herbert L. Packer, *The Limits of the Criminal Sanction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), part II; and Herbert Jacob, *Urban Justice* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), chapter 4; and "Criminal Courts as Organizational Phenomena" (unpublished paper, 1973).

[37] Maurice Rosenberg, *The Pretrial Conference and Effective Justice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

[38] Kawashima, p. 43.

[39] Similar devices have evolved in non-American settings. Cohen, in his study of criminal justice in China, detected an emphasis among public officials on informal settlement. He observed that almost immediately upon capturing the major cities of China in 1949, the Communists established out-of-court mediation committees there. Party agents were designated with special responsibility to seek, with the agreement of both parties, resolution of ordinary civil disputes and minor criminal problems. Local norms and values were applied in an effort to keep cases out of formal court. "Coping with disputes and anti-social conduct by means of persuasion and informal pressures" was the prevailing orientation. Jerome Cohen, *The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 123.

Many trade associations have established their own formal arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes among members.[40] Similarly, labor-management disputes are often brought before arbiters, designated in advance, whose decisions are binding by mutual consent of the disputants and ultimately enforceable by private sanctions and by the courts.[41] Agreement to submit disputes to private but formal arbitration is characteristic of parties whose relationship involves long-term performance or other aspects of permanence.

Private-formal tribunals have also emerged within distinctive subcultural groups. On Indian reservations tribal courts operate independently of state judicial systems. They "are established and administered by the tribes themselves and enforce tribal codes," are staffed with lay judges, and deal with civil disputes and tribal code violations. Their operation is private in that they have no direct means of coercing compliance, relying instead on the "normative consensus" of the subgroup to psychologically induce compliance.[42] A similar arrangement can be found in some tightly knit ethnic[43] or religious communities.[44]

Private-formal dispute-settling devices thus share some similarities but also vary widely. What they have in common is a court-like procedure for settling disputes among group members (even the complaint of an "outsider" about the conduct of group member, e.g., a legal or medical malpractice accusation, is considered as the occasion for an inquiry rather than as a strict adversary proceeding. Thus it becomes a dispute between a group and one of its members). Decision makers are not agents of the state, but may be regarded by group members as possessing some sort of jural authority based on the stipulations of a prior contract or flowing from delegated state authority. Compliance may be purely voluntary, as in the case of a religious court, or induced by potential sanctions (e.g., loss of license, loss of hospital privileges for a doctor, etc.) or the ultimate threat of a spillover into the public courts with greater potential consequences. It should be noted that, in the United States at least, the development of the industrial state has increased the scope of "private government" in a dramatic fashion. With this increase in scope has come increased concern and pressure to make the decisions of private government bodies conform to democratic norms and to emerging public standards of due process and legality.[45] Increasingly there seems to be a convergence between the norms and procedures of private tribunals and their public counterparts.[46]

Public-Formal Dispute Settlement. The final arena of adjudicative conflict resolution is both public and formal, and is best exemplified by courts. Although there is a wide gap between the highest appellate courts and the now nearly extinct justice of the peace courts, certain characteristics are shared. All are agencies of the state and vested with its coercive power. Most judicial personnel are trained in the law. Though individual discretion is a significant factor in the operation of courts, on the whole they are expected to operate congruently with procedural norms such as those described by Lon Fuller as the "inner morality" of the law.[47] Nonjudicial public bodies are frequently held to comparable, if not identical, standards in their adjudicative functions.

Whereas the optimal goal of dispute resolution at a simpler level is the mutual satisfaction of the parties, at this level the emphasis falls more heavily on rights and duties. Moreover the institutional self-interest of adjudicative bodies which are public and formal plays some role in the outcome of disputes they help to settle. A concern to do justice to the parties while maintaining institutional power and prestige often requires preference for one or the other. This potential internal conflict is but one expression of the traditional ambivalence of Americans toward law and the judicial system.[48] The conflicting demands we make of our courts also require them to balance considerations of state with considerations of private justice. Though technically they must be particularistic, in fact they cannot function legitimately without paying some attention to a broader universe of concerns. This is particularly true as one moves up the judicial ladder, where the specific grievances of the original disputants are rarely the sole focus of attention.

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[40] Soia Mentschikoff, "Commercial Arbitration," *Columbia Law Review*, 61 (May, 1961), 849. Also see Note 71 below.

[41] Morris Handshaker, "Grievance Arbitration and Mediated Settlements," *Labor Law Journal*, 17 (October, 1966), 580.

[42] James Kerr, "Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice and the American Indian," *Journal of Public Law*, 18, No. 2 (1969), 322.

[43] See Leigh-Wai Doo, "Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American Communities," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 21 (Fall, 1973), 627–663.

[44] "Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Courts and the Law of Marriage"; see also "Rabbinical Courts," *Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems*, 6 (January, 1970), 57.

[45] See Arthur S. Miller, "Private Governments and the Constitution" (Santa Barbara, California: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1959), and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), chapter 7 and *passim*.

[46] See Charles W. Anderson, "Public Policy, Pluralism, and the Further Evolution of Advanced Industrial Society" (paper delivered at the 1973 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans).

[47] Lon Fuller, *The Morality of Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), chapter 2.

The rules which govern access and establish the procedural framework of adjudicative bodies are variables of critical importance. What kinds of disputes are to be decided, who can bring these disputes, and what kinds of solutions are possible are among the most important determinants of the involvement of public-formal adjudicators in defining, managing, and interpreting conflict. In contrast to private, informal mechanisms, the "rules" for decision in courts do not come from the parties themselves. Their sources are many—statutes, prior decisions governed by the rule of precedent, and evolving policy considerations responsive to current demands. Recent relaxation of the rules of standing and class actions, and those governing habeas corpus challenges to criminal convictions, have opened new channels of access. Changes in the substantive law also promote increased use of the courts as interests seek to take advantage of newly favorable rules.[49]

Unlike other adjudicative institutions, those that are both public and formal generally require, either explicitly or implicitly, that parties in dispute be represented by legal specialists, people who claim unique knowledge of the procedural and substantive rules which govern access to and the operation of public-formal adjudicative institutions.[50] These specialists act on behalf of the parties to try to shape and structure the issues presented to these institutions and the way the issues are perceived and handled by them. Legal specialists play a critical "gatekeeping" role. They can influence and often determine the conditions under which courts and similar types of adjudicative institutions become involved in conflict management;[51] and they will play a crucial role in defining the goals and objectives of litigation.

Public-formal dispute mechanisms are usually more oriented toward zero-sum decisions than are the less formal mechanisms we have noted.[52] Additionally, they generally require disputants to narrow their definitions of issues in such a way as to identify unambiguously, if sometimes artificially, the nature of their problems. One example is in divorce cases, where the courts may focus on one incident in what is a complex and often not very clear-cut series of problems. In spite of the zero-sum nature and formality of many of their procedures, public-formal adjudicators occasionally do seek compromise and flexibility. Since they are substantively more concerned with right or wrong, and with enforcing general norms, than with the resumption of "normal" relations between the parties, the processes through which this flexibility is introduced may be quite unique. A number of means have been devised for reconciling new experiences and expectations with past values, while at the same time preserving at least the illusion that the law is consistent over time. The development of equity is one well-known technique of providing "justice" to the parties where a strict application of the law would be unjust.[53] Furthermore, the formal adjudication of disputes is, at least in some countries, an essential if somewhat awkward means of reinforcing or changing public policy. This is bound to have an important effect on the way in which essentially private or localized disputes are settled. For those who seek to bring public norms to bear in essentially private disputes, and thus broaden the range of perspectives relevant to their problem, litigation is an attractive mode of participation.[54] For them the "public regardingness"[55] which is attached to all disputes brought to the courts is an advantage which outweighs group ties or cultural norms designed to discourage this form of political participation.

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[48] See Daniel Boorstin, "The Perils of Indwelling Law," in *The Rule of Law*, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (New York. Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 75–97.

[49] See *A Research Plan for a Caseload Forecasting Study: Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center, 1972), p. 24. The influence of legal changes on litigation can be seen in reference to the growth of prisoner petitions in the federal courts. Recent Supreme Court decisions, for instance *Fay* v. *Noia* (1963), *Miranda* v. *Arizona* (1966) and *Gideon* v. *Wainwright* (1963), have gone far to stimulate the extraordinary growth in the number of prisoner petitions filed since 1960. In that year approximately 2,000 petitions were filed; by 1970 more than 16,000 were being filed annually. See *The Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 119.

[50] This requirement is not adhered to in all courts. In fact, some courts have been established so as to avoid the need to rely upon legal specialists. For a discussion of one type of court where lawyers are generally not employed see Barbara Yngvesson and Patricia Hennessey, "Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature" *Law and Society Review*, 9 (Winter, 1975), 219–274.

[51] The role of lawyers in adjudicative bodies is discussed by Herbert Jacob, *Justice in America*, pp. 60–64. See also Richard Wasserstrom, "Lawyers and Revolution," in *Radical Lawyers*, ed. Jonathan Black (New York. Avon, 1971), pp. 74–84.

[52] It should be noted, of course, that within a formal "zero-sum" structure of rules and rights the working ideology may be significantly more oriented toward compromise and official discretion. The disparity between the two has recently become the basis of much concern. See, *inter alia*, Kenneth Davis, *Discretionary Justice* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971).

[53] Paul Freund, "Social Justice and the Law," in *Social Justice*, ed. Richard Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 110–117.

We have described and analyzed a variety of adjudicative alternatives which disputants employ to resolve particular disputes. As a general rule, we, like Herbert Jacob, believe that the likelihood that parties will bring disputes to courts varies inversely with the availability of less formal, and less public alternatives.[56] Where informal public or private remedies of all types are available they generally provide less costly means (in the psychological as well as material sense) of settling disputes and as such will be more attractive than formal, public bodies. The desire to minimize costs may be offset, however, by other factors, including the nature of the social context in which the dispute occurs, the nature of the dispute itself, the goals of the disputants, and their overall cost-benefit claculations. In the next section of the paper we will examine the influence of these factors on the process by which adjudicative institutions become involved in the definition, interpretation, and management of conflict.

The Process of Mobilization

Understanding how adjudicative institutions become involved in conflict and conflict management is complicated by the absence, in most societies, of any statistics on the use of such institutions and by the inscrutability of the available data. In order fully to assess the role of courts and other adjudicators in dispute settlement it would be necessary to construct what might be called a "use-dispute index." Such an index would relate the frequency with which adjudicative institutions are mobilized to the total number of disputes in society. Construction of such an index is not possible at present since there is no available empirical information about the total number of disputes in this or any other society; indeed, in most societies the only available usage information deals solely with the mobilization of courts.[57] The frequency and range of mobilization of other kinds of adjudicators remain a mystery.

The Social Context. Mobilization sets the parameters of adjudicative activity. There is little consensus about the factors most important in explaining why individuals or groups turn to adjudicative institutions to help in the resolution of social conflict. Anthropologists and sociologists have conceived of the mobilization of adjudication as one among many means of regulating social relations. They have tried to determine whether and why different types of adjudicative institutions are involved in dispute resolution by positing what might be called a "social develop-

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[54] For a discussion of the strategies of litigation employed by various reform groups see Joel Handler, 'Social Reform Groups and the Legal System: Enforcement Problems" (Institute for Research on Poverty, Madison, Wisconsin, 1974).

[55] This value is first defined by Banfield and Wilson in *City Politics.*

[56] See Herbert Jacob, *Debtors in Court* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 20.

[57] Such data as there are suggest that there are wide-ranging differences among societies in the frequency with which judicial intervention in dispute settlement is sought. This is amply demonstrated by the data presented below, a simple index of civil cases initiated per unit of population for selected countries. Even allowing for the crudeness of these data, the table does more than suggest the wide

Litigation Rates

Country	*Civil Cases per 100,000 Population*	
Australia	5,277	(1969)
Denmark	4,844	(1969)
New Zealand	4,423	(1969)
Great Britain	3,605	(1969)
West Germany	2,085	(1969)
Japan	1,257	(1970)
Sweden	683	(1970)
Finland	493	(1970)
Norway	307	(1970)
South Korea	172	(1963)

variation in litigation rates. Some of the variations shown may be accounted for by different reporting techniques and by the concealment, under alternative labels, of what are essentially judicial processes. There is considerable variance in the accuracy of litigation statistics. Similar types of cases are treated differently in different countries. The use of administrative and other special tribunals to settle disputes which, elsewhere come to courts of general jurisdiction affects the reliability of this index. The table presented above uses the "raw" figures and does not attempt to correct for functional similarities reported under different category headings. The number of civil cases filed at the basic trial level was ascertained in all cases except Great Britain from each nation's statistical abstract. The British figures were obtained from the report of the Lord High Chancellor, *Civil Judicial Statistics* (Command Paper 4721, July, 1971). The United States has not been included because of the unavailability of adequate statistics from all 50 states at the time this paper was written. See Joel B. Grossman and Austin Sarat, "Litigation in the Federal Courts. A Comparative Perspective," *Law and Society Review*, 9 (Spring, 1975), 321–346.

ment theory." According to this theory, variation in the process of mobilization is a function of the level of complexity, differentiation, and scale of a social structure. The argument is that as the complexity, differentiation, and scale of a society increases, reliance on courts and other formal-public adjudicators also increases.[58]

Increased reliance on formal-public types of adjudication results from changes in the nature of social relationships which appear to accompany processes of social development. In less developed societies, individuals have relatively stable and enduring contacts and relationships with a limited range of others.[59] Conflict which occurs in such settings is easier to resolve informally. Generally there will be a framework of trust, a larger context of ongoing relationships between the disputing parties,[60] and a concomitant desire to resolve the conflict in a way which permits restoration of normal relations.[61] Galanter notes, in comparing common law and indigenous processes of dispute settlement in colonial India:

> The common law proceeds on the basis of equality before the law, while indigenous dispute settlement finds it unthinkable to separate the parties from their statuses and relations. The common law gives a clear cut "all or none" decision, while indigenous processes seek a face-saving solution agreeable to all parties; the common law deals with only a single isolated offense or transaction while the indigenous system sees this as arbitrarily leaving out the underlying dispute of which this may be one aspect.[62]

In such a setting, we would expect a much more frequent reliance on indigenous processes than on the formal-public common law system.

In more complex societies, individuals may have a wider range of contacts. Fleeting and transitory interaction between strangers is more common, and disputes occur more often between parties who have nothing more in common than the dispute itself. Under such conditions informal adjudication is a less acceptable alternative. But even in more complex societies, where relationships are ongoing and stable, as in certain economic transactions or in marriage, the mobilization of formal-public adjudicative institutions will generally be avoided.[63] The social development model predicts that courts and other formal and public adjudicators will play a more important role in dispute settlement in developed as opposed to underdeveloped or developing societies because non face-to-face relationships proliferate in these complex societies. As Marc Galanter formulates the hypothesis, ". . . the more inclusive in life space and temporal span a relationship between parties, the less likely it is that those parties will resort to the official system and more likely that the relationship will be regulated by some independent private system."[64]

The social development approach has entered political science in the work of Herbert Jacob. In his attempt to explain intercity differences in the use of courts in bankruptcy and garnishment proceedings, Jacob notes that individuals and business in cities marked by a "modern political culture" are more prone to resort to the courts to resolve their disputes than are those in less developed areas. Among the most important indicators of the presence of this culture motif are a high rate of geographic mobility among the residents of an area and a high level of bureaucratization.[65] Both are symptoms of breakdown in the kind of close personal and social relationships found in more traditional and less litigious cultures.[66]

The social development perspective has occupied an important place in the literature on conflict and conflict resolution, but it is especially problematic in its tendency to give rise to ideal types. Explanations based on this theory often do not account for what Leopold Pospisil has identified as the multiplicity of legal levels that exist in any society.

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[58] For a discussion of this relationship, see David M. Trubek, "Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism," 1972 *Wisconsin Law Review*, 720–753.

[59] P. H. Gulliver, "Case Studies of Law in Non-Western Societies," in *Law in Culture and Society*, ed. Laura Nader (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 15. Also see Richard D. Schwartz and James C. Miller, "Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity," *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (September, 1964), 159–169; and Richard D. Schwartz, "Legal Evolution and the Durkheim Hypothesis: A Reply to Professor Baxi," *Law and Society Review*, 8 (Summer, 1974), 653–668.

[60] Max Gluckman, *The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia*, 2nd edition (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1967), p. 21.

[61] Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change," *Law and Society Review*, 9 (Fall, 1974), 95–160. Daniel Lev, *Islamic Courts in Indonesia* (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1972).

[62] Marc Galanter, "Hindu Law and the Development of the Modern Indian Legal System" (paper presented at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 25.

[63] This is true to the point at which parties wish to terminate these relationships. See Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations."

[64] Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead," p. 130. Also Vilhelm Aubert, "Law as a Way of Resolving Conflicts," in Nadar, p. 286.

[65] Jacob, *Debtors in Court*, chapter 6.

[66] According to the social development model, as social relationships become attenuated and economic relationships more complex and less personal, there should be greater reliance on official and more public means of dispute settlement. If we accept urbanization (percentage of the population in cities of 100,000 or more) as one indicator of social development it is possible to hypothesize a relationship between urbanization and the rate of litigation. For the countries listed in the Table in Note 57 there is a correlation of .617 (sig. level .05) between urbanization and litigation rate.

> Any human society . . . does not possess a single consistent legal system, but as many such systems as there are functioning subgroups. Conversely, every functioning subgroup of a society regulates the relations of its members by its own legal system, which is of necessity different, at least in some respects, from those of other subgroups.[67]

The social development model posits a process of displacement in which one form of dispute settlement becomes dominant in a society. It would be more accurate to argue that as societies develop, various modes of conflict resolution are incorporated into, rather than displaced from, a society's conflict management system.

Furthermore, the social development model implies, if it does not directly present, a linear assumption that the rate of mobilization of courts and other public-formal adjudicators increases directly and continuously as societies develop. The relationship between development and the prominence of these adjudicative institutions in dispute settlement, however, is true only up to a point.[68] A look at the development of litigation in England[69] and Spain[70] suggests that there may be some break point in this relationship; the rise in the prominence and use of courts which accompanies development may occur only until a certain "critical mass" has been reached.

In the linear model social relationships which approach a specified level of impersonality and complexity can no longer be handled dyadically or informally; resort to some formal public adjudicative institution is necessary. After reaching a further threshold, however, social relationships may become so much more complex and specialized that generalist courts no longer have the expertise, and hence the legitimacy, to intervene effectively. At this point administrative remedies or less formal mechanisms such as arbitration are invoked. When relationships become as interdependent in the complex organization of postindustrialized societies as they were—or are—in primitive ones, the need for harmonious problem solving which preserves relationships is reasserted, with some resulting movement away from litigation.[71]

In sum, the process of involving adjudicative bodies in defining, interpreting, and managing conflict varies with the level of development of a society. Figure I depicts a *hypothetical* relationship between the level of development and the mobilization of courts. In the least developed societies, courts, if they exist at all, may be used little.[72] More highly developed societies, or those in a rapid state of change, are likely to emphasize the role of courts and show higher rates of litigation. Finally, in the most developed societies, the process of mobilization is likely to result in a more balanced utilization of courts and other adjudicative bodies.

The mobilization of adjudicative institutions cannot be analyzed solely in terms of a social development model. We must focus also on additional variables which specify the relationship of social context to the process of mobilization.

Chief among these variables are the nature of the dispute between the parties, the goals of the

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[67] Leonard Pospisil, "Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 11 (March, 1967), 3.

[68] This relationship has been examined for the United States by Grossman and Sarat, "Litigation in the Federal Courts."

[69] For a discussion of the development of litigation in Great Britain see Lawrence Friedman, "Functions of Trial Courts in the Modern World," pp. 21, ff.

[70] See Jose J. Toharia, "Economic Development and Litigation: The Case of Spain" (presented at Conference on Sociology of Judicial Process, University of Bielefeld, German Federal Republic, 1973), pp. 14, ff.

[71] The movement away from litigation to arbitration is well known and documented. For example, Bonn reports that from 1961 to 1969, in the Southern District of New York, the number of contract actions filed in the federal court declined absolutely, while at the same time the commercial case load of the American Arbitration Association more than doubled. Robert L. Bonn, "Arbitration: An Alternative System for Handling Contract Related Disputes," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17 (June, 1972), 254–264. See also Leonard Downie, Jr., *Justice Denied* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), pp. 202–203 and Jerome Frank, *Courts on Trial: Myth and Realty in American Justice* (New York. Atheneum, 1963), chapter 27.

A similar movement from litigation to arbitration has been noted in Sweden and Denmark. See Britt-Mari Blegvad, P.O. Bolding and Ole Landon, *Arbitration as a Means of Solving Conflicts* (Copenhagen: New Social Science Monographs, 1973), pp. 103–109; and Blegvad, "The 'Choice' Between Litigation and Arbitration" (presented at a Conference on Sociology of Judicial Process, University of Bielefeld, German Federal Republic, 1973).

We would expect that those who seek alternatives to litigation either have a better chance at winning in those alternative forums or see advantages in the speed, lower costs, flexibility and expertise of arbiters. On the other hand, arbitration has transferred a considerable amount of political and economic power away from public agencies to private groups who can operate outside of the restraints of legal and constitutional rules. See also James L. Stern, "Alternative Dispute Settlement Procedures," *Wisconsin Law Review*, No. 4 (1968), 1100–1112. Yet, private arbitration remains dependent on the existence of courts, and arbitration decisions themselves may be the subject of litigation, usually in a suit to compel enforcement. See Thomas J. McDermott, "Arbitrability: The Courts Versus Arbitration," *Arbitration Journal*, 23, No. 1 (1968), 18–37.

[72] See Jane Collier, *Law and Social Change Among the Zinacanton* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).



Figure 1. Social Development and the Mobilization of Courts

disputants, and perceptions of the costs and benefits of seeking different types of adjudicative relief. Of course, in every case the decision to involve courts or other adjudicators is predicated on a prior recognition that there is a more or less real conflict for which relief is possible, and that there is a remedy which can be sought. Studies of legal services programs have noted the importance of this threshold requirement in explaining the nonuse of courts by poor people. And there is good reason to believe, though as yet little empirical evidence, that recognition of available legal remedies is generally low even in societies in which the frequency of litigation is comparatively high.[73]

The Nature of the Dispute. Conflicts may be distinguished on a variety of grounds.[74] Perhaps the most fruitful categorization involves the theoretical distinction between interests and values; in practice of course there is considerable overlap. Conflicts of interest occur where two or more actors want the same thing. Normally, this type of situation is more conducive to compromise, either because the object in demand can be divided or because some equivalent can be substituted for it. Conflicts over values, however, tend to be less conducive to negotiation because they are less tangible and more symbolic. The currency of easy compromise is often lacking and the psychic cost of compromising "principles" is much greater than that of a satisfactory mutual adjustment of other types of interests.

Of course, not all differences over values result in social conflict. People may agree to disagree, or simply ignore the contrary beliefs of others. Conflicts are frequently turned inward and resolved by processes of dissonance reduction. But where conflicts of value do occur, we expect that they are more likely to result in mobilization of formal-public adjudicators than are conflicts of interest. In practice, disagreements over principles may be resolvable only through the kind of zero-sum decisions which the judiciary provides; conflicts of interest may be more readily handled in other adjudicative or nonadjudicative settings.[75]

The involvement of any particular level of adjudicative institution also depends on the complexity of a dispute. One does not usually "make a federal case" out of a simple personal problem that could either be settled by the parties themselves because of a common interest in dispute avoidance or by quick reference to available third parties. So the process of mobilization clearly depends not only on the nature of a dispute—i.e., whether it involves interest or values—but also on its magnitude. A sense of right and wrong may condition the response of both parties to a dispute, but it may not be strong enough to merit taking the risks and incurring the costs of bringing it to a public forum.[76] In the United States, it is first the cost of litigation, when weighed against the magnitude of the claim, that discourages most people from litigating automobile accident claims and encourages reliance on informal alternative means of settlement.[77]

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[73] On the recognition of legal needs see Gresham Sykes, "The Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver," *Law and Society Review*, 4 (November, 1969), 255–277. Almond and Verba did report that only two per cent of their sample would try to change government policy by going to court. Jacob's application of the same questions produced comparable results. But what they were tapping was only a small component of a more generalized attitude about going to court to resolve disputes. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Litle, Brown, 1965), pp. 148–160; and Jacob, *Debtors in Court*, p. 233.

[74] Conflict, as used in this paper and generally in the literature, is a "state existing between two (or more) individuals characterized by some overt signs of antagonism." See Vilhelm Aubert, "Competition and Dissensus," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7 (March, 1963), 25.

[75] Blegvad et al. report data which suggest that conflicts of interest may be more productive of arbitration and less productive of litigation than conflicts of value. *Arbitration as a Means of Solving Conflicts*, p. 139. However, this does not necessarily mean that conflicts of value will numerically predominate in the caseloads of courts. In fact, preliminary data from another study show without question that most litigation in American courts involves what would seem, by the above definition, to be conflicts of interest. What appears to be a conflict between these data and the hypothesis is easily resolved if one makes the entirely plausible assumption that conflicts of interest represent a much larger universe from which a relatively small sample of disputes is mobilized to the stage of judicial proceedings.

The decision about how to deal with a dispute, no matter what its magnitude, is sometimes a matter of private choice and sometimes a matter of public policy; it may also reflect both factors. For instance, whether or not a dispute is taken to court is in some sense at the discretion of one of the litigants who may be forced by the nature of the dispute to take the more active hand in its settlement. This very discretion in deciding when to bring a dispute to court depends on the existence of alternatives to the courts, and it is increased the more that the presence of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms is accompanied by relatively open access to these forums. On the other hand, official policy and structure are important factors influencing the choice of sites in dispute settlement. Depending on the nature and magnitude of a dispute, government may act to prevent or penalize recourse to nonofficial arenas of dispute settlement; it may seek to structure disputes in such a way as to preclude private settlement. We know from the work of Edelman and others that what government does and says influences perceptions of who are adversaries, how they will behave toward each other, what is the extent of individual rights and how readily government may be called upon to protect such rights.[78] It suggests appropriate patterns of behavior and expectations about relationships in each type of dispute and it may stimulate and direct various forms of participation designed to influence how disputes are managed. Just as private norms may come to be reflected in public policy and law, so too law and policy may shape the substance and development of private norms. In sum, what government does influences the nature and existence of a dispute, the choice of how it is to be handled, and the rules for its resolution.

The Goals of the Disputants. The process of mobilization is importantly shaped by the goals of the disputants. Where goals are specific, as they often are in disputes between individuals, adjudication may satisfy the need for short-term, finite, and relatively immediate disposition of issues. Where goals are more diffuse and long term, as they often are with organizations, the mobilization of adjudication will serve primarily instrumental purposes. Those pursuing longer-range, and more policy-oriented, goals are likely to seek an adjudicative framework in which a record can be accumulated, and where decisions will have precedent value. A high premium will also be placed on the attainment of rule or policy change.

In any conflict situation, the more active of the disputants may choose to bring the dispute to an arena where non-zero-sum resolutions can be obtained. In such a case the relationship among the parties in the dispute is not "strictly competitive." Alternatively, the nature of the goals may dictate a more competitive strategy in which negotiation or reconciliation is unacceptable. Additionally, the goals of the disputants determine the extent to which they are willing to publicize their dispute. In some cases, recourse to courts will be a central element in a strategy which seeks to remedy or neutralize inequalities of status, bargaining power and other resources.[79] Formal litigation may be strategically advantageous to less powerful individuals or groups since decisions derived from litigation are not made on the basis of power alone.[80] Finally, the process of mobilization will involve a decision about whether the dispute must be played out against certain formal rules or whether it can be handled in a less formal fashion. Such decisions about strategy are not exclusively the autonomous preferences of the disputants. Prevailing cultural norms about the legitimacy of private action (self-help) in one dispute but not another, or the preference for harmonious solutions in certain types of situations, will influence strategic decisions.

Prior Experiences and Perceptions of Costs and Benefits. The calculation of costs and benefits may be a strictly objective process for those organizations which repeatedly involve adjudicative bodies in conflict and conflict resolution. It may represent a more subjective and possibly more expressive decision on the part of individuals, particularly those with no prior experience in resolving disputes in this manner. Experience with any single means of adjudication is a critical determinant of the actions of disputants at any time in the future. For example, as Galanter suggests, those with a long history of litigation activity will be more ready to litigate, and more successful in litigating, than those rarely faced with such a choice (although even such repetitive litigants as creditors and insurance companies only litigate in a fraction of the cases where it is possible to do so).[81] It should also be noted that choosing to litigate is not only a choice of plaintiffs. Insurance companies who appear primarily as defendants in personal injury cases may nonetheless "control" the decision to litigate by their prior bargaining tactics with individual tort claimants. The decision to take disputes to court is, thus, often a decision by one party who rejects the use of other alternatives.

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[76] H. Laurence Ross, *Settled Out of Court. The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p. 144.

[77] *Ibid.*

[78] Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham, 1971), p. 10 and *passim*.

[79] As Dolbeare argues, people are more likely to use the courts when the balance of other political forces is against them, *Trial Courts in Urban Politics.*

[80] By involving the official third-party intervention of the courts, new rules and new actors, not always predictable, enter the dispute. Flexibility may be lost. When a dispute rises to a certain level of prominence the sphere of conflict may be enlarged, increasing the resources of one side to the disadvantage of the other. The political value of resources such as money, popular support, and interest group aggregation may be devalued in the judicial context, which places a great premium on individual effort, individual rights, and a more "objective" or abstract approach to conflict resolution.

The importance of repeated experience with courts and other formal-public bodies contributes, along with the cost factor, to the observed dominance of organizations and private groups as initiators of litigation. The major distinction among those who bring disputes to court, as opposed to bringing them to other adjudicative bodies, is based less on differences in attitudes or dispositions favorable to this particular form of participation than on differences in resources associated with varying levels of organization. As a general rule, the costs, both in time and money, of involving adjudicative institutions in conflict resolution rise as one moves from private and informal arenas to more public and/or formal bodies. The "costs" of mobilizing any particular adjudicator, however, may be as different among organizations with different goals and structures as they are between individuals and organizations who are experienced in this process. Losing a case involves only a bookkeeping debit to a large organization, with no demonstrable effect on the organization or its goals. To an individual disputant the costs of losing—but also possibly the benefits of winning—are significantly greater. Perhaps it is not surprising that organizations are the largest single users of the civil trial courts,[82] nor that the prototypical civil case is composed of an organization (most frequently creditor institution or banks) as plaintiff against an individual as defendant.

However it is calculated, we expect that disputants, whether individuals or groups, will choose an adjudicative forum which they believe will help minimize their "conflict costs" and increase the likelihood of a desired outcome. Adjudicative forums generally provide an immediate payoff; someone wins and someone loses. As a result, before initiating a lawsuit an individual or group may try to calculate a "risk" factor and weigh this factor against the possible benefits to be derived either from doing nothing or from invoking a different, perhaps less formal, adjudicative process. This calculation involves an assessment of the nature of the dispute at issue, the relevant goals, and the relationship between the parties as well as the economic costs and benefits. This summary judgment goes far in establishing whether or not a court will be employed as a means of dealing with—i.e., defining, interpreting and managing—conflict.

In summary, the process of mobilizing adjudicative institutions is difficult and complex. It varies with the characteristics of the institutions themselves as well as with the nature of the social context in which they are located. The process of mobilization is also influenced by the nature and magnitude of the issues in dispute, the goals of the individual disputants, and, finally, a judgment of the costs to be incurred and benefits likely to be derived from using one or another alternative. The process of mobilization and the reasons for involving the courts in dispute settlement are important in determining how courts and other adjudicators operate and what they do. These factors provide an important focus for future research. Most important of all, the process of adjudicative mobilization has important consequences for the stability of government and the political system.

The Impact of Adjudicative Mobilization

The various types of adjudicative processes we have discussed may exist separately or in combination; where they do exist in the same society their functioning is not clearly insulated or distinct. This is true both with respect to structure and methods of operation. Adjudication often is only a phase or tactic in ongoing processes of conflict resolution. Settlements reached through adjudication are not always definitive. Indeed, a common strategy of adjudication is to prolong and widen a dispute rather than settle it. Frequently, adjudication is only conclusive for the parties but not for the issue.

Even after "settlement," conflict and the need for conflict resolution often continue. Current solutions become part of future problems which, in turn, may involve a return to some of the adjudicative alternatives which we have discussed previously; or they may involve the displacement of conflict into a nonadjudicative setting. The processes by which disputes are resolved result in the fragmentation of some conflicts. This fragmentation is often required by the norms and procedures of the various agencies of dispute resolution. If an agency is equipped to handle only certain types of issues, conflicting parties are forced to sublimate or divert parts of their dispute which go beyond those issues. As a result disputes are often settled piecemeal. The phenomenon of fragmentation certainly is not unique to the judicial process, but it may help to account for the lack of finality often associated with court decisions.

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[81] Craig Wanner, "The Public Ordering of Private Relations," *Law and Society Review*, 8 (Spring, 1974), 421–440; and Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead." Also, at the individual level cost considerations seem to produce a bias in court usage in favor of higher SES people. See Robert Hunting and Gloria Neuwirth, *Who Sues in New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 98–110

[82] Wanner, p. 437 and *passim*.

In terms of the structure of dispute-settling alternatives, where a society possesses the full range of conflict-resolving devices, they can be depicted best in the form of a pyramid, with the more numerous private-informal mechanisms composing the foundation and the least numerous and more residual public and formal devices congregated at the top.[83] There is no strict hierarchical relationship intended here. The dimensions of publicness and formality, while they clearly increase as one approaches the top of the pyramid, do not always go together in the same proportion. Symmetry would be a poor guide to understanding this pyramid, yet it is not formless or without structure.

We suggested earlier that every government[84] has an important stake in the manner in which disputes arise and are resolved. It is better able to impose procedural requirements and influence the substantive results of dispute resolution the closer to the top of the pyramid that a dispute occurs. Adjudicative dispute resolution at the base may help to defuse and deflect social conflicts and to decrease the workload burdens on official dispute resolution mechanisms. But the procedures and, more important, the results of low level adjudication may be noticeably at variance with those in the more public and formal processes. For example, plea bargaining often produces a more lenient pattern of sanctions than would be produced by formal adjudication of guilt. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that government has an immediate and direct interest in promoting the movement of some conflicts from the base of the structure of dispute resolution toward the top. This is certainly true where the government itself is a party to a dispute. But there are occasions where the government, as a surrogate third-party mediator, has a greater interest in "solving" the dispute than do the nominal adversaries.[85]

Alternatively, there are some conflicts whose very appearance in public arenas would be severe threats to stability, for example, conflicts about the form of government itself. One would expect government efforts to prevent or discourage such conflicts from surfacing or at least from reaching the top of the pyramid. Most often, government will follow a mixed policy. Statements and symbols of goals and values appropriate to a particular level of conflict resolution will be disseminated. At the same time protagonists will be encouraged to seek less visible means of redress, with the emphasis on conciliation rather than on formal judgment or sanctions. Formal government intervention will remain a last resort. Emergence of a conflict at the highest formal levels of dispute settlement may indicate a failure of lower level bargaining and accommodation; it may also represent the beginning of a new phase of conflict.

Accepting a particular mode of conflict resolution as legitimate, and participating in it, implies acceptance of a range of values which affects substantive results as well as the stability of the social order. Acceptance of a vague notion of "due process of law" or "fair procedure" by American courts has greater consequences than merely facilitating acceptance of certain rules and forms of adjudication. If this is correct, then not only the frequency with which different types of adjudicators are mobilized but the supporting values which make them viable mechanisms of conflict resolution have an important and positive impact on social and political stability. As de Tocqueville says in discussing the consequences of service on a jury,

> The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens. . . . It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right. . . . It teaches men to practice equity; every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged. . . .

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[83] The location of the prototypical conflict resolution medium for a particular type of dispute would of course vary among societies. See Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, *The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law* (Cambridge. Tentative edition, 1958), pp. 312–313. The Hart and Sacks pyramid is often rightly criticized for overemphasizing the importance and primacy of the upper layers. Our use of the same metaphor is descriptive only. Certainly it would be contrary to much that we say elsewhere in this paper to endorse a top down view of the legal system. Morton Grodzins's "Marble Cake" metaphor, by which he described the federal system, might almost be more appropriate. Grodzins, "Centralization and Decentralization in the American Federal System," in *A Nation of States,* ed. Robert Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 1–4.

[84] In our discussion in this section of the paper we treat government as a single unified whole. We are aware, however, that this treatment does not do justice to reality. We recognize that one unit of government may encourage use of the courts while other units discourage use. This is particularly important where the courts themselves, as a part of government, encourage or discourage litigation while other government bodies may be doing the opposite.

[85] Cf. Eckhoff, "The Mediator and the Judge," p. 172 and *passim.*

> The jury teaches every man not to recoil from the responsibility of his own actions. . . . By obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs than their own, it rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of society.[86]

Initially, one might expect to find that in industrialized societies a high frequency of litigation would be positively related to stability since, as we suggested earlier, government may be better able to impose procedural and substantive constraints on conflict resolution in formal, public institutions.[87] Conversely, a high frequency of disputes unresolved, or unresolvable by recourse to litigation, would be inversely related to stability. It does not follow, however, that a low frequency of litigation in industrialized societies will contribute to or is symptomatic of instability. A low level of litigation may indicate a high degree of formal and informal consensus about basic values throughout the population, which serves to depress potential conflict. Or it may reflect the existence of alternative dispute-resolution techniques which perform the same function as litigation. As in Japan, it reflects an historical and culture antipathy toward formalization of dispute resolution. Indeed, any society which was so rule-oriented and formalistic as even to approach the conditions suggested by the paradigm of "perfectly litigious man"[88] would evince instability for several reasons, not the least important being rigidity and inability to respond to rapidly changing social conditions. Finally, as an inspection of the data reported in footnote 57 suggests, there is probably no *direct* relationship between the frequency of litigation and social stability.

Nevertheless, there are important ways in which litigation affects stability indirectly. We can identify at least three. First, we have already suggested that the output of litigation often serves as a guide to the nonlitigious settlement of many similar disputes, becoming an important factor in private and informal bargaining. Beyond that, however, litigation also serves as a structural model. Just as one finds basic majoritarian principles and parliamentary rules of order in many private groups, so too it is likely that the procedures of litigation in the courts, procedures designed to bolster the legitimacy of both the courts and the regime of which they are a part,[89] are widely copied and utilized in private dispute settlements.[90] American society, as has been noted by many observers, is characterized by a strong and increasing tendency toward legalization, or governance by rules. Litigation appears to promote this tendency, and is itself in turn a product of it.[91]

Second, litigation plays a role in absorbing pressures in key issue areas that might otherwise threaten the capacity of the nonadjudicative conflict resolution system. Grievances, even those beginning in a dyadic and fairly private relationship, may, if not settled, escalate into more intense and often more organized and widespread demands on the political system. Politicians who criticize judicial decisions proclaiming a particular set of rights as threats to their own power and authority often fail to appreciate the contribution of such decisions to system maintenance. On occasion litigation promotes decisions which appear to threaten the sovereignty of legislative or executive branches. But often litigation actually translates a number of demands which really do threaten a system into decisions which appear as symbolic victories to those seeking change, while at the same time preserving the existing system with little measurable change. This kind of "conflict displacement," which characterized early responses to the civil rights movement in the United States,[92] is possible because participants in the judicial system are encouraged to take comfort in the "individual" treatment each will receive, apart from others of the same class or with similar grievances. These are precisely the circumstances which can most effectively depoliticize and absorb large numbers of grievances while minimizing aggregative threats to the system. Litigants who recognize the common ground they share with others may well be disposed to seek a different and more threatening kind of participation. Not only does litigation encourage particularistic problem-solving efforts but, as Scheingold has observed, its disaggregative tendencies may actually impede the implementation of hard-won policy goals.[93] In the United States, the growth of class actions, test cases, and generally the use of litigation as a tactic to mobilize political forces has tended somewhat to counter its otherwise isolative tendencies.

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[86] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Knopf, 1945), pp. 291–297.

[87] A high frequency of litigation in a particular geographic area, or about a particular set of problems, might indicate temporary instability but promise a transition into a more stable environment. There are numerous examples just in the United States in recent years—questions of the rights of juveniles, prisoners, students, and persons subjected to involuntary civil commitment—of relationships which had been handled more or less bureaucratically and one-sidedly but which have now become "judicialized" and at least temporarily less stable. One could take the position that schools or prisons were run more efficiently when all disputes were settled internally. Or it could be argued that recourse to the courts provided a safety valve to stabilize conditions which, because of other social forces, were no longer responsive to the old rules.

[88] See Jerome Frank, *Courts on Trial,* p. 92 and *passim.*

[89] For an interesting discussion of the relationship of court procedures and regime legitimacy see Isaac Balbus, *The Dialectics of Legal Repression* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), chapter 1

[90] See Theodore L. Becker, *Comparative Judicial Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), pp. 109–112. Public norms may also reflect emerging norms of private dispute resolution.

[91] See Stuart Scheingold, *The Politics of Rights* (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1974), p. 48 and *passim.* Also see *Goss* v. *Lopez,* 42L.Ed.2d725 (1975), where the Supreme Court extended some due process guarantees to high school students threatened with suspension.

[92] Duane Lockard, *Toward Equal Opportunity* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 142.

The third, and perhaps most important, stability-related function of litigation concerns its impact on individual attitudes toward, and support of, regime values. We have already suggested that litigation promotes acceptance of rules of fair procedure and acceptance of the legitimacy of the institutions which approve and profess to follow these rules. It also produces a feeling of confidence that the political system is concerned with fairness and justice, a feeling which encourages individuals to accept decisions with which they might not agree, but decisions which are made fairly. This is not to say that litigation, or the values which are embodied in formal-public adjudicative institutions, can legitimize the entire political system; in fact, there is some evidence that contact with the courts does not even produce favorable evaluation of the courts.[94] Litigation is just one process among many which contribute to, but cannot themselves insure, the maintenance of support for the political system of which it is a part.

Although litigation in some way contributes to system stability through its influence on individual attitudes, it may also encourage certain attitudes which are, at least in part, threatening to that stability. Specifically, litigation encourages claims of "rights," claims which, as Friedman has so perceptively noted, may be dysfunctional to social equilibrium. By encouraging people to think of themselves as possessors of "rights," litigation encourages the transformation of conflicts of interest into conflicts of principle, conflicts which are both more intense and more difficult to resolve. At the same time, litigation promises more than it can provide. The institutions of a society are usually not set up to handle all theoretically conceivable rights, all rights to which people may feel entitled. One basic though for obvious reasons unstated assumption of a complex system is that not all rights can or will be claimed.[95] Litigation, by encouraging claims of "right,"[96] makes it difficult for the entire political system to discourage, as it must, certain kinds of claims. Yet, paradoxically, restrictive rules of access to the judicial system insure that the presentation of claims of "right" is a long, difficult, and discouraging process. Only those with persistence and resources can actually make an effective legal claim of "right." As Macaulay and Walster have noted, the legal system may also promote certain rights as theoretically absolute but in fact encourage bargaining which makes the full attainment of such rights impossible.[97]

At this point, we should recognize the existence of what would appear to be a theory of the role of courts and litigation counter to our own. Theodore Becker has argued that

> the key determinant of the effect the court structure has in society may well be a *widely believed* myth that the court is an instrument of social order. The fact that most people in a social group believe that order is forthcoming because of the courts may be the sufficient condition to the maintenance of that very order. That this is held as likely (both consciously and subconsciously) by certain elites probably accounts for the vast amount of literature that supports this belief and helps to reinforce it over time.[98]

Indeed, Becker might well argue that our effort here is just another contribution to the myth.

While there is certainly not adequate evidence to support all the propositions we advance, even less evidence supports Becker's hypothesis. The evidence Becker presents shows only that in some societies social order is maintained without great reliance on litigation or the courts. Of course this is true. But it is doubtful that the people in *those* societies *believe* that the existence of courts is important to the social order. On the other hand, we would not deny that attitudes of efficacy, trust, and diffuse support of governmental institutions, including courts, may be based on citizen misconceptions about themselves and their relationship to government. There is little evidence that people can or do think abstractly enough about the courts to link them to the maintenance of social order. But they may have sufficiently positive feelings about judicial institutions to support a general sense of satisfaction, otherwise derived, which may result in quiescence.

In closing, it is important to note that stability is only one of several dimensions on which to measure the consequences of litigation and litigiousness. Justice and social change are two obvious and important alternatives. A judicial system unable to provide more than the mere symbols of justice is unlikely to be regarded as an attractive dispute-resolution forum by potential litigants. Indeed the importance of the courts as one type of adjudicative institution ultimately rests on their ability to make just decisions. But, in addition, courts must provide a general example of *how* to reach just decisions and of how reasoning and sound judgment can help solve social problems. A system which does not set an example of how just decisions are reached, and of what is just, ought not to be regarded as successful even if political quiescence and social stability are achieved. The legal process will be effective in resolving disputes only if it promises and performs in accord with distinctively "legal" values.[99]

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[93] Scheingold, *The Politics of Rights*, pp. 8, 130 and *passim*.

[94] Jacob, *Debtors in Court*, pp. 117–124.

[95] Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Idea of Right as a Social and Legal Concept," *Journal of Social Issues*, 27, No. 2 (1971), 189–198.

[96] The importance of rights and their relation to litigation and litigation strategies is also discussed by Scheingold, *The Politics of Rights*.

[97] Stewart Macaulay and Elaine Walster, "Legal Structures and Restoring Equity," *Journal of Social Issues*, 27, No. 2 (1971), 173–188.

[98] Becker, p. 113.

Very much related to the concern for justice is the achievement of progressive social change; often the two are equated. No one would argue with the proposition that to remain viable and dynamic, a legal system must reflect major changes in a society. But how much can one expect of the law, and litigation, in positively promoting such change—leading a society instead of following it? Litigation, often at the constitutional level, has played such an important role in promoting equality and due-process norms in the United States in recent years that inevitably a set of exaggerated expectations has developed. Resolution of conflict will always be part of the dynamic of change. But we must be wary, as Trubek and Galanter remind us, of the fallacy of defining legal reality to conform to our moral aspirations. The Liberal-Legalist paradigm, as they define it, manifests a "pervasive belief in the ultimate efficacy of legal rules as instruments of social change."[100] Yet the observed discrepancy between the policy outputs of litigation—rules—and the problems of implementation suggest considerable caution in judging the role of litigation primarily by this standard.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to assess the role of courts and other adjudicative institutions in the definition, interpretation, and management of conflict. We have suggested that such an assessment can be carried out both by comparing courts with other governmental institutions and by comparing courts with institutions performing similar functions in other parts of society; and we have presented the second type of comparison. We have also suggested that to understand the operation of courts and other adjudicative institutions, we must understand the process through which they are mobilized and involved in conflict resolution. Finally, we have argued that this process of mobilization and the more specific process through which courts become involved in defining, interpreting and managing conflict will have important consequences for the political system. In most cases, we have not had the data necessary to test the relationships we suggest or the arguments we present. We hope that our observations will provide at least an initial guide to verification and further theory construction.

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[99] This line of argument was suggested to us by Hadley Arkes. We are not advocating a return to "juridical authority" in the same sense in which Theodore Lowi uses the term. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969), chapter 10. For a good expression of the contrary view, that legalization is the sign of a collapsing social order and not the means of its rejuvenation, see Sanford Levinson, "The Rediscovery of Law," *Soundings* (Fall, 1974), pp. 318–337, esp. p. 333.

[100] David T. Trubek and Marc Galanter, "Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflection on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States," 1975 *Wisconsin Law Review*, 1062–1102. See also Robert Booth Fowler and Joel B. Grossman, "Law, Liberalism and Social Change: A Preface," *American Politics Quarterly*, 2 (July, 1974), 276–312; and Handler, "Social Reform Groups."

Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response*

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Introduction

There can be little doubt that the sophisticated electorates postulated by some of the more enthusiastic democratic theorists do not exist, even in the best educated modern societies. Whatever else students of public opinion find unsettled, agreement is widespread that citizens have, at most, a general grasp of political issues without having well-developed opinions on every question of public policy. Indeed, no public opinion surveys are necessary to establish the point. The sheer volume of business in a large nation makes it impossible for even the most studious voter to follow more than a fraction of it.[1]

Of course, a theory of representative democracy need not require citizen opinions on every issue. Representatives usually are not expected to be mere administrative conveniences, meekly reflecting their constituents' preferences on every bill and thereby saving the polity the expense of continuing referenda. Rather, theories of representation typically attempt to treat politicians as specialists in governmental affairs, thereby saving the ordinary man for other tasks.[2] What is required of citizens is only enough sophistication to choose their representatives. In turn, this requires that the voters implicitly make use of at least some broad notions of public policy, lest they be unable to judge the various candidates for their vote.[3]

The general direction of public opinion research has been to assert that even these minimal orientations toward the polity are lacking. In particular, the public opinion surveys reported by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC) have powerfully supported the bleaker views of voter sophistication.[4] While the SRC has amassed varying evidence about the conceptual skills of voters, the predominant impression these studies yield is that the average citizen has little understanding of political matters. Voters are said to be little influenced by "ideology,"[5] to cast their votes with far more regard to their party identification than to the issues in a campaign,[6] and often to be ignorant of even the names of the candidates for Congress in their district.[7] Needless to say, the impact of these conclusions on democratic theory is enormously destructive.

In fact, an even more fundamental charge has been lodged against the mass public. Criticisms like those just mentioned make the case that voters' preferences on public policy matters are unsophisticated or poorly organized, or that they are without influence in the voting decision. Serious as these allegations are, they stop short of claiming that voters have no policy views whatever. This last charge—that the typical citizen's political thoughts appear ill focused simply because he lacks an image of the world—is far more disturbing than the others. For it is one thing to argue that voters have difficulty connecting their preferences to particular candidates and particular schools of thought, quite another to claim that the preferences are absent from the beginning. Yet, just this claim has been made, notably in the

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[1] For detailed arguments on this point, see Robert A. Dahl, *After the Revolution?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 40–56; and Bertrand de Jouvenal, "The Chairman's Problem," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (June, 1961), 368–72.

[2] A helpful discussion of the many versions of "representation" is Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[3] Even a constituent choosing a legislator in the Burkean tradition requires *some* political opinions, lest he have no means of evaluating the candidate's political judgment.

[4] See especially Angus Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954); Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); Angus Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966); Philip E. Converse et al., "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (June, 1965), 321–36.

[5] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 227–34.

[6] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, ch. 5. A comprehensive review of related literature is Peter B. Natchez, "Images of Voting: The Social Psychologists," *Public Policy*, 18 (Summer, 1970), 553–88. Analyses of voting that give less weight to party identification include David E. RePass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 389–400; and Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 429–49.

[7] Donald Stokes and Warren Miller, "Party Government and Saliency of Congress," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order*, p. 204.

well-known treatment of belief systems in mass publics by Philip Converse.[8]

Converse presents data indicating that the rank-order correlation between what a typical American thinks about a political issue this year and what he will believe two years hence is quite low—.30 to .40 on questions of foreign aid, isolationism, and federally guaranteed employment, for example. This seems to mean that there is little continuity in most voters' thinking. The correlations improve somewhat for racial issues and, more dramatically, for party identification. Converse argues that the high correlations for party ID show that consistency is possible for mass man; it simply does not occur for broad policy issues, since most voters find them meaningless and give a random response.

Similarly, Converse showed that the correlation between pairs of *different* attitudes at the same time was low, usually lower than the correlation over time for either one of them. A voter who believed in federally guaranteed jobs, for example, was only a little more likely than a voter who opposed them to favor government intervention in the housing and electricity markets, in spite of the common intellectual issues seemingly involved. Similar results have appeared in several other studies.[9]

The implication of both these findings, Converse argues, is that even relatively central and permanent issues of American political life have no meaning for the voters, that the issues involved do not form a part of voters' conceptual framework. Hence, for a large part of the population, the answers are essentially random. No real attitudes exist.

Some resistance to these conclusions has developed. Unfortunately, little empirical evidence has been developed to aid Converse's opponents, and most of the resistance has been confined to reinterpretation of his pessimistic results, with an attempt made to explain the findings on other grounds. Thus one occasionally hears the argument that Converse's low over-time correlation coefficients on political attitudes should not surprise us, since the phenomenon of attitude change is common enough. Those familiar, however, with just how weak a relation is represented by a correlation of .30 or .40 will not find the argument very persuasive. Citizens undergoing such erratic attitude change over a two-year interval will inevitably be suspected of having little real concern with the issues involved.

Among the few empirical re-examinations of Converse's findings, perhaps the best is Brown's attempt to demonstrate that voters exhibit considerable over-time attitude stability.[10] Thirty-six subjects, half designated "political articulates" and half "political inarticulates" (on the basis of subjective evaluations by the experimenters), were each given forty-eight general political statements (e.g., "Just because a man is a human being doesn't make him smart enough to vote"). The subjects were then asked to place these statements on a scale of -5 to $+5$ indicating their degree of agreement. Two to six weeks later, the operation was repeated. The placing of the statements typically correlated at .60 to .90 over the time interval, and there seemed to be no major differences between articulates and inarticulates in the strength of the correlations.

Brown's results are intriguing, but not entirely persuasive. One difficulty is that the brief interval between surveys in his study may have allowed respondents to remember their previous answers. If so, the correlations would be biased upward. Furthermore, even if no memory effect occurs, respondents might well exhibit only a little instability over a short interval. A six-week period, after all, is less than one-seventeenth of Converse's two-year interval, and it is perhaps not surprising that attitude stability is greater in the shorter period. This difference in the time interval between surveys, along with other differences in methodology and sampling techniques, makes it difficult to compare Converse's and Brown's results.

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[8] Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–61. See also Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. Edward R. Tufte (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 168–89.

[9] Robert Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Spring, 1967), 51–60; Edward C. Dreyer, "Change and Stability in Party Identification," *Journal of Politics*, 35 (August, 1973), 712–22; and Donald D. Searing et al., "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (June, 1973), 415–32. See also Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (June, 1964), 361–82. For contrary views on related matters, see Norman R. Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs among Leaders and the Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Fall, 1968), 398–409; and Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 415–28.

[10] Steven R. Brown, "Consistency and the Persistence of Ideology: Some Experimental Results," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Spring, 1970), 60–68. Since this article was written, John C. Pierce and Douglas D. Rose have published "Nonattitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (June, 1974), 626–49, which is also an interesting re-examination of Converse's findings. Its idiosyncratic statistical methods and restrictive assumptions, however, make possible several different interpretations of some of its key results, not all of them favorable to the authors' thesis. Many of these difficulties are pointed out by Converse in his powerful reply, pp. 650–60, in the same issue. (See also the rejoinder by Rose and Pierce, pp. 661–66.)

In addition, Converse's survey questions concern national public policy issues, while Brown's deal with very general attitudes toward politics and political actors. Thus one might believe Brown's results and yet remain uncertain about citizens' abilities to cope with even the broadest dimensions of policy in a political campaign. Some such ability seems essential to informed voting decisions. It is difficult to choose among American politicians on the basis of the attitudes Brown measures—beliefs about universal suffrage or the fundamental equality of all men.

If, therefore, Converse's argument can be escaped neither by denying the necessity of public knowledge of policy questions nor by claiming that his respondents exhibit only moderate amounts of attitude change, then his conclusions seem to remain as disturbing as ever. Democratic theory loses its starting point—public opinion on policy matters.

Individual Choice Behavior

A possible escape route remains. Psychologists studying the theory of individual choice have formulated models of human decisions that allow further analysis of Converse's data. These models usually insist that human choice is stochastic, that is, probabilistic. Given a variety of decision situations, each with apparently the same evidence and circumstances, individuals will nevertheless not make identical choices in all of them. Rather, alternative choices are made with varying probabilities. One may regard this phenomenon as an inherent characteristic of human choice or as a failure of the experimenter to recognize all the factors that determine choice: the experimental outcome is the same. People do not have a single preference in most decision situations.[11]

Applied to the analysis of survey questions, this conclusion of the individual choice studies means that citizens will make responses probabilistically. This latter conclusion is not fruitful, however, until two sources of probabilistic choice are disentangled: the variation that is due to the objects of choice and the variation that is due to the chooser himself. In a series of experiments in which subjects were asked to choose among colors of grey, Coombs[12] demonstrated (1) that subjects evaluated any given shade of grey differently at one time point than at another—variation owing to objects of choice—and (2) that their own most-preferred shades also varied from one time period to another—variation owing to the subjects themselves. Subjects were thus somewhat unclear about the choices available to them and about their own preferences.

Schematically, a subject's most-preferred shade may be thought of as a point along a continuum of "greyness," and the other available shades (as perceived by him) may be arrayed as points to its left and right along the same line. The implication of Coombs's study is that both the preferred point and the others may vary somewhat around their mean position for the subject. In a given choice, a subject may be thought of as drawing his most preferred point from the distribution around his central preferred point and likewise drawing the perceived relative positions of the other points from their own distributions. A model of this sort explains choice much better than versions which take either preferences or objects of choice as fixed. (See Figure 1.)

If the results of this study were applied to survey questions, one might expect that the respondent's genuine opinion about, say, foreign aid would be, not a single point, but rather a distribution of points around some central position. Respondents would be assumed not always to "know their own mind." Similarly, the objects of choice, both the questions and the response categories ("strongly agree," "agree," and so on) would also be distributions around central points. That is, survey questions would be treated as vague: respondents will not always respond the same way to the same question even if their attitudes remain unchanged. A subject may say "strongly agree" one time and "agree" the next, simply because of the ambiguity of the question asked or because he is uncertain how strong is "strongly."

Hence, if one were to compare a citizen's responses at any two time periods, one would expect something less than perfect correlation. The size of the correlation would depend on how vague the questions and response categories are (variation owing to the objects of choice) and on how unstable the respondent's views are (variation owing to the subject).

This distinction is important because the normative implications of the two kinds of variability are rather different. The subject's changing posi-

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[11] Two useful reviews of the individual choice literature that discuss stochastic choice and the evidence for it are Ward Edwards, "The Theory of Decision Making," *Psychological Bulletin*, 51 (1954), 380–417, and Ward Edwards, "Behavioral Decision Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 12 (1961), 473–98. Both are reprinted in *Decision Making*, ed. Ward Edwards and Amos Tversky (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), which also includes other discussions of the same topic.

[12] C. H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 106–18. Reprinted in Edwards and Tversky, pp. 319–333.


Probability Density
Distribution of Most-Preferred Point
Distributions of Perceptions of Available Shades
"Greyness"

Figure 1. **Probability distributions of subject's most-preferred shade of grey and of his perceptions of the shades available for choice**

tion presumably represents the sort of variation Converse had in mind. It measures instability of viewpoint. On the other hand, the variation in the questions themselves might conveniently be called "measurement error," since it refers to the inaccuracy with which the underlying attitude is reflected by the survey instrument. If survey questions are vague, then even perfectly stable respondents will appear to be inconsistent. The variation in their responses, therefore, represents errors of observation by the researchers. It is clear that this latter sort of variability is much less serious for democratic theory: it reflects a flaw in the survey research method rather than in the responses of subjects.

Converse does not distinguish between these two sources of variability in voters' responses. In his analysis, both kinds of variability are attributed to subjects' changing positions. The result is an underestimate of voters' attitudinal stability.

The immediate question, of course, is just how much bias Converse's analysis introduces. A statistical model is now put forward which allows an estimate of the stability of voters' responses, uncontaminated by measurement error.

A Model of the Survey Response

Consider the case of a voter whose opinion never changes. This voter may appear to change his views because of the effect of measurement error, but in fact his views remain constant. Now if three interviews are taken with this voter at two-year intervals, as was done with Converse's respondents, we expect his views at time 1 and time 3 to correlate as well as those at time 2 and time 3. If measurement errors obey the usual assumptions (see below), then since all three time periods exhibit the same opinion, there is no reason to think that any two will correlate better than any other two.

By contrast, consider a respondent whose opinions do change but whose responses are observed without error. All observed variation in his views represents genuine opinion change. Suppose for a moment that these changes are essentially random shocks: knowing how a voter changed his views between times 1 and 2 provides no information about how he will change between times 2 and 3. He undergoes a series of random opinion changes. For such an individual, clearly, it will be easier to predict his views at time 3 from time 2 rather than from time 1, simply because one has more up-to-date information at time 2. The voter has had less time to move away. For such a respondent, opinions at the three time periods will *not* be equally correlated. Correlations between adjacent time periods should be higher than that between times 1 and 3. In fact, given the correlations between periods 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3, we can predict under these assumptions precisely what the correlation between periods 1 and 3 should be.

In summary, when a voter is stable in his views and *all* observed variability is measurement error, correlations will be equal across time periods. At the other extreme, when a voter is unstable and there is *no* measurement error, correlations should become smaller at a predictable rate as time periods become more distant from each other. By observing where the data fall between these polar cases, the model estimates the measurement error in each survey question.

The most important assumption in this model is that opinion changes are random. It is this assumption that makes possible the statistical analysis reported below. One would expect in general, however, that opinion change for most respondents is not random. Instead, if a voter becomes more conservative over the first time period, it seems more probable than not that he will continue to do so in the next period. In other language, we expect on the average a positive association between opinion changes in adjacent time intervals. It is shown below that ignoring this possible positive association biases the model in Converse's direction—toward estimates of less measurement error and more respondent variability. As a first approach, therefore, the simpler assumption of random opinion change was made.

By the nature of the assumptions, all sources of observation error are implicitly counted as "measurement error." For example, the model postulates interval-level data, though our measurements are only ordinal. Hence observation error includes not only that from the nature of the questions themselves, discussed in the text, but also the information lost by having only ordinal categories instead of the (postulated) interval scale. Also included as measurement error are those errors that are due to clerical mistakes in coding responses and the biases due to differences in the personal styles of interviewers.[13] In short, any observational errors which meet the assumptions about "measurement error" set out in the model will be included. By far the largest part of the error, however, is expected to be due to the vagueness of the questions.

More formally, denote by p_t the voter's actual opinion at time t and by x_t the observed opinion at time t. Then define u_t, the change in the voter's actual opinion from time t to $t+1$, and e_t, the error of observation at time t, as follows:

$$\text{Defs.}\quad u_t = p_{t+1} - p_t \qquad (1)$$

$$e_t = x_t - p_t$$

In particular, since Converse's study employs three time periods, we have from (1) and (2) for each voter:

$$x_1 = p_1 + e_1 \qquad (3)$$

$$x_2 = p_2 + e_2 = p_1 + u_1 + e_2 \qquad (4)$$

$$x_3 = p_3 + e_3 = p_1 + u_1 + u_2 + e_3 \qquad (5)$$

We make the usual assumptions about measurement errors, that they have an expectation of zero and are uncorrelated with each other and with the variable of interest, actual opinion. We also assume that error variance is constant across time periods, i.e., that the vagueness of each question is a constant.

Assumption Set 1:

$$E(e_t) = 0 \qquad (\text{all } t) \qquad (6)$$

$$E(e_t e_s) = 0 \qquad (\text{all } t, s, t \neq s) \qquad (7)$$

$$E(p_t e_s) = 0 \qquad (\text{all } t, s) \qquad (8)$$

$$E(e_t^2) = \sigma_e^2 \qquad (\text{all } t) \qquad (9)$$

Finally, it is assumed that an individual's opinion changes are independent of each other.

Assumption Set 2:

$$E(u_t u_s) = E(u_t)E(u_s) \qquad (\text{all } t, s, t \neq s) \qquad (10)$$

We now observe the following:
from (1) and (8):

$$E(e_t u_s) = 0 \qquad (\text{all } t, s) \qquad (11)$$

from (3)–(6):

$$E(x_2 - x_1) = E(u_1) \qquad (12)$$

$$E(x_3 - x_2) = E(u_2) \qquad (13)$$

from (3)–(5), (7), (9), (11):

$$\begin{aligned} E(x_2 - x_1)^2 &= E(u_1 + e_2 - e_1)^2 \\ &= E(u_1^2) + 2\sigma_e^2 \qquad (14) \\ E(x_3 - x_2)^2 &= E(u_2 + e_3 - e_2)^2 \\ &= E(u_2^2) + 2\sigma_e^2 \qquad (15) \\ E(x_3 - x_1)^2 &= E(u_2 + u_1 + e_3 - e_1)^2 \\ &= E(u_1^2) + E(u_2^2) \\ &\quad + 2E(u_1 u_2) + 2\sigma_e^2 \qquad (16) \end{aligned}$$

Finally, from (12)–(16), and using (10):

$$\begin{aligned} &\tfrac{1}{2}\{E(x_2 - x_1)^2 + E(x_3 - x_2)^2 - E(x_3 - x_1)^2 \\ &\qquad + 2E(x_2 - x_1)E(x_3 - x_2)\} \\ &= \tfrac{1}{2}\{E(u_1^2) + 2\sigma_e^2 + E(u_2^2) + 2\sigma_e^2 \\ &\quad - E(u_1^2) - E(u_2^2) \\ &\quad - 2E(u_1 u_2) - 2\sigma_e^2 + 2E(u_1)E(u_2)\} \\ &= \sigma_e^2. \qquad (17) \end{aligned}$$

In (17), the expression on the left before the first equality sign involves only expected values of the observed responses and may be estimated from the data. The result will be a consistent[14] estimate of the quantity on the right after the last equality sign, namely, the amount of measurement error variance in the survey question, σ_e^2.

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[13] For examples of the detection of interviewer bias, see Michael J. Shapiro, "Discovering Interviewer Bias in Open-Ended Survey Responses," and W. Andrew Collins, "Interviewers' Verbal Idiosyncrasies as a Source of Bias," both in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Fall, 1970), 412–15 and 416–22, respectively.

[14] Estimates obtained from the model, given the assumptions, meet the conditions required for consistency, i.e., asymptotic convergence in probability to the true values. See P. J. Dhrymes, *Econometrics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 112–13. Two violations of the assumptions seem probable. First, the fixed number of ordinal categories insures that the extreme opinions will always be observed with measurement error toward the center of the scale: a respondent with the true opinion, "strongly agree," can be observed erroneously only by recording him as lower in agreement than he is. The reverse is true of those with opinion, "strongly disagree." Hence a negative correlation between opinion and observation error exists. With five categories available for the policy questions, however, and seven for party ID, this error is likely to be slight. In fact, tests were run in which the response categories for these questions were collapsed to three, which should have exacerbated the problem. Instead, the final results of applying the model were virtually identical.

Second, because respondents with extreme opinions have measurement errors in only a single direction, Note that if Assumption Set 2 is incorrect, and we omit it, the sole change will occur in the last line of (17), which will then read:

$$\sigma_e^2 - E(u_1u_2) + E(u_1)E(u_2). \qquad (18)$$

If, as argued above, u_1 and u_2 are probably positively correlated assuming they are correlated at all, then in (18), $E(u_1u_2) > E(u_1)E(u_2)$, and therefore the expression in (18) will be less than σ_e^2. Hence if we mistakenly believe that Assumption Set 2 is true and take (18) as an estimate of σ_e^2, the result will be an underestimate of σ_e^2. As noted above, this is an error in Converse's favor: it estimates less measurement error than is actually the case (and hence more respondent variability).

It is possible to replace the postulate in Assumption Set 2 with one of several other assumptions. Two other particular postulates were tried in its place. The first stipulated that u_1 and u_2 were independent *with* p_1 *controlled:* $r_{u_1u_2\cdot p_1} = 0$. Verbally, this postulate means that although opinion change between times 1 and 2 may be correlated with the change between times 2 and 3, the relation is due solely to differences in respondents' original positions at time 1. Liberals may change their views in one way and conservatives in another, but within each group, opinion change consists of random shocks.

The second postulate tried was that p_1 and u_2 were independent with u_1 controlled: $r_{p_1u_2\cdot u_1} = 0$. This assumption means that liberals and conservatives may change their views differently in the first time interval, but if the direction of this first change is allowed for, then there will be no relationship between liberalism/conservatism and opinion change in the second time interval.[15]

When the first of these substitute assumptions was tried in place of Assumption Set 2, the result was estimates of σ_e^2 that were within 1 per cent of those obtained under Assumption Set 2 for seven of the ten attitudes under study, and within 2 per cent for nine of ten. The tenth, the issue of keeping American soldiers overseas, differed by 5.4 per cent, indicating more measurement error than under Assumption Set 2. Under the second of the substitute assumptions, it was often impossible to obtain any results: given the data, the model was self-contradictory in four of ten cases. When estimates of σ_e^2 were obtained, they typically deviated from those obtained under Assumption Set 1 by 5–15 per cent and were not consistently higher or lower. In short, neither alternate assumption dramatically altered or improved upon the estimates from the simpler Assumption Set 2. All results reported here are therefore based upon the original assumption.

If Assumption Set 2 is provisionally accepted, then the conclusion in (17) allows us to correct Converse's over-time correlation coefficients for attenuation due to measurement error. The approach parallels that used in psychological test theory.[16] First, the reliability of a measurement is defined, as usual, as the squared correlation between the observed and true scores or, equivalently, as the correlation between two observed scores taken at different times when true scores are unchanged. In either case, reliability at time t, denoted r_{tt}, has the following interpretation:

$$r_{tt} = \frac{\text{variance of true scores}}{\text{total observed variance}} = \frac{\text{variance of true scores}}{\text{variance of true scores} + \text{error variance}}.$$

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the amount of possible error depends on the distribution of voters' opinions. Hence the assumption in the model of constant error variance implicitly assumes constant voter distributions. Distributions at the three different time periods, however, were so nearly similar for all questions that this difficulty was ignored. I am indebted to John Aldrich for bringing the latter point to my attention.

[15] It is not possible to assume that p_1 and u_2 are independent without u_1 controlled, though that is a more obvious assumption. Results (3)–(9) may be used to show that

$$E(x_3x_1) - E(x_2x_1) = E(p_1u_2) \quad \text{and}$$
$$E(x_1)\ E(x_3 - x_2) = E(p_1)\ E(u_2).$$

Strict independence of p_1 and u_2 requires $E(p_1u_2) = E(p_1)E(u_2)$ and therefore also $E(x_3x_1) - E(x_2x_1) = E(x_1)E(x_3 - x_2)$. Inspection of the data showed this to be consistently false, but even if it had been true, the fact that the value of $E(p_1u_2)$ can be derived from (3)–(9) means that the new assumption adds nothing to the model. Statistically speaking, $E(p_1u_2)$ is "identified" without Assumption Set 2 or any of its substitutes.

[16] See, for example, Frederick M. Lord and Melvin R. Novick, *Statistical Theories of Mental Test Scores* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968). The approach set out in the text also bears a resemblance to that developed in David E. Wiley and James A. Wiley, "The Estimation of Measurement Error in Panel Data," in *Causal Models in the Social Sciences,* ed. H. M. Blalock (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 364–74. The models were developed independently, however, and for different purposes; the Wileys have ratio scale data and their results depend on the existence of a meaningful zero point, while we have ordinal or interval level information only. The assumptions and computations involved are therefore somewhat different. The Wileys' article is also important for its statistical critique of David R. Heise, "Separating Reliability and Stability in Test-Retest Correlation," *American Sociological Review,* 34 (February, 1969), 93–101, which is reprinted in the Blalock volume, pp. 348–63.

Thus the reliability of a measure is simply the per cent of its variance that is *not* errors of observation.

In psychological testing, reliabilities are typically obtained by correlating the two halves of a test or by correlating the performance of subjects with themselves when they are retested a short while after taking the test the first time. Neither method is available here: we are dealing with single questions only, and with time periods of two years, during which some genuine opinion change may be expected to occur. Instead, reliabilities must be derived from the evidence at hand. Taking note of the definition of r_{tt} as applied to the model set out above, we have:

$$r_{tt} = \frac{\text{var}(p_t)}{\text{var}(x_t)} = \frac{\text{var}(x_t) - \sigma_e^2}{\text{var}(x_t)}. \quad (19)$$

This last expression may be estimated from the data, using (17).

Given an observed correlation, r_{ts}, between two measures, t and s, along with their reliabilities, r_{tt} and r_{ss}, test theory may be used to find the value the correlation would take on in the absence of measurement error. Call this "corrected correlation" r^*_{ts}. Then as usual:

$$r^{*2}_{ts} = \frac{r^2_{ts}}{r_{tt}r_{ss}} \quad (20)$$

Thus, Converse's correlation coefficients can be corrected to allow for the presence of measurement error arising from the vagueness of the questions.

In addition to Converse's survey questions, one other item from the same panel study is included in the results presented below. The question concerned frequency of church attendance. We have strong expectations about the actual stability of the attitudes measured by such a question, and therefore it may be used as a test of the model. We expect that most people's church attendance is quite stable and that therefore true over-time correlation coefficients for church attendance are very high. In fact, however, the observed correlations are relatively modest—between .60 and .70. Such correlations mean that less than half the variance is "explained" by previous behavior, a result for this question that seems implausible.

One is led to suspect that the correlations for this question are depressed by measurement error, i.e., by the ambiguity of the question. Indeed, while the question about church attendance is straightforward enough, its response categories are far from precise—"regularly," "often," "seldom," and "never." If the model postulated above is accurate, therefore, we expect it to encounter a good deal of measurement error on this question. Furthermore, corrected correlation coefficients should be quite high. Success with the test question should suggest that the results obtained for Converse's original survey questions are accurate.

Estimation

The outcome of the application of the model to Converse's items and the test question may be seen in Table 1. For reasons that will become apparent below, 382 individuals for whom certain items of background data were unavailable were dropped from the study. The remaining group defines the "total sample" used here, 1132 respondents. All correlations for each issue were based on that part of the sample having an opinion on the issue in all three time periods. The correlations are Pearson r's based on coding responses on a scale of 1 to 5 for the five responses "strongly agree," "agree," "it depends, not sure," "disagree," "strongly disagree."

Similar actions were taken for the party identification and church attendance variables, which have seven and four response categories, respectively. The correlation coefficients are Pearson product-moment coefficients, rather than Converse's tau-*b*'s since the tau-*b* does not lend itself to the sort of analysis undertaken in the text. The Pearson r's were computed by treating the variables as interval-level measures. Such an approach is not unreasonable in cases like these.[17]

The variables being correlated are not normally distributed, hence the distributions of the correlation coefficients in the text are unknown. Coefficients from different questions therefore cannot necessarily be meaningfully compared, since the underlying distributions of opinions may differ. Coefficients are best interpreted as referring strictly to the percentage of variance of one variable linearly explained by the other. That interpretation is sufficient to the substantive points being made.

It would be preferable to cast the entire debate over attitudinal stability in terms of regression coefficients rather than correlations, which would eliminate the problems of the preceding paragraph. Tradition is in the opposite direction, however, and in any case, the variance of each attitude is so stable across time periods that regression and correlation coefficients are virtually identical.

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[17] See Robert P. Abelson and John W. Tukey, "Efficient Conversion of Non-Metric Information into Metric Information," in Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems,* pp. 407–17. For exact statements of the attitude questions, see Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," footnote 21.

Table 1. Pearson Correlations (*r*) Between Attitudes in Converse's Panel Study, Time Periods 1, 2, 3[a]

Attitude	Observed *r*'s			Corrected *r*'s			Reliabilities		
	1-2	2-3	1-3	1-2	2-3	1-3	1	2	3
Federal Assistance to Negroes ($N=712$, $\sigma_e^2=0.966$)	.51	.51	.49	.95	.98	.93	.55	.52	.51
School Integration ($N=730$, $\sigma_e^2=1.430$)	.45	.55	.42	.80	.96	.76	.54	.57	.57
Isolationism ($N=761$, $\sigma_e^2=1.160$)	.37	.46	.35	.79	.96	.74	.46	.49	.48
Foreign Aid ($N=676$, $\sigma_e^2=1.120$)	.32	.44	.31	.72	.99	.71	.44	.44	.44
Maintain Army Overseas ($N=630$, $\sigma_e^2=0.781$)	.31	.37	.25	.63	.81	.49	.55	.44	.47
Federal Aid to Education ($N=784$, $\sigma_e^2=1.050$)	.48	.45	.43	1.00	.85	.88	.44	.52	.55
Guaranteed Jobs ($N=772$, $\sigma_e^2=1.316$)	.46	.47	.42	.94	.96	.89	.48	.51	.47
Government Intervention in Housing & Electricity ($N=546$, $\sigma_e^2=1.567$)	.37	.37	.37	.97	.98	.94	.39	.37	.39
Party Identification ($N=986$, $\sigma_e^2=0.567$)	.82	.86	.80	.94	.97	.91	.88	.88	.88
Church Attendance ($N=989$, $\sigma_e^2=0.244$)	.70	.64	.60	.94	.84	.79	.75	.74	.78

[a] Total $N=1132$. The total sample was defined as those individuals in the panel study for whom certain background data were available (see text). Correlations for each attitude were based on the percentage of the sample having an opinion in all three time periods.

(Note, however, that this identity will not hold for Table 5.)

In the case of the federal aid to education question, the initial estimate of σ_e^2 resulted in a corrected correlation coefficient between time periods one and two of 1.057. Ordinary statistical variability seems the most likely cause of the misestimate, but the assumptions of the model may be inappropriate to this question as well. In any event, the estimate of σ_e^2 was then constrained so that no corrected coefficient exceeded 1.00 and σ_e^2 was adjusted downward by 4.7%. It is the results from the latter estimate which appear in the text. This adjustment, which has disturbed several readers, is the standard approach to a common problem: by sheer chance, some near-zero positive quantities may have negative estimates if the statistical procedure is not constrained to be positive. Such constraints are typically used, for example, when estimating multiple correlations corrected for the number of independent variables and in variance component estimation. Here the difficulty is with the variance of true opinion between times 1 and 2, which has a negative estimate. Forcing it to be zero produces the constrained estimate.

Results

As may be readily seen, the model gives a rather different picture of the mass public than does Converse's analysis. Here the problem with the weak original correlations is demonstrated to lie, not with the variability of respondents, but rather with the fuzziness of the questions and with other errors of measurement. Low reliability in the questions constitutes most of the variance.[18] Interestingly, party ID is seen to have higher initial correlations more because of its greater intelligibility as a question rather than because respondents are more stable with regard to it.

Results for the test question are precisely as expected. The reliability of the church attendance measure is found to be rather low. Its corrected correlation coefficients are high, in accord with prior expectations. Thus, some confidence about the results for Converse's questions is justified.

On each policy question, about two thirds of the respondents express an opinion at all three time periods, and only they were included in the sample for that question. Strictly speaking, the conclusions derived from the estimation proce-

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[18] Interestingly, some recognition of the weakness of the questions appears in Converse himself: he notes in "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," footnote 21, that his questions had to be revised when presented to congressmen, since their simplistic wording made responses so difficult. The difference in survey questions put to congressmen and to the mass public reduces the impact of another of Converse's findings, that correlations among attitudes are higher for congressmen than for ordinary citizens. It is well known that small changes in the wording of survey questions can make a considerable difference in response patterns.

Table 2. Percentage of the Total Sample with No Opinion in any Time Period

Federal Assistance to Negroes	1.6%
School Integration	1.4
Isolationism	2.0
Foreign Aid	2.4
Maintain Army Overseas	4.2
Federal Aid to Education	1.0
Guaranteed Jobs	1.1
Government Intervention in Housing and Electricity	7.1
Party Identification	1.5
Church Attendance	0.0

dures apply only to them. However, it should not be thought respondents in the omitted third of the sample are entirely without opinions. A check of half-a-dozen attitude questions showed no consistent tendency for correlations between attitudes at different time periods to drop when respondents without an opinion at the other time period were added to the rest of the sample. In short, a respondent could describe himself as having no opinion at one of the time points and still give at the other two time periods responses that were far from random. Furthermore, only a handful of respondents were without an opinion at all three time periods. (See Table 2.)

Nevertheless, at this point the question may be raised: How is it possible that respondents find the questions so vague? Granted that none is very precise, yet the analysis indicates that the amount of ambiguity in voters' minds is substantial. Might it not be that this "measurement error" is really a simple matter of not understanding the question? After all, the high over-time correlations above indicate that voters find the questions vague, nothing more. If simple policy questions remain terribly confusing to the respondents, then these citizens can hardly be said to be sophisticated.

This argument appears to be strengthened when we examine the reliabilities of each of the attitudes measured. The questions about party identification and church attendance are quite reliable, while the policy items are much less so. This might mean that voters do not understand the policy questions.

The difficulty with this argument is that it provides no evidence by which to choose between the competing explanations. One may observe individuals having difficulty with questions and blame either the individuals or the questions. The usual criterion, however, for distinguishing between complexity and vagueness is the judgment of someone acquainted with the material. Applying that notion to the survey questions presumably means inquiring whether more sophisticated members of the electorate had noticeably less measurement error in their responses than did other members of the citizenry. The model set out above must therefore be modified to allow for different citizens' having differing amounts of measurement error in their responses. If these differences are large, then "measurement error" probably means "failure to understand"; if small, then everyone finds the questions difficult, and the fault lies with the questions themselves.

Converse himself discusses a Markov chain model to estimate the attitudinal stability of various parts of his sample population, but because he allows only for respondent variability and not for measurement error of any sort, he is soon reduced by the implications of the data from at least one survey question to the assertion that the entire population is divided into two groups—a small segment who are perfectly consistent in their responses and the remainder, who are perfectly random.

One way to avoid this rather unlikely conclusion would be to use the model set out above to estimate the measurement error for each of a number of subgroups in the population. Respondents could be divided on the basis of their education, their social class, or other background factors. Estimated measurement errors could then be compared, and a conclusion reached on that basis.

A difficulty with this approach is that respondents can be divided into no more than a few groups before sample sizes become so small as to make the model's statistical estimates useless. This means that no estimates can be made of the joint effect of all background factors or of their separate independent effects, with other factors controlled.

A better procedure is to use regression techniques. By making estimated measurement error the dependent variable and the background factors the independent variables, the impact of the background factors, taken individually and jointly, may be easily obtained. One may then examine the degree to which the better-off members of the electorate (the better-educated, more prosperous, etc.) have lower expected measurement errors.

For each survey question, the following simple additive regression equation was estimated:

Dependent Variable

Respondent measurement error variance:[19]

$$\sigma_{ei}^2 = \tfrac{1}{2}\left\{E(x_{2i} - x_{1i})^2 + E(x_{3i} - x_{2i})^2 - E(x_{3i} - x_{1i})^2 + 2E(x_2 - x_1)E(x_3 - x_2)\right\},$$

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[19] This expression can be simplified a good deal for computational purposes, but it is listed here as it appeared in the derivations from the model, where its form eased the exposition.

where the subscript i refers to the respondent in question. (See (17).) Since we have just one observation on each x_{1i}, x_{2i}, and x_{3i}, we must estimate the expected value of any expression involving them by the one observation available. Thus $E(x_{2i}-x_{1i})^2=(x_{2i}-x_{1i})^2$, and so forth. Note, however, that we assume $E(x_2-x_1)$ and $E(x_3-x_2)$ to be the same for all respondents and estimate them from the entire sample. Without this assumption, the expression in brackets above requires subscripts in the last term, and in that case, the expression is identically zero.

Independent Variables (taken from the 1958 section of the SRC panel study):

1. City dweller (scored 1 if inhabitant of city with population exceeding 100,000 or its suburbs, 0, otherwise).
2. Southerner (scored 1 if living in South, 0, otherwise).
3. Rural (scored 1 if respondent lives in place of under 10,000 population, 0, otherwise).
4. Concern (a five-point scale recording the respondent's expressed concern about who wins the 1958 congressional election—recoded so that higher values indicate more concern).
5. Financial situation (a three-point scale for the respondent's evaluation of his current financial situation—higher values are pessimistic).
6. Interest in campaign (a three-point scale recording the respondent's stated interest in the 1958 congressional campaigns—recoded so that higher values indicate more interest).
7. Talked to others (Did the respondent talk to other people to influence their vote? Scored 3 if yes, 1 if no).
8. Male (scored 1 if male, 0 if female).
9. Age (age in years).
10. Education (the SRC's nine-point scale—higher values indicate more education).
11. Income (the SRC's ten-point scale—higher values indicate more income).
12. Occupation (the SRC's nine-point scale—recoded so that higher values indicate higher occupational status).

Since only a few respondents answered "don't know" or "no answer" on the variables "concern," "financial situation," and "talked to others," such responses were recoded to the midpoint of their scale, to which they seemed to correspond. Similar answers for "interest in campaign" were recoded to the category indicating least interest for the same reasons. For all other variables, including the dependent variable in each regression, respondents with missing data were eliminated from the sample.

This regression, when performed for each of the survey questions, yields quite modest multiple correlation coefficients. (See Table 2.) If we consider only the eight policy questions, for example, the multiple R ranges from 0.11 to 0.19. This means that between 1 per cent and 4 per cent of the variance in respondents' estimated measurement errors is "accounted for" by differences in background factors. In addition, a total of seven regression coefficients of the ninety-six involved are significant at 0.05, which is just two more than would be expected by chance. If we simultaneously test the significance of the entire set of variables for each question, the result is significant at the 0.05 level in just three of eight cases. Results like these are the traditional indications that our independent variables do not predict measurement error well at all: the concerned, interested, and well-educated respondents perceive virtually as much ambiguity in the policy questions as do the less involved.

In fact, however, multiple R's and significance levels provide very little statistical evidence for the hypothesis in question (or, indeed, for most social science hypotheses). We are concerned with whether the independent variables have a sizable impact on the dependent variables, that is, with whether the true regression coefficients are large enough to be consequential. Neither multiple correlations nor significance tests will answer that question.[20] The relevant statistics are instead the estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors.

Table 4 presents the full results of the regression for the Foreign Aid policy question, which was chosen for display because it falls approximately at the median in "predictability" using either multiple R or standard error of the residual as criterion. Two aspects of the results are apparent. First, those factors that one would expect to increase voter comprehension typically have coefficients in the expected direction: taking an interest in the campaign, caring who wins, talking to others about it, higher education, income, and occupational status all act to reduce the perceived vagueness of this policy question. Similarly, apparently irrelevant variables like Southerner, City

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[20] The problem is particularly acute here because the dependent variable in the regression equation is itself a statistical estimate and incorporates a certain amount of measurement error. This will repress both the multiple correlations and the significance levels of the regression coefficients. Both are so low, however, that even very substantial upward revision would not alter the conclusions in the text. In addition, neither the regression coefficients nor the predicted values graphed in Figures 2 and 3 are biased by measurement error, and both of them indicate that the differences among the population in their understanding of the survey questions is slight. Unfortunately, the unknown distributional form of true and observed opinions and the single observation on measurement error variance per respondent make it impossible to estimate the size of the measurement error variance in the dependent variable without additional assumptions.

Table 3. Regression Results[a]

Issue	Multiple R	Significant (at 0.05) Coefficients (with Standard Error)		Is Overall Regression Significant (at 0.05)?
Federal Assistance to Negroes ($N=712$)	0.155	Male	0.427 (0.215)	No
School Integration ($N=730$)	0.106	None		No
Isolationism ($N=761$)	0.132	None		No
Foreign Aid ($N=676$)	0.153	Interest	−0.683 (0.330)	No
Maintain Army Overseas ($N=630$)	0.191	Financial situation	0.800 (0.300)	Yes
		Education	1.115 (0.461)	
Federal Aid to Education ($N=784$)	0.185	Concern	0.690 (0.342)	Yes
		Talked	−0.747 (0.284)	
Guaranteed Jobs ($N=772$)	0.175	Education	1.337 (0.589)	Yes
Government Intervention In Housing and Electricity ($N=546$)	0.123	None		No
Party Identification ($N=486$)	0.133	Concern	−0.613 (0.270)	No
Church Attendance ($N=989$)	0.147	Age	−0.244 (0.112)	Yes

[a] The dependent variable in each regression is the estimated measurement error variance for each respondent on the policy question. To facilitate comparison of coefficients, all independent variables in the regressions are standardized to a range of 0–1. The variable Age is standardized by setting 0 = 20 years and 1 = 70 years. Regressions are based solely on those respondents with an opinion on the policy question in all three time periods.

Dweller, and Financial Situation have little or no effect. Most of the standard errors are large (relative to the coefficients); but, and this is the second point, the usual 95 per cent confidence region for most of them falls in the range ±1.0, and none falls outside the range ±1.6. Thus, even if we are quite unlucky in our coefficient estimates, the impact of these independent variables remains relatively small.

For example, suppose that our coefficient for education is wrong by two full standard deviations, and suppose further that we change an otherwise average respondent from having graduate school training (education = 1) to having no formal schooling (education = 0) while holding all else constant. Now perhaps the best intuitive measure of the "average perceptual error" of a respondent is the estimated standard deviation of his measurement error, which may be regarded as the amount by which he typically errs in perceiving the question. This measure is just the square root of the predicted dependent variable in the regression. Using this measure, we find that our respondent's average perceptual error rises with his absence of schooling from about 1.0 to about 1.5. In short, under the worst possible assumptions, the loss of twenty years of education results in an average vagueness of a unit and a half instead of a single unit on the five-point scale of the policy questions. Most of the other variables in the regression equation have smaller effects than this, and *at worst*, none results in an average perceptual error above 1.6 units in this example.

Even taken all together, the effect of the independent variables is quite modest. This is perhaps most easily seen in a graph of the expected values of the dependent variable (the square of the "average perceptual error") as predicted by the regression equation. The two attitudes graphed are (1) Maintain Army Overseas, whose measurement error is best predicted by the background factors, (highest R and lowest standard error of the residual) and (2) School Integration, whose measurement error is predicted worst (lowest R and highest standard error). Respondents are weighted by their SRC sampling weights in the graphs to obtain a more representative sample.

The graphs show that there are probably some

Table 4. The Complete Foreign Aid Regression[a]

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)
City dweller	−0.062 (0.328)
Southerner	−0.033 (0.293)
Rural	−0.011 (0.275)
Concern	−0.194 (0.368)
Financial situation	0.045 (0.330)
Interest in campaign	−0.683 (0.330)
Talked to others	−0.304 (0.296)
Male	−0.392 (0.229)
Age	0.678 (0.450)
Education	−0.184 (0.504)
Income	−0.280 (0.590)
Occupation	−0.361 (0.563)

Intercept = 2.119. $R = 0.153$. $N = 676$. Standard error of residual = 2.910.

[a] The dependent variable is the estimated measurement error variance for each respondent on the Foreign Aid policy question. All independent variables are standardized to a range of 0–1 to facilitate comparison. The variable Age is standardized by setting 0 = 20 years and 1 = 70 years.

differences among subgroups in the population in perceived vagueness of the questions, especially on the Army Overseas question. Measurement error is partly a matter of comprehension by the respondent. What is impressive about the graphs, however, is the extent to which this is not true, the extent to which the subgroups cluster around intermediate values of measurement error. There is no evidence here of Converse's select group of sophisticates divided from the mass of the population. Thus the measurement error in the questions is not just another form of the ignorance Converse originally claimed to have found. The well-informed and interested have nearly as much difficulty with the questions as does the ordinary man. *Measurement error is primarily a fault of the instruments, not of the respondents.*

From this perspective, it is clear that some of Converse's other arguments must be revised as well. He showed that attitudes on domestic policy, on racial matters, and on foreign policy were correlated with other attitudes in their respective areas to form dimensions of policy thinking.[21] Taken at face value, the correlations appeared weak: Converse therefore argued that respondents show little ideological coherence. From the present perspective, with the knowledge that survey questions incorporate a great deal of measurement error, it is clear that intercorrelations *among* attitudes would rise dramatically if the attenuation due to measurement error were corrected. The expression in (20) applies.

Table 5 presents the Pearson intercorrelations among attitudes obtained before and after the appropriate correction for measurement error is made. Although the intercorrelations are not uniformly large (indeed, they probably should not *all* be large), the result is again a rather different picture of the coherence of voters' political thinking.[22]

Summary and Conclusion

Two possible sources of weak correlation coefficients among citizens' political survey responses were distinguished: (1) the instability of a voter's political attitudes and (2) the low reliabilities of opinion survey questions. A statistical model designed to separate these two sources of response instability was put forward and applied to Converse's data. Rather weak reliabilities for the survey questions were obtained. When the correlations among attitudes were corrected for this unreliability, the result was a sharply increased estimate of the stability and coherence of voters' political thinking.

Care should be exercised in interpreting these results. The model implies that voters are stable in their thinking, but it says nothing about their wisdom. A devotee of exotic conspiracy theories of political life may have coherent and stable (indeed, rigid) political views, and yet not be a

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[21] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," pp. 228–29.

[22] In order to maximize sample sizes, estimates of reliabilities are based on the per cent of the sample with attitudes on the variable in question at all three time periods, while intercorrelations are based on those 1958 respondents who had an opinion on both the variables correlated. A corrected correlation, which is a function of two reliabilities plus an intercorrelation, thus depends upon three different samples of respondents. If some of the parameters being estimated differ among these samples, errors will be introduced. As one would expect, however, the three samples always overlap heavily, and the errors introduced are almost surely negligible.

These relatively high intercorrelations make it unlikely that the large over-time correlations found earlier are due to response biases in favor of "agree" or "disagree" answers. To give liberal answers on both the civil rights questions, for example, respondents had to agree to one and disagree with the other. The same is true for the Foreign Aid and Isolationism questions. Yet these two pairs of issues had the highest corrected r's.



Value of σ_e^2 Predicted by Regression Equation for Attitude Toward School Integration (Weighted $N=818$)

Figure 2a



Value of σ_e^2 Predicted by Regression Equation for Attitude Toward Maintaining Army Overseas (Weighted $N = 708$)

σ_e^2 is the respondent's measurement error on a policy question. It may be interpreted as the square of the "average perceptual error" of a respondent, measured on the five-point scale used for the responses to the policy questions.

Figure 2b

Table 5. Observed and Corrected Intercorrelations among Attitudes in Converse's Panel Study, 1958

	Observed r's			Corrected r's	
Social Welfare Issues	Federal Aid to Education	Government Intervention in Housing and Electricity		Federal Aid to Education	Government Intervention in Housing and Electricity
Guaranteed Jobs	.37	.06	Guaranteed Jobs	.72	.14
Federal Aid to Education	—	.14	Federal Aid to Education	—	.33
Foreign Policy Issues	Foreign Aid	Maintain Army Overseas		Foreign Aid	Maintain Army Overseas
Isolationism	.34	.20	Isolationism	.73	.43
Foreign Aid	—	.12	Foreign Aid	—	.27
Civil Rights Issues	School Integration			School Integration	
Federal Assistance to Negroes	.45		Federal Assistance to Negroes	.82	

very well-informed or sophisticated citizen. A certain stability of viewpoint is a necessary, but hardly sufficient, condition for political understanding. If voters lack other, more subtle features of conceptual sophistication, the stability of their opinions will be cold comfort to the democratic theorist.[23]

The conclusions derived from the model are perhaps most important for what they recall to mind about survey methodology. Public opinion research depends heavily upon the survey response for evidence. While a great deal of progress has been made in its understanding, the nature of that response is by no means fully comprehended, and substantive work is bedeviled by doubts about aspects of the measuring instruments that remain ill-formulated theoretically—response set, scaling errors, interviewer bias, etc. If a researcher has no idea of the size of these errors, as is often the case, he has little choice but to assume that they are small and then proceed, treating the observed responses as direct measures of the underlying attitudes. The present results remind us that the errors involved may be substantial.

As the research undertaken in public opinion grows in complexity, methodological uncertainty becomes increasingly corrosive of substantive results. The greater the distance from data to conclusions, the more opportunity for error. Major improvements in our understanding of political thinking may therefore come to depend upon a considerably more advanced theoretical knowledge of our measuring instruments than we have yet mustered.[24]

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[23] See W. Lance Bennett, "Political Attitudes and Social Life" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1974), who argues that uninformed citizens may develop stable opinions precisely because of their lack of information: they become subject to symbolic appeals by political leaders.

[24] Two interesting attempts along these lines, using Markov chains, are James S. Coleman, *Models of Change and Response Uncertainty* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); and Ralph B. Ginsberg, "Critique of Probabilistic Models: Application of the Semi-Markov Model to Migration" and "Incorporating Causal Structure and Exogenous Information with Probabilistic Models: With Special Reference to Choice, Gravity, Migration, and Markov Chains," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology,* 2 (January, 1972), 63–82 and 83–103, respectively.

The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections*

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Public officials, many academic experts, and the press consider aggregate economic conditions to be important determinants of election outcomes. Low unemployment and a low rate of inflation are sometimes said to favor incumbents, and high rates of inflation and unemployment to favor challengers. Others suggest that high or rising unemployment favors the Democrats while high or rising inflation favors the Republicans. Attempts to test these propositions, in one or another form, can be found in social science journals for the past forty years.[1]

The importance placed on aggregate economic variables by politicians and their advisers is well known. The chances of victory for Richard Nixon in 1972 are said to have increased greatly following the wage and price freeze and effective devaluation of the dollar in August 1971. At least one former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers accepts the view that aggregate economic performance has an important influence on voting decisions.[2] There seems little reason to doubt that policy makers attempt to achieve particular levels or ranges for economic aggregates to win votes, even if the post-election consequences are unfavorable. Less certain is the effectiveness of these measures in congressional elections.

Several problems prevent acceptance of the argument and the evidence. Prior to Kramer's study, much of the work was done within a loose and rather ad hoc framework that leaves doubt about the proposition tested.[3] Kramer places his study within the context of a model of rational behavior, but as Stigler has shown, the evidence he presents depends very much on the choice of time periods.[4] Moreover, Kramer's study shows, at most, that rising real income benefits incumbents. "With real income held constant, changes in unemployment or in the rate of inflation have no significant independent effects."[5] A careful study of British opinion polls shows significant but variable influence of inflation and unemployment on voters' opinions of the popularity of the parties.[6] Less clear is whether parties are able to translate sentiment into votes.

There are two main problems with the argument that the choices made by rational voters are significantly influenced by the current position of aggregate economic variables. One is that a voter's opportunity set includes more than a choice between rival candidates. He can—and many voters do—choose not to vote. Even casual examination of voting statistics suggests that changes in the participation rate of eligible voters often is larger than changes in the share of votes received by the major parties. Is it less rational for a voter to abstain than to shift party loyalty? Two, any set of economic policies gives rise to expectations about future consequences. Recent experience reminds us that government economic policies have such long-term consequences. Do voters ignore the prospect that the policies that increase employment just before the election may increase inflation after the election? Are voters aware that action to reduce inflation before the election may reduce employment after the election? Do opposition candidates fail to make this point?

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* We are indebted to Jay Kadane and Timothy McGuire for helpful comments, to Gerald Kramer for finding errors in our data, and to the National Science Foundation for financial support. An earlier version was presented at the 1973 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[1] A review of much of this literature can be found in Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 131–143; and George J. Stigler, "General Economic Conditions and National Elections," *American Economic Review*, 63 (May, 1973), 160–167.

[2] Arthur M. Okun, "Comments on Stigler's Paper," *American Economic Review*, 63 (May 1973), 172–177. In fact, our interest in the subject started in 1970 after a discussion one of us had with Herbert Stein, then a member of the Council of Economic Advisers. Stein argued that the outcome of the 1972 election would depend on the ability of the administration to reduce inflation and aggregate unemployment to a specific range. A different view is expressed by former Chairman Paul W. McCracken in "The Practice of Political Economy," *American Economic Review*, 63 (May, 1973), 168–171.

[3] This position is taken by Stigler, and by William H. Riker, "Discussion," *American Economic Review*, 63 (May, 1973), 178–179.

[4] Stigler.

[5] Kramer, "Short-term Fluctuations," p. 141.

[6] See C. A. E. Goodhart and R. J. Bhansali, "Political Economy," *Political Studies*, 18 (1970), 43–106.

This paper combines two approaches. One is the framework provided by rational decision making; the other is the classification of voters according to degree of partisanship found useful in the work of the Survey Research Center.[7] In the following section, we present a model of voting behavior in which members of the electorate decide whether to vote and for whom to vote. The model permits estimation of (1) the effect of changes in participation rate following the enfranchisement of women, (2) the effect of party realignment in the 1932 election, and (3) the independent effect of presidential elections on congressional elections. A discussion of the results and a conclusion complete the paper.

A Model of Voting

Discussions of voting often emphasize the motivations that lead people to vote, to abstain, or to vote for the candidate of a particular party. Attitudinal and other psychological variables receive main emphasis, but family and group pressures are also considered important. Campbell and Flanigan offer excellent discussions of these relationships.[8] An implication of their work is that it is helpful to classify voters as strong or weak partisans or as independents.

Recent studies of political behavior have attempted to use the notion of rational decision making as an organizing device.[9] Applied to voting decisions, rational decision making is said to induce voting whenever expected utility is positive. Riker and Ordeshook summarized this position in a decision rule which can be written:[10]

$$R = PB - C + D. \tag{1}$$

R is the expected utility of voting minus the expected utility of abstaining: PB is the difference in utility resulting from the victory of a particular candidate multiplied by the probability that the individual, by voting, causes a benefit, B. C is the cost of voting—the loss of utility from using resources to vote.[11] D includes other factors affecting utility, including the attitudinal and psychological variables emphasized by Lazarsfeld and Campbell, and the citizen's sense of duty.[12]

In this section, we consider the voter's decision as a two-step process, a decision to vote and a decision about the preferred candidate or party. The two decisions have common elements as well as differences, and they may be taken simultaneously or separately. We assume that both decisions depend on the costs and expected benefits summarized in equation (1) above.

The Decision to Vote. A citizen votes if the benefits exceed the costs. The principal cost of voting is a cost of acquiring information about parties, candidates and issues. The cost varies with the voter's commitment to a party or candidate. A strict partisan votes for the party candidates, votes regularly and gains utility from participation, from the affirmation of partisanship, and in some cases from a job or contract. Neither issues nor other factors affect a partisan voter's decision to vote or his choice of party. Perceived benefits—particularly B in equation (1)—dominate other factors, so benefits always exceed costs for members of this group. Included here are party officials, their friends and relatives, and any groups that tradition places firmly in one of the two major parties.

We assume that the fraction of the electorate that is "strict partisan" changes very little from one election to the next. Only major changes in cost or perceived benefits change the participation rate or party allegiance. The literature discusses two types of major changes during the years 1896 to 1970 included in our study.

One is the extension of suffrage to women in 1920. Prior to 1920, the calculation of net benefits is meaningless for women; after 1920, the same or similar factors affect women and men, although not always in the same way.

A second type of major change is a "realignment."[13] In our analysis, realignment occurs when there is a substantial change in costs or benefits. Since we distinguish between changes in participation and changes in party alignment, we can separate the effects of a realignment into (1) shifts from nonpartisan, or less partisan, to strict partisan behavior, and (2) shifts from one party to the other. Realignments are said to have occurred in 1896, at the start of our sample, and in 1932.

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[7] Angus Campbell, Philip S. Converse, Warren S. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), esp. chaps. 6 and 7.

[8] Campbell et al., chap. 4, and William H. Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate,* 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

[9] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (March, 1968), 25–42; Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social Psychological Perspectives," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (December, 1969), 1106–19; Richard D. McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook, "A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* Vol. VI, ed. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University of Virginia Press, 1972).

[10] See Riker and Ordeshook.

[11] Tullock, p. 110–114, argues that in a typical election, there are many voters so P is small and R is negative. He concludes that voting is irrational. Riker and Ordeshook, p. 28–34 respond that P depends on the closeness of the election, not just the number of voters and also add D to the equation.

[12] See Campbell et al., also Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice,* 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948). Riker and Ordeshook p. 28 discuss the "sense of citizen duty."

Let H_t be the proportion of habitual, partisan voters in an election held during a particular year t. Our discussion implies that

$$H_t = V_0 + \Delta V_{01}\, X20_t + \Delta V_{02}\, X32_t + e_{1t},$$

where

$$X20 = 1 \qquad \text{if } t \geq 1920$$

$$X32 = 1 \qquad \text{if } t \geq 1932$$

and both are zero elsewhere. V_0 is the fraction of strictly partisan voters prior to 1920, and e_{1t} is a random variable representing the effect on partisans of weather, illness, and similar, non-systematic factors.

Voter participation in congressional elections increases in years of presidential elections but is never as high as the participation rate in the presidential election itself. A citizen's "sense of duty" may be greater when a president is elected. Also, the incremental cost of voting for a congressman is much lower once the voter decides to vote for president. The cost of forming an opinion about the merits of presidential candidates, however, is much lower than the cost of acquiring information about congressional candidates. The press, radio, television, the political parties and other groups are so much more active in the years of presidential elections that it is difficult to avoid exposure to information or partisan statements.

A second effect of presidential elections on voting for Congress is the effect of incumbency. Congressmen who are members of the President's party are more likely to support the President on partisan issues than members of the opposition. Presidential incumbency provides information about policies of congressional candidates, lowers the cost of voting and changes the expected net benefit of voting for Congress.

We use N_1 to denote the percentage of voters induced to vote by the reduction in cost or increase in perceived benefits resulting from presidential elections and incumbency.

$$N_{1t} = V_1 PR_t + \Delta V_1 RI_t PR_t + e_{2t},$$

where

$PR_t = 1$ if t is a presidential election year,
$RI_t = 1$ if the incumbent is a Republican,

and both are zero otherwise. An error term is included to allow for the effect of random factors affecting the proportion of the electorate in N_1.

None of the voters we have discussed is affected by aggregate economic variables or other specific issues. Some voters may be induced to vote because (1) they perceive a difference between candidates or parties on a particular issue, (2) they wish to protest against a particular policy or outcome, or (3) they wish to reward a party or candidate for a policy or outcome and encourage continuance. In each of these cases, the net benefit of voting and the probability of obtaining the benefit, PB, increase during the elections in which the issue arises.

The particular issue that concerns us is the effect of aggregate economic policies. To study the effect of these policies on an individual voter or a group, we have to distinguish between real and nominal income and to hold constant changes in real income. Nominal income is the value of income at current prices; changes in nominal income include all changes in prices. Measures of real income attempt to separate price changes from the quantity of goods and services received and to measure only the latter. Much of the reported unemployment in the United States is of short duration and arises because individuals voluntarily quit their jobs. It seems reasonable to expect voters to distinguish also between the prospect of being "laid off" as a result of government policies and changes in quit rates resulting from changes in the age composition of the population or other similar variables. It is reasonable also to expect voters to distinguish between "high" or "low" unemployment and rising or falling unemployment. Rising unemployment is likely to be accompanied by falling real income and reduced hours of work; high unemployment has no similar consequence for the bulk of the labor force or for voters. Quite apart from his social view, a voter is expected to be affected differently by the prospect of his own "lay-off" than by the unemployment of other members of the labor force.

Qualifications must also be made about the effects of inflation. Rational voters are concerned with their real income and real wealth, so their response to inflation depends on whether their incomes and purchasing power rise or fall with the price level. Inflation transfers wealth from creditors to debtors, and deflation induces the opposite flow. Within the private sector of the economy, private debtors gain what private creditors lose; there is redistribution but no net gain or loss. The principal net debtor in the U.S. is the U.S. government and its agencies, so the net effect of unanticipated inflation on the distribution of wealth is a transfer from the public to the government. Unanticipated inflation is a tax on creditors, in this case citizens or voters who are the government's creditors, for the benefit of debtors, including the government. The effect on voters should be similar to the effect of a tax with similar consequences for the distribution of income.[14]

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[13] Critical elections and the realignments produced by them have been discussed, among others, by Valdimer O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (1955), 3–18; Campbell et al.; and James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System. Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

To summarize, finding the effect of inflation, deflation or unemployment on voting requires, at a minimum, that we hold real income, or in an expanding economy the growth rate of real income, constant and that we analyze the effects of changes in the rate of inflation and the unemployment rate. Let N_2 denote the proportion of voters for whom the net benefit of voting is a function of aggregate economic performance.

$$N_{2t} = a_1\dot{p}_t + a_2\dot{U}_t + a_3\frac{C}{p\,t} + e_{3t},$$

where $\dot{p}$, $\dot{U}$, $\dot{C}/p$ are percentage changes in consumer prices, the unemployment rate and real compensation per man-hour. The Appendix gives additional description of the variables and their measurement.

There are, finally, other election issues local as well as national. We postulate that such issues are randomly distributed over time, so we include them in the error term of equation (2) as e_{4t}.[15]

Our hypothesis is that the percentage of eligible voters participating in a congressional election, VP_t, is the sum of the components we have specified. Collecting terms in equation (2) gives the result

$$\begin{aligned}(2)\quad VP_t &= H_t + N_{1t} + N_{2t} + e_{4t}\\ &= V_0 + \Delta V_{01}X20_t + \Delta V_{02}X32_t\\ &\quad + V_1PR_t + \Delta V_1RI_tPR_t\\ &\quad + aE_t + e_t,\end{aligned}$$

where

$$aE_t = a_1\dot{p}_t + a_2\dot{U}_t + a_3\frac{\dot{C}}{p\,t}$$

and

$$e_t = \sum_{i=1}^{4} e_{it}.$$

The Choice of Party Candidate. The framework developed to analyze the decision to vote is applicable, with little change, to the choice of candidates in congressional elections. Denote by D_t and R_t the percentage of the total vote for candidates of the Democratic and Republican parties so that

$D_t \cdot VP_t = VD_t$ is the percentage of those eligible to register who vote for the Democratic candidate in election year t,

and similarly for Republicans and third party voters (VT_t). Summing, we have

$$VP_t \equiv VD_t + VR_t + VT_t$$

In this section, we obtain the share of the vote for the Democratic candidate by distributing each of the components of VP introduced in the previous section. The Republican share is the exact analogue. The third party vote is treated as a residual.[16]

The first two components of VP are strict party regulars, H, and participants in presidential (but not congressional) elections, N_1. The Democrats' share of these votes is the fraction $\alpha_D H_t + \beta_D N_{1t}$. Voters concerned with the performance of the economy, N_2, are permitted not only to respond to aggregate economic variables but to respond in a partisan way. We allow our measures of unemployment or inflation to be given a more or less favorable interpretation depending on the party holding power. Democrats obtain a fraction, γ_D, of N_2 that varies with incumbency,

$$(\gamma_D + \Delta\gamma_D RI_t)N_2$$

If voters in N_2 are nonpartisan, $\Delta\gamma_D RI_t$ has no systematic effect on the Democrats' share. The fourth set of factors includes local issues and personalities and is assumed to be independent of aggregate economic variables and our measures of incumbency.

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[14] Further discussion of these points can be found in Martin J. Bailey, "The Welfare Cost of Inflationary Finance," *Journal of Political Economy,* 64 (April, 1956), 93–110.

[15] We made some efforts to see whether some other "national" issues had a significant effect on our results. We investigated the effect of war, the duration of war, the rate of change of farm prices and the rate of change of stock market prices, the latter as a possible indicator of future economic conditions. None of our preliminary results provided evidence that our measures of these events had a significant effect on congressional elections.

[16] Our definition differs from Kramer's, "Short-term Fluctuations," p. 136. He treats all minor party votes as votes against the incumbent on grounds that short-term fluctuations in voting express satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent. We believe this overstates the extent of change in public attitudes when there are changes in the party holding the presidency by shifting the average third party vote from one major party to the other.

Combining terms yields an hypothesis for the Democratic vote

$$\begin{aligned}(3)\quad VD_t = {} & d_0 + \Delta d_{01}X20_t + \Delta d_{02}X32_t \\ & + d_1PR_t + \Delta d_1PR_tRI_t + d_2\dot{p}_t \\ & + d_3\dot{U}_t + d_4\frac{\dot{C}}{pt} + \Delta d_2\dot{p}_tRI_t \\ & + \Delta d_3\dot{U}_tRI_t + \Delta d_4\frac{C}{pt}RI_t \\ & + e_{Dt},\end{aligned}$$

and a similar equation for the Republican vote.

Estimates and Implications

Our model differs from most previous studies of the effect of aggregate economic variables by permitting the voter to abstain. It is a peculiar notion of rational behavior, in the sense of equation (1), that requires a voter to believe that the opposition candidates can manage the economy better than the incumbents. If our hypothesis is correct, a main effect of aggregate economic variables is to change the participation rate.

Table 1 shows least squares estimates of the parameters of *VP*, *VD* and *VR* using data for congressional elections from 1896 to 1970.[17] The 1912 election is omitted to avoid the effects of the Roosevelt-Taft split.

Table 1. Parameter Estimates of Voting Participation (*VP*), Democratic (*VD*) and Republican (*VR*) Shares in Congressional Elections (*t*-statistics in parentheses)

	VP	*VD*	*VR*
Constant	47.64	21.42	22.30
	(23.72)*	(16.97)*	(22.38)*
*X*20	−16.39	−7.05	−4.51
	(6.13)*	(4.08)*	(3.30)*
*X*32	11.39	8.67	1.58
	(4.60)*	(5.37)*	(1.24)
PR	11.78	6.81	5.35
	(5.48)*	(4.93)*	(4.90)*
RIPR	0.76	−2.12	2.68
	(0.26)	(1.02)	(1.64)
$\dot{p}$	−0.23	−0.52	−0.03
	(1.11)	(3.05)*	(0.21)
$\dot{U}$	0.01	−0.01	0.01
	(0.79)	(0.56)	(0.46)
$\dot{C}/p$	0.11	−0.00	0.04
	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.19)
$RI\,\dot{p}$		0.62	0.38
		(2.07)*	(1.63)
$RI\,\dot{U}$		0.02	−0.02
		(0.78)	(0.85)
$RI\,\dot{C}/p$		−0.09	−0.07
		(0.19)	(0.21)
$\bar{R}^2$	.71	.67	.68
Durbin-Watson	.68	1.35	1.11

* Denotes significance at .05 level, one-tail test.

Three main implications of our findings deserve emphasis. (1) There is an identifiable, stable, partisan vote. This proposition, useful in analyzing survey data, is supported by our analysis of voting decisions. The magnitudes estimated from the election statistics, however, differ from the results shown in surveys. (2) There is a "coattails" effect. An incumbent president increases his party's vote. A Republican incumbent brings the two parties, on average, near to equality in presidential election years. (3) We find little evidence that incumbent presidents can increase support for candidates of their own party by reducing unemployment or increasing the growth of real income. In the remainder of this section, we discuss our findings in greater detail.

Partisans. Currently, in non-presidential years, 42.6 per cent of the eligible voters are partisans who vote in congressional elections. Presidential elections increase participation by 11.8 to 12.5 per cent on average, the increase depending on the party affiliation of the incumbent President. About 55 per cent of the voters participate in presidential years, and, on our hypothesis, choose candidates independently of current issues. The

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[17] The disturbances in the *VD* and *VR* equations are linear combinations of the four components of the error term in *VP*. Use of ordinary least-squares to estimate the coefficients of the *VD* and *VR* equations yields unbiased estimates that are not as asymptotically efficient as the generalized least-squares estimators of Zellner.

See Arnold Zellner, "An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 57 (1962), 348–68; Arnold Zellner and David S. Huang, "Further Properties of Efficient Estimators for Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations," *International Economic Review*, 3 (1962), 300–313, and Arnold Zellner, "Estimators for Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations: Some Exact Finite Sample Results," *Journal of The American Statistical Association*, 58 (December, 1963), 977–92.

Democrats have a slight advantage in nonpresidential years; 23 per cent of the strict partisans vote for the Democratic candidate, and 19 per cent now vote for the Republican candidate. Less than 1 per cent are third-party partisans.

Presidential elections with a Democratic incumbent add 11.7 per cent on average, and increase the Democrats' vote to 29.8 per cent compared to 24.7 per cent for the Republicans. A Republican incumbent appears to have little additional effect on the overall participation rate, but there is a redistribution of votes from Democrats to Republicans. The average Democrat percentage falls to approximate equality with the Republican percentage.

Our findings show that the Democrats generally have an advantage over the Republicans, but the advantage is less than is suggested by differences in the political identification of the electorate obtained from surveys. Surveys classify approximately 19 per cent of the electorate as "strong Democrats" and no more than 14 per cent as "strong Republicans" in presidential years.[18] If we ignore the effect of presidential elections (*PR*) or incumbency (*RIPR*) in Table 1, our estimate of the Democrats' share is four percentage points above the survey data, and our estimate of the Republican share is more than five percentage points higher than shown in the surveys. If we include the effect of presidential elections and incumbency, because the survey data are for presidential elections, both Democrats and Republicans can depend on even larger percentages than shown in the surveys. The Republican percentage rises above the sum of "strong" and "weak" Republicans shown by the surveys, but the Democrats percentage (28 per cent to 30 per cent) remains far below the total for "strong" and "weak" Democrats (40 per cent to 45 per cent) shown in the surveys. There appears to be no way to reconcile the survey data with our estimates of partisan voting.

The long-term partisan share is relatively stable. This is shown by the coefficients of variation of V_0, d_0 and r_0, all less than 6 per cent. Partisan behavior now appears to be less intense than in the past, however. Including women in the electorate in 1920 reduced the partisan vote for both parties and increased the variability of our estimates. "Realignment" in 1932 added to the partisan vote and increased variability further.

Our results suggest that "realignment" is an inappropriate term for the shift in voter sentiment in 1932. Although the Democrats gained more than the Republicans and became the dominant party, the gain did not come from dissatisfied Republicans switching parties. All of the Democrats' net gain, as shown by the coefficient of $X32$, is from nonaligned to Democratic and appears as an increase in the participation rate. The partisan Republican vote increased by 1.6 per cent. The increase is not statistically significant but is close to the reduction implied by $VP-VD$. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the estimate as meaningful.

Incumbency. Presidential elections increase the participation rate by about 12 per cent, on average, regardless of the party in power. Republican voters are slightly less affected than Democrats by a Democrat incumbent and their participation rate is less variable. An incumbent Democratic president increases the Democrats chances of controlling the House; an incumbent Republican president leaves the two parties with almost equal shares of the partisan vote for Congress.

The principal effect of a Democratic incumbent is to increase the number of weak partisans who vote. Both the Democratic and Republican vote increases. The Democratic share rises by more than the Republican share, so the absolute difference increases. However, the relative advantage of the Democrats declines. The Republicans benefit, slightly and in a relative way, from the increased participation in presidential elections, even if the incumbent is a Democrat. A Republican incumbent brings out approximately the same percentage of the total vote, but more Republicans and fewer Democrats vote, on the average. The coattails of Republicans appear to be longer; a Republican incumbent increases the Republican share of the vote by more than a Democrat incumbent increases the Democrat share. Several of these effects are not significant, however, at the 5 per cent level.

The Effects of Aggregate Economic Variables. The very small effect of the growth of real compensation is on participation, and not on the share of the vote received by either party. If voter dissatisfaction rises when real income or its growth rate decline, neither party gains or loses any significant percentage of the vote. Our attempts to find an effect of incumbency showed no evidence of a shift from Republicans to Democrats as real compensation changes. The estimated effects are tiny, and they are not significant by the usual test.

Changes in the unemployment percentage have little systematic effect on the participation rate or on party strength. Our results suggest that each party gains or loses from rising or falling unemployment rates when the other holds office, but the effects are small and far from significant. Some voters may believe familiar slogans suggesting that the Democrats are more "concerned" about employment and unemployment. The results suggest, however, that such voters are likely to be partisans, to have strong views about the two parties, and to have made their choice independently of the current unemployment rate or its rate of change.

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[18] Flanigan, p. 42.

Similar null results were obtained in several attempts to test for a significant effect of agricultural prices, stock prices, and other economic variables. These variables have no systematic effect on the participation rate or on the share of the vote going to Democrats and Republicans.

The inflation rate is the only exception to our findings that aggregate economic variables have very little effect on the outcome of congressional elections. High rates of inflation lower the participation rate, but the reduction is not significant. An increase in the inflation rate lowers the Democrats' share of the vote. The decline in the Democrats' share is estimated at half the inflation rate, and the effect is statistically significant. The Republicans are unaffected by the inflation rate.

Including the effect of incumbency changes the interpretation. If inflation rises in a presidential year with a Republican incumbent, our estimates suggest that the Democrats' share is unaffected or may rise slightly (0.62–0.52). The Republican share rises, but the change is not significant. Any effect of higher inflation is borne by the Democrats. The only effect of reducing inflation or increasing deflation, with fixed real income, is to increase the Democrats' share of the vote.

One likely, but untested explanation of this asymmetry is that most of the inflation in this century has occurred during the term of Democratic incumbents. The mean rate of inflation during the years used in our study is 2 per cent; during years of Republican presidents, the mean rate is close to zero. Rising inflation during several years of a Republican administration is a recent phenomenon that provides a test of the partisan effect. Our findings for real compensation and unemployment—where substantial differences in mean rates of change are also observed in Democratic and Republican years—suggest that neither party will benefit. Our findings for inflation suggest that the Republicans should have gained in the non-presidential year 1974 from their failure to control inflation. The relatively large loss of seats suggests that the asymmetric effect of inflation in the past may be attributed to the low rate of inflation in Republican years.

There are other plausible explanations. Unanticipated inflation redistributes wealth or income from creditors to debtors. The losses from unanticipated inflation fall most heavily on those who fail to anticipate inflation or fail to shift their position from net creditor to net debtor. We know that the relevant groups include those whose income is fixed by contractual agreements. Landlords, unionized workers, social security recipients are likely to be heavily represented in the group of net creditors at least during the early stages of inflation. A second plausible explanation can be constructed if these groups include many issue oriented voters who are inclined toward the Democrats in non-inflationary years. It is not difficult to construct still other plausible explanations of the asymmetry. Discriminating evidence is lacking.

Election statistics indicate that Republicans dominated the pre-1932 period while the Democrats controlled Congress in most of the years after 1932. This suggests the hypothesis that the economic events from 1929 to 1932 created a lasting change in the voting habits of nonpartisans. We have tested two additional hypotheses. One is that economic events were interpreted differently after 1932; the other is that the interpretation depends on the party of the incumbent President. We find no evidence to support either proposition.

Conclusion

Our results suggest that, with the possible exception of inflation, aggregate economic variables affect neither the participation rate in congressional elections nor the relative strengths of the two major parties. There is very little evidence that an incumbent president can affect the composition of the Congress by measures that have short-term effects on unemployment or real income.

Taken together, the findings support the hypothesis that the principal fluctuations in the percentage of the votes received in congressional elections arise from changes in the participation rate and not from shifts between parties. The percentage of voters participating in presidential years rises markedly. The Democrats gain most when the incumbent is a Democrat; the Republicans gain most when the incumbent is a Republican. Fluctuations in the participation rate have a partisan effect. The Republican share rises to equality with the Democrats share in presidential years if the incumbent is Republican.

The principal changes in the composition of the House during this century appear to reflect four main factors. Two are long-term changes, and two have short-term effects.

From 1896 to 1920, the two parties had about an equal number of partisans. The participation rate fell, and the relative position of the Republicans increased after women were permitted to vote in 1920. From 1920 to 1932, the Republicans had an advantage of three percentage points at the start of the election. The 1932 "realignment" shifted voters from "nonpartisan" to Democratic, but on balance, relatively few voters appear to have changed party loyalty. The increase in the number of partisan Democrats shifted the balance toward the Democrats. One explanation of the shift is the growth in the number of federal employees in the 1930s and of employment in state and local government in the postwar years.

The advantage obtained from the strict partisan vote can be overcome in any election. Two factors that appear most important are presidential elections and local issues or other random factors.

One principal effect of presidential elections is to increase participation. The distribution of the increase depends on the party of the incumbent president. Our findings suggest that Democrats have a 4 per cent advantage when there is an incumbent Democrat. The Republican share increases relative to the Democrats' in presidential elections, even if the incumbent is a Democrat.

A considerable part of the variance in participation and in party share is left unexplained or, on our interpretation, assigned to local and personal characteristics of the district and candidate. These factors are strong enough to dominate the results and to make our principal finding a null result. Neither our model of rational behavior nor the evidence implies that voters respond to short-term changes in employment or real income by voting for, or against, the party in power.

APPENDIX

List of Symbols, Definitions and Sources of Data

p	Consumer Price Index (1929 = 100): 1896–1970 *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, 1972.
U	Total Unemployment Rate: 1896–1947, Bureau of the Census: *Long-Term Economic Growth;* 1948–1970 Economic Report of the President, 1970.
C	Compensation per man-hour: 1896–1914, Albert Rees: *Real Wages in Manufacturing, 1890–1914;* 1914–1946: Albert Rees: *New Measures of Wage-Earner Compensation in Manufacturing*, 1914–1957; 1946–70 index of compensation per man-hour in non-agricultural establishments, adjusted to current dollars using 1966 benchmark. *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, 1972.
VP	Voting turnout: 1920–1970, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1971;* 1896–1918, computed as the fraction of the number of votes cast for Representative (Historical Statistics of the U.S.) divided by the voting age population. The voting age population, males over 21, for the years 1890, 1900, 1910 and 1920, from *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* 1898, 1907, 1918 and 1928 respectively; other years by interpolation.
VD	Percentage of those eligible to register voting Democratic: 1918–1970 the product of the percentage vote cast for House Democratic candidates (*Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1971*) and *VP;* 1896–1920: number of votes cast for Democratic candidates (*Historical Statistics of the U.S.*) divided by the voting age population estimated as for *VP*.
VR	Percentage of those eligible to register voting Republican: Same sources as for *VD*

$$\dot{p} = 1 - \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t}$$

with $t-1$ defined as the year prior to the election.

Similarly for $\dot{U}$ and $\dot{C}/p$.

Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession*

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Introduction

Economic conditions are presently receiving more attention from politicians, journalists, academicians and citizens than probably any other political issue. In light of the publicity they have received and their profound impact on the living standards of American families, it is hard to believe that these economic conditions do not influence voters' selection of candidates for public office.

Nevertheless this simple proposition, which is accepted as conventional wisdom by many politicians, has been the subject of debate among researchers during the past several years. This debate was touched off by Gerald Kramer's pioneering time-series analysis which appeared in the March, 1971 issue of this Review.[1] Using a multivariate regression model, Kramer derived results which appear to indicate that declining real income reduces the vote for the party of the incumbent President, and rising income increases it. Soon after this, George Stigler published findings which he claimed refuted Kramer's.[2] Most recently, Arcelus and Meltzer purport to demonstrate that economic conditions (with the possible exception of inflation) do not affect the vote.[3] How does one resolve this conflict?

To address this question properly, it is necessary to distinguish between the effect on the vote of economic downturns and that of economic upturns. Considerable evidence suggests that the magnitude of these two effects may be quite different. For example, in an article entitled "The Asymmetry of Liking and Disliking," Nehemiah Jordan cites results from several different experiments which indicate that "a positive attitude or positive affect does not have an effect upon measured behavior oppositely equivalent to the effect of a negative attitude or negative affect."[4] In addition, Angus Campbell et al. in *The American Voter*, considering the trend of the "party division of the vote," state that "changes in the party balance are induced primarily by negative rather than positive attitudes toward the party controlling the executive branch of federal government. . . . A party already in power is rewarded much less for good times than it is punished for bad times."[5]

We believe that economic conditions play a small role in the determination of voting behavior in times of prosperity. During these times, their impact is dominated by such forces as the underlying balance of party identification and other, more salient political issues. To this extent, our argument supports the views of Arcelus and Meltzer and of Stigler.

But what about years of economic distress? Here the accumulated evidence that economic conditions do have an effect is overwhelming. To interpret this evidence we must distinguish between the effects of long-run and short-run economic conditions. The effect of short-run economic conditions is reflected by greater voter concern over the economy and less favorable evaluation of the administration's performance relative to the economy. This rising chorus of criticism, however, is not uniformly distributed across the electorate. It is most intense among the large group of persons who are directly affected by the economic downturn. Data from *The American Voter* indicate that during the 1957–58 recession this group contained 4 out of every 10 American

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[1] Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964," *APSR*, 65 (March, 1971), 131–143.

[2] George J. Stigler, "Micropolitics and Macroeconomics: General Economic Conditions and National Elections," *American Economic Review*, 63 (May, 1973), 160–167.

[3] Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (December, 1975), 1232–1239.

[4] Nehemiah Jordan, "The Asymmetry of Liking and Disliking. A Phenomenon Meriting Further Reflection and Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Summer, 1965), 315–22, at. p. 315.

[5] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 554–555. In addition, John Mueller presents evidence of this asymmetry with respect to the impact of an "economic slump" on presidential popularity. See John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 213–16.

families and that the effect of the recession on the attitudes of members of this group toward the then-current Eisenhower administration varied systematically with their party identification.[6] Basically, the impact on their attitudes was greatest for independents and weak party identifiers and least for respondents who strongly identified with either major party.[7] The crucial link between these attitudes and voting decisions is illustrated as the authors go on to show that evaluation of the administration's economic performance affected voters' intentions for the 1958 U.S. congressional election.[8]

To estimate the short-run impact of such economic downturns, it is necessary to measure the long-run underlying "expected" partisan balance, or "normal" vote.[9] Both the measurement of this partisan balance and the analysis of its determinants remain subjects of debate. On the basis of the 1930s' experience, however, it appears that this underlying balance can itself be affected by major, prolonged economic distress, such as that which followed the 1929 crash. For example *The American Voter* indicates that the age cohorts entering the electorate in the 1930s, following the crash, produced about 10 per cent more Democratic identifiers than the cohorts entering the electorate in the 1920s.[10]

In the context of the preceding discussion we developed and tested a model which focuses on the response of voters to *short-run* changes in the economy. To the extent that our model is specified as a multivariate regression, and is estimated from aggregate time series data, our study is similar to those of Kramer, of Stigler, and of Arcelus and Meltzer. Our approach differs from theirs, however, in several important ways: (1) We explicitly recognize the asymmetry of the impact on the vote of short-run economic conditions and demonstrate that economic downturns reduce the vote for the party of the incumbent President, while economic upturns yield no corresponding benefits. (2) We estimate the lag structure of the effect of economic downturns and demonstrate that voters react far more strongly to economic conditions the year prior to an election than they do to economic conditions prior to that. (3) We compare the effect of economic conditions on the vote for the party of the incumbent President during Republican administrations with this effect during Democratic administrations and find no significant difference. (4) We examine the range of economic downturns which affect the vote and find it to be fairly broad.

Our paper is organized as follows: An explanation of the model is followed by a discussion of aggregate national time-series estimates, focusing on the asymmetry of the economic impact, its lag structure, and its impact on each party. Next we discuss a series of sensitivity tests of the model. We then draw upon state-level time-series data to provide further support for the model. In light of all this, we discuss several conceptual and methodological problems in the Arcelus and Meltzer analysis which we feel invalidate their conclusions.

The Model

The model (Figure 1) postulates that voting behavior is determined by both long- and short-run forces. The structure of the model includes a dependent variable, two independent variables, and a disturbance term.

The dependent variable, *voting behavior*, is represented by the Republican share of the two-party vote in U.S. House of Representatives elections. Third-party votes are not included since it is unclear whether they represent a vote against the incumbent party or a protest against the two-party system. Fortunately, during the period under study, third-party candidates received a small proportion of the vote, and changing the measure to incorporate these votes does not affect our conclusions.[11]

One independent variable is the long-run influence of *party identification*. The balance of party identification represents a "normal" or "expected" baseline vote about which short-run forces, such as economic conditions, cause the ob-

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[6] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, p. 387.

[7] Similar evidence is provided by results of Gallup Polls taken during the 1937–38 recession. Approximately 63 per cent of the respondents indicated that they had noticed a "decline in business" in their community during the past two months. Of those who noticed a decline, 58 per cent indicated that they held the current Roosevelt Administration at least partly to blame for it. The variation in response by party, however, was quite striking: only 37 per cent of the Democratic respondents held the administration at least partly to blame, whereas 89 per cent of the Republican respondents did so. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–71* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 78.

[8] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, p. 391.

[9] Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote" in *Elections and the Political Order*, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9–39.

[10] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, Figure 7.1, p. 154.

[11] In 35 of the 37 elections studied, the major two parties obtained 94 per cent or more of the total vote. Their median percentage during this period was 97 per cent. Details of the effect of including third party votes are discussed later.



Change in Prices
Change in Wage Rates
Change in Hours Worked
Change in Unemployment
Change in Other Determinants of Real Income
Direct Inflation Effect ?
Short-run Change In Real Income
Long-Run Balance of Party Identification
All Other Factors (e.g., Foreign Policy Issues and Candidate Personalities)
Observed Voting Behavior (i.e., Partisan Balance of the Vote)

Figure 1. Model of the Impact of Income Changes and Party Identification on Voting Behavior

served vote to fluctuate.[12] Various measures of party ID have been devised by previous researchers.[13] Arcelus and Meltzer use dummy variables in their regression equations to represent different average party shares of the vote during different periods, a procedure which creates sharp breaks between periods and does not account for changes within periods. Kramer uses a linear time variable in some of his regressions which unfortunately assumes implicitly that party ID has followed a linear trend throughout the past century. In a recent paper, Tufte uses a moving average of results in past off-year House elections.[14] This approach enables him to account for gradual changes in partisanship but the weights used to calculate his moving average are not based on empirical evidence.

Voter registration by party, which has been recorded by several states since the early 1920s seemed to us to be the best available measure of the balance of party ID over time.[15] We used these data to estimate our model based on election results in U.S. House races for three states during the period for which appropriate data are available (1930–70). Registration by party, however, is available only in a limited number of states, for very limited time periods. Since most of our analysis is based on aggregate national time-series, we needed to develop a proxy for registration. This proxy was defined as a weighted moving average of the Republican share of the two-party vote in U.S. House elections. Rather than arbitrarily selecting weights, we estimated them directly from the voting and registration data for the three states used in the state-level analysis. The selection of states and estimation of these weights is explained in detail in Appendix B. Basically, the weights were defined as the coefficients of the regression of the Republican share of the two-party registration on the Republican share of the two-party vote in each of the two preceding elections. The weights were estimated to equal 0.69 and 0.36 for each preceding election respectively. Thus, the registration proxy was defined to equal the sum of 0.69 multiplied by the Republican share of the vote in the preceding election plus 0.36 multiplied by the Republican share of the vote in the election preceding it.

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[12] Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote."

[13] One of the earliest attempts to measure party ID from aggregate data is: Donald E. Stokes, "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections," *Journal of Politics* (November, 1962), 689–702. Stokes estimates the division of party loyalty by taking the mean vote in all presidential elections from 1892–1960, and experiments with breaking this into subperiods for 1892–1928 and 1932–60.

[14] Edward Tufte, "Determinants of the Outcome of Midterm Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (September, 1975), 812–826.

[15] We recognize that individuals, regardless of their true attitudes toward each party, may have incentives to register with the locally dominant party. We do not feel, however, that this poses a serious problem for our analysis because (1) we use aggregate statewide data, in which specific local biases are probably largely cancelled out; (2) remaining net systematic biases will be picked up in the intercepts of our regressions and thus will not affect our coefficient estimates; and (3) remaining net random biases will be picked up in the disturbance terms of our regressions and thus will not bias our coefficient estimates. For an extensive analysis of registration changes over time, see James Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 204–233.

As can be seen, these weights decline rapidly. In fact, estimates presented in Appendix B indicate that only the results of the two immediately preceding elections are required to predict registration.

The other independent variable in the model, economic conditions, is most comprehensively measured by *changes in real income*. This change in spending power affects citizens' attitudes and thus influences their voting behavior. Figure 1 illustrates that prices, wage rates, hours worked, unemployment rates and other factors all contribute to the determination of real income. Arcelus and Meltzer claim that one of these factors (inflation), may have a direct effect on the vote. This direct effect represents an interesting refinement of the basic model, but since the determinants of income are highly intercorrelated, it is very difficult to distinguish their separate impacts on the vote. Fortunately, it is unnecessary to demonstrate such direct effects to show that overall economic conditions influence the vote.

The model requires an income measure which represents the change in the "average" voter's real spending power prior to each election. Because it was judged to be the best available measure of income as perceived by the voter, the percentage change in real per capita personal income during the year preceding each election was selected for this purpose. This measure includes before-tax income from all sources accruing to private individuals. One might argue that disposable, after-tax income better represents actual spending power. Since, however, the annual percentage change rates for these two variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.97, they contain virtually the same information (based on data available for 1920–70).

Personal income is available by state since 1929 and for the nation since 1919. Since the national analysis extends back to 1896, it was necessary to find an alternative measure for the earlier years. Percentage change in real per capita gross national product was selected. Of the available measures, it correlated most highly ($r=0.91$) with the percentage change in personal income for the years in which these two series overlap (1920–1966).

Stigler points out that there is "no naturally correct period" before each election during which income changes are most relevant to the determination of voting behavior.[16] Since personal income and gross national product are reported only on an annual basis back to 1896, the shortest possible time period is a year. Both Kramer and we use the change in real income during the year preceding each election under the plausible implicit assumption that voters react more strongly to more recent events. Stigler, on the other hand, chooses to average the percentage change in income during the two years preceding each election. According to him, his regressions were "surprisingly sensitive to this change of measure."[17] Unfortunately Stigler's procedure may just illustrate that if you average an important variable (income change the year directly preceding each election) with a relatively unimportant one (income change the second year prior to each election), you may dilute the apparent importance of the first variable. Estimates discussed later suggest that this is the case; hence instead of averaging the two annual changes, Stigler should have entered them as separate independent variables and estimated their relative impacts from his data.

The model does not assume that economic conditions are the sole determinants of the vote. *Other factors*, such as foreign policy and candidate personalities, may play an important role. In the regression equations which follow, these factors are represented by the disturbance terms as sources of "unexplained" variation in the vote. As long as they are not correlated with income changes, their omission does not bias resulting estimates of the impact of economic conditions on the vote.[18]

Estimation of the Model from Aggregate National Time-Series

The Effect of Income Changes. The model was specified as the following linear regression.

Equation 1. *Original Model Specification*

$$\text{VOTE} = a + B_1(\Delta\text{INC}\cdot\text{I}) + B_2(\text{ID}) + e,$$

where

VOTE = The Republican percentage of the two-party vote.

ΔINC = The percentage change in real per capita income during the year preceding each election.

I = An incumbency variable equal to 1 for

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[16] George J. Stigler, "Micropolitics and Macroeconomics," p. 163.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] For a general discussion of the effect of omitted variables on the estimates of regression coefficients, see Potluri Rao and Roger L. Miller, *Applied Econometrics* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971), pp. 60–67.

Republican presidential administrations and −1 for Democratic ones.

ID = The "expected" Republican percentage of the two-party vote due to party identification. For all national analyses, ID is measured by the registration proxy.

a, e = The intercept and disturbance terms respectively.

This equation states that the Republican share of the vote is a linear additive function of changes in income, ΔINC, and party identification, ID. To complete the specification, it is necessary to multiply ΔINC by an incumbency dummy variable, I, to account for the party of the incumbent President at the time of each election. The rationale for this dummy variable is as follows: If income declines during a Republican administration, the Republican share of the congressional vote is expected to fall. If income declines during a Democratic administration, the Democratic share should decline and the Republican share will increase accordingly.[19] Thus, the coefficient, *B*, of the independent variable, (ΔINC·I), should be positive for elections preceded by economic downturns. For reasons stated previously, however, we would not expect the coefficient to be significantly different from zero for elections preceded by increasing income. Thus the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of this coefficient provide a basis for testing the model.

Equation 1 was estimated from aggregate national data for all congressional elections from 1896–1970 except 1912, basically the same time period used for previous studies. (The election of 1912 is deleted because of its ambiguous results arising from the large Progressive vote that year.[20]) Results are summarized in Table 1. Separate estimates are displayed for (1) elections preceded by declining real income, (2) elections preceded by rising income, and (3) all elections during the period. Each parameter estimate is listed in the table with its corresponding *t*-statistic directly beneath it in parentheses.

The most striking feature of these results is the difference between elections preceded by economic downturns and those during times of relative prosperity. For economic downturns, the coefficient of the income variable, (ΔINC·I), is large, has the expected sign, and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. On the other hand, during prosperous years, this coefficient is considerably smaller, has the wrong sign, and is not significant at the 0.05 level.[21]

Table 1. Regression of the Congressional Vote on Income Change and Party ID

(National, 1896 to 1970, Except 1912)

	Elections Preceded by		All Elections
	Declining Income ($N=13$)	Rising Income ($N=24$)	($N=37$)
Coefficients of Income Change [ΔINC · I]	0.75**	−0.12	0.21*
	(3.5)[a]	(−0.9)	(2.1)
Party Identification [ID]	1.19**	0.86**	0.61*
	(3.6)	(5.2)	(4.6)
Intercept	−0.12	0.05	0.19**
	(−0.7)	(0.5)	(2.7)
R^2	0.60	0.62	0.45
DW	1.5	2.0	1.9

* Significant at .05 level, two-tail.

** Significant at .01 level, two-tail.

[a] All *t*-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates.

These results provide compelling evidence of the fact that economic conditions have a strong asymmetric impact on the congressional vote. Political parties are "punished" by the voters for economic downturns but are not "rewarded" accordingly for prosperity. Apparently, in bad times the economy becomes a salient issue, whereas in good times it diminishes in importance relative to other determinants of voting behavior. It should be noted that all estimates show a significant positive correlation between the vote and party ID, which explains why the overall R^2 is virtually identical in the two separate estimates of the equation.[22]

The model was specified in the form of Equation 1 to provide maximum comparability with Kramer's original results and to provide a better understanding of the following specification (Equation 2) which is used throughout the remainder of the paper.

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[19] Because VOTE is defined in terms of the two-party vote, the percentage of the vote lost or gained by Republicans exactly equals the percentage gained or lost by Democrats.

[20] The two major parties received only 80 per cent of the congressional vote.

[21] The difference between the significance of the results for the two subsamples is even more striking if one considers that the increasing income estimates are based on almost twice as many observations as the declining income estimates.

[22] This point is demonstrated by results of the regression of VOTE on ID only. For economic upturns, ID "predicts" 61 per cent of the variation in VOTE. In other words, past trends "predict" the current vote fairly well. On the other hand, during economic downturns, ID "predicts" only 9 per cent of the variation in VOTE, since economic conditions cause voters to deviate from their past behavior.

Equation 2. *Preferred Model Specification*

$$\text{DEV} = a + B(\Delta\text{INC}\cdot\text{I}) + e,$$

where

DEV = The deviation of the Republican percentage of the two-party vote from its "expected" percentage due to party identification (i.e., VOTE minus ID).

ΔINC = The percentage change in real per capita income during the year preceding each election.

I = An incumbency dummy variable equal to 1 for Republican presidential administrations and -1 for Democratic ones.

a, e = The intercept and disturbance terms respectively.

Equation 2 is preferable to the original specification because it focuses more directly on the principal subject of our analysis, the relationship between short-run economic and electoral fluctuations.[23]

This equation states that DEV, the deviation of the vote from its "expected" outcome, is a linear function of the change in income, ΔINC, times the incumbency variable, I, discussed previously. Expectations for the income coefficient are the same as those for the income coefficient in Equation 1. For economic downturns, it should be significantly positive, while for upturns it should not be significantly different from zero. Estimates of Equation 2 from the aggregate national time-series are listed in Table 2. They are entirely consistent with our expectations.

The present specification facilitates direct comparison of the two subsamples in terms of R^2 as well as the income coefficient. This comparison further illustrates the asymmetry of the process we have been describing: for economic downturns, R^2 is quite high, while for upturns it is negligible.

Table 2. Regression of Short-Run Deviations in the Congressional Vote on Income Change

(National, 1896 to 1970, Except 1912)

	Elections Preceded by		All Elections (N=37)
	Declining Income (N=13)	Rising Income (N=24)	
Coefficients of Income Change [ΔINC · I]	0.66** (4.8)[a]	−0.19 (−1.8)	0.17 (1.6)
Intercept	−0.02 (−1.8)	−0.03** (−4.5)	−0.02** (−3.0)
R^2	0.67	0.12	0.07
DW	1.5	2.0	2.0

** Coefficients and intercepts bearing "**" are significant at the .01 level, two-tail; all others do not even attain significance at the .05 level, two-tail.

[a] All t-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates.

The Effect of Income Changes by Party. After developing the basic conclusions of the model, we examined more closely how economic fluctuations affect voting behavior by first attempting to determine whether these fluctuations affect the vote for the party of the incumbent President to the same extent for both Republican and Democratic administrations. If, for some reason, voters treat administrations of the two parties differently with respect to economic issues, this would have important implications for party strategies.

Up to this point, we have specified a single economic variable, (ΔINC · I), in the model. This implicitly assumes no difference between the parties' susceptibility to economic fluctuations. The coefficients of this variable in Equations 1 and 2 represent the response of voters to income changes during *both* Republican and Democratic administrations. A simple test for different responses under different party administrations is provided by respecifying the model as Equation 3.

Equation 3. *Income Effect by Party*

$$\text{DEV} = a + B_1(\Delta\text{INC}\cdot\text{R}) + B_2(\Delta\text{INC}\cdot\text{D}) + e,$$

where

DEV = The deviation of the Republican percentage of the vote from its "expected" percentage as defined in Equation 2.

ΔINC = The percentage change in real per capita income during the year preceding each election.

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[23] Equation 2 is equivalent to Equation 1 with the value of the coefficient for ID constrained to equal one. This constraint is consistent with our inclusion of REG in the model to represent the "expected" vote, around which short-run economic conditions cause the observed vote to fluctuate. Empirical justification for this assumption is provided by the fact that the coefficients for ID in the appropriately specified asymmetric estimates of Equation 1 are not significantly different from one.

R, D = Republican and Democratic presidential dummy variables (R = 1, D = 0 during Republican administrations and R = 0, D = 1 during Democratic ones).
a, e = The intercept and disturbance terms respectively.

Equation 3 allows for different income coefficients during Republican administrations, B_1, and Democratic ones, B_2. For example, consider the income effect during Republican administrations. The Republican incumbency variable, R, equals 1 and the Democratic incumbency variable, D, equals 0. As a result, the model reduces to Equation 4 in which the income effect is measured only by the Republican coefficient, B_1.

Equation 4. *Income Effect During Republican Administrations*

$$\text{DEV} = a + B_1(\Delta\text{INC}) + e$$

According to the model, during economic downturns, the Republican vote will be lower than average and B_1 should be positive. A similar logic applies during Democratic administrations and the model now simplifies to Equation 5.

Equation 5. *Income Effect During Democratic Administrations*

$$\text{DEV} = a + B_2(\Delta\text{INC}) + e$$

In this situation, the Republican vote should correlate negatively with economic changes and B_2 should be negative. If both parties are equally susceptible to economic changes when they are in the White House, B_1 and B_2 should have opposite signs and equal absolute values during economic downturns. In addition, according to the present model, neither coefficient should be significantly different from zero during prosperous years.

Table 3 lists estimates of Equation 3 from the national data. Note that during economic downturns, coefficients for both parties have correct signs and are similar in magnitude. In addition, their t-statistics show that one is significant at better than 0.05 while the other is significant at 0.06. Significance in such a small sample indicates that these coefficients probably measure a robust phenomenon. On the other hand, estimates for prosperous times yield insignificant income effects regardless of the party in power. In conclusion, the data do not indicate appreciable differences between the effect of income on the vote during Republican or Democratic administrations.

Table 3. Regression of Short-Run Deviations in the Congressional Vote on Income Change by Party of the Incumbent President

(National, 1896 to 1970, Except 1912)

	Elections Preceded by	
	Declining Income[b] (N=13)	Rising Income[b] (N=24)
Coefficient of Income Change, Republican President [ΔINC · R]	0.59* (2.5)[a]	−0.09 (−0.3)
Income Change, Democratic President [ΔINC · D]	−0.79 (−2.1)	0.23 (1.2)
Intercept	−0.02 (−1.3)	−0.03** (−3.3)
R^2	0.68	0.13
DW	1.6	2.0

* Significant at .05 level, two-tail.

** Significant at .01 level, two-tail.

[a] All t-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates.

[b] Of the 13 elections preceded by declining income, 8 had Republican incumbent Presidents and 5 had Democratic ones. Of the 24 elections preceded by rising income, 10 had Republican incumbent Presidents and 14 had Democratic ones.

Lag Structure of the Effect of Income Changes. Next we attempted to clarify the lag structure of the impact of changing income on voting behavior both to gain insights into the dynamics of the process and to resolve the conflict between Kramer's and Stigler's results. One simple way to do this is to estimate Equation 6, which includes the annual percentage income change for each of the two years preceding every election as separate explanatory variables.

Equation 6. *Lag Structure of the Income Effect*

$$\text{DEV} = a + B_1(\Delta\text{INC}(-1)\cdot\text{I}) + B_2(\Delta\text{INC}(-2)\cdot\text{I}) + e,$$

where:

DEV = The deviation of the Republican percentage of the vote from its "expected" percentage as defined in Equation 3.
ΔINC(−1) = The percentage change in real per capita income during the first year preceding each election. (Note that this has been previously referred to as ΔINC.)

ΔINC(−2) = The percentage change in real per capita income during the second year preceding each election.

I = An incumbency dummy variable equal to 1 for Republican presidential administrations and −1 for Democratic ones.

a, *e* = The intercept and disturbance terms respectively.

Table 4 lists the results of estimating Equation 7 from the national data. For elections preceded by an economic downturn, the coefficient for the income change the year directly preceding each election is quite large and highly statistically significant, whereas the coefficient for the income change the second year prior to each election is indistinguishable from zero. Thus it is easy to see how by averaging ΔINC(−1) and ΔINC(−2) together, Stigler misspecified the model, thereby underestimating the income effect and concluding that it does not exist. Whereas Kramer, by including only the income change most relevant to voter decisions, was able to detect the income effect.

Table 4. Regression of Short-Run Deviations in the Congressional Vote on Income Changes Each of the Two Years Preceding Every Election

(National, 1896 to 1970, Except 1912)

	Elections Preceded by	
	Declining Income ($N = 13$)	Rising Income ($N = 24$)
Coefficient of		
Income Change, First Year Prior to Election [ΔINC(−1) · I]	0.67** (4.6)[a]	−0.20 (−1.5)
Income Change, Second Year Prior to Election[b] [ΔINC(−2) · I]	0.08 (0.4)	0.006 (0.1)
Intercept	−0.02* (−1.8)	−0.03** (−4.3)
R^2	0.68	0.12
DW	1.6	2.0

* Significant at .05 level, two-tail.

** Significant at .01 level, two-tail.

[a] All *t*-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates.

[b] The value of ΔINC(−2) for the 1920 election (representing the income change from 1918–1919) was calculated from the per capita GNP data. See Appendix A for data sources.

Sensitivity Tests of the Effect of Income Changes. We performed a series of tests to determine the sensitivity of our results to the particular elections included in the sample and the definitions of variables that were used. Results of these tests indicate that our findings hold for a fairly broad range of economic conditions and variable definitions.

The first test shifts the emphasis from the existence of an income effect on the vote to a consideration of the conditions under which this effect occurs. To the best of our knowledge, few people would deny that a major depression, such as that following 1929, is "bad news" for the incumbent party. Indeed, the largest number of House seats lost since the Civil War occurred in 1874 (Republicans lost 96 seats after the depression of 1873), 1894 (Democrats lost 116 seats after the depression of 1893), and 1932 (Republicans lost 101 seats as the post-1929 depression worsened). In a nonpartisan sense, we would label this the Hoover-Cleveland effect. But such massive changes are only involved in three of the elections since the Civil War. Does the electorate also respond to less drastic economic downturns?

To study this question, elections were cumulatively deleted from estimates of Equation 2 in order of greatest to least decline in real per capita income. Results of this procedure (Table 5) indicate that the model survives deletion of half the sample. In fact, the coefficient of the income effect changes by less than 12 per cent. In addition, although the *t*-statistic and R^2 decline regularly with the deletion of each election, they consistently provide confirmation of the model. Further deletions leave too small a sample for clear interpretation of the results. Thus, the vote for the incumbent party appears to be measurably reduced by a fairly wide range of economic downturns. It should be reiterated that our sample contains only elections from 1896–1970, except 1912. Because of the absence of sufficient comparable time-series data, it was not possible to include the 1873 and 1893 depressions; their inclusion would have further reinforced our findings.

Next, a standard "jackknife" test was performed for years of declining income to determine whether any single observation had an effect on the regression coefficients that was drastically different from the effect of the others. This test consisted of systematically deleting a single election from the estimate of Equation 2 until each election had been deleted from the sample once. No election had an appreciable impact on estimates of the model. The coefficient, *B*, varied by less than 14

Table 5. Sensitivity Test of Effect of Income Decline on Short-Run Deviations in Congressional Vote: Results with Cumulative Omission of Largest Income Declines[a]

Elections Remaining in Sample	Coefficient of Income Change, All Presidents	t Statistics	Significance Level[c]	R^2
All 13[b]	0.66	4.8	0.0006	0.67
12	0.58	3.2	0.009	0.51
11	0.65	3.0	0.016	0.49
10	0.71	2.6	0.031	0.46
9	0.83	2.1	0.075	0.39
8	0.77	1.5	0.190	0.27
7	0.64	1.0	0.380	0.16

[a] Elections are deleted in order of largest to smallest income decline.

[b] Elections included (with corresponding annual percentage income change in parentheses): 1932 (−15.6), 1908 (−10.0), 1914 (−9.4), 1930 (−9.1), 1938 (−6.8), 1946 (−4.7), 1920 (−4.3), 1896 (−3.8), 1904 (−3.2), 1954 (−1.6), 1958 (−1.5), 1902 (−1.1), 1910 (−1.0).

[c] Two-tail.

per cent of its original value, and all estimates yielded high R^2 and large t-statistics.[24]

Next, we examined the sensitivity of our results to changes in the definitions of the variables. We first measured the impact of changing the definition of voting behavior from the Republican share of the two-party vote (which we prefer for reasons cited earlier) to the Republican share of the total vote. To do this, Equation 2 was re-estimated from the national data, using the new measure of voting behavior. The resulting coefficient, B, for the income term differed by less than 15 per cent of its original value and the t-statistic and R^2 remained stable. In addition, modifications to the registration proxy were incorporated into estimates of Equation 2 by changing the weights used to calculate this proxy. These weights were varied to extremes unlikely to occur given their estimated standard errors (see Appendix B). The coefficient, B, of the income term changed by less than 6 per cent of its original value and all estimates yielded high t-statistics and high R^2.

Estimation of the Model from State-Level Time-Series

To test the preceding conclusions further, the model was estimated from data for the three states (California, Pennsylvania, and New York) that were used to construct the registration proxy. These estimates were based on personal income, registration and voting data for each U.S. House election from 1930–70. Separate estimates were made for elections preceded by economic downturns and those preceded by years of prosperity. In addition, two forms of the model were estimated, corresponding to Equations 2 and 3 in the national-level analysis. One assumed that income changes affect both parties to the same extent. The other allowed this effect to vary by party. Equations 7 and 8 illustrate these two specifications.

Equation 7. *State-Level Replication of Equation 2*

$$\mathrm{DEV} = a + B_1(\mathrm{CAL}) + B_2(\mathrm{PENN}) + B_3(\Delta\mathrm{INC}\cdot\mathrm{I}) + e$$

Equation 8. *State-Level Replication of Equation 3*

$$\mathrm{DEV} = a + B_1(\mathrm{CAL}) + B_2(\mathrm{PENN}) + B_3(\Delta\mathrm{INC}\cdot\mathrm{R}) + B_4(\Delta\mathrm{INC}\cdot\mathrm{D}) + e,$$

where

DEV = The deviation of the Republican percentage of the two-party vote from its "expected" percentage arising from party identification (i.e., VOTE minus ID, where in this case, ID is calculated directly as the Republican percentage of the two-party registration).

ΔINC = The percentage change in real per capita income during the year preceding each election.

I, R, D = Presidential dummy variables (I = 1, R = 1 and D = 0 during Republican administrations; I = −1, R = 0 and D = 1 during Democratic administrations).

CAL, PENN = State dummy variables (CAL = 1, PENN = 0 for California; CAL = 0, PENN = 1 for Pennsylvania; CAL = 0, PENN = 0 for New York).

a, e = The intercept and disturbance terms respectively.

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[24] Results of the model (Equation 2) for elections preceded by rising income were subjected to the following sensitivity test: The rising income subsample was split in two, with one half containing the elections preceded by the largest income increases and the other half containing the elections preceded by the smallest income increases. Equation 2 was then estimated separately from each half of the rising income subsample. The results for both estimates were quite similar to those reported for the rising income subsample as a whole.

Table 6. Regression of Short-Run Deviations in the Congressional Vote on Income Change (California, Pennsylvania, New York 1930–70)

	Equation 7 Elections Preceded by		Equation 8 Elections Preceded by	
	Declining Income ($N=21$)	Rising Income ($N=42$)	Declining Income ($N=21$)	Rising Income ($N=42$)
Coefficient of				
Income Change, All Presidents [ΔINC·I]	0.76** (5.0)[a]	0.16 (1.2)		
Income Change, Republican Pres. [ΔINC·R]			0.73** (3.0)	−0.27 (−0.4)
Income Change, Democratic Pres. [ΔINC·D]			−0.85 (−1.7)	−0.23 (−1.3)
California [CAL][b]	0.08** (−3.0)	0.08** (4.8)	0.08** (2.9)	0.08** (4.8)
Pennsylvania [PENN][b]	−0.08** (−3.1)	−0.07** (−4.1)	−0.09** (−3.0)	−0.06** (−3.9)
Intercept	0.02 (0.9)	0.03* (2.2)	0.01 (0.5)	0.03* (2.3)
R^2	0.79	0.68	0.79	0.68
DW	2.0	1.2	2.0	1.3

* Significant at .05 level, two-tail.
** Significant at .01 level, two-tail.
[a] All *t*-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates.
[b] CAL and PENN identify the state for each observation (CAL=1, PENN=0 for California; CAL=0, PENN=1 for Pennsylvania; and CAL=0, PENN=0 for New York).

These equations are identical to those estimated from the national data, with two exceptions. First, since party ID can be measured by state-level registration, it is unnecessary to calculate a registration proxy. Instead, registration can be used directly in defining the dependent variable (i.e., DEV=VOTE minus ID). Second, it is necessary to include two dummy variables, CAL and PENN, to identify each observation by state. The coefficients, B_1 and B_2, of these two variables indicate differences between New York's intercept, a, and those for California and Pennsylvania respectively. Interpretation of the estimated income coefficients is identical to that of estimates from the national data.

The state-level results are listed in Table 6. As can be seen, the estimated income coefficients are consistent with those obtained from the national data. They are large and significant for economic downturns but small and not significantly different from zero for prosperous times. In addition, the income coefficients for economic downturns during Republican and Democratic administrations are similar to each other and remarkably similar to those obtained from the national data.[25]

Implications for the Arcelus and Meltzer Study

Having presented our results, we now turn to the Arcelus and Meltzer study. Their findings con-

[25] The state estimates do not provide a completely independent replication of the national analysis. The two analyses are linked to the extent that the characteristics of the three states are imbedded in the national data. If the model had been estimated from data for the nation minus the three states, the results would have been completely independent from the state-level analysis. This was not desirable, however, since the state time-series are shorter than the national ones. Nevertheless, the interdependency between the two levels of analysis is probably not serious since the three states represent only 25 per cent and 28 per cent of the total national vote in the 1930 and 1970 congressional elections, respectively. Also, state estimates cover little over half the time period included in the national analysis.



Figure 2. Comparison of the Annual Percentage Change Rates for Real Per Capita Income and Real Compensation Per Man Hour from 1896 to 1970[a]

[a] Each point represents the annual income or compensation change rate preceding the election year indicated.

flict with ours in several important ways, because of conceptual and methodological problems in their analysis.

One of their most serious problems is that they overlook the difference between the impact of economic downturns and the impact of economic upturns. Their specification of the model implicitly assumes that the impacts of upturns and downturns are opposite in sign and equal in magnitude. As previously discussed, our results demonstrate the inappropriateness of this assumption.

A second important problem is Arcelus and Meltzer's use of real compensation per man hour as a measure of real income. For years, economists have recognized that wages may rise during prosperous times when income is rising but that they do not fall in a corresponding manner during economic downturns when income is declining. This downward rigidity of wages is often explained by such factors as union contracts and minimum wage laws.[26] Figure 2 illustrates the difference between the percentage change in real compensation per man hour used by Arcelus and Meltzer and the percentage change in real per capita income (measured by personal income and GNP), for the time period used in their analysis. For example, during the Great Depression from 1931–32, real compensation per man hour declined by only 2 per cent, while real per capita income fell 16 per cent. For the set of elections in their sample, real compensation per man hour "predicted" only 41 per cent of the variation in real per capita income. Thus we feel that compensation per man hour seriously misrepresents income changes.

A third problem with the Arcelus and Meltzer study is that their model includes three separate determinants of real income changes; [$\dot{p}$ (price changes), $\dot{U}$ (unemployment rate changes and $\dot{C}/p$ (changes in real compensation per man hour)] as explanatory variables. Arcelus and Meltzer find that no single factor (except possibly prices) exhibits a separate impact on the vote, and they conclude from this that overall short-run economic conditions have no effect. This conclusion does not follow from their results for the following reasons.

(1) It is possible that no single real income determinant is powerful enough to influence the vote but that the entire group as a whole (or real income itself) has a pronounced effect.

(2) The linear combination of prices, unemployment, and compensation per man hour used by Arcelus and Meltzer accounts for only part of the changes in real income because (a) additional factors enter into its determination and (b) the functional form relating income changes to its determinants is nonlinear. Thus even as a group, these variables do not represent a complete test of the impact of *real income* on the vote. To illustrate this point the percentage change in per capita real income was

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[26] See Gardner Ackley, *Macroeconomic Theory* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 196–198.

regressed on Arcelus and Meltzer's three variables ($\dot{p}$, $\dot{U}$ and $\dot{C}/p$). As a group, these variables "predicted" only 61 per cent of the variation in real income changes.

(3) Arcelus and Meltzer's economic variables are intercorrelated with each other and with the additional explanatory variables in their model (see their Table 1). This collinearity makes it difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain the separate impact on voting behavior of each economic variable. Their model further compounds this problem by including 10 explanatory variables in regressions which are estimated from only 37 observations. To assess the extent of this problem, it is useful to determine the multiple correlation, R, between each of their economic variables ($\dot{p}$, $\dot{U}$ and $\dot{C}/p$) and the remaining nine explanatory variables in their model. To do this, each economic variable was separately regressed on all nine remaining explanatory variables. The resulting multiple correlation coefficient for $\dot{p}$ as a linear function of the nine variables was 0.77; that for $\dot{U}$ was 0.86; and that for $\dot{C}/p$ was 0.77. This collinearity causes large standard errors for their regression coefficients, which make it very difficult to obtain estimates of the separate impact of each economic variable.

Conclusions and Suggested Further Research

State and national time-series and selected cross-sectional survey data indicate that economic downturns have a pronounced effect on the vote in U.S. House elections. They support a modified, asymmetric version of Kramer's original model which postulates a "throw the rascals out" phenomenon, in which economic downturns reduce the vote for the party of the incumbent President, but economic upturns have no corresponding effect. In addition, the data show that (1) the effect of economic downturns on the party of the incumbent President is the same for either Republican or Democratic administrations, (2) voters primarily consider economic conditions which occur the year immediately preceding each election, (3) the model holds for a fairly broad range of economic conditions, and (4) the contradictory findings of Arcelus and Meltzer and of Stigler can be explained by problems in their methodologies.

Studies to date, however, represent only a first step toward a full understanding of the role of economic issues in the political process. The following is a sampling of the many possibilities for future research in this area.

Assessment of the Relative Political Impacts of Inflation and Unemployment. Strong inflation is historically infrequent and largely associated with the occurrence of wars. High peacetime inflation rates are a recent phenomenon. Unemployment rates correlate with real income changes. For these reasons, it is unlikely that aggregate time-series can provide meaningful estimates of the relative impacts on voting behavior of inflation and unemployment. Such information, however, would be quite useful to public officials who must decide upon policies which make trade-offs between these problems. In our opinion, survey research techniques are the most fruitful potential source of this information.

Replication of the Analysis From More Disaggregate Data. Annual state per capita income data for 1919–21 and 1929 to the present exists in published form.[27] For more recent years, the Office of Business Economics is compiling income estimates for all counties and most major metropolitan areas.[28] This information, together with voting and registration data for those areas where it exists, could be used to replicate estimates of the model.

Application to Other Elective Offices. The structural relationship between economic conditions and the vote for the incumbent party may be common to a variety of elective offices. We have relied on the U.S. House vote, partly for reasons of comparability with previous studies, but also because the Senate and presidential time-series provide smaller samples. The Senate series begins in 1914 and the presidential series includes only half as many elections as the House series. In addition, we expect the effect of candidate personalities to reduce the impact of economic conditions in senatorial and presidential elections. These hypotheses, however, remain to be tested.

Finally, it should be noted that economic conditions are only one of many issues that enter into the political process and that in a broader context, a better understanding of their role is important for improving our knowledge of the role of issues in general.

APPENDIX A

Data Sources and Definitions of Variables

Aggregate National Analysis

1. *Percentage of the total vote by party, U.S. House of Representatives Elections, 1896–1970:* Obtained from unpublished tables provided by Prof. W. D. Burnham of MIT, which are considered to be the most recently updated figures

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[27] See Appendix A for sources of state income data published by the Department of Commerce for 1929 to the present. For 1919–21 see: Maurice Leven, *Income In the Various States, Its Sources and Distribution, 1919, 1920 and 1921* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1925). Note that the Leven data are not strictly comparable to the Department of Commerce data.

[28] "Personal Income in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas," *Survey of Current Business*, 50 (May, 1970), 22–36.

available and are quite similar to those used in the original Kramer analysis. The Republican percentage of the two-party vote was calculated as the Republican percentage of the total vote divided by the sum of the Republican and Democratic percentages of the total vote, the quotient of which was multiplied by 100.

2. *Consumer Price Index 1919–70 (1967=100):* Table 121, p. 276, *Handbook of Labor Statistics 1972*, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C. 1972.
3. *Total Population 1919–70:* Series A114, p. 200, *Long Term Economic Growth, 1860–1970*, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, D.C. 1973.
4. *Income:*
   A. 1895–1918—Per capita Gross National Product in constant 1958 dollars. Obtained from Series All, p. 182, *Long Term Economic Growth, 1860–1970, (LTEG)*, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, D.C., 1973.
   B. 1919–1928—Total personal income in current (nondeflated) dollars. Obtained from Series A37, p. 188, *LTEG.*
   C. 1929–1970—Total personal income in current (nondeflated) dollars. Obtained from the *Survey of Current Business*, 53 (July, 1973), Table B, p. 52.
   D. Real per capita annual income (INC) was estimated as
   For 1895–1918:
   INC=per capita Gross National Product in 1958 dollars.
   For 1919–1970:

$$\mathrm{INC} = (\mathrm{TPINC}\cdot 100)/(\mathrm{POP}\cdot \mathrm{CPI}),$$

where

INC=Real per capita income in 1967 dollars.
TPINC=Total current personal income.
POP=Total population.
CPI=The consumer price index (1967=100).

   E. Annual percentage change in real per capita income the year preceding each election was then obtained as

$$\Delta\mathrm{INC} = (\mathrm{INC} - \mathrm{INC}(-1))/\mathrm{INC}(-1),$$

where

ΔINC=Annual percentage change in real per capita income.
INC=Real per capita income the year of each election.
INC(−1)=Real per capita income the year prior to each election.

State-Level Analysis

1. *Percentage of the total vote, by party, U.S. House of Representatives Elections, 1930–70:* Paul T. David, *Party Strength in the United States 1872–1970*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., 1972. (Cal. data on p. 103, N.Y. data on p. 213, Penn data on p. 237). The Republican percentage of the two party vote was calculated as the Republican percentage of the total vote divided by the sum of the Republican and Democratic percentages, the quotient of which was multiplied by 100.
2. *Voter Registration by Party:*
   A. California (for 1922–1960) Eugene E. Lee, *California Votes 1928–60*, Table 2–1, p. 29, (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1963); (for 1962–70) *Report of Registration*, published for each general election by the California Secretary of State.
   B. Pennsylvania—*The Pennsylvania Manual* (Harrisburgh: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), 1925–26 through 1970–71 volumes. Prior to 1936, registration was not required in some rural areas. Since 1936, the data are statewide totals.
   C. New York—*Legislative Manual of New York* (Albany: Secretary of State), 1921 through 1971–72 volumes.
3. *Income:*
   A. *1929–47*—Per capita personal income in current (nondeflated) dollars. Table 2, pp. 142–45, *Personal Income by States Since 1929*, Office of Business Economics, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 1956.
   B. *1948–58*—Per capita personal income in current (nondeflated) dollars. Table F, pp. 33–4, *Sensitivity of State and Regional Income to National Business Cycles* (supplemental material in a reprint of the April, 1973 *Survey of Current Business*).
   C. *1959–70*—Per capita personal income in current (nondeflated) dollars. Table 2, p. 43, *Survey of Current Business*, 53 (Aug. 1973).
   D. Real per capita income (INC) was estimated as

$$\mathrm{INC} = (\mathrm{PINC}\cdot 100)/\mathrm{CPI},$$

where

INC=Real per capita income in constant 1967 dollars.
PINC=Per capita current income.
CPI=The aggregate national consumer price index (1967=100). Separate price indices for each

state were not available for the entire period.

E. Annual percentage change in real per capita income the year preceding each election was then obtained as

$$\Delta INC = (INC - INC(-1))/INC(-1),$$

where

ΔINC = Annual percentage change in real per capita income.

INC = Real per capita income the year of each election.

INC(-1) = Real per capita income the year prior to each election.

APPENDIX B

Estimation of the Weights for the Registration Proxy

The registration proxy is a weighted moving average of the Republican share of the two-party vote. Its weights are defined as the coefficients (B_1 and B_2) of the linear regression (Equation B1) of the Republican share of the two-party registration (REG) on the Republican share of the two-party vote in each of the two preceding U.S. House elections [VOTE(-1) and VOTE(-2)].

Equation B1. *Predicting Registration by Past Election Results*

$$REG = a + B_1(VOTE(-1)) + B_2(VOTE(-2)) + e,$$

where

REG = The Republican percentage of the two-party registration.

VOTE(-1), VOTE(-2) = The Republican percentage of the two-party vote in the first and second preceding U.S. House elections respectively.

B1, B2 = The regression coefficients or weights of VOTE(-1) and VOTE (-2) respectively.

a, e = The intercept and disturbance terms respectively.

This regression was estimated for California, Pennsylvania, and New York from time-series data on election results and voter registration by party maintained by each state. States were chosen according to the following criteria:

Size—Large states were needed to provide enough House districts to average out idiosyncracies arising from such factors as specific personalities and dominant local party organizations.

Length of Time Series—Registration time-series by party vary by state from zero to over twenty elections. California, Pennsylvania, and New York have the longest series available, with the exception of Oregon, which has too few House districts for use in the analysis (California begins in 1922, Pennsylvania begins in 1925, New York data for consecutive elections begin in 1920, and Oregon begins in 1908).[B1]

Variation Across States and Time—The greater the variation in registration and voting behavior, the more generalizable are the estimates of the weights.

The analysis is summarized in Table B1. Each column in the table represents an estimate of Equation B1. The first three columns list results for each state. The coefficients, for VOTE(-1) and VOTE(-2) are the relative weights used to combine the variables to calculate the registration proxy. This linear combination "predicts" a large proportion of the variation in observed registration. For example, a new variable defined as [$0.71\cdot VOTE(-1)+0.23\cdot VOTE(-2)$] "predicts" 75 per cent of the variation in California registration.[B2]

Coefficient estimates are remarkably consistent with each other. The appropriate t-test indicates that they do not significantly differ by state. Since we had no a priori reason for expecting them to differ, we pooled all observations into a joint sample from which Equation B1 was estimated.[B3] These pooled estimates (column 4 in Table B1) yield weights of 0.69 and 0.36 for VOTE(-1) and VOTE(-2) respectively. Thus the registration proxy used throughout the analysis of the national data was defined as [$0.69\cdot VOTE(-1) + 0.36\cdot VOTE(-2)$].

Table B1 also demonstrates that only the results of the past two elections are required to predict voter registration at any given point in time.[B4]

[B1] Oregon increased from two to four House districts during this period.

[B2] The unadjusted R^2 for the California equation is 0.75. Because they incorporate degrees of freedom, the adjusted R^2's shown in the table are underestimates of the actual proportion of the registration variation "predicted" by each regression. For further discussion of adjusted R^2, see J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods,* 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 129–130.

[B3] The standard errors of estimate of the regressions for each state were statistically significantly different from each other, according to the appropriate F-test. Thus to obtain the most efficient estimators, observations for each state in the pooled sample were weighted in inverse proportion to the standard error of the separate regression for that state.

[B4] Estimates also indicate that the weights attached to additional elections decrease rapidly as the time between the election and registration figures increases.

Table B1. Republication Share of Registration Estimated from Republican Share of Congressional Vote in Preceding Elections

(California 1922–70, Pennsylvania 1926–70, New York 1920–70)

	California ($N=25$)	Pennsylvania ($N=23$)	New York ($N=26$)	All Three States Pooled[c] ($N=74$)
Coefficients of:				
Vote, 1st Election Prior to Registration [VOTE(−1)]	0.71**	0.74**	0.58**	0.69**
	(4.5)[a]	(5.8)	(3.6)	(8.1)
Vote, 2nd Election Prior to Registration [VOTE(−2)]	0.23	0.44**	0.49**	0.36**
	(1.5)	(3.5)	(3.1)	(4.2)
California [CAL][b]				−0.09**
				(−5.5)
Pennsylvania [PENN][b]				0.05**
				(4.4)
Intercept	−0.06	−0.05	−0.05	−0.03
	(−0.9)	(−1.0)	(−0.6)	(−1.0)
DW	1.1	0.7	2.3	1.3
Adjusted R^2	0.73	0.87	0.63	0.82
Adjusted R^2, Past 6 Elections[d]	0.70	0.87	0.68	0.81

** Coefficients and intercepts bearing "**" are significant at the .01 level, two-tail; all others do not even attain significance at the .05 level, two-tail.

[a] All t-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates.

[b] CAL and PENN identify the state for each observation (CAL = 1, PENN = 0 for California; CAL = 0, PENN = 1 for Pennsylvania and CAL = 0, PENN = 0 for New York).

[c] Observations for each state are weighted in inverse proportion to the standard error of the separate regression for that state.

[d] Obtained from regressing current registration on the results of each of the past 6 congressional elections.

Additional past elections increase "predictive" ability very little. Comparison of the adjusted R^2 for the equations containing two prior elections with those containing six elections clearly illustrates this point. Adjusted R^2 explicitly trades off the gain in "predictive" ability against the loss of degrees of freedom caused by adding explanatory variables. For some of the estimates in the table, the loss of degrees of freedom outweighs the increase in "predictive" ability. In these cases, adjusted R^2 decreases when going from two to six elections.

Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer, The Effect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections*

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Arcelus and Meltzer begin with a quite plausible point, that short-term economic fluctuations may affect voter participation as well as partisan preference. Their empirical findings differ markedly from those of several earlier studies,[1] and if correct would considerably change our current understanding of the effects of economic variables on elections. It seems to us, however, that upon closer examination, their major inferences are not supported by the evidence they present. There are serious problems with their model, the data they apply it to, the statistical method they use to estimate it, and the way they interpret their results. We shall review some of these difficulties and show that their principal conclusions are not substantiated by their evidence, and that their results in fact show very little, one way or the other, about the effects of economic conditions on congressional elections. When some of the problems inherent in their research design are remedied, reanalysis of the model leads to quite different conclusions, which substantially (though not entirely) confirm those of the earlier studies cited above. Before presenting these results, however, we first consider some more basic matters.

Long-Term Changes in Participation

Figure 1 below shows the aggregate participation rate in congressional elections over the period 1896–1970. This is essentially the *VP* series used by Arcelus and Meltzer in their paper.[2] (The *VR* and *VD* series are similar.) Several broad trends are apparent. Participation declined rapidly from 1896 to 1912, dropped abruptly in 1920, then rose steadily until World War II. It dropped again during the War, then in the postwar period increased steadily until the 'sixties, and has declined somewhat since then. Though the precise reasons for these secular tendencies are not completely known, it seems clear that major historical and demographic forces, rather than short-term economic or other factors, are largely responsible.[3] In order to properly measure the impact of short-term forces, it is necessary to control and compensate for these longer-term historical forces, which would otherwise contribute most of the variation in the series and confound the estimates of short-term effects.

The Arcelus-Meltzer model in effect controls

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[1] Including G. H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 131–143; G. H. Kramer and S. J. Lepper, "Congressional Elections," in *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History*, ed. W. O. Aydelotte, A. G. Bogue and R. W. Fogel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 256–281; S. J. Lepper, "Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets," *Public Choice*, 18 (1974), 67–81; E. R. Tufte, "The Determinants of the Outcome of Midterm Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (September, 1975). In his original study Kramer found that real income fluctuations affected the incumbent party's vote, but that unemployment and inflation did not. There was a data error in the real income series used in the original article (discovered by George Stigler), however; the revised data indicate that both income and inflation are important electoral determinants. A corrected set of results is reported in Bobbs Merrill reprint (PS-498) of the original Kramer article.

[2] Arcelus and Meltzer draw their participation data for 1920–1970 from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1971). We used a later, revised series for 1930–1972, which is evidently based on new census data or analysis. We have also accounted for the gradual extension of women's suffrage before 1920. See Appendix.

[3] Among the forces at work were expansions of the electorate, the effects of immigration, changes in ballot forms and election laws, and the growth of literacy and the mass media. See for example, W. D. Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (March, 1965), 7–28; Phillip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, ed. Angus Campbell and Phillip E. Converse (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972); W. D. Burnham, "Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's 'Change in the American Electorate,'" *American Political Science Review*, 68 (September, 1974), 1002-1023, and comments by Phillip E. Converse and J. G. Rusk.

Figure 1. Voter Participation Rate (House Vote/Total Eligible Vote), 1896–1970[a].



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[a] Omitting 1912. Scales of midterm and presidential year elections adjusted to equate the means of the two series.

for long-term trends by incorporating two dummy variables, for the post-1920 and -1932 periods. This specification implicitly assumes that voter participation has fluctuated around relatively stable levels, with abrupt shifts to new levels in 1920 and again in 1932, as shown in Figure 1. Yet inspection of the actual participation series indicates that most of the major changes have been gradual trends, persisting over a series of elections, rather than the abrupt shifts they posit. The residuals generated by their various equations are not random (this is clear from visual inspection of the residuals, and also from the values of the Durbin-Watson statistic [a measure of the correlation between adjacent residuals] they report), as they should be if the model were correctly specified, but display systematic patterns. It seems clear that the long-term model is misspecified, and hence that the Arcelus-Meltzer estimates of the long-term partisan shares are incorrect. It is not surprising that they are unable to reconcile their estimates with survey data findings on partisanship (p. 1237).

The misspecification of the long-term part of the model may well also affect the estimates of short-term factors. Since it introduces systematic discrepancies between real and estimated long-term trends in participation, whatever genuine short-term fluctuations are present will be confounded with these spurious discrepancies. Misspecification of one part of the model can, in general, lead to biased estimates of all coefficients.[4] It is no simple task to model explicitly the complex and changing mix of social, demographic and historical forces which underlie long-term changes in participation, and there may be no easy way to correct for these biases; it may be, in fact, that longitudinal participation data are simply too "noisy" to permit accurate measurement of short-term effects. In any event, there is a potentially serious specification problem with the Arcelus-Meltzer model, and their results (including their estimates of short-run effects) should be regarded with caution.

Why, and How, Should Economic Variables Affect Participation?

The starting point of the Arcelus-Meltzer analysis of short-term effects is their model of "rational" abstention: thus, "Our model differs from most previous studies . . . by permitting voters to abstain. . . . If our hypothesis is correct, a main effect of aggregate economic variables comes by changing the participation rate." In developing these hypotheses, they suggest three ways in which economic (or other) factors may induce voters to vote: "(1) because they perceive a difference between . . . parties on a particular issue, (2) they wish to protest against a particular . . . outcome, or (3) they wish to reward a party . . . for a policy or outcome. . . . In each of these cases, the net benefit of voting . . . increase[s] during elections in which the issue arises." Presumably the idea behind (1) is that some potential voters consider one of the parties—the Republicans, for example —best qualified to deal with a particular issue, such as inflation. Then in an election in which inflation "arises" as an issue—presumably because it is too high—these individuals will be more likely to vote. By the same reasoning this "perceived differences" hypothesis would also predict increased turnout when unemployment is high, and when the growth rate falls. These predictions are summarized in Figure 2 below. The second hypothesis, (2), leads to the same predictions: "protesters" are more likely to vote when conditions are bad, i.e., when inflation and unemployment are high, and the growth rate low. The third hypothesis, however, would predict precisely *opposite* effects, since "rewarders" will be more likely to vote when conditions are good. Arcelus and Meltzer offer no hypotheses about the relative strengths of these three motivations in the electo-

Figure 2

	Type of Motivation:		
Variable:	(1) "Perceived Differences"	(2) "Protesters"	(3) "Rewarders"
Growth Rate of Real Income	−	−	+
Inflation Rate	+	+	−
Unemployment	+	+	−

Direction of the effects of economic variables on voter participation predicted by Arcelus and Meltzer's hypotheses; +, − indicate that increases in the economic variable in question will increase or decrease turnout, respectively.

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[4] See J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 168–169.

rate as a whole, or within any subgroup, such as partisans of either party. In the absence of such information, their theoretical hypotheses do not lead to any clear predictions about the net effects of economic conditions on participation. If "rewarders" are the most numerous group, the effects of the economic variables should be of the sign in column (3); if "rewarders" and others approximately offset each other, economic variables will have *no* net effect; while if protest and/or perceived differences are the prevalent motivations, the effects should be as in columns (1) and (2). Thus any possible set of empirical findings can be reconciled with their hypotheses: *there is no conceivable way in which their evidence could possibly falsify their model of the voting process.*

Where Are the Shift Voters?

Arcelus and Meltzer draw the surprising conclusion that "fluctuations in . . . congressional elections arise . . . not from shifts between parties." It seems to us, however, that their results do not support this conclusion, and in fact that there is no possible way of inferring the magnitude of shifting from the type of evidence they use. Their model proceeds by partitioning the eligible electorate into three groups: (1) "Habitual, partisan voters," who constitute H_t of the electorate in election t; (2) a group N_{1t} of "voters induced to vote by the reduction in cost or increase in perceived benefits resulting from presidential elections and incumbency"; and finally a block N_{2t} of voters "for whom the net benefit of voting is a function of aggregate economic performance." The participation rate of this last block is assumed to be a linear function of certain macroeconomic variables. In extending this framework to a model of partisan choice, they take the partisanship of the first two groups as fixed (the Democratic shares of each block of voters being α_D and β_D, respectively), while that of the third group of voters, those motivated to vote because of concern for economic issues, "varies with incumbency," presumably because of differential turnout effects. Nowhere in this framework is there any provision for a block of "shift" voters, who regularly vote but switch from one party to the other in response to economic or other issues. Ignoring this possibility seems dubious empirically, for evidence from other sources indicates that such voters do exist and that they constitute a sizable portion of the active electorate.[5] In any event, since their model makes no provision for the possibility of shift voters, it is not entirely surprising that they do not find any.

To explore this issue further, let us add to the Arcelus-Meltzer model a fourth block of voters, who always vote but shift from party to party. Let S be the size of this block (as a fraction of the eligible electorate), and vr_t and vd_t be the Republican and Democratic shares, respectively, of these votes in election t. Since these voters always vote they will not affect total participation (S will be incorporated into the intercept of the VP equation), but they will affect the relative sizes of the Democratic and Republican shares. To simplify, let us suppose there is only a single relevant economic variable, $\dot{r}$ (the growth in per capita real income), and that the voters in S vote for or against the incumbent party according to its economic performance. Then vd_t will be given by[6]

$$vd_t = c_1 - c_2\delta_t - c_3\delta_t\dot{r}_t + e_t,$$

where δ_t is $+1$ or -1 according to whether the incumbent president is a Republican or Democrat, and the coefficient c_3 is positive if voters do indeed shift in the manner described above. Since $\delta_t = 2RI_t - 1$, we can rewrite this expression in terms of the RI variable, after some elementary manipulation, as

$$vd_t = (c_1 + c_2) - 2c_2RI_t + c_3\dot{r}_t - 2c_3RI_t\dot{r}_t + e_t.$$

If we now add this block of voters to Arcelus-Meltzer's equation (3) (still assuming only one economic variable), the Democratic vote becomes

$$\begin{aligned} VD_t &= [\ \cdots\ ] + d_4\dot{r}_t + \Delta d_4 RI_t\dot{r}_t \\ &\quad + vd_t\cdot S + e_t \\ &= \{[\ \cdots\ ] + (c_1 + c_2)S\} \\ &\quad - (2c_2S)RI_t + (d_4 + c_3S)\dot{r}_t \\ &\quad + (\Delta d_4 - 2c_3S)RI_t\dot{r}_t + e_t, \end{aligned}$$

(where $[\ \cdots\ ]$ is the block of terms in their expression not involving economic variables). This expression involves nearly the same set of explanatory variables as their expression (3), the sole difference being the incumbency variable RI_t. The coefficient of this variable is a measure of the net advantage of incumbency, and both *a priori* considerations and other empirical evidence suggest this effect should be small, so that the inclusion or deletion of the RI_t term should have little effect on the remaining estimates.[7] Hence the results in their Table 1 can be interpreted in terms of this expanded model which includes switch voters.

A fundamental difficulty, however, is immediately apparent: the regression coefficient of the $\dot{r}_t$

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[5] For example, V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, 1966).

[6] This is the specification used in Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations," but others would do as well.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

term, for example, is an estimator of (d_4+c_3S), where d_4 is the true (but unknown) "participation" coefficient, and c_3S is the true "shift" coefficient. To test the hypothesis of a shift effect we must determine whether c_3S is positive. Yet the regression coefficient is an estimate of (d_4+c_3S), not c_3S alone; and as noted earlier, the participation coefficient can be positive, negative, or zero, since the Arcelus-Meltzer hypotheses place no constraints on it. Thus even if there were substantial switching, the estimated regression coefficient could be negative (or zero) if the participation effect were negative. Or conversely, it could be positive even if there were no shifting. The "shift" effect is not *identified*[8] in the Arcelus-Meltzer model; in the absence of other data or *a priori* information, there is no possible way of inferring its magnitude from their evidence.

Do Economic Factors Affect the Parties' Strengths?

On this broader question, Arcelus and Meltzer conclude that "with the possible exception of inflation, aggregate economic variables [do not] affect . . . the relative strengths of the two major parties. There is very little evidence that an incumbent president can affect the composition of the Congress by measures that have short-term effects on unemployment or real income." "Neither our model . . . nor the evidence implies that voters respond to short-term changes in employment or real income by voting for, or against, the party in power." This "null result" is based on the fact that the estimated coefficients of most of the economic variables are not significant and display no significant differential effects on the Democratic and Republican share of the two-party vote.

In several respects the evidence seems inadequate to support these conclusions. There are serious problems with the Arcelus-Meltzer data, and in particular with the unemployment and income variables (which we will examine below). This alone could account for their nonfindings on those variables. Quite apart from that, however, Arcelus and Meltzer's analysis of their results does not take adequate account of several rather basic matters of statistical inference. For one thing, multicollinearity among the economic variables makes it difficult to disentangle their individual effects, and tends to produce large standard errors for the individual estimates. Thus even if economic variables as a block had a highly significant effect, it is possible for all of the estimated coefficients to be individually insignificant.[9] Arcelus and Meltzer make no attempt to examine this possibility.

There is another important problem. Since the net effect of any economic variable on the parties' vote shares depends on the *difference* between the coefficients associated with that variable in the VD and VR equations, the relevant question is whether this *difference* is significantly different from zero, not whether the individual coefficients are. Since the disturbances in the two equations are positively correlated,[10] the corresponding estimated coefficients of any particular variable will also be positively correlated.[11] Under these conditions the standard error of the difference between the two coefficients can be smaller than that of either coefficient alone,[12] and the difference itself could be statistically significant even if the individual estimates were not. Arcelus and Meltzer do not consider this possibility, either.

Finally, there is a more fundamental point of basic statistical inference. The fact that a certain estimate is not significantly different from zero by no means shows that the variable has no effect. Lack of significance means only that the range of possible error, or confidence interval, associated with the estimate is large enough to include zero. When this is so, the data are indeed consistent with the possibility that the true effect is small (or zero), but they may be equally consistent with the possibility of very large effects. If a confidence interval is small and centered about zero, so that the possible values of the coefficient consistent with the data all correspond to small effects, then one might indeed conclude from the evidence that the effect in question is absent, or negligible; but if the interval is very large (and happens to include zero), the appropriate inference is not that the variable has no effect, but rather, that the results leave a great deal of uncertainty about its possible effects.

The range of uncertainty in the Arcelus-Meltzer estimates is considerable. For example, if we consider the two estimates of the $R\dot{I}C/p$ terms in their Table 1, the usual .95 confidence intervals would run from about -1.02 to .84 for the coefficient in the VD equation, and from $-.72$ to .58 for the VR equation. Thus (ignoring the nonindependence of the estimates), while these results are consistent with the null hypothesis that there is no income effect (i.e., that both coefficients are approximately zero), they are equally consistent with the hypothesis of very sizable effects. For example, if the true values were −.4 and +.4 respectively (both lying well within their respective confidence intervals), a 10 per cent increase in real compensation per man-hour would decrease the democratic vote by some 4 per cent of the eligible electorate, and increase the Republican vote by the same amount. In a midterm election with total participation of around 40 per cent, this represents the difference between a 50-50 election and a Republican landslide of 60 per cent—a very major effect indeed. It seems to us that the main inference to be drawn from the results in the Arcelus-Meltzer Table 1 is that they leave a great deal of uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of the possible effects of economic variables on election outcomes—they simply do not shed much light on the question one way or the other.

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[8] For a discussion of the identification problem in a slightly different context, see T. C. Koopmans, "Identification Problems in Economic Model Construction," in *Studies in Econometric Method*, ed. W. C. Hood and T. C. Koopmans (New York: Wiley, 1953).

[9] See Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, p. 159ff.

[10] The positive correlation is noted by Arcelus and Meltzer (footnote 17, p. 11).

[11] This follows from Johnston, pp. 239–241.

[12] Since $\mathrm{Var}(b-b') = \mathrm{Var}(b) + \mathrm{Var}(b') - 2\,\mathrm{Cov}(b, b')$, for any two estimators b and b'.

This inconclusiveness, however, is in part the product of several serious problems with their data and estimation method, which we shall now review.

Data and the Specification of Variables

While Arcelus and Meltzer have corrected a data error in the $\dot{C}/p$ series that we discovered in an earlier draft of their paper, we are still unable fully to replicate their results. We have carefully attempted to reconstruct their series using the sources and definitions given in their appendix, and have also used their own original data (with corrections in their $\dot{C}/p$ series). With either data set, however, we find a number of discrepancies, in some cases substantial, between our estimates and those reported in their Table 1.[13] Some of these discrepancies may reflect errors which remain in their data.

Possible errors aside, moreover, the entire Arcelus-Meltzer analysis of the effects of economic variables is seriously weakened by their peculiar specifications of the economic variables, especially their choice of the "income" variable. Arcelus and Meltzer themselves comment that "rational voters are concerned with their real income," and argue for the importance of including "real income, or in an expanding economy the growth rate of real income" as a variable. This is certainly plausible, since a variable like (per capita) real personal income is a measure of the average level of goods and services available for consumption, and hence reflects the average state of material well-being or prosperity in the electorate. Previous studies of the effects of macroeconomic conditions on voting have used such a variable, and have found it to be empirically important. Yet in passing from their general theoretical discussion to the particular equations they actually estimate, Arcelus and Meltzer inexplicably abandon real income, and change to quite a different variable, "real compensation per man-hour" (in nonagricultural establishments). The reasoning behind this change is obscure, and the compensation variable seems to us suspect in several ways. It is a measure of the average hourly wage (compensated for inflation) of those who work. Hence it ignores the unemployed: if in a recession low-wage workers are the first to be laid off, then compensation per man-hour would rise, even as the average level of prosperity in the country declined. It also takes no account of the number of hours worked: if the country were obliged to change over temporarily to a four-day work week, as Britain recently was, compensation per man-hour would be unchanged, though obviously incomes would fall. It takes no account of the agricultural sector, which was sizable in the earlier part of the sample period. All in all, compensation per man-hour seems to us a very poor measure of overall prosperity. A variable like per capita real personal income would have been a better choice.

The treatment of unemployment is likewise puzzling. They use, again without explanation, the *rate* of change in the unemployment rate. The rationale for this is unclear, since unemployment is already a rate (being corrected for changes in the size of the labor force), and does not show any long-term tendency to grow (unlike national income or the price level). On the Arcelus-Meltzer specification, the electorate should be equally concerned with unemployment if it increased from 5 to 6 per cent in the year of the election, or from .5 to .6 per cent, or from 50 to 60 per cent of the labor force—which seems most implausible. The unemployment rate itself (or perhaps the [absolute] change in that rate) would seem to be a more sensible variable.

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[13] Using the original Arcelus-Meltzer data (with a corrected $\dot{C}/P$ series), we reestimated the *VP*, *VD* and *VR* equations. The salient discrepancies between the two sets of estimates are summarized in the table below.

Equation	*VP*		*VR*			
Coefficient	$RIPR$	$\dot{p}$	$\dot{p}$	$\dot{C}/p$	$RI\dot{p}$	$RI\dot{C}/p$
Our Parameter Estimate	−3.50	−0.39	−0.11	0.12	0.50	−0.39
(*t*-statistic in parentheses)	(1.34)	(1.90)	(0.83)	(0.61)	(1.89)	(0.98)
Arcelus-Meltzer Parameter Estimate	0.76	−0.23	−0.03	0.04	0.38	−0.07
(*t*-statistic in parentheses)	(0.26)	(1.11)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(1.63)	(0.21)

The Arcelus-Meltzer definition of the rate of inflation is also a bit odd. If the consumer price index doubled during the year preceding the election (e.g., rose from 125 to 250), the inflation rate would be 50 per cent of their definition.[14] According to the usual definition, however, this should be counted as a 100 per cent inflation. Arcelus and Meltzer offer no reason for their convention, and it seems to us the usual definition is preferable.

It is not clear why the RI_tPR_t variable is included in the regression at all. Arcelus and Meltzer offer no explicit justification for including it, and their hypotheses about voting costs being lower during presidential than in midterm elections in no way suggest that this reduction should depend on which party holds the White House. Since this variable will be correlated with the $RI_t\dot{p}_t$, $RI_t\dot{u}_t$, $RI_t\dot{C}_t/p_t$ terms, the effect of including it is to introduce more multicollinearity and decrease the accuracy of the estimates.

Finally, it is arguable that wartime elections should not have been included (or at least should have been handled differently to allow for the possibility of structural shifts in the relations being estimated), since the dislocations of a major war affect the meanings of the economic series and reduce the political importance of domestic economic (and other) issues.

Methods

The Arcelus-Meltzer estimates of the effects of economic variables on the parties' vote shares are obtained by separately estimating the VD and VR equations, using ordinary least-squares regression. In a footnote they comment that these estimates, though unbiased, "are not as asymptotically efficient as . . . the [Zellner 'seemingly unrelated regressions'] estimators." An inefficient estimator yields estimates which are unnecessarily imprecise, and thus makes it less likely that accurate and significant estimates of the effects in question will be obtained.

The Arcelus-Meltzer estimates are indeed inefficient, though not for the reason they mention.[15] Their procedure ignores certain *a priori* information and constraints on the coefficients, which are implied by their theoretical hypotheses and model. In particular, their model takes the form of a system of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} VP_t &= H_t + N_{1t} + N_{2t} + e_t \\ VD_t &= \alpha_D H_t + \beta_D N_{1t} \\ &\quad + [\gamma_D + \Delta\gamma_D RI_t]N_{2t} + e_t' \\ VR_t &= \alpha_R H_t + \beta_R N_{1t} \\ &\quad + [\gamma_R + \Delta\gamma_R RI_t]N_{2t} + e_t'', \end{aligned}$$

where H_t, N_{1t} and N_{2t} are the sizes of the three blocks of voters (habitual partisans, voters induced to vote by the reduction in voting costs in presidential elections, and voters induced to vote by economic issues, respectively) in election t, expressed as shares of the eligible electorate. The coefficients α_D and α_R, β_D and β_R, etc. are the Democratic and Republican shares of the votes cast by voters in the various blocks. Since they are shares, or fractions, each must lie between zero and one, and they must sum to one, minus the third-party vote (i.e. $\alpha_D + \alpha_R = 1 - \alpha_T$, $\beta_D + \beta_R = 1 - \beta_T$, etc., where α_T, β_T, etc. are the third-party votes cast in each block). For most of the period under consideration, the aggregate congressional third-party vote has been quite small, and it is reasonable to assume that the sum of major-party coefficients is approximately unity. Thus the coefficients of the "economically motivated" block, in particular, must satisfy $\gamma_D + \gamma_R = 1$ and $\gamma_D + \Delta\gamma_D + \gamma_R + \Delta\gamma_R = 1$, implying $\Delta\gamma_D = -\Delta\gamma_R$. If these facts are substituted into the VD and VR equations (still assuming only one economic variable, $\dot{r}$), we get

$$\begin{aligned} VP_t &= [\ \cdots\ ] + a\dot{r}_t + e_t \\ VD_t &= [\ \cdots\ ] + (\gamma_D + \Delta\gamma_D RI_t)a\dot{r}_t + e_t' \\ &= [\ \cdots\ ] + (\gamma_D a)\dot{r}_t + (\Delta\gamma_D a)RI_t\dot{r}_t + e_t' \\ VR_t &= [\ \cdots\ ] + (\gamma_R a)\dot{r}_t + (\Delta\gamma_R a)RI_t\dot{r}_t + e_t'' \\ &= [\ \cdots\ ] + ([1 - \gamma_D]a)\dot{r}_t \\ &\quad + (-\Delta\gamma_D a)RI_t\dot{r}_t + e_t'' \end{aligned}$$

where $[\ \cdots\ ]$ is the block of terms not involving economic variables. The model implies that the coefficients of the $\dot{r}$ terms in the VD and VR equations must be of the *same* signs, and their sum must (approximately) equal the coefficient of the $\dot{r}$ term in the VP equation. Moreover the coefficients of the $RI\dot{r}$ terms must be of *opposite* signs, and approximately equal in magnitude. Yet the results reported by Arcelus and Meltzer violate all three conditions: the signs of the $\dot{U}$ and $\dot{C}/p$ estimates in the VD and VR equations, which should agree, are opposite, while the $RI\dot{p}$ and $RI\dot{C}/p$ estimates, which should be opposite (and equal), are of the same signs. Moreover the $\dot{p}$ estimates in the VD and VR equations sum to $-.55$, rather than −.23, as they should, and the sum of the $\dot{C}/p$ estimates is also off.

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[14] Arcelus and Meltzer define the rate as $(p_t - p_{t-1})/p_t$, rather than the conventional specification $(p_t - p_{t-1})/p_{t-1}$.

[15] The VD and VR relations involve the same set of regressors. Under these conditions the Zellner procedure reduces to the one used by Arcelus and Meltzer, of separate OLS estimation of each individual equation. Cf. Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, p. 240.

Arcelus and Meltzer implicitly recognize some of these constraints in interpreting their results, and in their estimation of the *VP* relation. (Since the total participation relation is the sum of *VD* and *VR* equations [plus an unspecified relation for the negligible third-party vote], the coefficients in (1) must be the sum of the corresponding coefficients in (2) and (3). Arcelus and Meltzer do not include terms like $RI_t\dot{r}_t$ in (1), presumably in recognition of the fact that these coefficients must sum to zero.) Their procedure for estimating the *VD* and *VR* equations, however, takes no account of the constraints. By ignoring these constraints, they get inefficient (and indeed mutually inconsistent) estimates.[16] Since several of the constraints are rather badly violated, it is clear that incorporating them would substantially affect their results. The "equal and opposite" constraint on the $RI\dot{r}$-like terms, in particular, directly involves the differences between corresponding coefficients in the *VD* and *VR* equations, so that their estimates of the net effect of these variables on the parties' respective vote shares would be particularly affected.

Revised Estimates

To get some idea of the consequences of the various statistical and data problems described above, we present below some revised estimates of the Arcelus-Meltzer model. Our variables and sources are identical to theirs, with the following exceptions:

1. Our income variable is the growth rate in per capita real personal income, $\dot{r}_t = (r_t - r_{t-1})/r_{t-1}$
2. The rate of inflation is defined in the usual fashion as $\dot{p}_t = (P_t - P_{t-1})/P_{t-1}$.
3. In place of their unemployment variable we have used the unemployment rate (as percentage of the labor force) during the election year, u_t. We also have experimented with another variable, the (absolute) change during the year preceding the election $\Delta u_t = u_t - u_{t-1}$.
4. The unjustified RI_tPR_t term is omitted from all regressions.
5. The 1972 election has been added to the sample. Each regression has been estimated twice, first omitting, and then including, the war years 1918, 1942, 1944.

(Precise definitions and sources, where they differ from those of Arcelus and Meltzer, are given in the Appendix.)

To simplify interpretation of the estimates, their model has been rewritten in terms of a second, Democratic incumbency dummy variable, $DI = 1 - RI$. Then the Arcelus-Meltzer formulation of the form

$$VR = [\cdots] + b_1\dot{r} + b_2 RI\dot{r} + e,$$

is rewritten as

$$VR = [\cdots] + b_1^* DI\dot{r} + b_2^* RI\dot{r} + e.$$

These equations are completely equivalent ($b_1^* = b_1$ and $b_2^* = b_1 + b_2$), but b_1^*, b_2^* are direct estimates of the impact of the $\dot{r}$ variable during Republican and Democratic incumbencies respectively, so the interpretation is more straightforward.

To incorporate the linear constraints on the various coefficients discussed earlier, we subtract the *VR* and *VD* equations, obtaining a relation of the form

$$VR - VD = [\cdots] + c_1 RI\dot{r} + c_2 DI\dot{r} + e',$$

where c_1 and c_2 are now estimates of the *net* effects of $\dot{r}$ on the parties' vote shares (i.e., of $\dot{r}$'s effect on the Republican vote, minus its effect on the Democratic vote), during Republican and Democratic incumbencies, respectively. Estimating this relation and the total participation (*VP*) equation by ordinary (unconstrained) least squares is essentially equivalent[17] to estimating the *VR*, *VD*, *VP* system subject to the coefficient constraints. (We also obtained unconstrained estimates using the Arcelus-Meltzer procedure, but will not report these results in detail.) Each equation was estimated four times, with the two different versions of the unemployment term, and first including, and then excluding the war years.

In the interest of brevity, we will not report all results in detail. Since we are primarily interested in the effects of economic variables on the parties' vote shares, we shall concentrate on the *VR*−*VD* equations, and report only the coefficients of the economic variables. These are shown in Table 1.

Since we retain the Arcelus-Meltzer specification of the long-term part of the model, our estimates, like theirs, are probably subject to specification bias. The Durbin-Watson statistic values may be indicative of specification problems (or alternatively of [negative] autocorrelation; in that case our estimates are inefficient, though the estimated standard errors may be too large, and the true significance levels higher than those reported

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[16] Henri Theil, *Principles of Econometrics* (New York: Wiley, 1971), p. 282ff.

[17] In principle the *VR* − *VD*, *VP* system are "seemingly unrelated regressions" to which the Zellner GLS procedure should be applied. The covariance between the disturbances, however, is small; if we let e_1, e_2, e_3, e^* be the disturbances in the *VR*, *VD*, *VP*, *VR* − *VD* relations respectively, then $e_3 = e_1 + e_2$ and $e^* = e_1 - e_2$. Hence

$$\mathrm{Cov}(e^*, e_3) = E([e_1 + e_2][e_1 - e_2]) = \sigma_1^2 - \sigma_2^2,$$

where σ_1^2 and σ_2^2 are the variances of e_1 and e_2 re-

Table 1. Regression Estimates of Effects of Economic Variables on $VR-VD$

War Years	(1) Omitted	(2) Included	(3) Omitted	(4) Included
$RI\dot{r}$	.015	.020	.403*	.413**
(+)	(.131)	(.130)	(.242)	(.241)
$RI\dot{p}$	−.136	−.145	−.008	−.019
(−)	(.215)	(.212)	(.197)	(.196)
RIu	−.278*	−.280**	X	X
(−)	(.163)	(.157)		
$RI\Delta u$	X	X	.581*	.587*
(−)			(.443)	(.439)
$DI\dot{r}$	−.185**	−.146**	−.0015	.011
(−)	(.090)	(.084)	(.209)	(.187)
$DI\dot{p}$	.200*	.196**	.286**	.312***
(+)	(.148)	(.114)	(.156)	(.105)
DIu	−.147*	−.153*	X	X
(+)	(.097)	(.093)		
$DI\Delta u$	X	X	.555	.431
(+)			(.633)	(.519)
R^2	.75	.73	.74	.71
d	2.72	2.43	2.46	2.01

Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Intercepts and coefficients of $X20$, $X32$ and PY not reported.
(+), (−): Predicted sign of coefficient from "incumbency" hypothesis.
***: Significant at .05 (or better) on two-tailed test.
**: Significant at .10 on two-tailed, or .05 on one-tailed, test.
*: Significant at .10 on one-tailed test.
X: Variable not included in equation.

in Table 1.[18] In any event, the results as reported, though hardly conclusive, generally indicate that economic variables do affect the parties' vote shares. As a block, the economic variables account for from 17 per cent (in equation [1]) to 13 per cent (in equation [4]) of the total variance of the $VR-VD$ series. This increment to explained variance is significant at the .10 level or better in every case, using the usual F-test. Multicollinearity among the variables tends to produce large standard errors for the individual coefficients, but even so, three or four of the coefficients in each equation approach or reach conventional significance levels. Moreover, the signs of most of the estimates are consistent with the "incumbency" hypothesis, i.e., that voters vote for or against the incumbent party according to its economic performance. In terms of magnitudes, several of the effects are respectable, though not overwhelming: for example, a 10 per cent inflation rate during a Democratic administration would decrease its plurality by two to three per cent of the eligible electorate, or (in a midterm election with turnout about 40 per cent) decrease its vote share by around 3 per cent of the votes cast. An unemployment level of 10 per cent during a Republican administration would decrease the Republican vote share by a comparable amount.

With respect to individual variables, consider inflation first. Three of the four $DI\dot{p}$ estimates are significant, and the fourth is close. The $RI\dot{p}$ estimates are not significant, and their standard errors are so large that they are not very informative, one way or the other, about the effects of inflation during Republican administrations. Nevertheless, the signs of all the estimates suggest that inflation hurts the incumbent party, and in equations (1) and (2) (which, for reasons to be given below, we

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spectively. Unconstrained OLS estimation of the VR, VD relations indicates σ_1^2 and σ_2^2 are nearly equal, so $\mathrm{Cov}(e^*, e_3)$ will be quite small, and the GLS estimates will be very close to our ordinary least squares estimates. See Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, pp. 238–241.

[18] See for example, Theil, pp. 255–256.

regard as the preferable specification), the magnitudes of the estimated effects are roughly the same, under either administration. (The unconstrained *VD* and *VR* estimates form a generally similar, though less sharp, pattern: the four significant estimates are in the "incumbency" direction, and while some eight estimates [of 16] were of the "wrong" sign, only one of these even approached significance [its *t*-ratio was 1.33].) All things considered, our evidence indicates that inflation does have an effect on congressional elections, with high inflation hurting the incumbent President's party.

Arcelus and Meltzer also found inflation to have some effect, but in a rather different direction. They found that the main effect of inflation is to lower the Democratic vote, and hence to increase the Republican vote share. Writing before the election, they comment that their "findings for inflation suggest that the Republicans will benefit in the nonpresidential year 1974 from their failure to control inflation." We doubt that many Republicans would interpret the election results that way.

Our results also suggest that the income variable affects the parties' vote shares. Two of the $D\dot{I}\dot{r}$ estimates and one of the $R\dot{I}\dot{r}$ estimates are significant (another is close), and all but one of the estimates are in the "incumbency" direction (the sole exception, the $D\dot{I}\dot{r}$ term in equation [4], is very close to zero and insignificant). The estimated effects are not symmetrical (in [1] and [2] the $RI\dot{p}$ estimates are close to zero, and considerably smaller than the $DI\dot{p}$ effects), though the estimates are too imprecise for detailed comparisons. In the unreported estimates of the unconstrained *CD* and *VR* equations, 13 of the 16 income estimates are in the "incumbency" direction. Four of the estimates are significant, and two others nearly so; all but one of these are in the "incumbency" direction. (The one significant estimate which goes in the other direction is in an equation involving the Δu unemployment variable. We will argue below that Δu is the wrong variable to use, so this result should be discounted accordingly.) In any event our results show that income does have an effect and they are generally consistent with the incumbency hypothesis.

The unemployment effects form a rather different pattern. One of the estimates is significant, and five others are close. The estimates are quite sensitive to the form of the unemployment variable; substitution of the change-in-level variable Δu for the level variable u reverses the signs of the unemployment estimates, and affects several of the other estimates as well. No matter which variable is used, however, the estimates do not conform to the "incumbency" hypothesis. On *a priori* grounds alone, there is a strong case for the level variable u; thus we would expect jobs to be a live political issue whenever the unemployment rate is high, irrespective of whether it is stable, increasing, or decreasing. The results in Table 1 reinforce this view. With the change-in-levels variable Δu, the estimated effects are all positive, which would imply that increasing unemployment always benefits the Republicans. We are inclined to discount this anomalous result. With the level variable u, however, the estimated effects are negative, suggesting that the electorate turns to the Democrats in times of high unemployment, which is not implausible. (The unconstrained *VD* and *VR* estimates with the level variable u all conform to this pattern also, though none are significant.) We are thus inclined to reject the Δu variable, and accept the results in (1) and (2) as the meaningful ones. They suggest that unemployment does have an effect, which always works in favor of the Democrats. The estimated magnitude of the effect is greater if unemployment occurs under a Republican administration (though once again, the estimates are too imprecise for detailed comparisons).

In sum, our reading of the evidence suggests that all three economic variables do influence congressional elections, and that Arcelus and Meltzer's nonfindings on income and employment can be attributed to the problems with their data and methods. The specific results reported in our Table 1 should be regarded as tentative, since as noted earlier, they may well be subject to bias because of the misspecification of the long-term model. Indeed, we are not convinced that short-term participation effects can be accurately estimated from aggregate participation data, because of the difficulties in controlling for long-term trends and variations in eligibility requirements, registration laws, polling hours, and the like.[19] It may well prove necessary to use disaggregated data at the state or county level, in order to control adequately for such factors. But at a minimum, our reanalysis of the Arcelus-Meltzer model does, we think, confirm the basic finding of earlier studies by Kramer and others, that economic conditions do affect the outcomes of congressional elections, and do so in ways which are broadly (though not completely) consistent with the notion that the electorate rewards or punishes the party in power according to its economic performance. To be sure, there is still substantial uncertainty about the detailed nature and magnitudes of these effects. Thus while most studies are in general agreement about the role of inflation and income, the evidence on unemployment is mixed. And there may yet turn out to be important differences in the roles of different economic variables during Republican and Democratic incumbencies, or (as emphasized by Bloom and Price in their commentary) as between "rewarding" or "punishing" an incumbent.[20] But on the basic question of whether such effects exist, it seems to us the evidence is clear: they do.

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[19] See, for example, Stanley Kelly, Jr., R. E. Ayres and W. G. Brown, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," *The American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 359–377.

APPENDIX

Data and Sources

The main data sources were *Long Term Economic Growth, 1860–1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970), the *Handbook of Labor Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1973), the *Historical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957), and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various issues). These sources are referred to below as LTEG, HLS, HAUS and SAUS, respectively.

Prices. Consumer price index (1967 = 100): 1895–1972, HLS (1973), p. 287.

Unemployment. Total unemployment rate: 1895–1947, LTEG, pp. 212–213; 1948, 1972, *Economic Report of the President* (GPO, 1974), p. 279.

Compensation per man-hour. 1895–1914, Albert Rees, *Real Wages in Manufacturing, 1890–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 4; 1914–1946, Albert Rees, *New Measures of Wage-Earner Compensation in Manufacturing, 1914–1957* (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960), p. 3; 1946–1972, index of compensation per man-hour for all persons in non-agricultural establishments, adjusted to current dollars using 1967 benchmark, HLS (1973), p. 175.

Personal Income. Department of Commerce concept: 1895–1919, based on GNP figures in John W. Kendrick, *Productivity Trends in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 298–299, then translated to personal income by a partially interpolated ratio of personal income to GNP, and adjusted to current dollars with implicit price deflator from M. Friedman, and A. J. Schwartz, *A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), Table 62, facing p. 618; 1920–1968, LTEG, p. 189; 1969, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, January, 1973), p. S-2; 1970–1972, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, December, 1973), p. S-2.

Population. Total population residing in United States: 1895–1940, HAUS, p. 7; 1941–1972, SAUS (1973), p. 5.

Voter Turnout. Ratio of total vote to total eligible vote. Eligible vote: 1896–1898, enfranchised male and female voters estimated by interpolation, SAUS (1899), p. 19, SAUS (1901), p. 19, and the *Abstract of the Twelfth Census* (1900), p. 39, 1900–1918, males over twenty-one from Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports* (P-25, No. 311), and enfranchised women by interpolation from SAUS (1901), p. 19, SAUS (1919), p. 42, *Abstract of the Twelfth Census* (1900), p. 39, and *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census* (1920), p. 123; 1920–1928, SAUS (1971), p. 364; 1930–1972, SAUS (1973), p. 379.

Election Returns. Total, Democratic and Republican votes cast in congressional elections: 1896–1928, HAUS, p. 692; 1930–1972, SAUS (1973), p. 364.

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[20] The evidence on this presented by Bloom and Price is impressive, though they consider only the income variable. Some very preliminary analysis we have done suggests that the asymmetry they found becomes much smaller if the effect of inflation is controlled for.

Aggregate Economic Variables and Votes for Congress: A Rejoinder*

FRANCISCO ARCELUS
AND
ALLAN H. MELTZER

Our interest in the effect of aggregate economic variables on election results began in 1970 following a conversation with an administration official that we have reported elsewhere.[1] We doubted both the implicit theory of voting behavior and the ability of the administration to achieve rates of inflation and unemployment even close to the ranges mentioned. We take this opportunity to note that the unemployment rate was higher and the inflation rate substantially higher than the adviser's estimate, but President Nixon was re-elected.

At the time, the principal econometric evidence of the effects of aggregate economic variables was a study by Kramer. Kramer found evidence of an effect of real income, but despite (or perhaps because of) the flaws in his procedure, he found no evidence of an effect of inflation or unemployment.[2] Furthermore, then and now, most of the reported evidence pertains to congressional not presidential elections and to votes for congressmen, not seats in the Congress.

We concluded our study by failing to reject a null hypothesis—that there was no evidence of an effect of real income or unemployment on votes for congressional candidates. We were less certain about the effect of inflation. Our evidence suggests some effect, and we have continued work on the problem by analyzing presidential voting and by much more detailed analysis of congressional votes and seats.

That more work remains to be done is evident from our current work and from the lengthy replies that our paper stimulated. Each pair of authors wrote a comment longer than our original article. They agree neither with us nor with each other on the proposition that evidence supports. Each raises some points that the other ignores.

The similarity ends there. Bloom and Price offer a scholarly criticism based mainly on their original and interesting work. Their comments are based on their assessment of evidence. We discuss their work first. Goodman and Kramer, on the other hand, offer a seemingly endless number of criticisms supported by little more than prior belief, innuendo, and conjecture. Answering each of the charges would take more space and time than the criticisms are worth. We are content to support our claim by discussing a few of their charges and by presenting evidence that most of their claims are empty.

Bloom and Price

Bloom and Price devote most of their comment to testing an alternative hypothesis of the effect of economic variables on congressional elections. They find evidence to support their hypothesis. If we had developed their evidence, we would have rejected the null hypothesis, as they do.

The hypothesis that Bloom and Price accept is different from Kramer's and, we will argue, much closer to our contention than to his. Bloom and Price show that a *decline* in real, per capita income hurts the party of the incumbent president in congressional elections. They do not show that small changes in the growth rate of real per capita income hurt the incumbent's party. Voters are not shown to be sensitive to small fluctuations in the growth rate of real income. In fact, they are relatively insensitive; a 1 per cent fall in real per capita income costs the incumbent's party from 0.6 per cent to 0.8 per cent of its vote, according to their estimates.

From 1948 to 1974, the maximum decline in real per capita income in an election year was 1.6 per cent in 1954. The largest shift of votes implied by the hypothesis is 1 per cent, so the maximum effect on the difference between the parties is about 2 per cent. The effects of inflation, unemployment, and small changes in the growth rate of output are not shown.

Per capita real output has grown at an average rate of 3 per cent. Nothing is shown about the range from zero to three per cent. It is entirely consistent with the results presented by Bloom and Price that small changes in employment and output have small effects, or no effect at all, on voting. Recessions shift votes, and major reces-

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[1] See footnote 2 of our paper, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections" elsewhere in this issue of the *Review*.

[2] See G. H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U. S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964," this *Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 131–143. Our discussion of the flaw in Kramer's treatment of minor party votes is in footnote 16 of our paper. Once an error in the data was corrected, the effect of inflation was found to be significant.

sions shift many votes. Marginal adjustments of economic conditions before an election have not yet been shown to be important. On the contrary, Bloom and Price show little or no evidence that stimulating the economy helps the incumbent's party. The short-term effect of short-term changes in economic variables is not established by the results Bloom and Price present.[3]

The asymmetry of the results raises questions. Why do voters respond to negative changes of 3 per cent in the average growth rate but not to positive changes or to reductions in the growth rate to 1 per cent? One reason may be that the new voters include new entrants to the labor force and workers with low seniority. These individuals bear a disproportionate share of the private cost of unemployment and recession. If they become weak or strong partisans of the party out of power, and remain loyal, we would have an explanation of the asymmetry and the effect found by Bloom and Price. An effect of this kind would not be inconsistent with our hypothesis.

All in all, we find the reformulation and the evidence presented by Bloom and Price intriguing. We hope that either they or others will investigate the asymmetry in the response to changes in real income.

Goodman and Kramer

There is, for us, a considerable difference between the proposition consistent with available evidence and the conclusion reached by Goodman and Kramer. They conclude that "on the basic question of whether such effects exist, it seems to us the evidence is clear: they do."[4]

What are these "effects"? Do voters reward and punish? Or, do they punish only, as Bloom and Price find? Do voters respond only to recession, measured by the negative growth of real income, or to inflation and recession, as Kramer concluded? Or do they respond more to inflation, than to income as we found? Do regular voters respond or is the main effect on new voters?

Goodman and Kramer do little to advance the discussion beyond the *a priori* position from which they start. They offer almost no evidence to support the strong, and in our view, overstated conclusions they reach.

A typical example of overstatement is the discussion of the evidence they present in Table 2. The table shows estimates of the effects of real income, inflation, and two measures of unemployment in four separate regressions. Only one coefficient—the effect of inflation—is significantly different from zero by the usual two-tailed test at the .05 level.

These results, unlike the results of Bloom and Price, do not cause us to reconsider our main conclusion. Inflation appears to affect the outcome of congressional elections; the various measures of unemployment have not been shown to have any significant effect; the current growth rate of real income has not been shown to have a reliable effect, and the work of Bloom and Price suggests that there is an asymmetry. Large negative deviations are important; other deviations are either much less important or unimportant.

The discussion of unemployment in Goodman and Kramer is an example of their *a priori* approach.[5] One result shows that changes in unemployment benefit Republicans. This result is rejected as "anomalous." The level of unemployment benefits Democrats, and the result is accepted as plausible. In fact, the sign of the level of unemployment is negative for the Democrats, and the results show that the Democrats gain only because the Republicans are hurt more. The differences are not significant.

If this were the only example of a cavalier treatment of evidence, we would dismiss the example as an oversight. Similar examples reoccur in the discussion of evidence and estimation, as we show in the following sections.

Participation. Both pairs of critics accept our hypothesis that voters can abstain instead of shifting party preference. Bloom and Price use the percentage of the two-party vote in their work and ignore the issue. Goodman and Kramer challenge our interpretation. They assert that "participation declined rapidly from 1896 to 1912" (p. 1255). A reasonable interpretation of their Figure 1 is that participation declined from 1896 to 1902 or 1904, so that the "historical trend" of which they speak is based on two or three observations.

Goodman and Kramer claim that our equation is misspecified (p. 1257). We are, frankly, puzzled at this overstatement. Their Figure 1 seems to us to show (1) a permanent shift in the participation rate in 1920 and (2) a second permanent shift about 1932. The first is negative but larger (in absolute value) than the shift in 1932. The coefficients for these shifts, in our participation (*VP*) equation, are entirely consistent with the evidence.

Although the word "misspecification" is used repeatedly, there is no explicit statement of the misspecification. The only evidence Goodman and Kramer offer is from our regression equation, and this evidence is misinterpreted. They claim, incorrectly, that the residuals from our *VP* equation are not random. The most that can be said, correctly, is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the residuals are not randomly distributed. If the residuals are not randomly distributed, it does not follow that the model is misspecified in the sense that the estimates are inconsistent.

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[3] Bloom and Price accept our argument that voters can abstain, but their work neglects the influence of economic conditions on participation.

[4] Saul Goodman and Gerald H. Kramer, "Commentary on Arcelus and Meltzer," *APSR* 69 (December, 1975), p. 1255–1265.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 1264.

In short, there is no basis for the statement (p. 1257) "the Arcelus-Meltzer estimates of the *long-term* partisan shares are incorrect." A plausible interpretation is that the serial correlation shows our inability fully to explain *short-term* fluctuations in the voting percentage by introducing aggregate economic variables into the *VP* equation. More remains to be done.

The Shift Voters. Goodman and Kramer introduce a long, excessively formal discussion of a simple question. Where are the shift voters? To indicate the importance of the question, they cite a previous study by V. O. Key. That study, however, discusses presidential, not congressional, elections. Our recent work suggests that shifting is much more important in presidential elections.

To bolster their position, they quote selectively and inappropriately. We have italicized the words included in our proposition and omitted from their quotation. With the omitted words included, the quotation is (our p. 1238, their p. 1258): "*the principal* fluctuations in *the percentage of votes received in* congressional elections arise *from changes in the participation rate and* not from shifts between parties."

No lengthy, formal analysis is required to support our proposition. All that is required is computation of the change in voting percentage in presidential and nonpresidential years. The mean difference is nearly twelve percentage points, according to the estimate in our paper. This difference is a 25 per cent change in average voting participation in congressional elections between presidential and non-presidential election years. The relevance of the comparison for the proposition becomes clear once the omitted words are restored.[6]

Basic Statistical Inference. Goodman and Kramer raise what they call a "fundamental point of basic statistical inference" (p. 1259). Their point is that the "fact that a certain estimate is not significantly different from zero by no means shows that the variable has no effect. . . . The data . . . may be equally consistent with the possibility of very large effects."

This is nonsense, pure and simple. Regardless of the size of the coefficient, relatively low *t*-statistics or large standard errors imply failure to reject the hypothesis that the variable in question has no effect.

Measurement of Economic Variables. A number of criticisms of our work can be discussed briefly. Some are raised by both critics.

(1) In using compensation per man hour, we ignore the unemployed. This comment is puzzling. We included measures of unemployment separately. Our procedure holds a measure of real income constant when estimating the effect of unemployment.

(2) Real compensation is an inappropriate measure of real income. Moreover, it is "suspect" (p. 1260 of Goodman and Kramer) because real compensation per man-hour rises in recession. This comment and similar comments by Bloom and Price miss the point. One of the questions that we want to answer is whether employed and unemployed workers respond in the same or in different ways to recessions. To separate the two groups we estimate the response to earnings, holding unemployment constant, and the response to unemployment, holding earnings constant. Only from estimates of this kind can we hope to learn whether the voters' response to unemployment or recession extends beyond the particular voters affected by loss of employment. The comment that we should not have deflated by man-hours is correct. We miss the effect of reductions in the work week.

(3) We take no account of the agricultural sector. This is false. We note (footnote 15) that we tried a number of other measures of economic and other issues including agricultural prices.

(4) Many additional criticisms reveal very little more than Goodman and Kramer's prior beliefs. Several relate to the use of unemployment and the procedures for computing percentages. To find whether the criticisms are substantive, we recomputed in the following ways: (1) using Goodman and Kramer's data series and ours; (2) using levels of unemployment, changes in unemployment, and percentage changes in unemployment; and (3) using percentages computed on the base $t-1$ and on the base t. A small sample of our results for aggregate economic variables is shown in Table 1. Others will be sent on request. Had Goodman and Kramer used some of the time lavished on their reply to compute these results, they would have found, as we did,

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[6] The rest of the paragraph from which the quotation is drawn leaves little doubt about the meaning of the proposition. The paragraph states that changes in participation have a partisan (shift) effect.

Table 1. The Effect of Alternative Measures of Unemployment on the Democrats' Share of the Vote

Coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses)

Variable	Using Our Data			Using Goodman and Kramer Data		
o *p*	−.42 (3.37)	−.46 (3.97)	−.45 (3.42)	−.46 (3.93)	−.51 (4.56)	−.52 (4.04)
U	.02 (.21)			.02 (.20)		
Δ***U***		−.05 (.16)			−.01 (.02)	
o ***U***			.00 (.15)			.00 (.07)
o *C/P*	.16 (1.00)	.08 (.47)	.08 (.48)	.15 (1.03)	.08 (.51)	.10 (.58)

All percentages are computed as $\frac{t-(t-1)}{t-1}$

U = level of unemployment
ΔU = change in unemployment
Other variables as defined in our paper

that their prior beliefs, conjectures about possibilities, and most of their criticisms are empty.[7]

Our general conclusion is that most of the Goodman and Kramer points lack substantive content. Either they are inconsequential or they concern potential, not actual, bias. If we printed all of the estimates using the various data sets, we doubt whether any reader would change any conclusion as a result of reading the many pages of output.[8]

Conclusion

The effects of short-term changes in economic conditions on votes for Congress seems to us to remain unsettled. The work to date has produced mainly null results, our own included.

Discussion of this kind occasionally leads scientists to reformulate the disputed proposition. For this reason we find the efforts by Bloom and Price and their evidence interesting. The proposition for which they find support is substantially different from earlier statements of the effect of short-term changes in aggregate economic variables on congressional votes.

Our own work has followed a different course. The basic unit of interest is the distribution of seats, not votes. Investigation of the distribution of seats requires disaggregation to the district level. Preliminary results suggest that incumbency alone accounts for nearly 80 per cent of the variation in the partisan distribution of seats. That leaves very little room for aggregate economic variables, but it does not rule out a small effect. Until such effects are found and confirmed, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

[7] We made available to Goodman and Kramer a printout of all of our results, including computations of the covariance matrix and other intermediate results to facilitate comparisons. We are therefore surprised and puzzled at comments about our errors. If there are errors in our data or computations, Goodman and Kramer should report them instead of offering suggestive hints.

[8] One point on which comment is required: Goodman and Kramer note (p. 1260) that there are some substantial discrepancies between their estimates and the results shown in Table 1 of our paper. We have used both sets of data and, aside from differences attributable to computer routines, we find no substantial differences in results.

The Limits of Consensual Decision*

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The idea that governments should function by some approximate consensus—unanimous agreement as a condition to action—has deep intuitive and analytic roots in liberal thought: in the myth of the social contract, in the doctrine of consent, in the structure of markets, in the utilitarian ethic which survives economic theory under the title of efficiency.[1] It is everywhere understood that consensus—this is the way with ideals—has serious practical limits, but these hardly disqualify it from service as a normative criterion to be approximated in experience. Yet, if I am right, we should not say merely that consensus *cannot* be duplicated in practice, we should say that it *should not* be approximated in practice. This, because consensual decision displays structural defects which, for any society requiring politics, spoil its normative promise. I will try at some length to explain this vague slander.

The paper argues three main theses. First, that consensual decision does indeed have deep roots in liberalism, of which the deepest run toward consent of the governed and toward utilitarian efficiency. This is the rather thin history[2] presented as Part I. Second, that neither consensual decision nor any other structure can conceivably grant an unconditional right of consent to persons living together in political society. Part II thus argues that some outcome to any decision must portend a violation of consent.[3] Third, that the new political economy—Knut Wicksell, Buchanan and Tullock[4]—is wrong in claiming that consensual decision leads toward social efficiency. They would be right only for a society requiring no politics. This is the burden of Part III. A final section offers one general and perhaps ironic conclusion.

I. Historical Place of the Consensus Doctrine

At least so far as it is a theory of public life, liberalism has always been committed to a fundamental symmetry among individuals—in John Schaar's phrase, to "men of standard size and shape."[5] This is a kind of equality which sleeps, in practice and theory, with partners as inequalitarian as Hobbes's *Leviathan* or as divisive as the class differences which attend private capital and managerial or technical expertise. Its fundamental meaning is that relevantly similar individuals must be treated with relevant similarity, and its central implication for argument is that men may be distinguished by ability and the social utility of their work, but not by their formal value as persons. This in turn constricts normative analysis to general or symmetrical judgments: to the con-

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[1] I presuppose at the outset that consensual decision does not emerge as a self-enforcing norm of collective action. There are structures for which this may be expected: ones in which the defection of any denies the reward of cooperation at all. This so-called "essential coalition" problem has its historical instances: in the cartel, the minimal parliamentary coalition, the Western marriage, the isolated exchange of goods and services, the international alliance between approximate equals. The European Economic Community, especially in light of the Luxembourg Accords (1966), also seems a case of this sort. And in all these cases, consensus is self-enforcing: disagreement opens the prospect of defection, which in turn denies the rewards of joint action to others. But the nation-state deviates decisively from the "essential coalition" ideal for at least three reasons: (1) relations of authority and *control* permit the repression of deviance, (2) *slack* permits the toleration of at least minor deviance and defection and (3) *substitution* permits the recruitment of alternative collaborators in collective action when deviance does occur. For all these reasons, it is no historical surprise that consensual decision, like substantive equality, serves as a normative ideal raised in protest against experience.

[2] This account is admittedly preliminary and covers a large sweep of arguments: Locke on consent, through Godwin, Mill, Calhoun, to the new political economy on the best structure for governmental decision.

[3] The argument here is addressed mainly to Calhoun's doctrine of "concurrent majorities," Wicksell's *laissez faire* consensus, and Robert Paul Wolff's "direct unanimous democracy." Cf. J. C. Calhoun, *A Disquisition on Government*, ed. Gordon Post (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Knut Wicksell, "Ein neues Prinzip der gerechten Besteuerung," *Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen* (Jena, 1896), abridged and translated as "A New Principle of Just Taxation," by J. M. Buchanan in *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance*, ed. Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock (New York: St. Martins Press, 1964) pp. 72–118; and Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[4] James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

[5] John H. Schaar, "Some Ways of Thinking About Equality," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (November, 1964) 867–95.

sent of *all* relevant subjects, to utility measured across a whole community.[6]

IA. Consent in Political Regime or Their Decisions

The fundamental idea of government by *consent*, enveloped from its beginning in this equalitarian symmetry,[7] became important for a quite specific historical purpose: the rationalization of liberal revolution. Locke's *Second Treatise* was, in part, an attempt to discredit Stuart absolutism as against a parliamentary alternative in the paradigm case of 1688.[8] And its central dogma is government by consent. For our purposes, two facts about Locke and his ideological task seem important.

First, like all of the great liberal constitutionalists, Locke was reacting against a structure of power—a structure which permitted some to take actions whose consequences fell upon others. This was a particular species of power—autocracy—and the doctrine of consent was shaped by it. In particular, it was *asymmetric* and *public*. By "asymmetric" I mean that it matched elite against subject public, so that authority flowed in one direction and not the other. The contrasting case, symmetrical power, was not faced by Locke's doctrine of consent. It was "public" in the sense that it had a necessary and explicit relation to the choice of policy by government: Locke did not choose to emphasize the alternative cases of anomic and civil power.[9] It is, at least in part, this attention to the special case of autocracy (and its parliamentary alternative) which underlies the peculiar quality of Locke's central fiction, a social contract in which "free, equal, and independent" men agree with one another—consent—to a government by majorities:

> When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.[10]

This is not the least bit odd as a weapon of parliamentary revolution, and it carried a certain ideological weight in the later revolutions of 1776 and 1789. But it is an odd idea if one looks *backward* from the experience of democratic societies.[11] It attaches the ideal of consent to *regimes*, and it was clear enough that Stuart absolutism had its objectors at that level. But once regimes are legitimated, the question of consent turns on particular *decisions*, and there exists no self-evident link between (1) a fictional (or, for that matter, historical) consent in regimes, and (2) an actual consent in government policy. If I am governed by some approximate democracy, and find my own will trampled by its law, government by consent may seem a shallow artifice. And, save perhaps Rousseau, no major theorist escapes the inference that consent—or self-government—may be threatened by the symmetry of democratic decision just as it may be threatened by the asymmetry of autocracy. We are bound, that is, to honor the nonconsenting minority as a legitimate problem of value. This is the second point about Locke's invocation of consent as a doctrine: it arose in one quarrel, but survived to haunt parties to very different quarrels.

The line of argument which brings us to the doctrine of consensual decision is faced by this later problem, by the ideological heritage of consent and the persistent historical importance of less-than-unanimous decisions by parliamentary regimes. As early as 1798, before the democracies had got very democratic, William Godwin was able to debunk the transition from consent in regimes to consent in policies:

> . . . if government be founded in the consent of the people, it can have no power over any individual by whom that consent is refused. If a tacit consent be not sufficient, still less can I be deemed to have consented to a measure upon which I put an express negative. This immediately follows from the observations of Rousseau. If the people, or the individuals of whom the people is constituted, cannot delegate their authority to a representative; neither can any individual delegate his authority to a majority, in an assembly of

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[6] This universality defines a nearly constant element of political reform in Europe and the United States from the early nineteenth century forward, as rules of exclusion based on property, race, sex, and religion are constricted and overturned. "All" comes closer and closer to meaning all, even if "consent" does not come closer and closer to meaning consent. In moral philosophy, its analog is the principle of universalizability, e.g., roughly, answers to the question "what if everyone did that?" See, for example, R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[7] Were it not enveloped in such a symmetry, its value as an assault on monarchy and aristocracy would of course seem slight. If one asymmetry, why not another?

[8] It is not altogether certain that Locke saw his book in this light. Cf. John Plamenatz, *Man and Society*, Vol. I (London: Longman's, 1963), 209 ff.

[9] By "anomic power" I have in mind coercion which does not rely on a public code, as in Hobbes's state of nature or many contemporary cities; by "civil" or "private" power I have in mind control over others based on the use of public codes, as with the rights of ownership.

[10] Locke, of course, goes on to develop a very loose doctrine of consent for "later," historical acts of government, thus avoiding the issue raised by Godwin and others as discussed below.

[11] See in particular Willmoore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1941).

> which he is himself a member. That must surely be a singular species of consent, the external indications of which are often to be found, in an unremitting opposition in the first instance, and compulsory subjection in the second.[12]

Partly, no doubt, his temperament, but equally important his position as an outsider, carry Godwin toward anarchism, not consensus. As we will see (Part IIE), this is not so great a leap—from anarchism to consensus—as it may seem. The later view of Mill embodies essentially the same observation:

> It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves" do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active *part* of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, *may* desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power.[13]

Mill's response is essentially libertarian: to argue that the common good compels a highly constrained use of state authority, confining prohibitions to acts that harm others,[14] mandates to acts whose omission would do similar harm. The resulting economy of liberty is notoriously complex. We should note, for future reference, that this argument is at least ostensibly built on an hypothesis connecting restraint from coercion with aggregate social utility:

> I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. . . .
>
> Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.[15]

This claim later becomes the cornerstone on which the most sophisticated case for consensual decision is built. Mill himself, however, comes no closer to consensual decision than his advocacy of Mr. Hare's scheme of proportional representation: giving minorities voices if not vetoes over state policy.[16] It was for J. C. Calhoun to "remedy" these difficulties with a full doctrine of consensual decision. His recognition of symmetrical coercion is especially clear in his account of representative government:

> If the whole community had the same interests so that the interests of each and every portion would be so affected by the action of the government that the laws which oppressed or impoverished one portion would necessarily oppress or impoverish all others—or the reverse—then the right of suffrage, of itself, would be all-sufficient to counteract the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of its powers, and, of course, would form, of itself, a perfect constitutional government. . . . But such is not the case. On the contrary, nothing is more difficult than to equalize the action of the government in reference to the various and diversified interests of the community; and nothing more easy than to pervert its powers into instruments to aggrandize and enrich one or more interests by oppressing and impoverishing the others; and this, too, under the operation of laws couched in general terms and which, on their face, appear fair and equal.[17]

Calhoun, perhaps more than any other theorist, speaks for a defensive minority, for the Southern planter after the Tariff of 1828, during the rise of Yankee industrialism, at the ascendance of abolitionism. It is this, perhaps, which leads his excellent imagination to a doctrine of consensual decision by "concurrent majority":

> . . . the government of the concurrent majority, where the organism is perfect, excludes the possibility of oppression by giving to each interest, or portion, or order—where there are established classes—the means of protecting itself by its negative against all measures calculated to advance the peculiar interests of others at its expense. Its effect, then, is to cause the different interests . . . to desist from attempting to adopt any measure calculated to promote the prosperity of one, or more, by sacrificing that of others: and thus to force them to unite in such measures only as would promote the prosperity of all, as the only means to prevent the suspension of the action of government, and, thereby, to avoid anarchy, the greatest of all evils.[18]

Calhoun's interests are partly sinister, and his sociology is Panglossian, but his doctrine is nevertheless a prime historical leap from the concern with symmetrical conflict to the ideal of consensus.[19] American readers, reared on *Federalist 10*, may imagine that I have slighted James Madison or perhaps Alexander Hamilton here. But any careful reading of that great essay and its companions reveals a mistrust of consensual decision, born partly of experience with *immobilism* under the Articles of Confederation:

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[12] William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (edition of 1798), 3 Vols., F. E. L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), book III, chap. 2, p. 193. In his reference to Rousseau, Godwin evidently has in mind the argument that sovereignty is indivisible as it appears in chaps. 1 and 2 of Book II in the *Social Contract.*

[13] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government,* Everyman edition (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.; and London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1951), chap. 1, p. 88.

[14] As will become apparent, in III below, acts of private harm, combined with static government policy, are critical to the present analysis.

[15] Mill, p. 97, p. 100. I have perhaps unfairly juxtaposed two sentences separated by nearly one hundred lines, but I think they give the main sense of Mill's view as briefly as possible.

[16] Mill's further proposal for a second Chamber composed of intellectuals is meant, evidently, as a method of moral persuasion, not a center of countervailing power against parliament. Cf. *Representative Government,* ch. 13.

[17] Calhoun, p. 13.

[18] Calhoun, p. 30.

> . . . What at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon a majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision) is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.[20]

This might seem momentary opportunism, were it not a sample from a substantial theme, and were not its sense backed up by the partial record we have of the 1787 Convention.[21]

It is Calhoun, then, who draws the relevant consequence of government by consent when we consider policies rather than regimes: consent *in policy* is assured only by a regime requiring consensus, not majoritarian democracy or its representational approximation. In Part II, this claim will be tested, and found partly incorrect. First, it is important to note that it is open to the most obvious objections as it stands.

IB. Immediate Objections

The doctrine of consensual decision would be frail indeed if it had maintained a direct connection with the theory of consent in the nation-state. It can be shown, first, that consensus is less than optimal if one begins from the ideas of consent and formal equality. For example, we may interpret "consent" as a matching problem between individual preferences and policy outcomes: the optimum, among simple voting schemes, is majority rule if we make one set of assumptions, and will be consensual decision only if we make the evidently strong assumption that changes of policy opposed by individuals are *a priori* very much more costly than continuances of policy opposed by individuals. Similarly, it can be very simply shown that majority decision minimizes the maximum number of voters who can possibly be dissatisfied with such outcomes.[22] And, from the view of equality, it is evident that consensual decision favors negative minorities over positive majorities—"weights" them unevenly: " . . . unless government policy responds to the preferences of the greater number, the preferences of some individuals (the lesser number) must be weighted more heavily than the preferences of some other individuals (the greater number). But to weight preferences in this way is to reject the goal of political equality."[23]

Moreover, the doctrine is easy prey to the charge that defensive minorities may use their special leverage—the potential cost of their votes to those who want change—as a means to exploit others. Indeed, there seem to be incentives for persons indifferent or even modestly favorable to change to falsify their preferences as a means of extortion. This is the sense of Ben Franklin's opposition to executive veto as he recounts his experience with the colonial Governor of Pennsylvania for the Convention of 1787:

> The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter.[24]

This no doubt betrays the liberty of an aging wit, and has the special structural feature of monopoly: only one actor could singlehandedly threaten veto. But, it is easy to show that the same may happen where veto rights are symmetrical, and, perhaps worse, that bluffing may lead to the rejection of policies which would in fact have benefited everyone.[25]

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[19] Two antecedents to this argument deserve notice. There is some evidence that the earliest European equivalents for positive law in our sense of that term were made by something like unanimity among local elites. Cf. Max Weber, *On Law in Economy and Society*, transl., Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, ed. Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), especially, p. 84. This perhaps corresponds to the "essential coalition" problem, footnote 1 above. A second antecedent is in the doctrine of separation of powers, in its less pragmatic formulations. Cf. Moses Mather, *America's Appeal to an Impartial World* (Hartford, 1775) especially p. 8, where he writes of estates ". . . armed with a power of self-defense against the encroachments of the other two, by being enabled to put a negative upon any or all of their resolves. . . ." Cited in Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) p. 57, 73. The explicit veto makes the parallel to Montesquieu or *Federalist 51* less clear.

[20] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist 22*. All quotations from the *Federalist* are as in the edition by Benjamin Fletcher Wright (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).

[21] See *Federalists* 45 and 58 by Madison, in Wright, and consult Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention*, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937). Particularly revealing are the internal organization of the convention (majority rule by states) and the reaction against the Articles.

[22] Douglas W. Rae, "Decision Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice," and "Political Democracy as a Property of Political Institutions," both, *American Political Science Review*, 63 (March, 1969), 40–56 and 65 (March, 1971), 111–19.

[23] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953) p. 44. A more formal argument with similar implications is K. O. May, "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," *Econometrica*, 20 (October, 1952), 680–684. See also, Neal Reimer, "The Case of Bare Majority Rule," *Ethics*, 62 (October, 1951), 16–32.

[24] As reported by Madison's notes, in Farrand, p. 99.

There is also the intuitive historical sense that consensual decision may saddle societies with policies designed to meet circumstances which no longer exist, making it all but impossible to cope with present exigencies:

> When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely *to be done;* but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary from being done, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.[26]

This criticism is in the end decisive, but in much altered form. This is because other developments lead toward a far subtler account of consensual decision and its relation to the public good.

IC. Utilitarian Efficiency and the Market Analogy

These developments, emerging during about the same historical era, center on a doctrine, utilitarianism, and an institution, the market. From them rises a theory of social value—utilitarian efficiency—which unites the practice of consensus, the doctrine of consent, and a withered residue of utilitarian philosophy.

Benthamite utilitarianism seems to have codified a kind of enlightened common sense for a civilization whose institutions had only just begun to accommodate the notion of formal equality: if each is to count for one, class and standing aside, what could be more sensible than a grand addition of welfare in social decision? Yet the doctrine has always displayed singular vulnerabilities. One of these is the leap from an ostensibly descriptive idea of greatest happiness to a prescriptive judgment that it ought to be pursued, even where the happiness fails to accrue to the person who must decide. The question, quite simply, "Why?" is not answerable within the unamended utilitarian doctrine.[27] For our argument, however, the real relevance of the greatest-good idea is precisely that some important analysts *have* made that transition. If one studies a scheme of partial conflict, where the goals of groups and individuals cross one another, and one simultaneously claims a measure of neutrality, then a plausible and impersonal criterion is required. One can then attach judgments to it—"If you want that, do this . . . "—and produce a prudential science which avoids at least the most obvious forms of special pleading. This was the position of 19th-century political economy, and the parts of it which remained liberal seem at least tacitly to have taken this line. The greatest happiness idea thus becomes an underlying axiom of analysis.[28] Its apogee is no doubt to be found in the quite incredible pages of F. Y. Edgeworth's *Mathematical Psychics.*[29] Although the doctrine has grown less fashionable with time, its at least tacit acceptance seems essential to an understanding of what followed.

Three major difficulties are at once encountered if one proposes to apply a utilitarian ethic: (1) for a given individual, it seems impossible to "measure" utiles cardinally;[30] (2) if such measurements are possible, it seems impossible to aggregate them among individuals—at least not with arithmetic precision; and (3) it has never been clear how to conceive the underlying "stuff" of utility apart from the subjective preferences of individuals. These difficulties, taken together, have three important implications. First, they seem to undermine direct utilitarian engineering; for example, the "leveling" of real income to maximize aggregate utility as suggested by a line of analysts stretching from Mill to Abba Lerner in our own time.[31] Second, they offer a line of resistance against arguments predicated on ethics of distribution—equality, fairness, justice—especially as these are used in attacks upon market institutions. Finally, they define the analytic challenge met by the normative *principle of efficiency* as we know it today.

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[25] Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 245-250.

[26] Hamilton, *Federalist 22.* Hamilton's example demonstrates an almost clairvoyant intuition for what is now the recent past: "Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally lead him to seek the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of government from making peace. . . ."

[27] Cf. John Plamenatz, *Man and Society,* 2 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), vol. II, chap. 1, pp. 1-36. A related difficulty, worth noting, is the blindness of the utilitarian doctrine to fair distribution. We will touch on this later, but a particularly useful attempt to offer an alternative doctrine, sensitive to fairness, is John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[28] It would perhaps be more accurate to call it a "tacit assumption" than an axiom, since the present economic theory of utility is reducible in principle to an entirely formal schema.

[29] *Mathematical Psychics* (London: Kegan Paul, 1881). Despite the elegance of his analysis, Edgeworth's contribution is flawed by Victorian prejudice: he manages to use the utilitarian calculus to justify nearly all the major inequalities of his time. See especially pp. 74, 77–82.

[30] Apart from the Von Neumann-Morgenstern system on the assumption that risk does not affect utility.

[31] *The Economics of Control* (New York: Mac-

This notion of efficiency arises indirectly from the astonishingly recent discovery, dating apparently to the work of Adam Smith, that exchange *itself* is a source of utility. If Peter gives X to Paul and receives Y from him in return, both acting voluntarily,[32] does it not follow that both have gained utility? Is not Y worth more than X to Peter and X worth more than Y to Paul? How else to explain the constituents of market behavior? Both analytically and normatively, this has become a central pillar in the theory of the market. Moreover, its modest methodological requirements ingratiate themselves nicely with the caveats against utilitarianism noted a moment ago.

If we accept those caveats, we are entitled to precisely two inferences about individual utility: (1) if a person successfully chooses to alter his position, he has gained utility, and (2) if he is unwillingly compelled to change his position, he has lost utility. We can, of course, drop "utility" and reduce this to a discussion of indifference curves, but the important point is this: we can neither quantify gains and losses for an individual, nor compare those of two individuals. It follows, and this is critical, that *any event in which some persons gain and some lose is indeterminate with respect to aggregate welfare.* We cannot, on this view, decide whether losses outweigh gains or vice versa: such inferences are impossible within the analytic scheme. Two things follow immediately. First, if (say by majority voting) $n-1$ people gain and one loses, we cannot claim to have done the group a good turn.[33] Second, what is somewhat improperly called the "Pareto principle"[34] takes center stage: we will call it the "efficiency rule."

Let us define the efficiency rule as we will use it later.[35] Suppose we have a "policy set," consisting of possible outcomes to a particular social decision. In the market case, these would be bundles of goods associated to owners. One of these outcomes may be distinguished as the status quo. We have a community of people whose welfare is relevant to the selection of an outcome from the policy set. Each of these people entertains preferences about outcomes which are at least sufficient to produce a three-cell division of this set: (1) *a preference set* of outcomes which he would substitute for the status quo, (2) *a rejection set* of outcomes against which he would retain the status quo, and (3) an *indifference set* for which neither (1) nor (2) holds. Each person has such a division for any given status quo point, and it is ostensibly based on a weak ordering of all alternatives. The efficiency rule has two relevant provisions:

(1) If an outcome belongs to at least one preference set and no rejection set, its substitution for the status quo is efficient.
(2) If no outcome meets requirement (1), the status quo is efficient (or "Pareto optimal").

The efficiency rule is subject to at least four misunderstandings. First, a transaction, considered as a whole, may meet (1), although its component elements do not: this is true for simple market exchange, as well as more complex cases. Second, provision (2) usually defines a very large, sometimes infinite, set of outcomes, all of them efficient. If this is so, many, perhaps most, social choices are "undecidable" from the standpoint of efficiency. What should we do about undecidable cases? This question is central to our analysis of the consensus argument later. Third, the efficiency criterion is blind to both distributive and perfectionist morals. As Amartya Sen has it,

> An economy can be optimal in this sense even when some people are rolling in luxury and others are near starvation as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich. If preventing the burning of Rome would have made Emperor Nero feel worse off, then letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto-optimal. In short, a society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting.[36]

Last, the efficiency rule is extremely "brittle" in its sensitivity to the status quo: Once he ignites the curtains, Nero must be bribed to desist; before he

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millan, 1944). See also Kenneth Arrow, "A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditure," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 85 (August, 1971), 409–15.

[32] And as rational egoists who know what's good for them.

[33] This of course raises the "intensity problem" from democratic theory. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), especially chap. 4; Willmoore Kendall and George M. Carey, "The 'Intensity' Problem and Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (March, 1968), 5–24; Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, "Some Ambiguities in the Concept of Intensity," *Polity,* 1 (Spring, 1969), 298–308. Notice the devastating effect of the present position ~~on any utilitarian argument for majority rule.~~

[34] "Improperly" because it appears that Pareto did not intend the use presently given to his criteria. Cf. Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action,* Vol. I (New York: The Free Press, 1937, 1968), 241–249, and, less importantly, Vincent J. Tarascio, *Pareto's Methodological Approach to Economics* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

~~[35] Cf. III below.~~

[36] *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), p. 22.

does so, the Romans must be bribed to have their city burned. In the case of economic exchange, this makes property rights pivotal, and where they are ambiguous—as with external diseconomies not contemplated by existing civil law[37]—the criterion itself is ambiguous. We will find this difficulty in exacerbated form when we come to political decision.

These difficulties, important as they are, fail to deny the efficiency rule its enormous influence. Its immediate effect is to make the connection between consent and utility (vouchsafed by efficiency) a tautology. How do we know a change is efficient? By the consent of the parties, by their willingness to consent in the substitution. How do we know a status quo is efficient? By someone's unwillingness to substitute any alternative for it. Apart from the special case of "hypothetical compensation,"[38] this analytic seam is airtight. And one need not be the least bit cynical to see that it has enormous ideological value to people well placed in society, for no redistribution can be justified without the consent of those who stand to lose, even if they are numerically overwhelmed by prospective beneficiaries.

We are in the midst of a chain relationship. If we retain a tacit loyalty to Benthamite utilitarianism, then the utility caveats draw us toward the efficiency rule. This in turn renders the utility-consent hypothesis we earlier attributed to Mill an analytic inevitability. Finally, this gives market exchange a normatively privileged position. My consent is my willingness to deal, and if you and I are rational egoists, the market's rules lead us to act out the doctrine "automatically," by trading efficiently until an efficient outcome is reached. It is the voluntary quality of market exchange that makes this possible, and—for the doctrine of consensual decision—this is a momentous fact. For *we should now imagine the market as a normative ideal, against which ordinary political decisions look "sub-optimal" at best.*

The critical inference is a simple one: the normative virtue of markets lies in the voluntariness of exchange, and this voluntariness is guaranteed by the consensual structure of market exchange. Leaving aside external diseconomies and the occasional prospect of blackmail, we can represent the choice-structure of market transactions thus,

Coalitions that can impose exchanges:
 ((seller & buyer))
Coalitions that can veto exchanges:
 ((seller) or (buyer))

Which is, formally at least, homologous with

Coalitions that can change public policy
 $((A \ \& \ B \ \& \ C \ldots \& \ N))$
Coalitions that can veto changes of public policy
 $((A)$ or $(B) \ldots$ or $(N))$

The market analogy" is that, for both market exchange and consensual decision, anyone can prevent action, so that no party can be damaged by it.[39] This provides the background for Knut Wicksell's claim (in his account of taxation) that

> provided the expenditure in question holds out any prospect at all of creating utility exceeding costs, it will always be theoretically possible, and approximately so in practice, to find a distribution of costs such that all parties regard the expenditure as beneficial and may therefore approve it unanimously. Should this prove altogether impossible, I would consider such failure as an *a posteriori*, and the sole possible, proof that the state activity under consideration would not provide the community with utility corresponding to the necessary sacrifice and should hence be rejected on rational grounds.[40]

We will later examine Wicksell's argument more closely, but here it is necessary merely to see that this is a very strong new case for consensual decision, and that it completes the complex development we have been sketching. Very nearly the same claim is offered by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, as they write,

> . . . we admit as "better" only those changes that are observed to be approved unanimously by all members of the group. Any change that secures unanimous support is clearly "desirable," and we can say that such a change is "in the public interest." Few would, we suspect, dispute this half of our criterion for evaluating social changes. However, we go further and state that

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[37] For a brilliant analysis of such cases see R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3 (October, 1960), 1–44.

[38] Hypothetical compensation undoes the connection because it lets me carry out a change so long as I gain enough from it that I *could have* compensated you for your losses. The idea, implicit in Wicksell (see below), is formalized by N. Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," *Economic Journal*, 49 (September, 1939), 549, which is excellently discussed in I. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 88 ff; and E. J. Mishan, *Welfare Economics* (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969), p. 38–51; and Sen, pp. 30–32. A further difficulty, evidently proved by Skitovski, is that the criterion gives intransitive results. Its importance, for us, is that it brings the practical implications of "efficiency" very nearly full circle to the Benthamite position.

[39] Ironically, the idea of the social contract seems to have an at least intuitive relation to this analogy in pre-Lockean thought. This is suggested by the multiple contract theory of Althusius' *Politica Methodice Diogesta* (1603), as analyzed by Kendall, *John Locke*, pp. 46–9. The explicit analogy reappears in Buchanan and Tullock, p. 250 ff.

[40] Wicksell, pp. 89–90.

for *any* change *in* the public interest, unanimous support can be achieved.[41]

It is evident that these authors entertain a utilitarian conception of the public interest. And they seem to have combined a constrained version of this philosophy with the consent of the governed.

ID. Summary

This completes an admittedly fragmentary historical sketch, which leaves us, I think, with three important facts. First, that the ideology of parliamentary revolution—most of all a symmetrical doctrine of government by consent—left liberal ideology with an enormous leap to be made: from fictive consent in regimes to actual consent in their policies. Second, that a plausible response to this leap is to be found in a doctrine of consensual decision. Finally, that the additional doctrine of efficiency and the "market analogy" offer an apparent synthesis of these two—consent and utilitarianism.

My purpose from this point is to offer an analytic appraisal for these conjectures. I begin with the contention that consensual decision would, at least in theory, guarantee the consent of the governed.

II. Consensus and the Consent of the Governed

The most fundamental claim for consensual decision is also the simplest: that consensus implies consent. That is, if an outcome is adopted under a system of consensual decision, we are entitled to assume that everyone has given his consent to it. This is *not* a mere tautology, and it is not always true. Let me begin by looking briefly at two arguments which have this consent-consensus hypothesis as their cornerstones.

IIA. The Consensual Systems Proposed by Calhoun and Wolff

Calhoun is central to the consensus doctrine. His scheme for concurrent majority decision is an effort to approximate consensual decision in the face of large numbers and the resulting escalation of decision-making costs.[42] Summarized very simply, Calhoun's plan is this:[43]

(1) The community is to be divided into a set of mutually exclusive classes.
(2) These classes are to be homogeneous with respect to the effects of government policy.
(3) For any proposal of government policy, each such class is to make a separate decision: approve or disapprove.
(4) Given homogeneity (2), and some rationality assumption, the method of class decision (3) is not very important: majority rule will do.
(5) If a government policy is to be enforced, every class must agree.

This presupposes a cleavage structure without cross-cutting: a "pillar society," such as the Dutch are said to have. And, more demanding still, this structure must remain essentially constant through time, else repeated constitutional crisis. Calhoun is obviously thinking about the southern planters as a class, and is tactically willing to permit other classes to fall as they may. If the required assumptions be granted, I believe the concurrent majorities must be admitted as a valid approximation to consensual decision. The question however remains: Does this guarantee consent? Let me return to that momentarily.

A more recent analysis is Robert Paul Wolff's *In Defense of Anarchism*.[44] This author writes from the American moral left during the Vietnam era; he is concerned with the moral autonomy of citizens as it is threatened by government authority. And the overall structure of his argument is straightforward: (1) each citizen should do as he thinks best, (2) the state necessarily entails authority, which requires that citizens do as someone else thinks best; (3) these are incompatible, so that (4) there ought to be no states. This argument is compelling only on the unlikely supposition that the abolition of states would be attended by no other form of coercion. Buried within this larger argument, however, is the proposition that states would be acceptable *if only* it were practicable to organize them consensually. This position may be summed up as follows:[45]

(1) Citizens should do as they think best.
(2) This is possible if they must obey only laws and policies to which they have each given their consent.
(3) If government authority were exercised only by unanimous direct democracy, (2) would obtain and (1) would therefore be possible.

Wolff imagines that this scheme would in principle resolve his normative dilemma:

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[41] Buchanan and Tullock, p. 285.

[42] A concept owing to Buchanan and Tullock, cf. III below.

[43] Calhoun, *Disquisition*, pp. 19–23, 27–31, 35–54.

[44] *In Defense of Anarchism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[45] Wolff, pp. 22–27. Notice the similarity to Rousseau's search for " . . . a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of each associate, and by means of which each, coalescing with all, may nevertheless *obey only himself*, and remain free as before." (Emphasis added.) *Social Contract*, book I, chap. VI. Rousseau does propose consensus as the basis of a fictive social contract, but urges that "the citizen consents to all the laws, even to those which are passed in spite of him. . . ." (book IV, chap. II). The sense of this consent has always escaped me.

> The solution is a direct democracy—that is, a political community in which every person votes on every issue—governed by a rule of unanimity. Under unanimous direct democracy, every member of society wills freely every law which is actually passed. Hence, he is only confronted as a citizen with laws to which he has consented. Since a man who is constrained only by the dictates of his own will is autonomous, it follows that under the directions of unanimous direct democracy, men can harmonize the duty of autonomy with the commands of authority.[46]

Now Wolff must be aware that each citizen is born into a society with a history; that this history will have deposited a residue of laws; that each of these laws cannot be conditionally revoked at the birth of each fresh infant, pending his yes vote during the morning of his eighteenth birthday. Yet this difficulty alone would seem sufficient to shatter his hypothesis that consensus implies autonomy (which is, of course, a species of consent).[47]

IIB. A Revised Market Analogy

To avoid this difficulty, one would have to change the "market analogy" (IC above) so that it looked like this:

Coalitions that can impose exchanges:
  ((seller & buyer))
Coalitions that can veto exchanges:
  ((seller & buyer))

and analogously,

Coalitions that can impose new policies:
  ((*A* & *B*, . . . & *N*))
Coalitions that can retain old policies:
  ((*A* & *B*, . . . & *N*))

Thus, each would hold a right of veto over every policy, including old laws in politics and the non-exchange outcome in the market. But there is something very wrong here, for these structures open the prospect that *every* outcome will be blocked by some coalition. In the market case, this would suggest that you and I might neither exchange nor fail to exchange certain bundles of goods, in politics that we might neither retain nor rid ourselves of a law. Both prospects are in some fundamental way preposterous, and important foundations are missing from the analysis. These are supplied by a simple and very partial account of public choices (IIC), and a criterion of robustness for the structures by which they are resolved (IID).

IIC. Forced Choice

The full policy of a government at any moment will be some historical combination of outcomes to specific issues. Suppose we treat issues, X_1, $X_2, \cdots, X_n$, as sets of mutually exclusive government policies. Each such issue, or "policy set" X_i thus contains a collection of policy outcomes which exclude one another, $X_i=(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, \cdots, x_{mi})$. On any such issue, at any given time, there must be some status quo, whether explicit or tacit. So we can represent a full public policy as an n-tuple of alternatives for $x_1 \cdots x_n$, and mark their standing as status quo outcomes with a bar:

$$\bar{x}_{i1}, \bar{x}_{j2}, \bar{x}_{k3}, \cdots, \bar{x}_{1n}.^{48}$$

This account carries the implication that each issue involves a *forced choice* among alternative outcomes. Forced in two senses (1) not more than one outcome can be the status quo, and (2) some outcome must be the status quo. This applies to issues, and by an obvious extension to the n-tuples of issues which define public policies.

Here are some classes of issues which illustrate the forcing of choice:

(1) Even if government chooses to permit market decision makers to establish it, a society must have some given social product over any interval of time, and must have some set of rules for its allocation.

(2) Consider any given public good[49] which any given government might produce: it must always be producing it at some level, even if that level be zero.

(3) Consider the public law as a compound of triples in the form:
[(subject class) (norm-operator) (action class)]
and think of three norm-operators (must, may, must-not).[50] Then, for any pair of subject and

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[46] Wolff, p. 23.

[47] Godwin's response to the myth of the social contract seems appropriate to the point: How am I obliged? "Surely not upon the contract into which my father entered before I was born?" *Enquiry*, book III, chap. 2, p. 189. In his assault on the Pareto principle, I. D. Little makes essentially the same observation in *A Critique*, p. 94.

[48] E.g., the *i*th outcome to the first issue, the *j*th to the second, etc.

[49] E.g., a good for which exclusion is impossible or expensive, so that its distribution follows the pattern "if any then all," or at least, "if some then others." Mancur Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) offers a classic analysis of the incentive problems raised by public goods.

[50] This three-operator analysis is controversial, but our point would hold for the four- or *n*-operator case as well. Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright, *Norm and Action* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963) or Alf Ross, *Directives and Norms* (New York. Humanities Press, 1968). I myself believe von Wright is correct in claiming that these three operators are sufficient to express the content of any law or other rule, given the auxiliary privilege of negation.

action classes, there must be *one and only one* effective norm-operator. For example, let the subject class be "persons living in California" and the action class be "deliberately kill other people": the law must either prohibit or command or permit this pattern of behavior for those people. It is shallow at best to imagine that such legal choices can be put off: to "not decide" must imply one of two outcomes:

(a) tacit permission, *nullum crimen sine lege*, or

(b) continuance of an explicit status quo mandate, prohibition or permission.

To see the point's obviousness, try to devise a way of effectively postponing a decision on the legality of abortion which can be explained to a pregnant woman.

(4) In the choice of candidates for office, either someone is elected or nobody is (yet) elected at any given moment: a final choice can be put off only by accepting an interval of indeterminancy or "provisional" control which is a very real outcome (consider the Greek colonels or the Portuguese Communists).

(5) International agreements can be put off, but a very real and often painful status quo remains to be experienced.

These cases suggest a ubiquitous forcing of choice:[51] even when explicit outcomes can be postponed, tacit ones are *ipso facto* chosen. In the schemes proposed by Calhoun and Wolff, this suggests that *some* outcomes and not others are subject to the requirement of unanimity. If *all* outcomes were subject to unanimity, then we would risk the position in which we both refused to change policy and refused to keep it the same. This brings us to a somewhat more exact account of policy decisions.

Considering any single issue, we are confronted with a status quo, and some alternatives to it. Assuming m alternatives in X_1, and repressing the subscript which identifies the issue, we have a list of possible status quo points as the left column of the matrix below. We also have a list of alternatives to each of these, as shown in the top row of the matrix. Notice that the status quo is included as "an alternative to itself," in order to display the rejection of change as a choice:

$$\begin{array}{c|c|ccc}
 & & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\textit{to these alternatives}} \\
 & X_1 & x_1 & x_2 \cdots & x_m \\
\hline
 & x_1 & D_{11} & D_{12} & D_{1m} \\
\textit{from these possible status quo policies:} & x_2 & D_{21} & D_{22} & D_{2m} \\
 & \cdots & & & \\
 & x_m & D_{m1} & D_{m2} & D_{mm}
\end{array}$$

Society's problem is to pick a *transition* from the alternatives thus offered. Decision D_{11}, for example, means retaining outcome x_1. By contrast, D_{12} represents the substitution of outcome x_2 for x_1. We will operate always in a single row of the matrix, as defined by the particular status quo we confront. We can therefore confine our attention to a single arbitrary row with status quo x_i:

$$\begin{array}{l|ccc}
\text{moving from } x_i \textit{ to} & x_j \cdots & x_i \cdots & x_m \\
\hline
\text{is decision} & D_{ij} & D_{ii} & D_{im}
\end{array}$$

We can define consent, consensus, and the criterion of robustness over the choice so defined.

IID. Robustness, Consent, and Why Consensus must be Conditional

A *control-structure* defines the coalitions which can impose decisions. An arbitrary decision D_{ij} can be imposed by one or more minimally sufficient coalitions, and the set of such coalitions is labelled C_{ij}. Thus, for example, we might let x_i and x_j represent arbitrary imputations of goods to two traders, *A* and *B*. Then the normal rules of market exchange would display the structure,

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[51] ". . . government *inaction* is as much a choice of policy as government action," Dahl and Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, p. 338. See also IV below. Two contrary observations need mention. First, it has been suggested that this choice from mutually exclusive alternatives rules out compromise and creates a zero-sum constraint on outcomes. This is simply incorrect: the compromise outcome *is* an alternative, and *does* exclude other outcomes. Second, there is no reason whatever to imagine a zero-sum constraint for mutually exclusive alternatives. Consider, for example, an Edgeworth box for two traders. Its points are in the end mutually exclusive, but choices among them are certainly not zero-sum. These erroneous views are expounded by Buchanan and Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*, p. 253 ff. Second, some decisions suggest the possibility of multiple outcomes. Say we are awarding medals to national heroes: awarding one may deflate the value of awarding another, but surely does not exclude it. This is correct, but rather superficial. The effective alternatives are lists of national heroes. With n candidates, there would be 2^n possible lists. But any one list does rule out any other list. A more important example: public works projects as authorized by the American Congress. At the *margin*, when each new project is considered, it seems irrelevant that others have been approved already, so each may be treated as a separate issue. But the choices are nonetheless forced in two ways: (1) each must be approved in some form or rejected, and (2) one grand list of projects must emerge from each Congress. The current proposal for centralizing the appropriations process in Congress would make this latter point clear even as each project was considered.

$$\begin{array}{c|cc} & x_i & x_j \\ \hline x_i & C_{ii}=((A)\text{ or }(B)) & C_{ij}=((A\&B)) \end{array} \qquad (1)$$

so that the nonexchange decision D_{ii} can be imposed by either; exchange decision D_{ij} only by both.

A given actor enjoys a *right of consent* in decision D_{ij} only if he belongs to every minimally sufficient coalition in C_{ij}. Both *A* and *B* enjoy such a right for the exchange outcomes; neither enjoys such a right for the nonexchange outcome. Similarly, a control structure is *consensual for a specific decision* if and only if every relevant actor enjoys a right of consent in that outcome. The market is consensual for exchange but not for nonexchange outcomes.

Earlier observations (IIC) suggest that society must always be prepared to choose exactly one outcome. It is therefore inadmissible to have a structure which could deny us *any* decision, any location for the status quo. Such a structure could be workable in exactly the same way that sugar could be "insoluble"—until, that is, it was wet. In our case, that means until there is a conflict in which coalitions at once block all decisions. I have in mind a concept of *robustness*. Here is the peculiar market structure mentioned in IIB.

$$\begin{array}{c|cc} & x_i & x_j \\ \hline x_i & C_{ii}=((A\&B)) & C_{ij}=((A\&B)) \end{array} \qquad (2)$$

This scheme has two properties. First, it is unconditionally consensual: each person enjoys a right of consent in each outcome. Second, it is nonrobust. Intuitively: what if *A* blocks the nonexchange outcome and *B* blocks the exchange outcome(s)? Precisely: a structure is robust if it meets the following requirement:

(1) Consider a coalition (*) which is insufficient to impose any decision (impotent)
(2) For every coalition (*) there must exist at least one other coalition (*′) with two properties:
  (a) it is disjoint with (*)—no members in common
  (b) it is potent—can impose some outcome

Ordinary market exchange (1) meets this requirement. Neither (*A*) nor (*B*) nor (*AB*) is impotent. The emply set (∅) is impotent like (*). But all three of the other coalitions just mentioned satisfy (ii) by being disjoint with (∅) and potent. Now consider the special market exchange system defined by (2). The coalition (*A*) is impotent like (*). The coalitions (*B*) and (∅) are disjoint with (*A*), but both are impotent. The coalition (*AB*) is nonimpotent, but is not disjoint with (*A*). Thus this odd scheme is nonrobust. It permits failure to adopt any outcome.

More generally, consider a structure which is unconditionally consensual and therefore gives a universal right of consent to all decisions,

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} & x_i & x_j & \cdots & x_m \\ \hline \bar{x}_i & C_{ii}=((\forall)) & C_{ij}=((\forall)) & & C_{im}=((\forall)) \end{array} \qquad (3)$$

where (∀) represents the coalition of all relevant actors. No other structure is unconditionally consensual and gives an unconditional right of consent. But this structure is nonrobust. Any proper subset of (∀) is impotent like (*). Some other subset of (∀) may be disjoint with this impotent coalition, but will itself be impotent. Only (∀) is nonimpotent, but it can hardly be disjoint with its own subset. Therefore, this structure and all its concrete analogs are nonrobust.

The choice of structure is then between robustness and unconditional consensus with its correspondingly perfect right of consent. We do not choose robustness; necessity chooses it for us. We therefore can choose at most a conditional form of consensus and correspondingly conditional right of consent. If there are *m* decisions available, as many as $m-1$ may be consensual, but *at least one must not be consensual.*

IIE. Anarchic Consensus: Calhoun and Wolff

Calhoun seems to have known this. Notice that he attributes a motive for agreement to his actors: they must come to unanimous agreement on positive policy " . . . as the only means to prevent the suspension of the action of the government, and, thereby, to avoid anarchy, the greatest of all evils."[52] The structure seems to be this:

$$\begin{array}{c|ccc} & x_i & x_j & x_0 \\ \hline \bar{x}_i & C_{ii}=((\forall)) & C_{ij}=((\forall)) & C_{i0}=((\exists)) \end{array}$$

To sustain the status quo requires unanimity;[53] to substitute another positive policy requires unanimity; but to block either course of action and thereby suspend all positive policy (D_{i0}) requires only a single class (let $\exists$ be any single class). In other words, each class can impose anarchy, which functions as the nonconsensual outcome and preserves the robustness of the concurrent majorities as a structure. If we classify conditional (hence, robust) schemes of consensus by their "escape" decisions, this might be termed *anarchic consensus*. It is, so far as I can tell, precisely the scheme which answers to Godwin's objection against government: insofar as Calhoun's structure imposes any status quo save anarchy, it does so by a functional equivalent of unanimous consent. Calhoun's system—or the more general structure of anarchic consensus—abandons consent in regimes and imposes direct consent in policy.

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[52] Calhoun, *Disquisition,* p. 30, as cited above, IA.

[53] This critical point of interpretation is perhaps counterintuitive, but fits well with the text of Calhoun's essay and is consistent with his tactical posi-

However fanciful this may seem, it forces the question: should we *choose* the prospect of being bound by government without our own consent? In other words, should we reject universal consent in policy as a normative criterion? Calhoun avoids this deeper issue. From his vantage, remember, the force of government was used to bind one large class—the blacks—without their consent or even a gesture in that direction. Calhoun clearly *would not* have liked to part with this leverage by universalizing his concurrent majorities to include the blacks as a class. Calhoun clearly *would* have liked to gain new leverage by extending the concurrent majorities to the class of southern planters, in their conflict with other sectors of the society, notably the industrial North. Since the blacks do not qualify as citizens, he is able to finesse the obvious contradiction.

But if one is bound by symmetry of argument, then the fundamental dilemma is unavoidable. Let "Ego" and "Alter" be any two persons or classes. Then symmetry implies that if Ego would bind Alter by governmental decision, against his will, he too must face the prospect of being bound unwillingly by Alter. Calhoun's proposal, read symmetrically, is a mutual agreement to rule out such binding. It is clear that both must surrender any right of consent in the ungoverned action of the other. If Alter chooses to aggress against Ego, directly or indirectly, Ego cannot invoke a governmental constraint against him. *The effect of Calhoun's proposal is to repeat the social contract position at the level of policy.* Each governmental decision is like a fresh social contract, and each such contract is subject to unilateral revocation at any time.[54] We purchase unconditional consent in government by surrendering any further right of consent in the behavior of others.

Robert Paul Wolff's *In Defense of Anarchism* carries this facet of Calhoun's theory to its conclusion. We should seek a society in which each does as he thinks best, thus enjoys autonomy by consent in all decisions. This could be accomplished if all decisions were taken by direct unanimous democracy. But we could achieve this unanimous democracy only if we *already* had " . . . substantial agreement among *all* members of a community on all matters of major importance."[55] Wolff thus points to a problem (autonomy or consent); proposes a solution (consensual decision); and cautions that it will work only if we haven't got the problem in the first place (e.g., no real disagreements exist). It is as if we had contrived a medicine useful only to the well.

It is worth noticing that this exercise should lead, as it does in Wolff, to a doctrine of philosophical anarchism only if a stateless society promises a better approximation to a condition of universal autonomy. This might mean that we asked everyone to internalize the interests of others under a universal principle of just action so that no part of society would ever choose to act in a way unacceptable to others. And, as Wolff admits by way of footnote, unanimous agreement is a useful mental experiment in choosing the principle which would be so internalized.[56] But this is not to be confused with the problem of political structure—with the rules under which public decisions are in fact to occur. Here, Wolff's analysis offers very little. For suppose that either (1) a principle of just action has become the guide to action by all or (2) that it hasn't. In the first case, anarchism will work but so will everything else; in the second case anarchism won't work—won't function as an approximation to universal autonomy.

It can indeed be shown that *no* structure of decision unanimity—majority-rule, combat, dice-throwing, oracular contemplations, or the reading of coffee grounds—can of itself unhinge the fundamental problem of *political vulnerability:*

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tion. Calhoun, it will be recalled, had taken a "nullificationist" position against federal tariff policy on behalf of South Carolina in 1828. And, during the 1840s when the present theory was concocted, his region found itself at an increasing disadvantage in federal policy. Only a doctrine which at once offered a defense against further damage *and* a recourse against existing policy would suit his need. I believe he found this in the "anarchic consensus" theory as interpreted here.

[54] I draw this inference in full knowledge that Calhoun rejected the social contract as an historical doctrine, in *Disquisition*, pp. 3–4. His analytic motive for this seems obvious.

[55] Wolff, p. 24.

[56] See, for a main example, John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

unanimous universal consent has the logical form of the square circle.

IIF. Stasis Consensus: Buchanan and Tullock

An especially important consensual structure, argued by Buchanan and Tullock, has this shape,

$$\begin{array}{c|cc} & x_i & x_j \\ \hline \bar{x}_i & C_{ii}=((\exists)) & C_{ij}=((\forall)) \end{array}$$

The *stasis consensus* has the status quo as its nonconsensual outcome, offering a universal right of consent only in change. This is the version of consensus which fits the "market analogy," and the version which goes to the doctrine of utilitarian efficiency: if a new outcome is adopted, must not this change benefit society? It evidently cannot have damaged society if nobody objects and blocks its adoption. But the issue is more subtle, and I postpone it for Part III below.

IIG. Laissez Faire Consensus: Wicksell

Yet another structure is Knut Wicksell's *laissez faire* consensus.[57] Here, the policy which removes least from the private sector can be imposed unilaterally by anyone, or at least by a small minority. Unless it also happens to be the *laissez faire* solution, the status quo enjoys no special privilege, and all spending is open to what might be called the "Earl Landgrebe syndrome"[58] in which all activity is vetoed. Wicksell thus asks us to accept the rules of a market society—property, contract, rights of disposition—nonconsensually, and to offer a right of consent in any deviation from them.

IIH. Implications of Consensus Analysis

The right of consent cannot be unconditionally vouchsafed by any workable structure. For any issue, there must be at least one outcome against which no universal right of consent is available. If we follow Calhoun's anarchic consensus, this is the "no-policy" solution, which leaves people free to act as they can and will without governmental intervention. We would never be freighted with positive policies against our will, but the price is measured in the events which might occur without governmental intervention. Calhoun, in effect, asks us to surrender the right to coerce others through government in return for freedom from coercion by them through government. Whether this is an appropriate idealization depends on an estimate for the consequences of anarchy. It should be noted in closing that only the anarchic consensual system resolves the problem of consent in policy left open by Locke's initial argument. Any alternative structure must leave some positive policy which may be imposed nonconsensually, be it the status quo created by an earlier generation, the bare market solution, or the law whose first word stands highest in alphabetical order.

III. Consensus and Utilitarian Efficiency

Bearing in mind, then, that all viable structures offer an at most conditional right of consent, we may at last test the central dogma of the new political economy: that consensual decision leads to utilitarian efficiency. For this purpose, we put aside the objections already raised (Part I), and begin with a spatial interpretation for the rule of efficiency.

IIIA. The Efficiency Rule

Consider an *N*-space, each of whose dimensions corresponds to the utility of a single individual, and each of whose points is defined by an *n*-tuple of individual utilities. The dimensions are "elastic," and distance is meaningless: only direction is determinate. This corresponds to the caveats against cardinality and interpersonal comparison of utility. Each dimension is an individual weak ordering, and each point is defined by the intersect of *n* such orderings. In Figure 1, we have picked one two-dimensional slice from this space and use it to depict the intersection between the orderings of two arbitrary individuals *A* and *B*. These allow us to define efficiency and its alternatives spatially.

The weak ordering attributed to *A* defines three sets with respect to a status quo at $\bar{x}_i$: (1) a preference set north of $A-A'$, (2) an indifference set on $A-A'$, and (3) a rejection set south of $A-A'$. Line $B-B'$ defines analogous sets for *B*. From $\bar{x}_i$, according to our earlier definitions, we can identify the set of *efficiency dominant changes* as those north, east, or northeast of $\bar{x}_i$ (the set defined inclusively by line $B'-\bar{x}_i-A'$). These bestow gains without losses. *Counterefficient changes*, if we may be permitted such a barbarism, are defined inclusively by the southwesterly set bounded at $A-\bar{x}_i-B$. These bestow losses without gains.

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[57] Wicksell. Since Wicksell's system is not symmetrical with respect to the status quo, its structure must be represented in two matrix rows, as follows:

	$\bar{x}_i$	cost-minimal x_j	other x_j
cost-minimal $\bar{x}_i$	(θ)	(?)	(&)
other $\bar{x}_i$	(&)	(θ)	(?)

Unanimity is thus required to increase or sustain spending. The system is undefined for cases in which spending is not a relevant variable.

[58] Landgrebe is Congressman from the Indiana 2nd District and claims to have voted against every nonmilitary appropriation in the 92nd Congress.



Figure 1. The Efficiency Rule

Undecidable changes are located in the sets exclusively defined by $A-\bar{x}_i-B'$ and $B-\bar{x}_i-A'$—northwest and southeast of x. Notice that such undecidable substitutions may be very tempting: as with x_k, which seems to offer a great gain to A at small cost to B. In Calhoun's terms, this seems a profitable sacrifice of one interest to another. But within the present frames of reference, we need not argue against it from consent, since *we are not entitled to the inference itself.*[59] That is, we cannot distinguish x_k from a point like x_j, cannot know that we are making a "social dividend" by this change. We can, of course, construct a *new* alternative, like x_l, perhaps by side-payment from A to B or log-rolling—either simultaneously with a "rider" or by promise of future votes. But this is not the same as moving to x_k (no more the same than selling me a car is the same as giving it to me.)

Suppose, for the moment, that line $F-F'$ defines a possibility frontier passing through $\bar{x}_i$. This means there can be no efficient substitutions for $\bar{x}_i$ (the sector bounded by $B'-\bar{x}_i-A'$ being entirely out of reach). In this case, the rule tells us that $\bar{x}_i$ is an *efficiency maximum.* We may reformulate the efficiency rule in strong terms: *Make substitutions if and only if they are efficiency dominant.* This is precisely what a well-functioning market does if each person behaves as a rational egoist. If certain other conditions are also met, the market moves toward an efficient outcome: an equilibrium from which no further efficient progress is possible. We wish to analyze the claim that consensual political decision will function similarly. The detailed implications would seem to be as follows:

(1) Only efficient changes occur.

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[59] A limitation which rules out a very great deal: any compromise with consensual decision (agreement by $n-1$ members, say) is, in this light, qualitatively indistinguishable from majority-rule or a personal dictatorship. In policy terms, it also entitles me to retain my twenty-seventh fur coat against the feeding of your sick child unless I choose to part with the coat.

(2) All efficient changes occur.
and (3) Efficiency equilibria will be attained.

IIIB. Stasis Consensus and Efficient Decision

We want to see whether consensual decision will produce these results. We consider a stasis consensual system which I believe embodies the most attractive features of the account given by Buchanan and Tullock.[60] This is sufficiently determined by the following model:

1. Each person whose utility may be affected by a decision either has a vote or is faithfully represented by an agent who does.[61]
2. Each such person's vote is determined as follows:
   - (a) If a substitute outcome is in his preference set, a yes vote,
   - (b) if a substitute outcome is in his rejection set, a no vote,
   - (c) if a substitute policy is in his indifference set an abstention.
3. A substitute for the status quo is imposed if and only if there is at least one yes vote and no no votes.

This scheme is a sophisticated cousin of the consent theories with which we began. Does it fulfill the requirements we have adduced for the efficiency principle? This would seem to be the minimum implication of the claim made by Buchanan and Tullock as they set unanimity as a necessary and sufficient condition to change.[62]

Implication (a) is confirmed for this model: only efficient changes occur. Suppose a policy change is undecidable or counterefficient. Someone loses from the substitution, and the policy belongs to one or more rejection sets. A no vote follows, and the necessary condition for change is violated. Thus, only efficient changes occur. With side-payments, this may mean the adoption of complex packages, efficient in aggregate but composed of inefficient elements (e.g., an inefficient policy outcome and an inefficient side-payment to make an efficient package). This is consistent with our hypothesis, which we confirm for this model.

Now implication (b): that all efficient changes occur. Assume, first, a fixed and fully visible set of efficient alternatives to the status quo. Each of these will be adopted against the status quo. Thus in Figure 1, either D_{i1} or D_{im} would substitute x_1 or x_m for x_i under the stasis consensual system. Notice, however, that once either was adopted, the other would *become* an efficiency-undecidable proposal for change, and would be rejected under our model. In other words, we should say, *any* rather than all efficient changes will be adopted. The significance of this is both distributive and tactical. *A* would rather move to x_1 and *B* to x_m. Each may well be tempted to express insincere preferences so that *both* outcomes are rejected. *A* may try to impose x_1 by alleging that x_m belongs to his rejection set for x_i, and *B* may take the obverse strategy. It is, then, evident that *neither* outcome may be adopted: decisions D_{i1} and D_{im}, both efficient, may be rejected in favor of the status quo choices D_{ii}. This suggests that the model contains within itself incentives for departure from the voting rule (2). This is a serious practical limitation, despite the formal result implied if the model is faithfully acted out. This point of brittleness is already well understood.[63]

A second difficulty: suppose we do not imagine a fixed set of visible alternatives, but assume that only a few of the many possible outcomes are searched out and proposed. This would seem realistic. It follows immediately that an efficient substitution (say D_{im}) may be omitted. It should, nevertheless, be noted that the model contains strong incentives for search: somebody inevitably stands to gain from any efficient substitution. A plausible supposition would be that each participant will search up to some personal threshold of "satisficing,"[64] so that this omission would be less serious than one might imagine. Yet, it is also plausible to imagine large inequalities of information and technical competence which would lead to search biased toward large gains for some minorities and not others.[65] Partial and possibly biased search, then, adds a second caveat to our confirmation of implication (b).

IIIC. Utilitarian Maxima, Equality, and the Limits of Efficiency

Suppose, next, that we go along way beyond implications (a) and (b), and begin to engage in loose talk about the maximization of aggregate

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[60] See Buchanan and Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*, especially pp. 63–96, 249–262; and section IIG above.

[61] Wicksell imagines this as achieved by parliamentary decision with proportional representation (pp. 96–97), while Buchanan and Tullock focus mainly on direct decision. The word *each* is very important, for the logic of the efficiency argument collapses even under minor deviations.

[62] Buchanan and Tullock, p. 285; above, p. 1276–1277.

[63] Barry, pp. 245–250. Also Hamilton, *Federalist 22*, and Franklin as cited above, and William Baumol, *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed., 1965) p. 42ff.

[64] The notion is Herbert Simon's. See, for example, "Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science," *American Economic Review*, 49 (June, 1959), 253–283.

[65] Notice that no *sinister* motive need be attributed to an elite under this account; a merely self-centered search for alternatives will suffice. It is to Calhoun's credit that he sees the possibility of extractive outcomes without recourse to evil motive: *Disquisition*, especially pp. 3–7. The classic formulation is Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (1915; rpt., New York: Dover Books, 1959), especially pp. 377–392.



Figure 2. An Inefficient Increase of Aggregate Utility by Redistributive Decision D_{ij}

utility. We might allege that our confirmation of (a) and (b) supports Wicksell's conjecture that "[failure to reach unanimity provides] an *a posteriori*, and the sole possible, proof that the state activity under consideration would not provide the community with utility corresponding to the necessary sacrifice. . . . "[66] Consider a redistributive program, whose incidence for two arbitrary individuals is to reduce the difference between their real incomes. Person *A* loses a given increment of real income ($A'-x_j$ in Figure 2) and Person *B* gains the same amount ($B'-\bar{x}_i$ in Figure 2). Clearly, this package is efficiency-undecidable[67] and will be rejected consensually if (a) holds: Person *A* will withhold his consent. Does this entitle us to claim that the redistribution would therefore have failed to increase aggregate utility? Not at all. Following the common supposition that real income yields a decreasing marginal utility, an opponent could claim that this downward redistribution would increase aggregate utility.[68] Suppose he conjectures utility functions for real income shown as Figure 2. Since *B*'s utility gain (x_j-B') exceeds *A*'s loss ($\bar{x}_i-A'$), his case is good: this has nothing to do with the labeling of the two functions, and his argument would actually be stronger if the two curves were reversed. His argument does violate our utility caveats, but so does any refutation we may offer.

This digression has four consequences for the larger analysis. First, efficiency and consensual decision (so far as it is efficient), are blind to distributive equality. Blind twice: (1) because equality as ordinarily conceived requires interpersonal comparisons, and (2) because consensus gives the privileged a right of consent in reform. If then, the object is to reduce inequalities, we must either reject consensual choice or hope fervently for the good will of the rich. It is, in short, clear that equalitarians, with or without utilitarian roots, have good reason to reject efficient consensus as an ideal. Conversely, Wicksell has suggested this as an advertisement for his scheme of consensus to the rich.[69] Second, if our underlying normative position is utilitarian, it follows that consensual decision may exact serious *opportunity costs* precisely because it respects implication (1) of the efficiency rule, rejecting efficiency-undecidable decisions (like D_{ij} in Figure 2). This in turn modifies the normative sense of implication (2): that we adopt any *efficiency*-improvement does not imply that we adopt any *utility*-improvement. We are sheltered from this conjecture by the fact the utilitarian case for redistribution requires interpersonal comparisons, which permits us to deny that any valid evidence could even in principle be displayed for the hypothesis that leveling increases aggregate utility. By the same stroke, of course, it denies us any claim to the falsification of that hypothesis.

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[66] Wicksell, as quoted above, p. 1276. Wicksell has a different consensus structure in mind, but this happens to coincide exactly with the stasis structure under consideration for the present case: both the status quo and the *laissez faire* solutions would leave real incomes undisturbed.

[67] In the spatial interpretation given as Figure 2, it is analogous to decision D_{ik} or D_{ij}.

[68] Lerner and Arrow give far subtler arguments. The simple case made here appears in Christopher Jencks et al., *Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 5ff.

Both of these difficulties are overcome by a political economy of abundance. If the total supply of real income expands inexorably, then we need not face the harsh trade-off between "haves" and "have nots." This optimism has deep roots in American thought, and is elegantly caricatured by David Potter in its contrast to the European alternative,

> . . . Europe has always conceived of redistribution of wealth as necessitating the expropriation of some and the corresponding aggrandizement of others; but America has conceived of it primarily in terms of giving to some without taking from others . . . without necessarily treating one class as the victim or even, in an ultimate sense, the antagonist of another.[70]

This permits us to look past these objections to consensus. First, we can "level up"[71] by giving dividends of growth to the poor while allowing the rich to maintain their position. Second, we need not take the opportunity costs of consensual decision very seriously: the future presents a steady supply of fresh (and painless) opportunities. This optimism is expressed in the market analogy itself: Since traders trade, they are surely doing themselves a good turn; since citizens accept change (if they do), they too are doing themselves a good turn.[72]

But this line of escape seems to me increasingly implausible. There is every reason to suspect that the future does not promise boundless economic growth, at least not at a price we ought to be willing to pay.[73] If (by grace) the future does offer such a prospect, another difficulty must be faced. We have so far tacitly supposed independence in the utility of real income. Thus, the case goes, if A gets more while B stands pat, gross utility must have increased. But there is some evidence that the utility of real income is defined *invidiously:* If you gain in real income, the utility of my real income is diminished by invidious comparison. This ancient supposition is supported by intuition: Why else are "poor" Americans, whose incomes excel more than 90 per cent of the world's population, poor? Partly, to be sure, because the structure of everyday life presses high demands for consumption in a society like our own. But partly also because they *are* poor in relation to the rest of us. It is also supported by some contemporary research: deprivation is relative, and the utility of income varies not with its absolute amount but with its placement in specific social distributions.[74] If this is so, then "leveling up" is chimerical: if it is possible to level up real incomes, it may still be impossible to level up welfare.

A third implication returns us to the doctrine of consensus itself. If governmental decisions were taken without side-payments, consensual decision would clearly be vulnerable to Hamilton's objection, would make adaptive change all but impossible. The open use of bribes is the punch behind the market analogy, and only Victorian prissiness would suggest that it is an inherently bad idea.[75] The present digression on equality and redistribution, however, calls to mind a distressing prospect. Suppose that, under the status quo, persons are well stocked with side-payments valued by others, and some other persons are utterly without such side-payments. Let *A* represent a "fat cat" and *B* represent a "pauper." Suppose then that a policy change advantaging *A* arises: he can make it an efficiency improvement by giving *B* a sufficient bribe, and it will be adopted. But the reverse case is distressing: a measure advantaging *B* arises, but he cannot lay hands on a sufficient bribe for *A*. If side-payments have diminishing marginal utility, this effect will be magnified, since *A* will set less store on a bribe of fixed size than *B* will. Neither as utilitarians nor as equalitarians are we apt to rest happily with the fact that *A*'s proposal goes through while *B*'s does not. Insofar as we escape Hamilton's objection, then, the case for consensual decision must *presuppose* a relatively equalitarian and fluid distribution of transferable, valuable goods.

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[69] Wicksell, p. 95–96. Given a *laissez faire* status quo, his argument would apply to the stasis consensual scheme as well.

[70] *People of Plenty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 113.

[71] The phrase is Potter's, *People of Plenty*, p. 121.

[72] Cf. Buchanan and Tullock, pp. 249–262.

[73] The literature of pessimistic economics grows daily. I have in mind, for example, the Committee of Rome's argument as expressed in Danella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972). A very concise and pointed analysis of material limits on growth is Earl Cook, "Energy for Millenium Three," *Technology Review*, 75 (December, 1972), 16–23.

[74] See, for example, W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) and Richard A. Easterlin, "Does Money Buy Happiness?", *The Public Interest*, 30 (Winter, 1973), 3–10.

[75] The institutionalization of side-payments is discussed in James S. Coleman, "Political Money," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1074–87, and Buchanan and Tullock, pp. 265–81.

Finally, this case once again calls into question our commitment to the idea of unanimous consent in government policy. The consent assumption, built into the argument from efficiency, here rises and falls with that doctrine. We have suggested three reasons—utilitarian opportunity costs, distributive fairness, and the distribution of side-payments—to hold the doctrine of efficiency at arm's length. Here, as before, we are given cause to deny that the right of consent in change should always be honored in governmental decision.[76]

IIID. Consensual Decision and Progress Toward Efficiency Maxima

We have yet to examine implication (3)—the achievement of efficiency equilibria—for our consensual model. This line of analysis leads, if I am not mistaken, to a serious objection against the consensus doctrine even in this sophisticated form. Let us proceed on the supposition that implications (1) and (2) are essentially correct: consensual decision makes only efficient substitutions of policy, and makes such substitutions whenever they are visible.

If this were so, we might expect to find "histories" of the kind suggested by Figure 3. Possibility frontier $F-F'$ defines an efficiency equilibrium set: once such a point is achieved, no efficient changes are possible. Policies $x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_5$ define a hierarchy of efficiency, each an improvement over its predecessors. It follows that decisions D_{12}, D_{23}, D_{45} represent a "history" of progress toward equilibrium. Each narrows the remaining set of efficiency improvements, defined by the nested sectors radiating from each policy point (the dotted lines in Figure 3). The status quo plods toward equilibrium, as these sets of remaining improvements diminish with each decision.[77] Now, if consensual decision displays this sort of sequence, we are entitled to imagine a steady progress and enjoy a strong objection against "risky" deviations from consensual efficiency. Moreover, we have given real substance to the earlier doctrine of consent: each citizen is free from any loss of welfare. But is this what we ought to expect?

Consider a scenario which seems to confirm the optimistic history just outlined.[78] I have in mind

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[76] It should be clear that these shortcomings are not *unique* to consensual decision. It is obvious that implication (1) does not hold for other structures: All other structures permit changes opposed by some persons and thus brook the possibility that efficiency-undecidable choices will result. Implication (2) is also violated by other structures: efficiency-dominant outcomes may be passed up. Biased search is perhaps universal; many structures, such as majority voting, invite strategic manipulation. (See, for instance, Robin Farquharson, *A Theory of Voting* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). Finally, other structures fail to enforce equalitarian outcomes even where these may arguably serve to maximize total welfare. See William Riker, "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September, 1967), 642–56. For an introduction to the related "games of fair division" problem, see Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: John Wiley, 1967) pp. 363–68.

[77] Notice that this history is exactly the "market case" in which successive gains from trade drive partners toward a contract locus from which further gains are impossible. This is the very heart of the "market analogy."

[78] Here is the account given by Buchanan and Tullock, p. 91:

> . . . if decisionmaking costs are neglected, this test [consensus] must be met if collective action is to be judged "desirable" by any rational individual calculus at the constitutional level. We may illustrate this point by the classical example of Pigouvian welfare economics, the case of the smoking chimney. Smoke from an industrial plant fouls the air and imposes external costs on residents in the surrounding areas. If this represents a genuine externality, either voluntary arrangements will emerge to eliminate it or collective action with unanimous support can be implemented. If the externality is real, *some* collectively imposed scheme through which the damaged property owners are taxed and the firm's owners are subsidized for capital losses incurred in putting in a smoke-abatement machine can command the assent of all parties. If no such compensation scheme is possible (organizing costs neglected), the externality is only apparent and not real. The same conclusion applies to the possibility of voluntary arrangements being worked out. Suppose that the owners of the residential property claim some smoke damage, however slight. If this claim is real, the opportunity will always be open for them to combine forces and buy out the firm in order to introduce smoke-abatement devices. If the costs of organizing such action are left out of account, such an arrangement would surely be made. All externalities of this sort would be eliminated through either voluntary organized action or unanimously supported collective action, with full compensation paid to



Figure 3. A Sequence of Efficiency Improvements Approaching Equilibrium

the famous Pigouvian chimney:

(1) A chimney emits smoke, reducing the welfare of people living nearby.
(2) The victims of this diseconomy would gain from its elimination, but the chimney owners would lose from its elimination.
(3) It is proposed that government eliminate the smoke by simple prohibition. This is rejected (implication 1).
(4) It is proposed that government eliminate the smoke by the combination of a prohibition and a tax on former victims sufficient to make this a gain for the chimney owners. This is accepted (implication 2).

This is a happy story. We reject an efficiency-undecidable reform at step (3), and simultaneously honor the chimney owner's right of consent in the alteration of government policy. Notice that we do *not* honor the victims' right of consent in the retention of status quo policy, but put this aside (momentarily) as inconsequential. Better yet, we are able to achieve an efficiency improvement by combining two (efficiency undecidable) changes in a single package of reform which is accepted by everyone. In step (4), that is, we have made an efficiency improvement. And we have done so without violating anyone's right of consent. This move would be analogous to a decision in Figure 4, say D_{12}, where A is a smoke victim and B is a chimney owner. But what if we had rejected the reform package at (4)? This would suggest that the package was not an efficiency improvement, perhaps because the tax-bribe was insufficient compensation to the chimney owners. Again, all is well and good for the optimistic history: we have here one of its constituent elements.

Notice that this telling might founder on any of several difficulties noted already. First, the reform

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parties damaged by the changes introduced by the removal of the externalities." This is an unconventional use of "externality." But, as will be seen momentarily, it is also incorrect analytically.

might never be proposed for the lack of a sufficient search, especially if the victims of the smoke lacked the confidence or skill to seek it out and communicate the result to the owners. Second, it might be rejected not for its inefficiency, but out of strategic misrepresentation. The chimney owners, for example, might calculate thus: (1) the tax-bribe offered is acceptable to the smoke victims, so (2) they must therefore enjoy a margin of improved welfare from its adoption; but (3) why not obtain some of this margin for ourselves by demanding a higher level of compensation? The result might be the rejection of an efficiency improvement. Third, the story offers no hint of fairness. Fourth, we have no assurance that a rejected alternative might not constitute an efficiency-undecidable gain of aggregate utility. This would be an especially tempting hunch if there were far more victims than chimney owners. Finally, it might happen that the victims simply did not have the assets required to offer sufficient compensation. For all these reasons, we have no right to propose the story as an historical probability or to take unambiguous satisfaction in its occurrence.

IIIF. Drift and the Detachment of Incremental from Aggregate Efficiency

But all of these difficulties are less serious than the ones which arise from the effort to extend the analysis *backward* in time.[79] The telling we have so far given *begins* with the existence of an external diseconomy. But suppose we supply step (O) as follows:

> O. Government policy permits industrial siting in the neighborhood, and then the owners site their chimney so that the smoke begins to fall on the neighborhood.

This suggests two relevant inferences. First, government policy is a *partial* constraint on action: government decisions only partially determine social states. From this a second point follows: it is possible for people to suffer welfare losses *within* a given status quo policy. Let us define the "private sector" rather unconventionally as the sum total of action within any fixed government policy. Then we may divide the class of all possible private sectors in two: (1) uniformly efficient private sectors, and (2) sometimes inefficient private sectors. The former will *never* impose welfare losses, and corresponds to a "market society" without external diseconomies (like the smoke in our example). The latter corresponds to society as we know it. I will discuss this more generally below, but let us apply it to the smokestack immediately.

Consider x_1 to be a permissive government policy. Perhaps the permission is tacit, *nullum crimen*, because nobody has anticipated the social cost of chimneys. In the initial position, we map $\bar{x}_1$ onto the welfare surface of A and B as we have it in Figure 4. Then the chimney's prospective owners, acting within $\bar{x}_1$, site their factory and it begins to belch smoke. They have, we assume, gained from this enterprise. If B is an owner, this is reflected as an eastward shift in the space defined by Figure 4. But, again within $\bar{x}_1$, some local residents have lost utility. If A is one of these victims, this is accounted as a southerly shift in Figure 4. The result is a *drift in the utility of the status quo policy*. The drift, which is itself efficiency undecidable, is traced by the stasis outcome, D_{11}. It is *a change in social welfare without a change in government policy*. On this new telling, the story begins not at $\bar{x}_1$ but at $\bar{x}_1'$ in Figure 4. This detail destroys the optimistic history.

The consensus-efficiency hypothesis is split by this. In Figure 4, we begin at $\bar{x}_1$ (no smoke, no prohibition). Overall or *aggregate* efficiency, therefor, is defined with respect to the shaded set of outcomes bounded by $A-\bar{x}_1-C-A$. Only by achieving outcomes in this set, and avoiding outcomes elsewhere, can we claim aggregate conformity to the efficiency principle. And, only by this result can we give substance to the notion of consent—protecting citizens from coercive losses of welfare. But efficiency also has a marginal or *incremental* interpretation. We find ourselves at $\bar{x}_1'$, and efficient increments from here are bounded by the line $B-\bar{x}_1'D-B$, so that precisely the confirmation of implications (i) and (ii) for (incremental) governmental action detaches the effect of action from the prospect of aggregate efficiency.

This analysis forces us to revise our earlier claims. First, what does it mean that consensual decision rejects efficiency undecidable changes as per implication (i)? Suppose, in our chimney story, that a proposal is rejected. Perhaps the rejected decision is an order to close the chimney along with compensation which the owners judge inadequate. By hypothesis, this must be something other than an efficiency improvement in incremental terms. In Figure 4, it therefore lies outside $B-\bar{x}_1'-D$. There are two normatively relevant locations for the rejected proposal in the remaining space. Like x_2, it may be an efficient change in neither the incremental nor the aggregate sense. Its rejection is therefore appropriate. But, it may also resemble x_2': conforming to aggregate but not incremental efficiency. In this case, its rejection will violate implication (ii): failing, that is, to adopt an efficiency improve-

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[79] See Barry, p. 256 ff, in connection with this and succeeding criticisms of Buchanan and Tullock.


A
B
C
D
E
x_2
x_2'
x_3
$\bar{x}_1$
D_{11}
x_3'
x_1'
Utility of Person A (Victim)
Utility of Person B (Owner)
4a
A
x_3
C
B
D_{11}
x_3'
D
Utility of Person A (Victim)
Utility of Person B (Owner)
4b

Figure 4. The Difference between Aggregate and Incremental Efficiency

ment (in the aggregate). The troublesome set of rejected alternatives (like x_2') have the following property: they assure both A and B their pre-drift utility levels, but fail to assure B his post-drift utility level. The set is bounded by $A-\bar{x}_1-E-B$ in Figure 4a. Consensual decision permits B to veto these policy changes, and therefore *denies us the inference that any aggregate improvement of efficiency will be selected.* In other words, *implication (ii) holds in the increment but not the aggregate for a society whose private sector permits efficiency-undecidable drift.*

But consider the converse case. According to implication (ii) consensus will lead to the adoption of any alternative which is an efficiency improvement. We re-examine this inference from the view of aggregate efficiency. Suppose an outcome is adopted. Perhaps a sufficient bribe for the chimney's closure. By hypothesis, this outcome is incrementally efficient, and thus lies within $B-\bar{x}_1'-D$ in Figure 4a. There are again two relevant possibilities. Like x_3, the new outcome may be an aggregate improvement. This is good. But, like x_3', it may be efficiency-undecidable in the aggregate. This will be so if B equals or surpasses his post-drift utility level but A fails to reach his pre-drift level. The embarrassing set of outcomes with this property is bounded by $E-\bar{x}_1'D-C$ in Figure 4a. Consensual decision withholds from A the authority to impose his initial level of utility, and therefore *denies us the inference that adopted consensual decisions will be efficient in the aggregate. Implication (ii) is therefore false in the aggregate for societies whose private sectors permit efficiency-undecidable drift.*

The chimney case is in fact even more distressing than this analysis indicates. If there is to be any hope of aggregate efficiency within incremental consensus, then there must be a non-empty set of outcomes which are improvements over both $\bar{x}_1'$ and $\bar{x}_1$. The test for membership in that set: an outcome must exceed each person's utility threshold both before *and* after drift occurs. The critical edge of this is in our case: A must reach his pre-drift level without B going below his post-drift level. The set of such points would be $B-E-C$ in Figure 4a. Consider the common solution:[80] A and his fellow victims pay B and his fellow owners a sufficient bribe. If this is offered, it must exceed A's post-drift level of utility, but will it also exceed his pre-drift level? Surely not, for he loses something he values (his share of the bribe), but gains only what he had in the first place (clean air). Only if he derives the side-payment from some effect of the chimney's operation —a job in the factory?—does it seem so much as possible that aggregate efficiency will be achieved. Indeed, if such a byproduct is ruled out, there seems every reason to think Figure 4b is appropriate: the drift is sufficient to collapse the set of incrementally and aggregately efficient points: $B-E-C$ has evaporated. If this is so, we are forced to the still more pessimistic conclusion that *the consensual outcome cannot possibly be an aggregate improvement of efficiency.* In Figure 4a, x_3 will be rejected against $\bar{x}_1'$, and this stasis outcome, $D_{1'1'}$, is not efficient in aggregate. But x_3'

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[80] See note 79.

will be adopted. The latter, efficient in the increment, is not efficient in the aggregate. Since this depends on special features of the example chosen, we will not claim any generality for it. We do, however, note it as a prospect, and insist that it denies any guarantee that successive movements will return the outcome to aggregate efficiency.

If we commit the (remissable) sin of interpersonal comparison, a further difficulty emerges. Suppose *A* initiates a change within the status quo which gains him a little, say 1 International Utile. The social cost may be very great, perhaps 5 International Utiles from each of a thousand persons. If this is so, and an appropriate medium of exchange happens to exist, it may become evident that no change can return us to aggregate efficiency even if we are willing to expropriate assets corresponding to *A*'s full gain of 1 utile. There is nothing in the doctrine of consensual decision to refute this conjecture. Except, of course, the denial of interpersonal comparison. But this leads to more serious difficulty still. Suppose only one person is damaged by the drift in question. The chimney's shadow ruins a rose garden. Without interpersonal comparison, we cannot claim that $n-1$ gains—it is perhaps a People's Chimney—will balance out this single loss. Surely, this is not a satisfying response to the difficulties we have been exploring.

It may be argued that we have missed our own point. We began with the hypothesis that efficiency maxima will be achieved consensually, but we have discussed only transitions from one submaximal point to another. Granting that consensus will not assure aggregate efficiency in such transitions, it may be argued that maxima will nevertheless be achieved. Indeed it is easily possible to reach an efficient equilibrium by a decision which violates implication (i) by imposing an efficiency-undecidable change that turns out to reach a maximum. (See Fig. 5.)

This may of course happen, but then consensual decision holds no special distinction: majority-rule,[81] dictatorship, or perhaps the Oracle of Delphi might also accomplish the same result. Indeed drift itself might press the community to an efficient maximum. These possibilities suggest that the maximum criterion by itself implies neither consensual decision nor any fixed right of consent in policy. But consensual decision still holds two distinctions. First, *if* it follows implications (1) and (2) in aggregate, then consensus offers us a "safe" line of travel toward maxima. This is the idea of our optimistic history in Figure 3. Second, ask yourself how we are to *know* that a maximum has been achieved. Assuming that the number of possible states is very large or infinite, we will not be able to identify efficiency maxima by any casual inspection. Nor can we use the shortcut assumptions of economics since we lack goods of the kind they consider. Under the complex conditions of government decision, the fact that an outcome is a maximum will emerge as an *inference from experience*. Even *with* drift, stasis consensus offers the appropriate laboratory: if protracted search produces no acceptable change, we are entitled to the practical hunch that a maximum has already been achieved. Of course we will not *stay* at a maximum merely because we fail to change policy, which renders this slight comfort.



Figure 5. Reaching an Efficiency Maximum by an Efficiency-Undecidable Change

IIIG. Buchanan and Tullock on the Elimination of External Cost

Let us pause to formulate this in the "external cost" language proposed by Buchanan and Tullock. An external cost is what ". . . the individual expects to endure as a result of the actions of others over which he has no direct control."[82] Like Locke—and Calhoun and Wolff and Wicksell—these authors are thinking mainly about the threat posed by *public* power over the individual: the cost of action through government. They do not say so, but it is otherwise impossible to comprehend their most fundamental conclusion: "Only the unanimity rule will insure that all external effects will be eliminated by collectivization."[83] Or, " . . . only if the consent of all members of the group is required will he be free of all expectations of external costs."[84] This is the punch behind the general claim with which we began—consensus as a means of utilitarian efficiency.[85]

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[81] Buchanan and Tullock, p. 186 recognize this prospect where side-payments are available.

[82] Buchanan and Tullock, p. 45.

The claim that consensus eliminates external cost is equivalent to claiming that implication (1) is fulfilled: only efficient changes occur.[86] (This is because other changes will damage some people and therefore exact external costs.) With some qualification, we have accepted this as a property of consensual decision in the increment. But, critically, we have shown it not to hold in the aggregate, unless the private sector is "perfect." If we confine our attention to the former case, what Buchanan and Tullock say is correct. If we consider the latter, what they say is not correct. In this latter instance, we are compelled to consider *two* forms of external cost, two classes of harmful acts over which we lack direct control. First, changes of government policy may be carried over our objection. This is eliminated by consensus. Second, private or civil actions, consistent with existing government policy, may damage our interests. If we cannot control these by governmental initiative, surely they are relevant external costs. Precisely because it rules out the first sort of cost, consensus permits those who benefit from these actions and the resulting "drift" to veto our efforts at government intervention.

It follows immediately that Buchanan and Tullock err when they offer the conclusion that unanimity excludes external costs—even if decision-making costs are ignored. Yet it may be claimed that the private sector *is* perfect, permitting no efficiency-undecidable drift. But in this case, the same authors would have urged that the activity in question not be subject to governmental decision.[87] They propose that government consider only imperfect portions of the private sector, but these are exactly the sectors in which the relevant difficulty occurs. Moreover, as Olson has suggested this seems to imply the optimality of an anarchic solution similar to Calhoun's.[88] But this is a slight exaggeration. At what point would a man expecting to eliminate future external costs agree to the sort of consensual government decision we have been discussing? At the point when he believed that existing government policy, with no further change, would eliminate all external effects occasioned by the private conduct of others; when, in other words, a code corresponding to a perfect private sector was in hand.

IIIH. Perfection of Private Sector as a Condition of Consensual Efficiency

A perfect private sector—a society in which no harm was done to others except by action of government—is historically implausible. I cannot explore the point fully here, but three observations seem at once obvious and important. First, let us suppose I claim that some present public code brooks no imperfection. How are we to test my hypothesis? Presumably by waiting for someone to claim that his welfare has been diminished under existing policy. Apart from the sheer statistical brittleness of the hypothesis,[89] and allowing that the status quo would include a court system capable of absorbing small and middle-sized exceptions,[90] we still confront an appalling epistemological dilemma: How are we to judge the accuracy of any claims which do arise? Suppose Smith is the claimant: Am I to be the judge? Or are we to poll the society? Or is Smith alone to judge? If we choose any but the last alternative, we confront the prospect of disagreement, perhaps a Smith-Rae debate. How is this to be settled? I know no way which is consistent with consensual decision, and that seems the appropriate criterion unless our activity is an idle one. If our hypothesis is politically relevant—its violation having some relevance to policy—we should resolve it consensually. But if the alternatives become "Smith is right" or "Rae is right," then one disputant must prevail over the other, probably Smith over Rae, yet this is hardly consensual.

Second, unless the citizenry is dull as dirt or the makers of the public code utterly clairvoyant, it seems to me very nearly certain that innovation will occur, creating relations not proscribed by present policy, which are nonetheless misfortunes for some groups and individuals. The Pigouvian chimney is an example, but an easy one readily faced down by the simplest of zoning ordinances. Here are some general categories which illustrate the point.[91]

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[83] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[84] *Ibid.*

[85] Above, Section IC, or Buchanan and Tullock, p. 285.

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 43–62.

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Principle of 'Fiscal Equivalence': the Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," *The American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceedings, 59 (May, 1969), 479–87, the point in question is at p. 480.

[89] If the probability of an exception is some small number, p, and there are n citizens with independent chances of being harmed, I should expect the hypothesis to stand in only one out of $(1 - p)^n$ trials. With p greater than, say, .01, and n greater than 1,000, this comes to practically nothing. And regardless what non-zero value p takes, the relevant function approaches zero as n increases toward infinity.

[90] But such a system of courts would be odd: judges could not make law, and could not therefore cope with ambiguity. This suggests, however, either that the courts would be virtually inert or that the law would be very different from any law we presently know. It would be utterly mechanical and lack "open texture" of the sort H. L. A. Hart describes so interestingly in *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).

(1) Changes in the technology of productive activity imposing material diseconomics on others, including the marginalization of workers.
(2) Pecuniary diseconomies resulting from market transactions, such as wage inflation or the price fluctuation of goods under changing demand by third parties.
(3) Declines of welfare resulting from static codes of behavior in the face of generational change in values.
(4) Declines of welfare arising from static policy and changes in the size or distribution of population.
(5) Declines of welfare resulting from changing patterns of personal decision with complementarity between individual behaviors.
(6) Historical change in the material environment brought about by the cumulative effect of past and present human behavior.

All these patterns will occasion "drift" of the sort analyzed in IIIF unless they are fully anticipated by government policy. This is simply implausible as a long-term proposition. And once the drift occurs, we have seen that stasis consensual decision will not necessarily protect us by achieving aggregate efficiency.

Finally, the analysis given here is unfair to the doctrine of consensus. The critique of its claim to efficiency does not, strictly speaking, apply to consensual decision *itself.* It applies rather to the combination of consensual decision in government policy and the lack of consensual decision for behavior within government policy. If *everything* were decided consensually, then incremental and aggregate efficiency would coincide, and would be at least approximated by consensual decision. Drift would not occur, for each action would require unanimous consent. The private sector would be perfectly efficient precisely because it would be empty: everything would be a governmental policy. This is wildly implausible sociologically, and utterly unattractive to the liberal conscience. It is the odd suggestion that consensual decision will achieve its stated relation to utilitarian efficiency precisely as the government's agenda becomes total.[92]

III–I. Free Exit and the Failure of the Market Analogy

A main conclusion: *Consensual decision will cash its guarantee—assure utilitarian efficiency—precisely where politics itself seems unnecessary—i.e., in a perfect private sector.* This last, however improbable, would make politics a risky luxury: If no harm can befall me under static policy, yet losses can be inflicted by governmental action, why should I not choose to end political history?

But what has become of the "market analogy?" I am afraid the answer is that the relation between market transactions and governmental choices of policy will not bear so strong an assertion of similarity. The distinguishing property of free exchange is ease of escape: a well-functioning market permits each trader to *exit* any relationship he finds odious. Suppose it didn't: I could buy salt only from you. You could of course use your veto over the exchange outcome to exact a blackmail price from me, because of the market's consensual structure—because, that is, I have no right of consent in the status quo. The voluntary quality of the market arises from the freedom of exit and the ready availability of substitute partners.[93] But government is another matter: one can typically escape governments only at a high price, measured in material and psychic dislocation. If the government chooses to sell me salt at monopoly prices—some have—my line of escape is clogged, and the right of consent in a *change* of policy far from helpful. "Drift" of the kind discussed above can be escaped cheaply by traders, but not by citizens. And it is at just this point that the market analogy fails.

With it goes the marriage of consent and utility in consensual efficiency. It is no comfort that increments of governmental change honor this union if aggregates of social change abuse it. And this last must be expected in a world which needs politics and in that way resembles our own experience. I turn now to a finishing conjecture.

IV. One Implication

I will withstand the (very slight) temptation to repeat the essay's main points, and finish instead a single line of conjecture which leads to an odd conclusion. We began with consent as a response against autocracy. The critical transition from consent in regimes to consent in their policies, presents an historical embarrassment, and the doctrine of consensual decision speaks in answer to it. The doctrine has grown subtler, but retains the mark of its birth: a single-minded attention to *public* power and a corresponding inattention to its alternatives. If it were possible to put these aside by granting an unconditional right of consent to everyone, then the doctrine of consensual decision would be an appropriate ideal for government decision. It is not possible to do so. I do not mean to raise the sociological difficulties occasioned by entrenched elites, or the division of labor in politics, or the mere costs of talk and newsprint. If the obstacles to unconditional consensus were of this order, it would provide an intelligent guide to reform—an optimum to be approximated in the face of difficulty. The objection is a deeper one which arises from the inner structure of decision making itself: choices must have outcomes, and the structures by which they are made must contain points of vulnerability so that these may be achieved. These in turn deny a universal right of consent, no matter what configuration society takes. If this is so, then any unconditional ideal of consensual decision must present an *inherently* unreachable structure which cannot be approximated by actual institutions.

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[91] The relevant literature is stupendous. Two at once entertaining and informative analyses are offered by William F. Baxter, "A Parable," *Stanford Law Review,* 23 (May, 1971), 973–77, and Thomas Schelling, "Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving," Kennedy School Discussion Paper No. 9, 1972. Schelling's famous paper, "On the Ecology of Micromotives," *Public Interest,* 25 (Fall, 1971), 61–98, is also worth consulting, along with Barry p. 256ff.

[92] The nearest historical approximation seems to occur within certain small utopian communities such as the Hutterite colonies of Western Canada. Cf. Victor Peters, *All Things Common* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965).

[93] See Albert Hirschmann, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

Whatever practical ideal of consensual decision is available must therefore be conditional: must leave open a nonconsensual path to some outcomes. In the theories considered by this essay, the line of escape leads to private as opposed to public forms of power. With Calhoun's anarchic consensus, we are vulnerable—without a right of consent—to the nullification of positive government policy. The *laissez-faire* proposal of Wicksell leaves us vulnerable to the bare market outcome. The stasis consensual system of Buchanan and Tullock leaves us vulnerable to action within the status quo. I personally believe these proposals should be rejected because their points of vulnerability are more than a little unattractive under the historical circumstances of 20th-century society. Others may of course disagree, but I hope at least that the analysis clarifies the central question. If we are to decide by an approximation of consensus for some outcomes, we must surrender that right for other outcomes: What should they be?

There is, in fact, exactly one structure of decision which escapes this choice. Such a structure would grant somebody an unconditional right of consent in *every* outcome for every issue. This cannot be a scheme which grants more than one person a right of consent in some incomplete class of outcomes—like the structures examined here. It likewise cannot be a nonconsensual structure like majority-rule democracy. Given the criterion of robustness, it can brook no disagreement within the consenting class. A moment's reflection suggests that the only such structure for the formation of policy in society is pure autocracy.

Comment on Rae's "The Limits of Consensual Decision"

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On the whole, I am very much an admirer of Douglas Rae's article. Indeed, if the editor will not object to my revealing this fact, I was one of the referees who recommended its publication. I do find myself with two objections to it, however, and as I suppose the reader will not be very surprised to learn, these concern its treatment of the general approach to politics which James Buchanan and I put into *The Calculus of Consent.*[1] These objections fall into two general fields: first, the intellectual history of the doctrine of consent, and, second, the methodological importance of Pareto optimality.

With respect to the intellectual history, Rae, I think, may have been misled by the literature. The origins of the doctrine of consent or consensus, which he traces through political scientists from Locke and Calhoun, were actually quite disparate from those of the doctrine of Pareto optimality, which was drawn from economics, and there is no obvious reason to believe that the earlier political writers influenced the economists particularly. Pareto, for example, was an Italian engineer and Wicksell a Swede. Their educations would have put little emphasis on Locke, and I doubt that either had even heard of Calhoun.

The positions they adopted were essentially efforts to deal with technical problems which had arisen in economic analysis in their particular fields. It was only after their positions had been developed that the resemblance between their position and that of certain earlier political philosophers was noticed. Even to this day there is a great difference between the two. I myself, for example, have never read so much as one page of Calhoun and have no desire to do so. Similarly, my knowledge of Locke and John Stuart Mill and even Bentham is largely derived from secondary sources. Buchanan, on the other hand, who is interested in philosophy, has done a good deal of reading in these areas, but I must say even in his case he is totally ignorant of the original text of Calhoun's work.

The fact that there is some resemblance between the two points of view has, however, led to a number of recent writers, who are writing in what I might call the economic tradition, to refer to these political philosophers. In fact, what we have are two totally different streams of intellectual development which happen to lead to somewhat similar ends. I should like to emphasize the "somewhat" in the previous sentence. In my opinion, the resemblance between, shall we say, Locke's views and those of Wicksell is very superficial. The modern Paretian economists are essentially motivated by technical problems in economic analysis and not by the grand considerations of traditional philosophy which motivated Locke and Mill. Certainly they are not prompted by the desire to protect slavery which, in my opinion, was the foundation of Calhoun's political philosophy.[2]

In modern economic thinking, unanimity or the Pareto principle is not thought of as a practical policy but as part of an analytical machine. No one suggests that unanimity be used as a practical means of making decisions and, indeed, there are probably more economists than political scientists who are opposed to requiring unanimity for the jury. This is of some interest because the jury is the only major part of our present institutional system requiring unanimity. Of course, this is not a Pareto optimal decision, since the two parties to the litigation are not permitted to vote.

Economic analysis very commonly proceeds by figuring out what the result would be *if* unanimity were required and there were no transactions costs. The strength of that second requirement—no transactions costs—is immense, and it is very difficult to imagine any real-world situation which meets it. Nevertheless, after this calculation has been made, the adding on of transactions costs turns out to be a convenient approach. It can readily be demonstrated that, leaving distributional matters aside, with zero transactions costs you do reach an optimal system, although there obviously may be many other optimal outcomes.

In the real world, of course, there *are* transactions costs, and so far as I know, every economist is aware of that fact. Indeed, the addition of transactions costs to the analytical apparatus is, in a way, the heart of modern economic reasoning, whether in economics proper or in the new extensions of economics into previously noneconomic fields.

Note, however, that Pareto optimality is as much a restriction on market processes as it is on political processes. Rae's example of the chimney involves the assumptions that we do not require unanimous consent for a "private" decision and that, in the chimney case, with large externalities we do require it for a political decision. Requiring unanimity throughout will not reach the same solution. No one suggests that we require unanimous consent for all private decisions, e.g., that Rae may not acquire an additional cat without my permission; but the reason we do not is simply that the transactions costs would be too high, and hence we shift to a system which saves on transactions costs.[3] In *The Calculus of Consent* we applied the same rule to political activities. Like the economist, we first applied the Paretian apparatus and then considered the effect of the transactions costs on it.

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[1] James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

[2] Defenders of Calhoun will no doubt wish to emphasize that I have never read so much as one page by Calhoun himself.

The argument for this procedure is, I think, strong, but it is widely recognized that income redistribution raises different issues. The problem, of course, is that if I am compensated for having my income reduced, the end result is that my income is not reduced. Thus, compensation is not possible in this case. A certain amount of income redistribution could conceptually achieve unanimous consent. In *The Calculus of Consent* we pointed out that people making decisions on institutions are making decisions for a future which is not certain. Under the circumstances, they may be interested in requiring a certain amount of income redistribution as a way of reducing their own personal risk in this not-perfectly-predictable future. The close resemblance between this pattern of reasoning and Rawls's, of course, is clear.[4] He makes the ignorance of the future complete by way of his "veil of ignorance." While we did discuss complete ignorance of the future and the possibility under these circumstances of getting general agreement to a high degree of redistribution in that future, that ignorance, in the real world of course, would not be complete.

Another motive for income redistribution in a Pareto optimal system is discussed by Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers in their famous article, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution."[5] They point out that people are, to some extent, charitable, and hence would be interested in progressive income redistribution. There are reasons having to do with externalities that suggest that the government should be used for this redistribution. This article set off a spate of further articles on the same point, but also stimulated an examination of yet a third category of possible Pareto-optimal income redistribution by Geoffrey Brennan.[6] Brennan discusses primarily redistribution undertaken for what we might call precautionary motives, i.e., avoidance of revolution, etc.

But it is not obvious that the amount of income redistribution that would be obtained through these Pareto-optimal techniques would be thought by the reader to be ideal. The problem here is to decide what is the proper amount. Once we have determined that, it is very easy to modify the status quo point in such a way that we will always have this ideal income distribution. For example, suppose it were thought that the ideal income distribution were one that provided just half as much inequality as now exists. We could simply enact a world law providing that 50 per cent of all income above $500 be taken by some redistribution agency,[7] and this be used to supplement all incomes below $500 by half of the difference between the income and the $500.[8] Having made the constitutional decision, we could, then, apply Pareto optimality subject to this particular general set of rules. Note, however, that the basic decision would *not* be Pareto optimal.

A great many people, however, feel that the decision-making process should be so designed as to generate an appropriate amount of equality rather than putting the equality in as something before the decision-making process. Presumably, if we knew the correct amount of redistribution and if this amount were greater than one would get under the Pareto-optimal type of system, we could design a constitution which would generate that amount of redistribution. Clearly this would require knowledge we do not have now, but it does not seem an impossible task for future research. However, one cannot justify a particular method of voting—say majority voting—on the grounds that the income redistribution that it generates (which we observe around us) is optimal, if the only evidence that it is optimal is that it is generated from majority voting. Thus, you can argue for majority voting on some other grounds and then point out that it generates a particular amount of income redistribution.[9] On the other hand, it is possible that we might have an idea obtained by some other line of reasoning about what is the optimal amount of redistribution, and then seek out the voting rule which achieves it. Except by coincidence, this would not be majority voting. But we must not engage in circular reasoning. Rae does not, but in several parts of his article I felt that he was on the verge.

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[3] As a matter of fact, the market process is Pareto optimal in those cases in which there are no externalities. In cases in which all externalities are trivial (which is, after all, the common case for market transactions), it is a close approximation of Pareto optimality.

[4] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

[5] Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," *American Economic Review*, 59 (September, 1969), 542–57. The whole discussion of the economics of income redistribution is summarized by Anthony J. Culyer, *The Economics of Social Policy* (New York: Dunellen, 1973).

[6] Geoffrey Brennan, "Pareto Desirable Redistribution: The Non-Altruistic Dimension," *Public Choice*, 14 (Spring, 1973), 43–68.

[7] Calculated on the method suggested in Henry C. Simon, *Personal Income Taxation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), rather than that used by the Internal Revenue Service.

[8] This calculation is very rough and is based on preliminary figures. It might be that the point at which one begins taking 50 per cent under present circumstances would be $600 or even $700. Note that this is in addition to existing taxes.

It will be observed that my criticisms of Rae's article are not really severe. He is unhappy with the present situation in the social sciences in which the conceptual use of unanimity is our only method of obtaining optimality other than simply deciding that we know what is good for other people. I, too, am unhappy about it. *The Calculus of Consent*, although most political scientists may not realize this, actually made a major step away from the unanimity criterion by demonstrating that Pareto optimality at the constitutional level would not entail Pareto optimality at the operational level. Since then, in *The Logic of the Law*,[10] I have attempted another line of reasoning, admittedly very close to Pareto optimality, which I hope may eventually be a step toward a better welfare criterion.

The number of problems raised by Pareto optimality is not an argument for any other particular system. Like Rae, I would like something else. I suspect that I am unlike Rae, however, in believing that the disadvantages of majority voting as a conceptual tool are greater than those of Pareto optimality. I suspect this because, although Rae seems to have intended to defend majority voting against Pareto optimality, at no point in his article does he actually offer any positive argument *for* majority voting. Most (not all) of his criticisms of Pareto optimality are just; but in order to choose the best tool, we must undertake comparative evaluation rather than simply pointing out that one tool has its defects.

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[9] It should be emphasized that the bulk of the income redistribution obtained in modern welfare states is not from the wealthy to the poor, but from certain members of the middle class to other members of the middle class. There is, indeed, some aid to the poor and some money removed from the wealthy, but this is a relatively modest phenomenon in most modern democracies. See Gordon Tullock, "The Charity of the Uncharitable," *Western Economic Journal*, 9 (December, 1971), 379–92.

[10] Gordon Tullock, *The Logic of the Law* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Gordon Tullock

DOUGLAS RAE
Yale University

Alas, Professor Tullock's remarkable temperance and generosity leave no room for a quarrel. But it may be worthwhile to comment on three aspects of his piece:

First, the connection between the early constitutionalists (say, Locke) and the Paretian economists (say, Wicksell or yourself). If Professor Tullock wants to say that the former exert no (direct, literal) influence upon the latter we are nearly agreed. But my concerns are more complicated. I want to show—apart from important indirect patterns of influence and tradition—that fundamental structural problems persist from one era (say 1688) to another (say 1789, or 1975). It is not so interesting to see that earlier workers influence later ones; but it is fascinating to see that their *tasks* retain their shape. By this, I do not mean anything literal enough to collide with Tullock's view that "the modern Paretian economists are essentially motivated by technical problems in economic analysis and not by the grand considerations of traditional philosophy which prompted Locke and Mill." I want, really, to say that there is a structural level at which technical problems of contemporary economics *are* the problems of liberal constitutionalism. The Pareto principle is not on the surface much like Locke's doctrine of consent or Bentham's principle of the greatest good. But beneath words lies the structural fact that Paretian economics amalgamates both of these earlier arguments in confronting problems of the same size and shape as those faced by Locke and Bentham. It hardly needs saying that Paretian economics can be technical or scientific without for a moment ceasing to be political.

Professor Tullock generously acknowledges that some of the criticisms offered against *The Calculus*—and other Paretian works—do in fact stick. He does, however, indulge the temptation to say that "it can readily be demonstrated that, leaving distributional matters aside, with zero transactions costs you do reach an optimal system, although there may be many other optimal outcomes, of course." This leaves three loopholes: (i) what counts as distribution, (ii) what counts as transaction, and (iii) at which level "optimal system" is to be defined. If (i) and (ii) are defined to include *whatever* might get in the way of (iii) you are on safe ground. I doubt, however, that either of us would want to embrace this tautology, and I remain convinced that the critique of *Calculus* . . . is mostly right.

Finally, Professor Tullock and I now agree that the Pareto principle won't do as a general rule of constitutional design. We need only to agree on what should take its place.

Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption*

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Social security is one of the most important means by which modern nations protect the welfare of their citizens. Through programs that deal with the hardships of workers' injury, illness, old age, unemployment, and low income, social security attempts to set a minimum standard of living for the sectors of society covered by the programs. In countries with fully developed programs, social security now protects nearly all members of society.

Given the importance of social security, it is hardly surprising that scholars have shown considerable interest in analyzing its evolution. Among the many aspects of social security development, the timing of the first adoption of social security merits particular attention. The circumstances of the first appearance of any policy are inherently interesting, and the first appearance of social security is particularly important because it has represented in many nations a major break with the antiwelfare doctrine of traditional liberalism.

The timing of first adoption has received considerable attention in comparative research on social security.[1] However, this research has generally used the timing of adoption to explain other aspects of the social security experience of nations, and not as an outcome that is itself to be explained.[2] The present research is concerned with explaining the timing of the first adoption of social security among the 59 countries which had formal political autonomy with regard to domestic policy at the time of first adoption (see Appendix).

The analysis focuses on two of the most important explanations of social security development: the prerequisites explanation,[3] which emphasizes causes of social security development *within* nations, most commonly the level of social and economic modernization; and diffusion, which focuses on the imitation of social security programs *among* nations. These alternative theoretical approaches have received very unequal attention in political research. The prerequisites approach has been widely used, particularly in the area of comparative politics.[4] By contrast,

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[1] See Margaret Gordon, *The Economics of Welfare Policies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (March, 1965), 537–550; Phillips Cutright, "Income Redistribution: A Cross-National Analysis," *Social Forces*, 46 (December, 1967), 180–190; Henry Aaron, "Social Security: International Comparisons," in Otto Eckstein, ed., *Studies in the Economics of Income Maintenance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967); Frederick Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (Homewood, Ill.: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968); and Koji Taira and Peter Kilby, "Differences in Social Security Development in Selected Countries," *International Social Security Review*, 22 (1969), 139–153.

[2] In quantitative research, the only exception of which we are aware is a two and a half page analysis in Appendix E-12 in Pryor, *Public Expenditures*. Historical studies such as Gaston V. Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971) have also attempted to explain timing of adoption.

[3] This expression is used loosely here to refer to what Marion Levy has labeled functional and structural prerequisites. In using the expression prerequisites, we are following his distinction between the *prerequisites* for the appearance of a given phenomenon and the *requisites* for its continued existence. See Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 62–63 and 71–72.

[4] Examples of cross-national studies that examine various forms of the prerequisites and requisites hypotheses (see footnote 3) with regard to democratic political outcomes are S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (March, 1959), 69–105; James S. Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960)

diffusion explanations have received only occasional attention in political analysis, though they have been widely used in other areas of research.[5]

The present study is based on the belief that it is extremely important to bring these alternative explanations together in comparative political analysis. It is important not only on substantive grounds—because they are both plausible explanations of many aspects of political life—but also on methodological grounds. This is due to Galton's problem, the problem that the findings based on the analysis of causal relations within nations (or other units of analysis) may be distorted by the effect of diffusion.[6] This occurs when the joint diffusion of two or more societal characteristics produces high correlations between them which lead researchers to infer incorrectly that they are causally related. Incorporating hypotheses about diffusion into the analysis in effect turns this problem into an opportunity to consider a type of explanation that has previously received limited attention in political research. We recognize that it may be impossible to test definitively the relative importance of causation within units of analysis, as opposed to diffusion.[7] The present research has the more modest goal of attempting through a combination of simple tests and the presentation of qualitative evidence to reach tentative conclusions about the relative importance of diffusion as opposed to prerequisites explanations.

It is also hoped that this research will add to the variety of types of diffusion that are considered in diffusion analysis. Some writers have argued that the diffusion approach to the study of modernization has placed excessive emphasis on the spread of innovations from advanced centers to back-

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pp. 532–576; Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in *Development of the Emerging Countries,* ed. Robert E. Asher et al. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962) pp. 1–38; Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review,* 28 (April, 1963), 253–264; Dick Simpson, "The Congruence of Political, Social, and Economic Aspects of Development," *International Development Review,* 6 (June, 1964), 21–25; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inference in Political Analysis," in Joseph Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II.* Arnold Foundation Monographs, XVI (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966) pp. 7–37; Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (December, 1967), 1002–1009; Marvin E. Olsen, "Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development," *American Sociological Review,* 33 (October, 1968), 699–712; Phillips Cutright and James A. Wiley, "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927–1966," *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 5 (1969–1970). For studies in this tradition using political participation as a dependent variable, see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958); Hayward Alker, "Causal Inference in Political Analysis"; Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (March, 1967), 72–79.

[5] References to the idea of diffusion may be found in much political research (see, for example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 2, but the number of studies that have presented explicit tests for diffusion is limited. These have included Stewart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1928); Robert L. Crain, "Fluoridation: The Diffusion of an Innovation Among Cities," *Social Forces,* 44 (June, 1966), 467–476; Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics,* 20 (October, 1967), 102–3; Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," *The American Political Science Review,* 63 (September, 1969), 880–899; Manus Midlarsky, "Mathematical Models of Instability and a Theory of Diffusion," *International Studies Quarterly,* 14 (November, 1970), 60–84. For a discussion of systematic attempts to examine the role of diffusion in social security adoption, see the discussion later in this article. The literature on diffusion outside of political science is usefully summarized by Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, *Communication of Innovations,* 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1971) and John C. Hudson, *Geographical Diffusion Theory* (Evanston, Ill.. Northwestern University, Department of Geography, 1972).

[6] See Raoul Naroll, "Galton's Problem: The Logic of Cross-Cultural Research," *Social Research,* 32 (Winter, 1965), 428–451; Brian J. L. Berry, "Some Methodological Consequences of Using the Nation as a Unit of Analysis in Comparative Politics," paper prepared for the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, 1970; John V. Gillespie, "Galton's Problem and Parameter Estimation Error in Comparative Political Analysis," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1970; and Richard E. Hildreth and Raoul Naroll, "Galton's Problem in Cross-National Studies," paper prepared for the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, 1970.

[7] Berry has made this point with particular reference to spatial diffusion. He has argued that whereas "in time series a natural distinction exists between past and future, no such property characterizes spatial series. Dependence will extend in a variety of directions, and often on vectors at angles to the Cartesian grid, leading to elaborate cross-product locational terms. . . . [M]ost of the functions introduced by statisticians into the field of spatial processes have been introduced simply because the mathematics exists, as extensions of time-series analysis, without thought for their usefulness or interpretability. And even more significant, all of the existing models rely on an assumption of stationarity, i.e., that the relation between values of the processes is the same for every pair of points whose relative positions are the same. This is patently invalid." See Brian J. L. Berry, "Problems of Data Organization and Analytical Methods in Geography," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 36 (September, 1971), 521.

ward peripheral areas.[8] One of the subpatterns of diffusion which is examined in the present research—diffusion from a somewhat less advanced country to progressively more advanced countries—represents an entirely different pattern through which an innovation can spread. The presentation of this finding may suggest to other researchers opportunities for analyzing less conventional patterns of diffusion.

In focusing on the timing of social security adoption, this research also addresses the issue of the timing and sequence of different aspects of modernization. Several writers have recently attempted to measure the timing of certain aspects of modernization,[9] and a number of authors have explored hypotheses regarding the sequence in which different aspects of modernization occur.[10] The present research demonstrates that there are systematic variations in the sequence of social security adoption in relation to other aspects of modernization. The most important overall relationship is the tendency for later adopters to adopt at far lower levels of social and economic modernization. It is argued that this tendency is in part an aspect of the more general tendency toward a larger role of the state in later developing countries, and that it is also due to certain special characteristics of social security as a public policy.

The Development of Social Security

Social security is generally considered to consist of five distinct programs which provide cash payments to individuals to replace income lost as a result of injury related to employment, sickness and maternity, old age, and unemployment, and to supplement income for families with children, usually, though not always, on the basis of need. In many countries, medical services are provided directly by the state in place of the system of cash reimbursements for medical expenses. Social security differs from the many types of private insurance arrangements, according to standard definitions, in that it is initiated by the state, although it may not be administered or financed entirely by the state.[11] Following the example of most comparative analyses of social security, this research does not consider insurance programs maintained by the state for its own employees.

Although social security first appeared in Europe at the end of the last century, its origins must be seen within the context of growing state intervention in private mutual aid societies in the nineteenth century.[12] Mutual aid societies are known to have existed as early as ancient Grecian times and have been present in Western Europe from the Middle Ages and down to the present day.[13] They have ranged greatly in size and scope: some have consisted of groups of neighbors who set aside a small sum each week to cover funeral expenses,[14] while others have counted their membership in the thousands and provided not only burial expenses, but sickness and accident insurance as well.

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[8] See Susanne J. Bodenheimer, *The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies*. Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, Vol. 2 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 22ff and A. Eugene Havens, "Methodological Issues in the Study of Development," paper prepared for delivery at the Third World Congress of Rural Sociology, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, August, 1972.

[9] See W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 38, and *Politics and the Stages of Growth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 55; C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York. Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 90ff; Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 78–80; Steven L. Barsby, "Economic Backwardness and the Characteristics of Development," *Journal of Economic History*, 29 (September, 1969), 449–473; Fernando H. Cardoso and Jose Luis Reyna, "Industrialization, Occupational Structure, and Social Stratification in Latin America" in *Constructive Change in Latin America*, ed. Cole Blasier (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), pp. 25–26; and David Collier, "Timing of Economic Growth and Regime Characteristics in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, 7 (April, 1975), 331–360.

[10] See, for instance, Eric A. Nordlinder, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics*, 20, No. 3 (April, 1968), 494–520; Peter Heintz, *Ein Soziologisches Paradigma der Entwicklung* (Stuttgart. Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1969); Richard A. Pride, *Origins of Democracy: A Cross-National Study of Mobilization, Party Systems and Democratic Stability*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics Vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1970); Sidney Verba, "Sequences and Development," in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, ed. Leonard Binder et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 283–316; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); William Flanigan and Edwin Fogleman, "Patterns of Political Development and Democratization: A Quantitative Analysis," in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis*, ed. John V. Gillespie (Beverly Hills, Cal.; Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 441–473 and "Patterns of Democratic Development: An Historical Comparative Analysis," in Gillespie and Nesvold, pp. 475–497.

[11] This is a paraphrase of the definition found in U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, *Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. ix.

[12] For a detailed discussion of the early development of social security, see Vladmir Rys, "The Sociology of Social Security," *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association*, 17, No. 1 (January-February, 1964), 3–34; and Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy and Industrialization.*

[13] Rys, "The Sociology of Social Security," p. 6.

[14] J. M. Baernreither, *English Associations of Working Men* (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1889, republished in 1966 by Gale Research Company, Detroit), p. 165.

As the size of the industrial labor force began to grow in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, these societies grew as well, both in size and number. This proliferation brought an increasing number of cases in which, because of mismanagement or fraud, societies went bankrupt and the contributors lost their equity. As bankruptcies continued, government regulation of the funds began to appear. While the type of regulation varied from country to country, it generally included an audit to insure that the funds were actuarially sound. In some cases where regulation was not mandatory, incentives such as free postage or tax exemptions were given to those funds which accepted it.[15] In other cases, state intervention went even further in relation to certain dangerous occupations, such as mining. For instance, an 1854 law in Prussia made membership in mutual aid funds compulsory for all workers in mines, quarries, and salt works.[16]

According to the definition cited above, which identifies social security programs as insurance schemes that are *initiated*, and not merely regulated or required, by public law, social security first appeared in Germany in 1883 with the adoption of a program to cover the costs of sickness and maternity. A work injury program was adopted a year later, and a pension program in 1889.[17] Other programs have been slower in coming, even in Germany. Unemployment insurance was enacted in 1927, and family allowances were established in the German Democratic Republic in 1950 and in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954.

This pattern of gradual development of social security has characterized all aspects of program growth. For instance, it has taken seven decades for work-injury programs—generally the first program to be adopted in each country—to spread to all 59 countries considered in this study. The appearance of other programs within each country and the broadening of the coverage of existing programs has also occurred gradually. Even in the most advanced countries, additions to the scope of coverage and the type of benefits offered continue to occur.[18]

The Timing of Social Security Adoption

The principal variable used in this analysis is the timing of the adoption of the first social security program in each country. The dates for first adoption were taken from *Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1971*.[19] The use of this source follows the precedent set by Aaron, Pryor, and Taira and Kilby, who derived measures of program age solely on the basis of the date of first adoption, and by Cutright, who constructed a measure of cumulative social security experience that is closely related to it.[20]

Because this study focuses on the first adoption of social security, it is appropriate to assess the extent to which the timing of first adoption is closely related to the timing of the emergence of other aspects of social security.[21] The examination of evidence about social security development reveals, not surprisingly, considerable variation in the way that social security first appears in each country. In some cases, initial laws with relatively wide coverage are quickly followed by additional programs in a pattern of rapid social security development. In other cases, a first law of limited coverage may be passed which is not followed by additional legislation for many years.

The data show, however, that the development of social security follows a surprisingly consistent pattern in which the different aspects of development are closely interrelated. For instance, the five different types of programs are adopted in a remarkably consistent order, to such an extent that the pattern of adoption among nations forms a Guttman Scale.[22] The correlations between the date of first adoption and the dates of adoption of the five types of programs are also high. Since the first program is usually work injury, the correlation with that program is nearly perfect, .98. The correlations of first adoption with pensions, sickness and maternity, unemployment, and family allowance are .79, .74, .53, and .22 respectively. The low correlation for the last program may be explained by the qualitatively different issues involved in family allowance programs.[23]

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[15] U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1909. Workmen's Insurance and Compensation Systems in Europe* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 8.

[16] Robert Morse Woodbury, *Social Insurance: An Economic Analysis* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1917), p. 8.

[17] These and other dates are from U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Social Security Programs.*

[18] For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon of gradual growth in Latin America see "Gradual Extension of Social Insurance Schemes in Latin American Countries," *International Labour Review,* 68 (September, 1958), 257–283.

[19] U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). The limitations of this source are discussed in the Appendix.

[20] See Aaron, "Social Security"; Fredrick Pryor, *Public Expenditures;* Taira and Kilby, "Differences in Social Security Development:" and Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs" and "Income Redistribution."

[21] The procedure followed here is that recommended by Przeworski and Teune for confirming the reliability of an indicator. See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 114–115.

[22] Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security," p. 540.

Timing of first adoption is related to other aspects of social security as well. Cutright, Aaron, Pryor, and Taira and Kilby have all found that indicators based on the timing of adoption are strongly correlated with present level of social security spending as a percentage of gross national product, with the earlier adopters having consistently higher levels of spending.[24] Among the countries considered in the present study, the correlation with the percentage of the gross national product devoted to social security in 1960 is −.81.[25] The timing of first adoption is also strongly related to the proportion of the population that is covered by social security. For the two programs for which reasonably complete data are available—work injury and pensions—the correlations are −.77 and −.71, respectively.[26]

Available data thus suggest that first adoption is strongly related to several other important aspects of social security development. This provides a firmer basis for arguing that the timing of first adoption is a valid indicator of the timing of over-all social security development and does not represent just an isolated aspect of it.[27]

Prerequisites Explanations of Social Security Development

The prerequisites approach treats the development of social security as a result of the social and economic transformations associated with the transition from primarily agricultural to industrial economies. Within this perspective, one of the most important hypotheses is that the decline in the proportion of the work force in agriculture increases the need for social security. Pryor argues that "although agricultural workers have considerable welfare needs, they can make certain provisions for such purposes that are nonmonetary in nature and that are unavailable for those who have left the land."[28] Food and shelter are more readily acquired through nonmonetary means in agricultural settings, and it is easier to make nonmonetary provisions for sickness and old age in an agricultural setting in which extended family networks are often of greater importance. There unquestionably exist types of agricultural laborers for whom these nonmonetary means are not available, and the extent of the decay of extended family networks in cities has at times been exaggerated. Nevertheless, there are important differences in the availability of these nonmonetary provisions in rural as opposed to urban areas.[29]

Other writers have focused on the growth of industry as a crucial factor in the development of social security. Cutright argues that the percentage of the work force in industry is an indicator of the vulnerability of the population to drastic changes in income arising from unemployment.[30] Organski also emphasizes the importance of industrialization, both because it provides the opportunities for organization and leadership that make it possible for workers to demand protection, and because it provides the higher productivity that makes social security financially possible.[31]

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[23] See J. Henry Richardson, *Economic and Financial Aspects of Social Security: An International Survey* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 139–155 for a discussion of the issues involved in family allowance programs.

[24] See Cutright, "Income Redistribution;" Aaron, "Social Security"; Pryor, *Public Expenditures;* and Taira and Kilby, "Differences in Social Security Development." It should be noted that whereas these correlations are treated, in the present research as a means of assessing the validity of an indicator these authors have used them to examine causal relations among different aspects of social security experience.

[25] The negative sign of this correlation and the two others reported in the next paragraph results from the fact that timing of adoption is measured by the year of adoption, and hence involves a smaller number for the earlier adopters. The measure of spending is taken from *The Cost of Social Security,* published by the International Labor Organization (Geneva: 1967). This correlation is based on data on 34 countries.

[26] The data on coverage are taken from International Labor Office *The Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1961* (Geneva, 1961). The correlation for work injury is based on 27 cases, and that for pensions on 30 cases.

[27] Probably the most important aspect of social security development—the quality of the benefits offered to those who are covered—is extremely difficult to measure. One might hypothesize that timing of adoption and quality of services are strongly associated, but that as one moves from earlier to later adopters, the lag between the first adoption of programs and the growth in the quality of programs would be greater and greater. Wolf's discussion of the quality of services in Latin America—a region in which the first adoption occurred nearly three decades after the first adoption in Germany—would appear to support this hypothesis. He suggests that dilution of the quality of service, long delays in insurance payments, and wide-spread corruption and bribery are found even in the most advanced countries in Latin America. See Marshall Wolfe, "Social Security and Development: The Latin American Experience," in *The Role of Social Security in Economic Development,* ed. Everett M. Kassalow (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of HEW, Social Security Administration, Research Report No. 27, 1968), pp. 155 and 165.

[28] Pryor, *Public Expenditures,* pp. 134–135.

[29] For a useful discussion of the literature that has overstated the importance of the transition for rural to urban life, see Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration in Latin America: Toward an Empirical Theory," in *Latin American Urban Research, I,* Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood, eds. (Beverly Hills, Cal., Sage Publications, 1971) pp. 95–150. In the present context it is important to note that opportunities for nonmonetary provisions of certain types may be present in cities. See, for instance, William Mangin's "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review,* 2, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 65–98.

[30] Cutright, "Income Redistribution," p. 184.

Pryor's finding that labor union strength is related to the timing of the adoption of social security appears to give support to the first of these hypotheses.[32] The relationship between productivity and social security is more complex, but also appears to support Organski's argument. Measuring productivity as gross national product per capita, Pryor finds that social security spending is related to productivity only if the sample of nations includes the entire range of economic modernization. If only the semi- or fully-developed economies are considered, there is no relationship. A similar finding emerges in Pryor's time-series analysis, and Taira and Kilby actually find a negative relationship among the most advanced countries.[33] Pryor interprets his findings by suggesting that productivity is an underlying, but not an immediate determinant of expenditures.[34] It would appear that increases in productivity at earlier levels of modernization produce more spending, but that variation in productivity makes no difference once it has gotten above a certain level. Since the first adoption of social security generally occurs at the lower levels of modernization, however, it appears that productivity may be a relevant explanation for first adoption.

The argument that the need for old-age pensions increases as economic modernization proceeds is also part of the prerequisites thesis. Pryor notes that the proportion of the population over 65 increases as per capita income rises, thereby increasing the need for pensions.[35] Rimlinger argues with reference to the United States that in addition to a change in the age composition of the population, the difficulty of accommodating older workers in mass production organization also increases the need for pensions as economic development proceeds.[36] Aaron specifically suggests that the aging of the population may be one factor that explains the timing of adoption.[37]

Another important theme in the social security literature—the human capital argument—may also be subsumed under the heading of prerequisites explanations. This is the argument that as the capital equipment used in industry becomes more complex and more expensive, it is important to make a concomitant investment in human capital as well.[38] A recent study has suggested that greater investments in the welfare of workers actually increase productivity only at the middle levels of modernization.[39] Nonetheless, it is widely believed that there is a link between the welfare of workers and productivity, and the human capital argument has often been used by social security advocates because of its obvious appeal to the self-interest of employers.[40]

In examining prerequisites explanations of social security adoption, it is important to assess the kinds of assumptions that this approach requires. It might first be emphasized that it need not require the assumption that all nations will adopt social security at precisely the same level of modernization. A more realistic application of the prerequisites thesis might distinguish between the idea that a particular threshold level of modernization is a necessary, but not a necessary *and* sufficient, condition for adoption. If it is only a necessary condition, one would expect that cases of adoption below a certain threshold of modernization would be rare, but that nations might vary over a considerable range above the threshold in their level of modernization at adoption. If, however, a particular threshold level is both a necessary *and* sufficient condition, adoption should cluster closely around that level.

We must emphasize that the prerequisites thesis does not require a simplified conception of modernization. The departure of workers from agriculture, their entry into industry, increases in productivity, and many other changes that influence the likelihood of social security adoption may occur in a different order, or to differing degrees, in particular countries, and some of them may never occur at all in certain nations. The prerequisites argument does not assume that they necessarily occur together, but rather that to the extent that one or a combination of them does occur, the adoption of social security becomes more likely.

It is, however, an implicit assumption of much comparative research that has dealt with the prerequisites theme that causal relations exist only within nations. This is not because these writers explicitly reject diffusion, but rather because the statistical procedures employed in much of this research require the assumption of independence among units if erroneous conclusions are to be avoided. This difficulty of comparative research—called Galton's problem—has been noted earlier. One means of confronting this problem is to make diffusion explicitly part of the analysis. Analysts of social security can readily deal with this methodological problem by turning to the analysis of diffusion, since the qualitative literature on social security has already devoted considerable attention to diffusion effects.

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[31] A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1965), p. 162.

[32] Pryor, *Public Expenditures,* p. 474.

[33] *Ibid.,* pp. 145–146 and Taira and Kilby, "Differences in Social Security Development," p. 142.

[34] Pryor, p. 146.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 135.

[36] Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy and Industrialization,* p. 209.

[37] Aaron, "Social Security," pp. 32–33.

[38] See Rimlinger, pp. 103–104.

[39] Walter Galenson, "Social Security and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* Vol. 21, No. 4 (July, 1968), 559–569.

[40] Gaston V. Rimlinger, "Welfare Policy and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Perspective," *Journal of Economic History,* 26 (December, 1966), 568.

Diffusion Explanations of Social Security Adoption

The diffusion approach views social security adoption as taking place within an international system of communication and influence. As Rys has pointed out, since " . . . no modern State exists in splendid isolation, independent of the international community that surrounds it, the study of factors which influence the establishment of social insurance in a country will necessarily have to go beyond the frontiers of a national community and be considered also at the international level."[41]

A few examples from the literature on social security may serve to illustrate the types of imitation that occur. One type involves cases in which nations have directly imitated the legislation of other countries. For instance, the Italian insurance system for workers' pensions and sickness established in 1898 is a synthesis of corresponding laws in France and Belgium, and the first programs in Austria were modeled after those in Germany.[42] This latter imitation involved not only the overall form of the program, but technical details as well.[43]

In other cases that do not involve direct imitation, existing programs have had an important influence on new adopters. Lloyd George, who played a considerable role in the adoption of some of the early programs in the United Kingdom, is known to have been greatly influenced by the programs previously adopted in Germany and Belgium.[44] Various groups in the United States commissioned studies of European social security systems with the purpose of appraising the feasibility of social security in the United States. This included a 2,749-page, two-volume study of European systems of workers' insurance and compensation published in 1911 by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor "in response to the very great demand in this country at the present time for information concerning all aspects of this subject."[45] Though it was many years before social security was adopted on the national level in the United States, the European experience had considerable influence on programs adopted at the state level.

International organizations and international agreements concerning reciprocity of benefits also play a role in the diffusion of social security. For instance, as a result of a reciprocal agreement with France, Belgium was forced to revise its entire social security system to bring it up to the French standard.[46] The activities of the Correspondence Committee of the International Labor Organization played a major role after the First World War in spreading the idea of social security from Europe to other parts of the world and supporting the consolidation of the already existing systems.[47] Since that time, the activities of groups such as the International Social Security Association, the Ibero-American Social Security Organization, and the Inter-American Social Security Conference have promoted the standardization of social security legislation.

Although the literature on social security provides considerable evidence that diffusion is present, only limited attention has been given to systematic analyses of patterns of diffusion. Pilcher, Ramirez, and Swihart have studied diffusion effects in the selection of the normal age for retirement under national pension programs, analyzing such factors as the influence of nations on their neighbors, common language, and colonial experience.[48] The strongest relationship appears for common language, with mixed results for the other two factors. Taira and Kilby have shown that geographical location may be important in social security development.[49] They find clear differences between countries in the European Common Market, other European countries, and non-European countries in levels of spending for social security.

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[41] Rys, "The Sociology of Social Security," p. 4.

[42] U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *24th Annual Report*, pp. 1862–1863 and V. Klumpar, "The Investment of Social Insurance Funds," *International Labor Review*, 27 (January, 1933), 53.

[43] U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *24th Annual Report*, p. 44.

[44] Thomas Jones, *Lloyd George* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 36–37.

[45] U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *24th Annual Report*, p. xv. The National Association of Manufacturers sent a group to Germany in 1909 to study the social insurance system there, and the Russell Sage Foundation also sponsored a study of European systems of social insurance in 1908. See Rimlinger, "Welfare Policy and Economic Development," p. 566 and Lee K. Frankel and Miles M. Dawson, *Workingmen's Insurance in Europe*, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1910).

[46] U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, *24th Annual Report*, p. 25.

[47] Isabel Craig and Igor Tomes, "Origins and Activities of the ILO Committee of Social Security Experts," *International Social Security Review*, 22 (1969), 509.

[48] Donald M. Pilcher, Charles J. Ramirez, and Judson J. Swihart, "Some Correlates of Normal Pensionable Age," *International Social Security Review*, 21, 3 (1968), 387–411.

[49] Taira and Kilby, "Differences in Social Security Development," p. 143.

The present research considers two patterns of diffusion that have received considerable attention in the general literature on diffusion: hierarchical and spatial. In the case of hierarchical diffusion, innovations appear in the most advanced or largest centers and are then adopted by successively less advanced or smaller units. Hierarchical diffusion has been observed for innovations as diverse as radio stations, trolley cars, electronic technology, policy innovations among the states of the United States, the diffusion of fluoridation among cities in the United States, and the diffusion of fire brigades and Rotary Clubs in Chile.[50] Hierarchical diffusion has also received considerable attention in research on diffusion among individuals, and Rogers has noted the consistent finding that earlier as opposed to later adopting individuals are more educated and of higher social status.[51]

Various causes of the hierarchical pattern may be identified. Larger or more developed units may be more disposed to innovations because they have more resources with which to experiment. They tend to have more information about and more contact with other units, and hence are likely to receive more information about an innovation once it begins to spread.[52] It might also be argued that smaller, less advanced units to some degree consciously adjust their behavior to larger, more advanced units, following a pattern of "positioning behavior" in which they are constantly imitating the behavior of the units that they have chosen as models.[53] This involves a pattern that is in a sense an extension of the two-step flow of communication described by Katz and Lazarsfeld and the queuing behavior among legislators discussed by Matthews and Stimson.[54]

An alternative type of diffusion is spatial diffusion: diffusion along lines of spatial proximity or, alternatively, along major lines of communication. There is a wide variety of possible lines of spatial communication, and the present research will only illustrate possible patterns and will not attempt to demonstrate definitively the relative importance of spatial as opposed to hierarchical diffusion. Indeed, hierarchical and spatial patterns may be closely interrelated, since economic growth itself has to a considerable degree diffused over a regular, spatial pattern. For this reason, diffusion that is ordered in terms of a hierarchy of economic growth may be spatially ordered as well.

A Test of the Prerequisite Thesis

Under the heading of prerequisites explanations, a series of modernizing changes have been identified that presumably increase the likelihood that a nation will adopt social security. Two interpretations of the prerequisites thesis were suggested. On the one hand, it may be argued that it identifies only a necessary condition for adoption and that while countries would never fall below a given level of modernization at the time of adoption, there will actually be a wide variation above that level in the degree of modernization at adoption. Alternatively, there may be a certain level of modernization that is both a necessary and sufficient condition for adoption, such that adoption will tend to occur at roughly the same level of modernization in many or all countries.

Ideally, one would like to examine all of the characteristics of nations at the time of adoption that are suggested by the prerequisites arguments. However, because of the problem of finding data for the wide range of dates represented among the years of adoption,[55] sufficient data were available only for percentage of work force in agriculture, percentage of work force in industry, and real income per capita. The definition and sources of these measures are presented in the Appendix. In the following pages, the expression "level of modernization" is used to refer to these three indicators.

Table 1 shows the distribution of values for these three variables at the time of first adoption

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[50] See Berry, "Problems of Data Organization," and Berry and Elaine Neils, "Location, Size and Shape of Cities as Influenced by Environmental Factors: The Urban Environment Writ Large," in *The Quality of the Urban Environment*, Harvey S. Perloff, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1971); John E. Tilton, *International Diffusion of Technology: The Case of Semiconductors* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971); Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States"; Crain, "Fluoridation," p. 572; and Paul O. Pedersen, "Innovation Diffusion Within and Between National Urban Systems," *Geographical Analysis* (July, 1970), pp. 203–254.

[51] Rogers and Shoemaker, *Communication of Innovations*, p. 186.

[52] Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations," p. 885.

[53] The expression *positioning behavior* was suggested by Jack Walker in a personal communication.

[54] Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955) and Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "Decision-Making by U.S. Representatives: A Preliminary Model," in *Political Decision-Making*, ed. S. Sidney Ulmer (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970), pp. 22–23.

[55] Even such outstanding sources as Stein Rokkan and Jean Meyriat, *International Guide to Electoral Statistics, Vol. 1: National Elections in Western Europe* (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), a major source of data on electoral participation, do not provide data on variables such as the proportion of the population voting in elections for enough countries at the appropriate points in time to permit any meaningful analysis.



Percentage of the Work Force in Agriculture



Percentage of the Work Force in Industry



Real Income per Capita
(Expressed in U.S. dollars around 1930)

Table 1. Distribution of Level of Modernization at First Adoption of Social Security

of social security in each country. For work force in agriculture, there is clearly a clustering around a modal value, and for work force in industry and national income there is a small range (the third column in each case) that contains a substantial proportion of the cases. The range of variation is so wide for all three variables, however, that it appears to disconfirm the necessary and sufficient condition version of the prerequisites argument. The percentage of the work force in agriculture at the year of first adoption ranges from nine per cent for the United Kingdom to 91 per cent for Saudi Arabia. Work force in industry ranges from three per cent for El Salvador to 54 per cent for Switzerland. Real income per capita, measured in units roughly equivalent to U.S. dollars around

1930, varies from 19 dollars for Ethiopia to 596 dollars for the United States and 504 dollars for the next wealthiest adopter, the United Kingdom.

The alternative interpretation of the prerequisites argument—that level of development is a necessary but *not* sufficient condition for adoption—is more strongly supported by these data, since for each variable there is a level below which few adoptions occur. There were no adoptions in countries with more than 91 per cent of their work force in agriculture, and only six countries had more than 80 per cent in agriculture at adoption. Work force in industry was as low as three per cent at adoption, yet there is a sharp increase in the number of cases in the 11 to 15 per cent range. For real income per capita, the lowest value is 19 dollars, with two other countries adopting at only slightly higher levels. Since the reader may be more familiar with income data expressed in terms of a more recent period, it may be noted that one 1930 dollar is worth about 2.7 1960 dollars.[56] The lowest level of income at adoption is thus 51 in terms of 1960 dollars. Though still very low, this figure gives a bit more support to the idea that there is a minimum level below which adoption does not occur. This level of modernization is so low, however, that the necessary condition version of the prerequisites argument would seem to have little explanatory power.

On the basis of this simple test, it therefore appears that the prerequisites argument, at least by itself, does not provide an adequate explanation of social security adoption. Other indicators of modernization might be found which produce better results, or there may be complex interactions among different aspects of modernization which, if properly represented in the test, would allow a better prediction of the timing of adoption. The analysis of diffusion, however, may provide a far simpler means of finding order in the apparent diversity of circumstances of social security adoption.

A Test for Hierarchical Diffusion

Considering first the possibility of hierarchical diffusion, a simple test is to examine the relationship between timing of adoption and level of modernization at adoption. If a pattern of diffusion is present in which countries tend to imitate other countries that are at higher levels of modernization, this should be reflected in a tendency for each successive adopter to adopt at a progressively lower level of modernization.

The tendency for later adopters to adopt at lower levels of modernization is shown clearly in Figure 1, where modernization is measured as the percentage of the work force in agriculture.[57] Since the level of modernization is defined in terms of the year of adoption, this relationship does not really involve a prediction of the timing of adoption on the basis of level of modernization. Nonetheless, treating the variable measuring year of adoption as an interval scale, a correlation coefficient may be used to summarize the degree of consistency in the relationship. The correlation, and hence the standardized regression coefficient, is .61, reflecting a fairly strong tendency for later adopters to be less modernized at the time of adoption. Similar relationships appear if one uses the other two measures of modernization, except that the correlations have opposite signs because of the opposite polarity of the variables: −.61 for work force in industry, and −.35 for real income.[58] The lower correlation for real income may be due in part to the greater difficulty in comparing levels of income because of the effects of inflation and fixed exchange rates.

This tendency for social security to appear at an earlier stage of modernization among later developers doubtless arises in part from the desire noted by Rys for governments in the developing countries

> to prove that they can give their populations the same protection other nations give to theirs, and in so doing only follow the general imperatives of social policy in any modern state.[59]

Lund has similarly noted the tendency for leaders in Third World countries to introduce social security out of a wish to acquire for their nations all of the most visible signs of national modernity.[60] A similar tendency has been noted with

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[56] This coefficient is derived from the *Economic Report of the President, 1972* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 247–253.

[57] This method of illustrating the relationship between development and timing of adoption is similar to that used by quantitative geographers who have analyzed the diffusion of innovations among urban centers by plotting size of urban center at the time of adoption by the year of adoption for various types of innovations. See Berry, "Problems of Data Organization and Analytical Methods in Geography," p. 521; Berry and Neils, "Location, Size, and Shape of Cities," p. 299; and Pedersen, "Innovation Diffusion Within and Between National Urban Systems," pp. 209-212.

[58] Although there is considerable disagreement about the relevance of tests of significance for interpreting correlations in nonsample data, we will present them for readers who find them useful. These correlations for work force in agriculture and work force in industry are significant at the .01 level. That for real income is significant at the .02 level.

[59] Vladmir Rys, "Comparative Studies of Social Security: Problems and Perspectives," *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association,* Nos. 7-8 (July-August, 1966), 242–268, at p. 245.

[60] Michael S. Lund, *Comparing the Social Policies of Nations: A Report on Issues, Methods, and Resources* (Center for the Study of Welfare Policy, University of Chicago, 1972), p. 42.



Timing of Adoption by Work Force in Agriculture at Adoption

Figure 1

regard to the types of modern technology selected by developing countries.[61]

Aside from the question of the types of programs or technology that are selected, the pattern of social security adoption in Figure 1 may reflect a tendency toward a larger role of the state in society in later-developing countries. Dahrendorf and Gerschenkron have noted this tendency among European countries,[62] and it may be present in broader frames of comparison as well. Though some developing countries have had considerable experience with mutual benefit associations and conventional insurance, the introduction of social security by the state appears to come far earlier relative to the development of these private arrangements among later adopters than it did in Europe.[63]

The pattern of adoption may also be due in part to special characteristics of social security as a public policy. To the extent that it is financed by taxing employees who are covered by the programs, it has the unusual feature of being an easy form of taxation, since citizens may feel that they are not really paying taxes when they make social security payments, but rather that they are purchasing insurance. In addition, there is often an interval of many years between the payment of social security taxes and the retirement or illness for which the contributor is covered. Social security is therefore an easy form of taxation which produces large amounts of capital that are invested at the discretion of the social security administration. In some countries, this capital is loaned to the national government at low interest rates, or is distributed on a patronage basis to finance a variety of private or public projects.[64] It is easy to see that a government in a developing country might be tempted to adopt social security even if the social and economic need for a program was more limited than it was at the time of adoption among the earliest adopters.

Another feature of social security that may account for this pattern of adoption is its tendency to weaken labor movements.[65] The use of social security in this co-optive way at earlier stages of development may be explained in part by the tendency for labor movements to appear at earlier stages of modernization in later developing countries.

Diffusion among the Earliest Adopters

In addition to the overall pattern of adoption reflected in Figure 1, three sub-patterns merit close attention. We will therefore present separate analyses of the earliest adopters, a middle group of adopters, and the later adopters.

Perhaps the most striking of these subpatterns is that among the earliest adopters. Within Europe, the first appearance of social security did not occur in the most advanced countries, but rather in 1883 in Germany, a later developer within the European context. The most advanced country—the United Kingdom—did not adopt until 1897. An examination of the lower part of Figure 1 reveals that though three countries did adopt at lower levels of modernization than Germany, there is a moderate but consistent tendency among the nations which adopted up until 1901 to do so at successively *higher* levels of modernization. The correlation for this group of countries is −.49, with the negative sign reflecting the tendency toward adoption by successively more advanced countries. It might be objected that this statistical finding depends largely on the fact that Germany was the first adopter and the United Kingdom was a later adopter for reasons perhaps unrelated to their level of modernization at adoption. However, the removal of these two countries leaves the correlation virtually unchanged. Similar patterns appear in the correlations for the other measures of modernization.[66]

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[61] Harry Johnson, ed., *Economic Nationalism in Old and New States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 1ff.

[62] See Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in *The Progress of the Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. Bert F. Hoselitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 3–29 and Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1967).

[63] On the basis of data made available to the senior author by the Ministry of Labor in Peru, the earliest date of foundation of the mutual benefit associations which have received government recognition in that country is around 1900, only a few years before the first adoption of social security. Although there may have been other associations which were founded much earlier, this suggests at least tentatively that these associations had a far more limited development prior to the appearance of social security than in Europe.

[64] Robert J. Lampman, "The Investment of Social Security Reserves and Development Problems: The Philippines as a Case History," in *The Role of Social Securitv in Economic Development*, ed. Kassalow, pp. 92–93.

[65] The importance of social security in weakening labor movements has been suggested in Gaston V. Rimlinger, "Social Security and Industrialization: The Western Experience, with Possible Lessons for the Less Developed Nations," in Kassalow, *The Role of Social Security in Economic Development*, pp. 135 and 143 and in David Chaplin, *The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 78. The remarkable history of resistance to the adoption of national unemployment insurance in the United States by the American Federation of Labor also illustrates the importance of the threat posed to labor movements by social security. See Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 85.

Within this earlier group of adopters, there is thus a moderate tendency toward diffusion *up* a hierarchy, a type of diffusion that has received scant attention in diffusion research.[67] Yet if diffusion research is to avoid treating modernization as involving only innovations that emanate from the most advanced centers to the rest of the world, patterns of diffusion such as this must be given close attention.

How can this pattern of diffusion be explained? Rimlinger has argued that a principal variable affecting the timing of adoption of social security among early adopters was the extent of resistance to welfare programs due to the development of liberal ideology that stressed the importance of self-reliance on the part of the poor.[68] If one chooses to emphasize power relationships rather than ideology, a parallel argument can be made in terms of the extent to which industrialization was led by a capitalist entrepreneurial class which opposed state intervention in welfare, as opposed to an entrepreneurial state eager to win the political loyalty of the working class. The weaker development of liberalism and capitalism in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Hungary meant that there was less resistance to overcome, and that adoption came earlier in these nations. In terms of the idea of the co-optive use of social security referred to earlier, it may be argued—particularly with reference to Germany—that there was less resistance to using social security to secure the loyalty of the working class.

Two major explanations might be suggested in interpreting these relationships. On the one hand it might be argued that because an independent bourgeoisie played a larger role in industrialization in the earlier industrializers of Europe, the strength of liberal ideology (and capitalist practice) was therefore greater in these countries.[69] Alternatively, it might be argued that such *pre*-modern characteristics as the strong tradition of a centralized state and of state paternalism in Central and Eastern Europe caused both later economic growth and earlier adoption of social security. It is beyond the scope of this research to test these alternative explanations. The crucial point is that regardless of which is correct, they both provide a rationale for the inverse relationship between the timing of economic growth and the timing of social security adoption among these countries.

Diffusion in the Middle Group of Adopters

Turning now to the cases of adoption in 1908 or later (there were no adoptions between 1901 and 1908), it can be seen in the upper part of Figure 1 that the general tendency toward adoption at lower levels of modernization among later adopters is present among these countries, though the correlation is somewhat weaker (.49) than among all 59 countries. A careful examination of Figure 1 suggests a partial explanation: instead of a consistent pattern of adoption by successively less modern nations, one finds that during the fifteen years after 1908, social security was adopted nearly simultaneously in highly advanced and relatively backward countries, and was then gradually adopted by successively less modern countries over the following several decades.

In the period from 1908 to 1922, the dominant pattern is not one of diffusion either up or down a hierarchy. The pattern appears instead to be one of spatial diffusion. Figure 2 provides a preliminary test of this hypothesis by illustrating the spatial distribution of adoption broken down into four time periods: 1883 to 1891; 1892 to 1901; 1908 to 1922; and 1923 and later.[70] The cases of adoption in 1901 and earlier are subdivided in order to illustrate more clearly the pattern of spatial diffusion within Europe. In examining this map, one should remember from the earlier discussion that while spatial diffusion may operate along simple lines of proximity, the relevant dimension of closeness may involve not only physical proximity, but proximity along dominant lines of communication.

Figure 2 shows that in addition to involving diffusion up a hierarchy, the pattern of adoption in Europe up to 1901 was also spatially ordered. The earlier adopters in this period were closer to the center of innovation—Germany—and the later adopters within this time period were in Western Europe. This spatial ordering is consistent with the earlier findings, and probably emerged because the timing of economic growth

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[66] The correlations for work force in industry and real income for these countries are .34 and .22 respectively, with slight increases if Germany and the United Kingdom are removed.

[67] A close analogue to this pattern of diffusion may be found in social psychological discussions of marginal individuals as innovators. See Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), chapter 7. In "The Diffusion of Innovations . . . ," p. 883, Walker notes that Mississippi was the first state in the United States to adopt a general sales tax. This is not surprising, in light of the fact that this is a regressive tax. However, Walker does not report the pattern of adoption for this innovation following its introduction in Mississippi.

[68] Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy and Industrialization*, pp. 35ff and 93-98.

[69] See the Gerschenkron and Dahrendorf references cited in footnote 62 above.

[70] Berry and Neils, "Location, Size, and Shape of Cities as Influenced by Environmental Factors," p. 298, have used a somewhat similar mapping procedure to illustrate the spatial diffusion of street cars in the United States.


Successive Periods of European Adoption (only inconsistency is Switzerland)
Middle East and Asia (except Japan) All Fourth Period
Japan
Liberia
Former British Colonies Ruled by European Settlers
Latin America Third and Fourth Periods
0
1000
2000
3000
miles
Periods of Adoption
1 Up to 1891
2 1892 to 1908
3 1902 to 1922
4 1923 to 1960

Figure 2. Timing and Spatial Distribution of Adoption

and the distribution of liberalism that emerged more strongly among the early modernizers also followed a regular spatial pattern.

An understanding of the pattern of adoption for the period 1908 to 1922 requires an examination of both the levels of modernization at adoption and the spatial distribution of adoption. It can be seen in Figure 1 that several of the countries that adopted in this period did so at relatively high levels of modernization—following a pattern that might be considered to be a continuation of the pattern of adoption among successively more advanced countries from the earlier period. This included not only an additional European country—Switzerland—but also two former British Colonies—Canada and Australia—and the most advanced Latin American countries—Argentine, Chile, and Uruguay.

The surprising feature of this period is that a number of much less modern countries adopted at almost exactly the same time. These adoptions may be due to a regional effect. They included *all* of the remaining countries in Europe—Greece, Spain, Portugal, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Russia. These countries apparently adopted in part because of their proximity to the earlier European adopters, even though some of them were at extremely low levels of modernization at adoption. A similar regional effect is present in Latin America, where countries adopted during this period at a wide range of levels of modernization during a relatively small number of years, with no clear hierarchical ordering of adoption. The remaining adopters during this period were an additional former British colony ruled by European settlers—South Africa—and Japan, the most advanced country of Asia.

Diffusion among the Late Adopters

The remaining countries to be considered are those which adopted social security after 1922. These include all of the countries of the Middle East and Asia except Japan; the remaining countries of Latin America; and Liberia and the United States. The late adoption in the United States may be interpreted as an extreme case of the impact of liberal ideology (or capitalist practice) that was discussed earlier. For the rest of the countries, regional effects are obviously present in the sense that particular regions of the world are involved. An examination of the upper right-hand corner of Figure 1 suggests, however, that the underlying effect may again be diffusion, this time *down* a hierarchy of modernization. If work force in agriculture is used as a measure of modernization, the correlation between level of modernization at adoption and timing of adoption is .49 among these countries. For work force in industry and real income, it is $-.55$ and $-.40$, respectively.[71] It is noteworthy that the size of these correlations has been reduced by two extreme outliers—the United States and, for the correlation with income, Libya—for which ambiguities about the appropriate scoring were resolved in a way that tended to weaken the confirmation of the hypothesis. If the opposite decisions had been made, these correlations would have been considerably higher.[72]

Regardless of which correlations one accepts, a clear pattern of diffusion down a hierarchy of modernization is present. It should be emphasized, however, that this apparent diffusion pattern does not preclude the possibility of a prerequisites effect. One interpretation of the timing of adoption for most of the ten countries in the upper right hand corner of Figure 1 is that in terms of the pattern of hierarchical diffusion, social security finally diffused down to them. On the other hand, most of them experienced some degree of modernization in the decades preceeding their adoption, and it might alternatively be argued that there is, indeed, a minimum level below which it is unlikely for adoption to occur, and that their adoption was delayed until they reached that level. The fact that adoption has not occurred in any country with more than 91 per cent of its work force in agriculture would appear to give some support to this conclusion.

Conclusion

This research has sought to analyze the patterns of social security adoption among nations. An examination of the overall pattern of adoption provided substantial support for the hypothesis that hierarchical diffusion is present, with later adopters tending to adopt at far lower levels of modernization than the early adopters. This relationship was interpreted as being in part an aspect of the tendency toward a larger role of the state in later-developing countries, and in part due to certain characteristics of social security as a policy.

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[71] These correlations are significant at the .01, .01, and .20 levels respectively. The correlations presented in the following paragraph are all significant at the .01 level.

[72] The first involves ambiguity with regard to the year of adoption by the United States, which might be scored around 1920 because of the extensive development of work injury programs at the state level by that date (see Appendix). Though the date that was used for the United States does not make much difference in the correlations presented earlier, it places the United States in the group of late adopters and has a considerable effect on the correlations within this group. The other outlier is Libya in the correlation involving real income. Libya adopted at a far higher level of income than would be expected because it was already a major exporter of oil at the time of adoption. It might be argued that real income is a particularly misleading indicator of development for Libya.

Within this overall pattern, three striking subpatterns clearly emerged. Among the earliest adopters, social security actually diffuses *up* a hierarchy of nations rather than *down* a hierarchy. In the middle group of adopters, a pattern of spatial diffusion is present in which social security is rapidly diffused among countries at widely differing levels of modernization. Finally, a combination of hierarchical diffusion and a prerequisites explanation appear to be the most satisfactory means of accounting for the pattern of adoption among the latest adopters.

Apart from contributing to an understanding of the patterns of social security development, it is hoped that this research may help to suggest two innovations that might play a useful role in comparative political research. First, it is clearly time that comparative political analysis devoted more attention to the role of diffusion in political change. Though a few studies have considered it, most comparative research devotes no attention to it at all, thereby neglecting an important explanatory factor and running the risk of reaching misleading conclusions regarding the importance of causal factors that exist within each unit of analysis, due to Galton's problem. A useful starting point in an attempt to give more attention to diffusion might be to identify types of research that lend themselves to a diffusion perspective. The increasing concern in recent literature with the timing of modernization and with the rate, timing, and sequence of different aspects of modernization was referred to earlier. This would appear to be one of the areas of hypotheses in which explicit attention to diffusion might yield particularly interesting results.

With regard to alternative patterns of diffusion, it has been shown that one of the most interesting phases of the diffusion of social security was one in which it tended to be adopted by progressively more advanced countries, involving a pattern of diffusion up a hierarchy. It is obvious that a great many of the modernizing changes considered in studies of development do diffuse from more advanced centers to more backward regions. Yet, particularly in the area of political innovations, some of the most interesting new aspects of development originate not at the top of a developmental hierarchy, but part way down it. This is obviously the case for the Chinese and Cuban models of economic and political development, and must surely be the case for many other political innovations as well. Students of innovation would do well to seek out these alternative patterns of diffusion along with the more conventional types of diffusion from the most advanced to the less advanced centers.

APPENDIX

Deciding upon and collecting data for a meaningful statistical universe is a perennial problem of cross-national research. The universe studied in the present research consists of all nations listed in *Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1971* which were autonomous with regard to domestic policy and were not socialist at the time of adoption.[73] Since a test of the prerequisites hypothesis would be less meaningful to the extent that adoption is imposed (as opposed to simply diffused) from outside, autonomy was required. On this basis, 65 countries were excluded which presently have social security but which were not autonomous with regard to domestic policy at the time of adoption, thereby eliminating all of Black Africa except Liberia and a number of countries in Asia and the Middle East. This criterion permitted the inclusion of certain countries—Hungary, Finland, and some Commonwealth nations—which were not formally independent at adoption, but which were autonomous with regard to domestic policy.

Countries which were socialist at the time of adoption were excluded because social security involves very different issues in socialist countries than in capitalist countries and including socialist countries might distort the analysis.[74] In practice, only one country proved to have been socialist at the time of adoption—Albania. It was therefore excluded from the analysis. With the exclusion of the dependent units and Albania, 59 countries remain in the universe of analysis.

The four principal variables used in the analysis are the year of the first adoption of social security, the percentage of the work force in agriculture, the percentage of the work force in industry, and real income per capita in the year of adoption. Since these variables cover three-quarters of a century, the problems of finding adequate data are obviously serious. Fortunately, however, the earlier adopters tend to be those countries for which more complete historical data are available, so that it was possible to find complete data on work force in agriculture and industry for all countries except China and Luxembourg. The data were far less complete for real income, with information having been available for only 36 of the 59 countries.

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[73] United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1971*. The only nations not reporting to the Social Security Administration were Guinea, Fiji, Kuwait, Lesotho, Maldive Islands, Nepal, North Korea, and Southern Yemen.

[74] This point is made by Vladmir Rys, "Some Current Problems of Social Security in the World," *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association*, 21 (1968), 432–442, at p. 439.

The source for the year of first adoption is *Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1971*. The definition of social security used in this source for determining first adoption is paraphrased in the discussion of the development of social security in the text. Exhaustive historical research on social security development in the 59 countries considered here would doubtless raise questions about the appropriate identification of the first law in a few cases which could result in small changes in the date of first adoption. It is clear, however, that these changes would generally be so small as to have virtually no effect on the findings reported in this research.

A problem of validity may arise in connection with adoption in federal systems, however. For example, although it was not until 1936 that national social security legislation was passed in the United States, 45 states had some form of work-injury insurance by 1920. While the authors chose to use the 1936 date, it should be noted that some of the relationships presented in the research would be stronger if the 1920 date had been used. An exhaustive investigation of legislation in subnational units in other countries with federal systems might raise similar questions about their year of first adoption.

In estimating the values for the three indicators of level of development at the time of adoption, we were fortunate to be able to rely on the work of two economists, Colin Clark and Simon Kuznets.[75] Though Clark and Kuznets rarely provided data for the exact year of adoption, they generally provided data at ten-year intervals, so that linear interpolation between their dates generally provided fairly reliable estimates. If Clark and Kuznets differed, we relied on Kuznets, since his work is more recent and in many cases involved an updating of Clark. When the three Kuznets publications differed, the more recent one was again chosen. A smaller number of the estimates were based on the unpublished 1971 version of Arthur S. Banks's Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which was kindly supplied by Professor Banks. In a few cases in which the time series in the Banks data fell short by a few years of the year of adoption, linear extrapolations were used. For certain countries, other sources were used, generally based on census data for a year close to the year of adoption.[76]

Clark, Kuznets, and Banks define agriculture as including agriculture proper, fishing, forestry, trapping, and nomadic grazing. Though slight variations in the definition of industry exist even within the data presented by individual authors, it generally included not only industry itself, but also mining, construction, transportation, and communication. Because of the definition of industry used by these authors, the percentage in industry is higher than might be expected if one is accustomed to thinking in terms of strictly industrial activities. However, these other activities also lead to opportunities for worker organization and create for workers many of the same problems and needs as industrial employment. Hence, in terms of the concerns of the present analysis, the particular activities included in this definition do not pose a problem.

Real income per capita is gross national product per capita expressed in international units which correspond to the average value of dollars in the United States over the period 1925 to 1934. Most of the income data are from Clark, who includes in the definition of income the value of farm products which never enter the market and are consumed in farm households. When the data were obtained from a source other than Clark, they were converted so as to be roughly equivalent to 1930 dollars.

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[75] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1957); Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations II: Industrial Distribution of National Production and Labor Force," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, supplement to Vol. V, No. 4 (July, 1957); Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth: Rate Structure and Spread* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); and Kuznets, *The Economic Growth of Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[76] Other sources include Stanley Braithwaite, "Real Income Levels in Latin America," *The Review of Income and Wealth*, Series 14, No. 2 (June, 1968), p. 146–47; Everett E. Hagan and Ali Hawrylyshin, "Analysis of World Income and Growth, 1955–1965," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (November, 1955); *Statesman's Yearbook*, various years; Irene B. Taeuber, *The Population of Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958); and United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, various years.

Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations*

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At the height of the student movement in the United States it was being freely predicted that an unbridgeable gulf was forming between the generations. Differences over political ends and especially over the means to reach those ends reached epidemic proportions. The defensive reaction of the middle-age "establishment" seemed merely to speed the widening of the chasm.[1] Nor were the differences confined strictly to the ranks of committed college radicals, as the movement expanded to include a wide array of sympathetic supporters on the campuses.[2] Some observers also saw strong signs of generational change among working-class youth.[3] And at a more general level the counterculture seemed likely to diffuse into all segments of the rising generation, thereby helping create and sustain a sociopolitical cleavage between the generations.

With the softening of young voices and the alteration of the public agenda, the predictions of *politically* conflicted generations have diminished. The failure of the McGovern campaign to realize fully the youth vote potential, visibly expanded by the franchise extension, was seen by many as the swan song of the youth movement and age-based politics. What had appeared to be unresolvable conflict a few years previously, now seemed to be more like tolerable tension. If vivid differences in life styles still marked the generations, these differences did not appear to have their sequels in the political sphere.

Of course, some observers never regarded the intergenerational differences as constituting what came to be called the generation gap.[4] The apparent cleavage was said to be an illusion, a function of the vociferous few, something which would dissolve as the young passed through another life stage, or as a phenomenon not really very different from past illustrations of age-graded conflict. On the other hand, some observers maintain that the gap still exists, that basically different kinds of political orientations and frameworks have been adopted by the young, and that the youthful cohorts baptized into politics from the mid-1960s onward constitute a new political generation. Still others argue that there has been selective continuity and change, that in some respects the rising generation has evolved a different set of preferences and modes of behavior, but that in other respects it echoes very faithfully the generation of its parents.

Complicating even more these divergent perspectives is the possibility that older generations may be in a state of flux also. While a good deal of the social science literature—especially in the area of political socialization—holds that change is relatively rare after adolescence,[5] there are signs that older people were not immune to the same forces affecting the young in the recent past, and that they were not completely impervious to the lessons which the young were trying to broadcast. The more dramatic forms of youthful expression may have simply overshadowed movements which were also at work among older people.

Any attempt to sort out these conflicting views on change and continuity can profit by using longitudinal materials. It would be helpful to

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[1] In addition to the more spectacular evidence of generational cleavage, a good deal of survey data has been offered. Perhaps the best known, partly because of its three-part showing on CBS television, is Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., *Generations Apart: A Study of the Generation Gap Conducted for CBS News* (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 1969).

[2] For example, Milton Mankoff and Richard Flacks, "The Changing Social Base of the American Student Movement," *The Annals,* 395 (May, 1971), 54–67.

[3] Richard Flacks, "Strategies for Radical Social Change," *Social Policy,* 1 (March-April, 1971), 7–14.

[4] A very useful discussion of different interpretations of the generation gap, from which the following discussion borrows, is Vern L. Bengtson, "The Generation Gap: A Review and Typology of Social Psychological Perspectives," *Youth and Society,* 2 (September, 1970), 7–32.

[5] Two works stand out for their emphasis on change throughout life—Stanton Wheeler and Orville Brim, *Socialization After Childhood: Two Essays* (New York: Wiley, 1966); and Theodore Newcomb, Kathryn E. Roenig, Richard P. Flacks, and Donald P. Warwick, *Persistence and Change: Bennington College and Its Students after Twenty-Five Years* (New York: Wiley, 1967).

know what the parental and filial generations were like both before and after the onset of a radically changed political climate beginning around the middle of the past decade. At the simplest level this would help resolve the question of the absolute and relative size of the so-called generation gap at different points in time, thereby shedding light on propositions about age-based political cleavages and on propositions about the changing political character of the American citizenry. More fundamentally, however, such materials would enable us to go beyond the generation-gap formulation. In particular, we could (1) specify the domains of continuity and change; (2) detect the residues and trace elements of the historical period on each generation; (3) establish the degree to which one's stage in the life cycle prompted change and continuity; and (4) define as precisely as possible those political traits which might constitute a more or less permanent schism between the generations.

In order to gain a better understanding of these dynamic elements of political behavior, and in particular to investigate change and continuity in early and middle adulthood, we undertook a panel study of two age generations. Beginning with a representative national sample of high school seniors and their parents in 1965, we reinterviewed a large proportion of these respondents during the first part of 1973.[6] This study design allows us to investigate questions of continuity and change both across and within generations more adequately than is usually the case. In this paper we will present the initial results from this study by comparing the two-wave aggregate response patterns for both generations. Since this study design is unusual, and since many patterns of development could conceivably be observed, we shall begin by discussing the major models of continuity and change which we are likely to encounter, along with the interpretations appropriate to these models.

Models of Continuity and Change

In comparing generations with each other and with themselves over time, one must be alert to four types of phenomena: continuity over time and three kinds of discontinuity arising, respectively, from generational effects, life cycle effects, and period effects.[7] It will be helpful to sketch in diagrammatic terms some configurations which would describe these various processes at work among our two generations. Figure 1a, for example, depicts a near-perfect continuity model. Scarcely any difference marks the generations in 1965, and neither shows any change by 1973.

Life-cycle effects are ordinarily interpreted as movements by the young which, as they pass through time, bring them into line with the older generation (or at least to the point at which the older generation was when it was in that age bracket). This interpretation rests on the assumption that certain kinds of change are endemic to the life course. These changes stem from shifting responsibilities, opportunities, and needs which accompany the aging process. Many of these changes are held to transpire as people move through young adulthood and into the middle years. But life cycle effects may also be a function of movements among older people which would increase (or conceivably decrease) the distance between them and the young. A conventional life-cycle effects model is shown in Figure 1b, in which the filial generation moves toward the older one, and in which change in the older generation has stopped. Implicit here is the assumption that subsequent shifting by the young generation would only serve to bring it even closer to the older one.

An ideal type of generational difference model is shown in Figure 1c. Here the two stand apart in 1965 and maintain that division in 1973. Sustained cleavages of this order are what people usually have in mind when speaking of a *true* generation gap. Generation effects derive from age cohorts undergoing a shared community of experiences under roughly similar circumstances at pivotal, impressionable points (usually before adulthood) in the life cycle. Differential experiences within a generation can lead to generation units, distinctive clusters of like-minded people.[8]

The third major indicator of discontinuity is displayed in its ideal form in Figure 1d. Period

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[6] The most complete report of the original study is M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *The Political Character of Adolescence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

[7] A comprehensive treatment of these topics is found in Matilda White Riley, Marilyn Johnson, and Anne Foner, *Aging and Society, Vol. III, A Sociology of Age Stratification* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972). See especially Chapter 2, and a shorter version by Matilda White Riley, "Aging and Cohort Succession: Interpretations and Misinterpretations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 37 (Spring, 1973), 35–49.

[8] The classic formulation of the generational concept remains that of Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Mannheim, *Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford, 1952), pp. 276–320. Herbert Hyman anticipates some current analytic problems in *Political Socialization* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), chapter 6. One of the best empirical applications of the political generation concept is David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martins, 1971). For a provocative cross-national application see Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 991–1017.



Continuity: Generations remain the same over time, absolutely and relative to each other

Life cycle effects: Younger generation converges with older as it ages



Generation effects: Generations begin apart and remain so over time

Period effects: Generations begin the same and move congruently over time



Hybrid generation-period effects: Generations begin apart and move in same direction at equal rates

Hybrid life cycle-period effects: Generations begin apart and move in same direction; Younger moves much more rapidly as result of place in life cycle

Figure 1. Models of Continuity and Change

effects work their will on each generation, reflecting the important events and trends of the time. They are often referred to as *Zeitgeist* effects. True period effects have a roughly common impact on all or most segments of society. Illustratively, certain elements of a war, an economic depression, a unique regime, a technological innovation, or mass cultural movement leave their mark on the entire society, even though other elements touch population segments in unique ways.

It would be difficult to interpret Figure 1d as illustrating anything other than period effects, given the great life-cycle and experiential differences in the two generations. Of course period effects, like the other processes, are not usually so easily identified in the real world. Rather, the three factors of age, date of birth, and historical periods often work simultaneously and in varying combinations. One very likely illustration of this is contained in Figure 1e, which depicts a hybrid, generation/period effects model. The gap between the generations in 1965 remains in 1973, but each generation has moved at a corresponding rate over time.

Another hybrid model, life cycle plus period effects, is demonstrated in Figure 1f. In this instance the generations are set apart in 1965, and both move with the times. But the younger generation, because of its still impressionable years, changes more rapidly and begins to converge with the older.

One can imagine other consequent patterns based on complex relationships among aging, generations, and periods. For example, curvilinear life-cycle development would add to the array of patterns we might expect to find, thereby adding to the difficulty of interpreting changes observed in the real world. Even some of the relatively "clean" models already presented are susceptible to alternative interpretations. One must certainly take into account substance and theory in assessing over-time patterns. Nonetheless, the processes we have outlined are among the most prominent patterns to be expected and will at least serve as points of departure.

The foregoing types of change and stability deal with aggregates rather than individuals. It is known that aggregate stability within a generation may disguise enormous individual level movement; and apparent large movement at the aggregate level may be a function of a minority undergoing sizable shifts. Moreover, the *reasons* for change and stability often lie largely untapped in an aggregate analysis. Any good understanding of political generations must ultimately be able to draw on what is occurring at the micro level.

Nevertheless, there is much to be said for a more aggregated approach also. In the final analysis political leaders and lay persons alike deal in gross, average, grouped modes of thought. For example, while it is vitally important to know the why and how much of individual changes which have led to a marked decline in political trust over the past few years, the politically significant event is that it declined in the aggregate and especially so in some identifiable segments of the aggregate.

Furthermore, generational discontinuities are no less real simply because there are compositional factors "explaining" them. It is often speculated, for example, that differences between young and old arise because the young are much better educated. Controlling for education washes out the generation gulf. Such explanations no more reduce the age cleavage as such than do those which say that the young will become more like the old in due time. Clearly, we want to know whether the generational cleavage is temporary or permanent and whether it rests on a true difference in "communities of shared experiences" or has other bases. But in terms of some vital functions of the system the point is whether sequential generations are more like or unlike—regardless of the reasons.

Study Design and Panel Composition

This panel study began with a representative cross-section sample of 1669 high school seniors and their parents, interviewed in the spring of 1965. Eight years later, in the late winter and early spring of 1973, an attempt was made to reinterview all youths and one of their parents. Reinterviews were completed with 1119 out of an original pool of 1669 youths, and with 1118 of a possible 1562 parents.[9] Mail questionnaires were received from 230 youths and 61 parents who were inaccessible to the interviewers.

The study design allows for a multiplicity of analyses across generations and across time. For the initial presentation of the data we will simply compare the aggregate changes in each generation on some of the political orientations first tapped in 1965. Detailed comparisons between those retained in the panel versus those not retained, based on 1965 characteristics, indicate the presence of very little bias in the panel subset. For example, differences in the distributions on social and political characteristics rarely exceeded five per cent.

It is worth dwelling on the life course and historical corollaries of the two biologic generations that we have studied. First, and most obviously, there is a sharp difference in their place in the life cycle. Three-fourths of the parents were between 40 and 54 years of age in 1965 and, inexorably, were between 48 and 62 by 1973. By definition, all

[9] The difference between 1562 and 1669 stems from the fact that we were unable to interview a parent in 107 instances in 1965.

had a child at least 25 or 26 years of age; a majority by 1973 had seen their last child through high school. Their place in the life cycle contrasts sharply with the youth sample, all of whom were born *after* the end of World War II and represent the first installment of the post-war baby boom. Even by 1973 one-fourth of the youth sample had not been married, and among those who had children most of the children were still pre-schoolers.

Accompanying this discontinuity is the generational one. All but a handful of the parents were born before the crash of 1929, and most were old enough to remember FDR's first election. World War II touched them very personally. They began their families in the Cold War era, and they saw at least one of their children finish high school in 1965, shortly before the Great Society began to dissolve in riots and demonstrations.

The contrast offered by the political history of their offspring is well known. Most of them have only the dimmest recollection of Eisenhower's first election. Kennedy's 1960 victory is probably the first one recalled with precision. They entered high school with the civil rights movement, and about one-half left college in the midst of turmoil and discontent.

In addition to being distinguished by current age and date of birth the two generations also differ on where the life course has taken them over the eight-year period covered by our observations. Whereas the personal lives of the parents underwent relatively little alteration (one of the major ones being the leave-taking of a child) the same was scarcely true of the young adults. The period between high school graduation and the mid-twenties is obviously one of major mobility, new endeavors, and role changes.[10]

As noted above, apparent age-related differences can be artifacts of compositional differences. For example, rather than being derivative of "shared communities of experiences," the deviance of a generation may simply be due to a change in its composition, say by race and ethnicity, migration, skill level, educational attainment, or selective mortality.[11] At this stage, we have considered the most obvious compositional difference between the two generations, *viz.*, educational attainment. Not uncommonly, the educational disparity has been cited as the cause of the putative generation gap. Therefore, for all of the analysis to follow we have also examined the results for each of three subgroups in the junior generation: those who had no collegiate schooling after finishing high school (40 per cent); those who matriculated but did not receive a four-year degree (26 per cent); and those with at least a college degree (34 per cent). There are some absolutely large attitudinal and behavioral differences across the three groups, not only in 1973 *after* most of the educational achievements, but in 1965 as well, *before* the achievements.

For the present, however, the central point is that the three educational subgroups tended to move in tandem between 1965 and 1973. Thus regardless of whether the drift was down, up, or stable, the direction of the drift tended to be very much the same for all three. This being the case, most of what we report below concerning the young generation (in terms of direction at least) is not a function of one subgroup performing at odds with another nor of wildly disproportionate contributions from the college educated. While not completely solving the composition problem by any means, these results do tell us that when we observe what appear to be either generational, life-cycle, or period effects, we can be reasonably sure that all three educational strata are sharing in these processes.

The Salience of Public Affairs and Politics

As will be demonstrated momentarily, the *objects* of political interest change substantially over relatively short periods of the life cycle. But what about the *level* of political interest? It has been argued that the rising generation—being highly educated and coming of age in exceptionally politicized times—has already surpassed the parental generation in its concern with political matters. Judging from previous adult data, however, overall political interest appears to grow at a moderate rate well into the middle years. (There is some controversy about whether it tails off among the very old.[12]) If political interest rises

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[10] The time lapse happens to embrace what have been called the most crucial age years for creating a distinctive, self-conscious political generation. There is nothing magic in these figures, but Mannheim put the span at 17–25. Another scholar has recently built an elaborate biosocial rationale for 18–26 as the span wherein "political-cultural consciousness" takes firm hold and wherein, if the psycho-historical conditions are appropriate, a new political generation may be born. See T. Allen Lambert, "Generations and Change: Toward a Theory of Generations as a Force in Historical Process," *Youth and Society*, 4 (September, 1972), 21–46. At a more general level, Erik H. Erikson's work on identity crisis singles out late adolescence and early adulthood as a potentially important period for political character formation. See his *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968).

[11] Although this explanation seems simple enough, the reality is more complicated. For example, there is the question of whether certain compositional factors, education being a prominent one, have the same equivalency of measurement over time. This is one of the drawbacks to standardization as a statistical way of checking for compositional effects.

[12] Recent work indicates that the widely perceived disengagement of older people is in part an artifact of



Figure 2. Salience of Public Affairs

with age, both the parent and young adult generations should have changed to reasonably similar degrees over the eight-year span covered by our study.

That this is what happened can be observed from Figure 2a. The percentages signify the proportions of respondents at each time period indicating that they follow what is going on in government "most of the time." In interpreting this development it is essential that we have been able to draw upon previous data about life-cycle development, because the parallel lines of change could be interpreted as indicative of period effects. Here we have an instance, however, in which life-cycle effects do not occur solely among young adults, but continue throughout most if not all of adult life. Thus a pattern that might reflect period effects is more likely to be a result of normal life-cycle changes. While the young adults have nearly reached the level of interest expressed by their parents in 1965, we expect that they will surpass this level by the time they reach a comparable age because of their greater overall education.

If it is true that the general salience of public affairs changes only modestly but at a similar rate for the two generations, it is clearly not true for the salience of particular arenas of politics. We have advanced elsewhere the idea that individuals

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socioeconomic composition. See Norval Glenn, "Aging, Disengagement, and Opinionation," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (Spring, 1969), 17–33; Norval Glenn and Michael Grimes, "Aging, Voting, and Political Interest," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (August, 1968), 563-75; and Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), chapter 9.

develop salience maps of public affairs and politics.[13] One such mapping operation arranges public affairs according to geopolitical domains, specifically the arenas of international affairs, national affairs, state affairs, and local affairs. The relative emphasis placed on these various levels may be conceptualized as representing one's degree of cosmopolitanism or of its mirror image, localism.

From the gross indicators used at this stage, it is obvious that the geo-political orientations of the young have changed considerably, whereas those of the middle-age have shifted only slightly. Figure 2b shows the proportions selecting international affairs as the domain to which they pay most (first-rank) attention. Since there is only slight movement among the older generation, we may rule out large-scale period effects.

Is there something peculiar about this generation which causes the precipitous drop, or is this restriction of scope a normal life course development? A generational interpretation is suspect, because this young generation has been more exposed to international stimuli, including travel, than any previous one. Rather, the press of other domains becomes the political reality with which people must deal. For a student sitting in the high-school classroom, the romance and intrigue of the international scene hold great attraction. But in the "adult world," there are more localized institutions, officials, and forms which must be dealt with; and news must be monitored which has more potential personal consequence. The pattern displayed here also fits cross-sectional data from national surveys taken in 1966 and 1968. The sizable dip thus seems to be very much a function of alteration in the life stage.[14]

If the young as high school seniors were heavily oriented to international affairs as their first loyalty, they were equally oriented to local affairs as their last (fourth-rank) domain of interest. Figure 2c reveals that parents held steady but that their offspring showed a modest drop in placing local affairs as their least favored domain. As young adults begin to settle into a community and feel its impact on their lives, they begin a slow gravitation toward the local arena. That the gap between the young and old still persists, though narrowed, suggests that further penetration into the life cycle will be necessary before they achieve union with the parental generation.

Now let us turn to another set of rather general measures, this time assessing media behavior in regard to politics. Here the problem is complicated by long-term trends in media usage, as we shall see in a moment. First, judging solely from previous cross-sectional data, we would expect newspaper readership and television viewing to rise considerably among the younger adults. In contrast, use of the radio and magazines could be expected to increase little, if any, judging by the relatively small differences between parents and youths in 1965. Superimposed on these life-cycle expectations, however, are probable long-term changes in media usage. These seem to be working primarily in the direction of increasing reliance on television and decreasing reliance on radio and, to some extent, newspapers.

Data on usage of all four media are presented in Figure 3. The results are not entirely as expected. Television viewing does rise dramatically in the filial generation. But newspaper readership is almost constant over this eight year period and remains well below parental levels, even though parental usage itself has declined slightly. Altered patterns of daily time use and something as simple as having one's own television set are life-stage developments related to the sharp gain in television watching. Hence the first generation raised on television assumes its rightful place. Even within the parental generation there is a modest movement away from newspaper readership and toward television viewing, but this movement is overshadowed by the shift just discussed.

The declines in magazine readership and in radio listening are perhaps not surprising, but they suggest still further the increasing reliance being placed on television. While magazine readership was quite high among the seniors in 1965, there was still room for marginal advances to achieve parental levels at that time (taking into account the greater education of the young). But instead of gaining slightly, magazine readership dropped very noticeably among the young adults. The decrease in radio usage is perhaps less surprising but no less significant. Certainly the radio was no longer the primary source of political news even by 1965, but the level of usage was still quite high, perhaps owing in large part to captive audiences such as car drivers and to news coverage picked up as an incidental part of entertainment listening. For whatever reason, however, it is clear that minimum levels of radio usage for political news had not been reached even by 1965.

Though it seems almost contradictory that overall interest should rise while attention via at least some of the mass media declines, there may be a very simple explanation. The declines for the printed media and radio may be compensated for by the increases in television viewing. (Unfortunately, we do not know the absolute amount of

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[13] Jennings and Niemi, *Adolescence*, Chapter 10.

[14] Data from 1966 are presented in Jennings and Niemi. A period effect may have accelerated the movement in the young cohort, however. Disengagement from Vietnam and the rise of severe domestic issues are secular forces which probably contributed disproportionately to the declining internationalism of the current young.



Figure 3. Following Public Affairs Through Mass Media Usage

daily time devoted by our respondents to watching news and public affiairs on TV.) Thus there may be no anomaly between rising professed interest in politics and lack of increase in three of the media.

Overall, both the relative and absolute rise in the use of television to keep informed about public affairs, coupled with a fall or no gain for other media describes a strong period effect. The continued lag in newspaper usage by the younger generation also suggests a net generation effect, and the increased use of television a life cycle effect.

Partisanship and Electoral Behavior

Virtually all previous work on partisanship leads to one clear expectation about the eight-year period of the panel. Partisanship among the parents should change very little if at all. Even in unsettled times, such as realigning periods, it is the young who are peculiarly susceptible to the currents of partisan sentiment flowing largely in one direction or the other. Parents, having had many years in which to develop and nurture a partisan attachment, should be highly resistant to short-term ebbs and tides in party fortunes. That this is true is borne out nicely by the data in Figure 4a, which differs from previous figures in showing the entire partisan distribution for parents in both years. The slight decline in the proportion of strong partisans may slightly contradict the life cycle processes that have been evident in earlier years. But the great similarity of the overall distributions in the two years unequivocally supports the view that partisanship among the middle-age adults is quite stable.



Figure 4. Partisanship and Voting, 1965–1973

More change in partisanship should be apparent among the younger generation, but exactly what changes should be expected are not altogether clear. On the one hand, the generation is maturing at a time marked by a significant rise in the proportion claiming to be free of allegiance to either of the major parties. Thus the proportion of Independents might be expected to rise above what it was in 1965.

Working against this possibility, however, are two factors. First, these young adults are several years into the adult life cycle. All have been able to vote in at least one congressional and one presidential election, and many have been able to vote in two presidential elections. Past studies indicate that partisan feelings begin to jell fairly quickly after the individual enters the active electorate.[15] If this force is operative, we would expect the proportion of Independents to have already declined slightly. Second, compared with other orientations, the transmission of party attachments across generations is carried out quite successfully except, possibly, in realignment periods. Though the question of whether the present time constitutes such a period has been repeatedly raised, opinion is far from unanimous that it is. Hence it would not be surprising if the offspring, after flirting with independence while in high school and perhaps in college, returned to the partisanship of their parents in fairly large numbers.

These two countervailing tendencies should at least keep the proportion of Independents among the young adults from rising much, if at all. With these thoughts as a backdrop, the change in the partisan distribution of the filial generation between 1965 and 1973 is startling (Figure 4b). The proportion of Independents, already very high in 1965, rose another 12 per cent, to include almost half of the sample. At the same time, the proportion of strong identifiers was cut nearly in half. Such an increase in the proportion of Independents at a time in the life cycle when we would ordinarily have expected the beginning of a long term decline, provides a compelling argument for a generation effect.

What will the future development of partisanship be for this generation? Although there may be a decline in the proportion of Independents in the future, the rate of decline probably will not bring this proportion down to levels observed in previous generations for some years, if ever. The decline of political trust which we shall observe later, along with negative implications about parties and the party system generated by disclosures through the Watergate scandal, would very likely support this feeling of independence. Moreover, the degree of independence from parties that many of these respondents have felt for several years is also likely to make them more resistant to future changes. On the other hand, sustained psychological attachment to the rather abstract concept of "independence" seems intuitively more difficult than attachment to the more concrete entity of a political party.

Generation effects also emerge when considering voting behavior. Of equal or greater importance, however, are the short-term period effects. While the younger generation consistently voted more Democratic by a small margin (an average of 7 per cent), the movement from one year to another followed very much the same pattern in both generations. A look at the reported vote in the presidential election of 1968, the congressional election of 1970, and the presidential election of 1972 demonstrates this very nicely (Figure 4c). Thus both generations manifest signs of Nixon's hairline victory in 1968, the traditional "decline" in the off-year election, and a spectacular "surge" represented by Nixon's landslide of 1972. These parallel movements occur despite the intense Democratic attempts to woo the young in 1972 and despite the much greater proportion of Independents among the young adults. Especially given the differential composition of the two generations, Figure 4c appears to be a good example of a hybrid, generation/period effects model.

Another aspect of electoral behavior is turnout. The life cycle pattern of initial low turnout rates, which then grow rapidly and level off, has been observed so frequently that it would be surprising if it were not found in our panels. As Figure 4d shows, parental turnout—the figures for which are inflated because of the middle-aged character of the sample—is high for all three elections. The reduced turnout in 1972 compared to 1968 is consistent with the lower national balloting in the later year.

In contrast, the younger generation began its voting history with a turnout markedly below that for the elder generation. This is so even though the youth sample includes the better educated three-fourths of the total cohort (i.e., all were at least high-school graduates). Predictably, turnout decreased in the offyear election, but in an exaggerated fashion. Finally, in 1972, while the nation's overall turnout was dropping from its 1968 level, voting in the young cohort rose by 12 per cent, reflecting that cohort's increasing engagement in the political world and the development of the voting habit. By 1972 the large 1968 difference between the two generations had been reduced severely. In its voting record this young generation registers the same slow start and rapid growth that has been observed almost universally in the past. Life-cycle effects are clearly at work in this process, as they are in the much less volatile performance of the senior generation.

A final facet of partisanship to consider is the respondents' understanding of the differences between the parties. Unlike partisanship, knowledge of presumed party differences is not widespread among young children.[16] And while such knowl-

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[15] Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies,* 2 (July, 1969), 139–71.

[16] Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), chapter 4; and



Figure 5. Perceptions of Political Parties

edge grows rapidly during the high school years, high school graduates are still slightly less knowledgable than their parents. We would expect this knowledge to expand somewhat in the early years of adulthood. In contrast, parental views would change very little on the basis of life-cycle developments. However, images of the parties have certainly changed during the past couple of decades, and it is possible that some adult movement will be observed in the 1965 to 1973 period.

Based on responses to three questions about party differences, more change occurred among the young than among their elders (Figure 5). The youths' understanding of political party differences rose on each of the three measures. Rather surprisingly, given its greater proportion of Independents, the filial generation in 1973 ascribed *more* differences to the parties and was at least as aware of the liberal and conservative tags as was the senior cohort.

More so than with other measures we have used, it is unclear to what extent generational effects account for the patterns observed. Our results seem to show primarily how fast young adults learned the typical views of political party differences. It is impossible to say however, how much this was due to the particular circumstances of the late '60s and early '70s. That the young not only caught up with but also surpassed in some respects their elders suggests the operation

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Jack Dennis, *Political Learning in Childhood and Adolescence* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Research and Development Center for Cognitive Learning, 1969), chapter 2.

of both life cycle and generational processes at work. The complexities of information acquisition deserve more attention, and we now turn more directly to that topic.

Political Information

Part of what guides an individual's processing and evaluation of political events is the storehouse of factual information accumulated over the years. While perhaps not as crucial as goals, values, and attitudes, an awareness of current and past political history and a comprehension of the machinery of government undoubtedly make for a difference in individual political behavior. Six questions to which there were right and wrong answers were asked of the respondents at both points in time. Although these questions by no means exhaust all types of factual information, they cover a good range of history, geography, and political institutions. The workings of a variety of dynamic processes can be seen in the differential patterns based on answers to the six questions.

Parents are unlikely to have changed very much at all with regard to the questions that we have used. On the one hand, they should not really have forgotten significant historical phenomena that occurred during their lifetimes. On the other hand, for questions concerning facts and figures about governmental machinery, we presume that if parents were to forget what book learning they may have had, they had already done so by 1965. Surely the older generation would have increased its knowledge of individuals and events primarily of recent significance (such as Vietnam), but on the questions we asked very little change ought to be observed among the parents.

In contrast, young people ought to show a definite decline in one area, namely, the technical operations of government. Eight years after high school graduation fewer of the young adults are likely to answer correctly such questions, just as they have probably forgotten specific names, dates, and places from their history books. Less clearcut is what is likely to take place in the younger generation's knowledge of major historical events of the recent past. Young people obviously cannot relive these events, so that we would rarely expect dramatic increases in their knowledge of them.[17] They may, however, come to know more about such events as they enter the adult world where much of the population assumes that one knows about such things and where considerable political interaction presupposes knowledge of those forces shaping the contemporary world. Thus youthful awareness of recent historical events and personalities should rise, though not very steeply.

The data for the six questions are rich in their variety and rewarding in the extent to which they fit these theoretical expectations. As can be seen in Figure 6, parents were remarkably stable on every question. A saturation point seems to be reached by the middle years. Over this eight year period the greatest change in parental response was a 3 per cent gain in the number who were able to indicate correctly the number of Supreme Court justices. Given the amount of attention devoted to the Supreme Court during this time period, so very slight a climb strongly suggests that older adults' knowledge of many features of governmental structure and processes is firmly fixed.

In contrast to the stability of parental responses is the movement in both directions observed in the young adults' answers. As expected, the declines come in their knowledge of governmental structure. We would expect some further decline in the percentage able to answer these questions in the future. The percentage will probably remain higher than for the parents, however, because of the young adults' higher education level.

Most interesting to us are the increases in young people's knowledge of historical events and current personalities. Two features are important —that there *is* an increase and that the rise is relatively small. Nearly three in ten youths are still ignorant of the partisan era in which their parents matured. Despite the small gain registered, there continued to be a true and substantial generational difference. Only where a political personality continues to occupy the stage (e.g., Tito) did familiarity grow by more than five to six per cent.

The development of political knowledge reveals both life cycle and generational patterns from which we can tentatively generalize beyond the specific questions asked. Information held by the new adult about forms and processes of governmental operations appears to have a deteriorating quality. Knowledge of facts and figures may rise slowly over generations as the level of education rises; but in each generation we can probably witness a cycle of expanded technical knowledge toward the end of formal schooling, coupled with the trailing off of the ability to recall this information as one leaves school. In the aggregate this drop probably occurs relatively quickly at first and then slowly as a more or less steady state is approached. Here a life-cycle pattern seems most significant in understanding the learning process.

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[17] As E. E. Schattschneider says: "What people think about public affairs depends to a great extent on when they were born. Since life is short and history is endless, what anybody remembers of the past illuminates only a brief segment of the whole story." See his *Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 83.



Figure 6. Factual Knowledge About Politics (Per cent Giving Correct Answer)

A sharply different picture emerges for events and personalities prominent in the present or recent past. Because of their recent entry into the adult world of politics and increasing exposure to politically-relevant media content, the rising generation improves on its awareness. On the other hand, the parental generation has reached a saturation point: those who will learn have learned. (Strictly speaking, of course, this needs individual level analysis for support.) Set off against these life cycle effects are generational effects, as exemplified by the discrepancy over the New Deal era. This type of discrepancy, and the variety of images, experiences, and emotions attached to it, is likely to stand as a permanent part of the political landscape.

National Images

If *Zeitgeist* means anything it should mean that individuals within a political system are sensitive to and affected by the critical problems of the time. It would be absurd, for example, to think that the traumatic events of the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the Vietnam War were not perceived by people experiencing them as tests of the nation's ability to survive either physically, morally, or both. Similarly, the various economic panics and depressions have not passed unnoticed among those experiencing them. Broad social-political ills and gains also help set off major and minor political periods. To the extent that they are recognized and experienced, these events and movements form the citizenry's image of the political periods through which they are passing. They constitute, in short, one barometer of the "spirit of the times."

We have tapped this spirit by asking our respondents what things they are least proud of as Americans. Answers to this free-response question were coded under a great number of specific categories, which in turn fall under a few general rubrics. By observing the marginal distributions of these rubrics for each generation we can catch the kinds of events and processes which struck them as constituting national negative images. These images may be taken as one indicator of a political era.

Political historians are already referring to the 1960s as the civil rights decade. Beginning with the sit-ins of the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, and culminating with riots, strong legislation, favorable court decisions, and administrative enforcement, the civil rights movement centered primarily on the struggle for Black equality. The question at hand is whether this sense of the times is shared by our two generations, and whether it is shared to the same degree. According to our data, the judgment of the political historians is matched by the images of the mass public. We have taken the total number of responses referring to civil rights and percentaged them against the total number of responses of all kinds in answer to the question about the "least proud" aspects of being an American.[18] In 1965 both generations placed extraordinary emphasis on the civil rights area (Figure 7a). Responses of this type more than doubled those in other areas. And the great majority of these responses dealt specifically with white-black problems, with only a scant few being overtly hostile to the movement.

The relative and absolute focus on civil rights as of 1965 strongly suggests a period effect at full tide. But without another observation point, that developmental state would be difficult to document. By using exactly the same coding scheme on the 1973 replies (except for adding new categories) we are able to replicate the 1965 procedures. As Figure 7a shows, there was a staggering drop in the salience of civil rights on the part of both generations. The attrition was slightly sharper for the younger generation, virtually removing the modest edge it possessed in 1965. Aside from this small difference, the two generations moved almost in parallel, pointing toward a decisive *Zeitgeist* phenomenon.[19]

Exactly what the long-range consequences of the absorption with civil rights in the mid-sixties would be on the two generations is beyond the scope of this paper. So also is the equally significant question of the consequences of its eclipse by early 1973. It is worthwhile, however, to offer one vivid piece of fall-out from the civil rights movement which shows concretely the behavioral consequences of the historical period.

In both 1965 and 1973 our respondents were asked if they had any close friends of the opposite race. Blacks of both generations responded much more in the affirmative, and exhibited little change over time. Not so among the whites. While noticeably less than half of each generation claimed close black friends at either point in time, the trend was definitely up for each over the eight-year span (Figure 7b). Other explanations are possible, but it is difficult to account for this in anything other than period effects, flowing directly out of the civil rights movement. This explanation is all the more convincing because movement among the parents parallels (in fact, slightly exceeds) that for the youths. If it were only the "compositional" effects derivative of the younger generation being better educated, the shift should

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[18] Similar patterns emerge using respondents rather than responses as the percentage base.

[19] One might challenge data of this type on the grounds that people simply report "what is in the news" at the time. To a great extent that is precisely the point, but only when that "news" is continuously repeated and reinforced by other phenomena—as was clearly the case for civil rights.



Figure 7. Salience of Civil Rights and Black-White Friendship

be less among the parents. That the filial generation still holds an edge over the older does point, however, toward a continuing generation gap in an absolute sense. Parents by 1973 had reached just about the same level the young had reached as of 1965. Overall, the pattern suggests strong period effects leavened by generational ones. The edge for the young would seem to be very much a function of being socialized in an environment more sensitive to racial injustice and strife.

Returning to the original question about negative national images as an indicator of the spirit of the times, it is significant that 1965–1973 comparisons for each generation reveal that they moved in tandem for every major substantive area. For example, perceptions of national shortcomings in the domain of moral, ethical, and religious conduct rose from 9 per cent to 18 per cent among the middle-aged, and from 5 per cent to 14 per cent among the young—the same absolute increase for each. Similarly, references to failings of the domestic political system climbed from 16 per cent to 31 per cent among the old, and from 14 per cent to 29 per cent among the young, again an absolute increase of equal magnitude. What we may be capturing in the latter category are the strong, rising sentiments that the domestic political system is failing. Because the field work was completed well before the shattering developments and spinoffs of the Watergate affair, the 15 per cent climb probably understates what will ultimately be a pronounced period effect. In this sense the increased references to failings of the political system are of a piece with the tide of responses to the political trust items to be reported next.

Political Trust and Cynicism

Of all recent changes in mass public attitudes, those regarding political trust have been perhaps the most widely discussed. Cohort and cross-section analysis have shown remarkable drops in the level of trust accorded the national government.[20] Our unique contribution will be to trace that pattern for two distinct generations over an extended time-frame.

We have relatively well-developed theoretical expectations about the course of development of political trust. Two kinds of processes are expected jointly to structure the patterns of change for the older and younger generations. On the one hand, strong period effects are likely to be found. Trust in the government has been declining for a number of years, particularly since 1966. Thus the level of trust shown by the parent and young adult samples should decline markedly; conversely, levels of cynicism should rise.

In addition, a life-cycle change should also be observed. It has been shown repeatedly that young children are more idealistic about political authority than older persons. This is true even of the late '60s and early '70s when the extremely positive views of earlier years were no longer so evident. By late adolescence, idealistic views decline, but in 1965 we still found the young generation to be much more positive about the government than were their parents. In the years since then we would expect their cynicism to have grown because of their encounters with the "real" world of politics, quite apart from any period effects.

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[20] See especially Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (September, 1974), 951–972; and Arthur H. Miller, Thad A. Brown, and Alden S. Raine, "Social Conflict and Political Estrangement, 1958–1972" (paper presented at the 1973 Midwest Political Science Association Convention, Chicago).

Combining these two expectations, we should find growing cynicism among both generations, but a faster rate of change among the young adults.[21] Strong confirmation of these expectations is observed in Figure 8. The percentages indicate the proportion giving *cynical* replies to each of five questions about the government in Washington. In each case exceptionally strong *Zeitgeist* effects are seen in the growth of cynicism among both parents and young adults. One seldom sees in longitudinal data the precipitous slopes especially prominent in Figures 8a, 8b, and 8c.

But the young have changed more, drawing closer to, and in two cases overtaking, parental levels. The depth of cynicism that this represents can be seen by the fact that in 1973 the young adults are consistently more cynical than were their parents in 1965, usually by a moderately wide margin. In more normal times we would have expected the younger set to change by a relatively small amount, perhaps approaching the degree of cynicism held by parents in 1965. Under the impetus of events beginning in the late 60s, however, this generation was catapulted well beyond what probably occurred in most preceding cohorts.

Despite the very rapid change among the young, for three of the five questions they still remain less cynical than their parents. This suggests that there is room for yet a further increment in the cynicism of the younger population arising solely from life-cycle effects. That likelihood is also supported by data from adult cross-section samples showing change well into adulthood among individuals as well educated as our young adults. Moreover, we would speculate that having reached this degree of cynicism, the young would be unlikely to re-embrace attitudes of trust even when the political atmosphere becomes less charged. The greater than usual advance of cynicism among the young adults would then keep the level of cynicism quite high even if the young are replaced over the next few decades by new, less cynical cohorts. We may be witnessing not only period and life-cycle effects, but also the makings of generational effects.

As political trust in the national government has declined dramatically in absolute terms, the relative place of the national government in the three-tiered U.S. system has also declined. In contrast to absolute trust, however, there are also marked age-related contrasts. These contrasts suggest the additional workings of life cycle effects.

Our evidence comes from questions about the level of government—national, state, or local—in which the respondents have the most faith and confidence and the least faith and confidence. In 1965 a majority of each generation vested more confidence in the national government, but there was a chasm between the overriding majority point of view of the younger group versus the more moderate margin among the older (Figure 9a). Based only on those figures, and making no allowance for period and life-cycle changes, one might well have predicted a continuing generational cleavage. What happened in the eight years approached landslide proportions among the young. Both generations recorded a decline, thereby fitting our presumption of period effects. But the decline was momentous among the young, bringing them into virtual congruence with their elders.

Strictly speaking it is difficult to distinguish between life-cycle and generation effects in accounting for the exaggerated movement of the filial generation. Evidence from other work suggests a similar dip at that age range among previous cohorts.[22] This would support a period/life-course hybrid model. On the other hand, as noted earlier, period effects often fall unequally on the generations. Because of their still impressionable years it is conceivable that the secular trend is falling especially hard on the young. Nor should we rule out the possibility that while period effects account for virtually all of the shift among the parents, a combination of period, generational, and life-cycle processes is operating on the young adults.

Although this is a good example of the complexities of trying to unravel the threads of change and continuity, of one thing we can be sure: for both generations trust in the federal government declined relative to other levels of government as well as absolutely. The main beneficiary of that decline was the local government and, to a much smaller extent, the state government. Figure 9b shows that local government gained slightly in the senior generation and very substantially in the younger. Again, there is presumptive evidence for

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[21] The relationship between age and cynicism among adults tends to be curvilinear and somewhat inconsistent over time. Moreover, race and social class complicate the age trends. See Miller, Brown, and Raine; and Jennings and Niemi, *Adolescence,* chapter 10.

[22] Jennings and Niemi, chapter 10.



(a) Trust government in Washington some of the time

(b) Government wastes a lot of money

(c) Government run by a few big interests

(d) Quite a few people running the government are crooked (dishonest)

(e) Quite a few people running the government don't know what they're doing

Figure 8. Political Trust and Cynicism



Figure 9. Faith and Confidence in Levels of Government

a secular shift affecting both, and either life-cycle and/or generational processes heavily affecting the younger. Regardless of the processes, the two generations are now in much closer proximity than they were eight years previously.

Opinions on Political Issues

Much of the work on age and generational conflict has centered on the diversity of views on issues of the day. Age breaks in the popular polls often reflect sizable differences between young and old. Divisions of opinion on material, economic issues have traditionally been based much more on divisions of social class than of age. But claims to prestige and recognition, differences of views on life styles, competing moral structures, conflicts over means to achieve ends, and sometimes polarization over basic changes in the political order vary often with age.[23]

We draw on judgments made about four issues in comparing our two generations over time. The resulting patterns illustrate very nicely the diverse nature of issue continuity and change.[24] Emerging as a classic example of generational cleavage is the issue of prayers in the public schools. Despite court rulings that seemed to be unfavorable to the use of prayers, this position is agreed to by only a minority within each generation at both points in time (Figure 10a). More interesting, there has been scarcely any change in either generation, with the younger group maintaining its moderate edge over the older. Given this continuing difference, it seems best to interpret the result as generationally inspired. The older generation was socialized in a time when religious interests were clearly more prominent than now and before the courts had drawn even sharper lines on the separation of church and state. Only a marked dip later on in life would bring the junior generation into accord with the older.

Another issue involving religion and the state yields a similar pattern of movement, although the opinions expressed are considerably different from those on the prayers in school issue. Figure 10b demonstrates that support for allowing speeches against churches and religion has remained very high among both generations. And the visible gap between the two generations remains, suggesting again a more or less permanent schism. Beyond that, there is evidence of a growing division. The increasing secularization of society and perhaps the residues of the free-speech movement have pushed the younger generation almost to a point of unanimity on the issue of freedom to oppose organized religion publicly.

Although prayers in school is a continuing issue which occasionally blazes into life, the third issue at hand has burned with a sustained flame over the eight-year period. To say that the federal government's role in integrating the schools has been a volatile issue and one which has seen some shifting of sides is to state the obvious. During the mid-sixties, at what may well have been the height of the civil rights movement, opinion among our respondents was very much on the side of a positive federal role in integration. Consistent with the theme of being socialized during a more ra-

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[23] On this point see Anne Foner, "The Polity," in Riley, Johnson, and Foner, *Aging*, pp. 115–159.

[24] It should be stressed that the issues for which we have longitudinal data do not include (almost by definition) issues of more recent vintage. Initial inspection of the marginals on some issues included in the 1973 wave reveals some striking differences between the generations.



Figure 10. Opinions on Political Issues

cially liberal *Zeitgeist*, the upcoming generation was more positively disposed than the older (Figure 10c).

By 1973 a downturn had set in. Slightly under one-half of each generation favored a strong federal role, and the former edge of the young adults had come close to disappearing. So strong was the decline in youth support that by 1973 they were well below the point occupied by their elders in 1965. There are any number of reasons for the fall—the busing controversy certainly being amongst them. From the long-term perspective, however, the key point is the evidence of a strong secular pull operating on both generations. In contrast to the previous issue where essentially no period effect could be observed, this one shows it in abundance, with perhaps an extra kicker effect on the young in particular.

While the secular trend has been away from the liberal position (*as of 1965*) on the school integration issue, it has been toward liberalism on an issue reflecting the waning years of the Cold War and anti-communism. About one-third within each generation agreed in 1965 that a Communist should be allowed to take an office rightfully won. By 1973 the figure had climbed appreciably for each generation, especially so for the younger one (Figure 10d). Since there is no plausible reason to suspect that Americans become less anti-Communist as a function of passing through middle age, period effects would seem to explain the increasing liberalism of each generation. As the plots reveal, however, the very modest excess liberalism of the young adults in 1965 has grown to a net difference of 15 per cent. It would be difficult to construct a life-course explanation for the enlarging gap. Rather, it would seem that the era in which the young have been socialized has led them to be more receptive to the secular trends.

As is true of most of the other domains covered in this paper, no single model adequately describes the issue positioning of the two generations over time. That the youth cohort remains more liberal after an eight-year interim suggests the formation of a standing generational contrast along a liberal-conservative dimension. And thus far it is difficult to see any life-cycle effects at work. On the other hand, there are two marked instances of secular shifts overlaid on the generational differences. One (federal role in school integration) seems to be drawing the generations together, while the other (Communists taking office) separates them still further.

Concluding Remarks

We began this discussion by noting the controversy and ambiguity surrounding the question of conflict between the generations. It is now time to take stock of where the generations stand in relation to each other in 1973 as compared with 1965. Much additional work must be done before definitive statements can be made, but simply on the basis of what we have seen thus far a clear pattern seems to be emerging.

The flow of the two generations over time has, if anything, worked to bring them closer together now than they were eight years earlier. Only in certain issue areas and in regard to partisanship were the generations noticeably pulling apart. To the extent that differences increased, they consisted of the rising generation's having emerged with slightly to moderately more liberal political views, greater independence of partisanship, and higher Democratic voting behavior. Of the other orientations covered (and others not reported in this paper), the pattern is either one of little change over time or of visible convergence. Considering that three-fifths of our young generation attended college, that approximately one-half of the males served in the military, that the country was in an uproar during much of the eight-year period, and that open efforts were made to pit the young and the middle-aged against each other, one can only marvel that the gulf did not widen rather than narrow.

Part of the explanation lies in the sorts of indicators we have used. Rather than restricting ourselves to matters of affect and preference we have also introduced measures of participation and cognition. To the extent that the generation gap hypothesis rests purely on contrasting issue preferences, the examination of these other dimensions probably reduces the likelihood of establishing a gap phenomenon.

More fundamentally, however, other processes can be seen either drawing the generations together or, less often, pulling them apart. Clearly, life-cycle effects were working primarily—but with significant exceptions—to hold the parents on a plane while drawing their offspring toward them. We saw this most vividly in the cognitive and participative domains. Period effects in some instances, most notably regarding political trust and civil rights, prompted parallel shifts in both generations. And there were, indeed, some visible signs of lasting generational effects as in information holding and certain issues of our time. Some evidence also clearly suggests nascent generation effects which may not be fully realized for some time.

On balance the forces acting to establish convergence seem to outweigh those creating divergence. True, there are forces drawing the age generations apart, and we shall address these in another place. But what stands out as we watch these two generations over time are the strong vectors acting to bring the generations in line. These come, in substantial part, from the life-space changes (e.g., marriage, family, employment, property ownership, organizational life) accompanying the aging process among the young. Those forces, while perhaps weaker now than in the past, are still massive shapers of behavior and belief. Complementing this source of convergence are the forces of contemporary history (e.g., economic conditions, war, technology, entertainment, the arts) which touch the lives of young and middle-aged alike. If the middle-aged were unresponsive to these effects, differences between the generations would persist or increase. While malleability is higher among the young, there is graphic evidence in our materials that change occurs in the middle years also. The net result of life-space changes among the young and of historical forces operating on each generation is a smoothing out of intergenerational antagonisms, a smoothing out accomplished even over the eight turbulent years covered by our observations.

Hobbes's Doctrine of Method*

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The rise of modern political science is usually associated with the rise of modern natural science and scientific method. It is often noted that Hobbes was the first modern thinker to apply the new science of nature to the study of politics and, therefore, that Hobbes was the first to argue for the use of scientific method in the study of politics. It is generally agreed that Hobbes's teaching is somehow unified by his novel use of a comprehensive method. However, with respect to the two basic parts of his teaching—his doctrine of nature and his doctrine of man and society—the character of this unity has been the subject of important controversy.

According to one interpretation, it is thought that because of Hobbes's novel application of the new scientific method, his mechanistic, antimetaphysical doctrine of matter in motion is the sole foundation for his doctrine of man and politics. Implicit in this interpretation is the understanding that if Hobbes's political teaching is governed by the new scientific method, it cannot but be physicalist and a doctrine of moral relativism. According to another interpretation, it is thought that Hobbes's doctrine of man and politics must be simply independent from and prior to his materialistic, antimetaphysical doctrine of nature. Implicit in this interpretation is the understanding that since Hobbes's political teaching is moral and so neither physicalist nor relativistic, the methodological unity of Hobbes's teaching must be superficial at best.[1]

These interpretations obtain in spite of Hobbes's apparently clear statement that the study of man as matter in motion (moral philosophy) does not "so adhere" to the study of natural right and civic duty (civil philosophy) "that they may be severed."[2] The persistence of the opposing interpretations must be attributed to Hobbes's insistence upon the value and necessity of the new scientific method. For although he argues that "moral philosophy" and "civil philosophy" may be severed and that the first principles of "civil philosophy" can be had by commonsensical introspection, he criticizes classical political philosophy for its unmethodical, unscientific uncertainty and indemonstrability.[3] According to Hobbes, the basic defect of the ancients was not a failure of commonsensical introspection, but rather a want of true method. Yet if the tradition failed for want of systematic, scientific method, and if Hobbes's political teaching is founded on common sense, it is hard to see in what the substance of Hobbes's method consists. It is not surprising that Hobbes's triumphal celebration of scientific method has engendered controversy over the unity of his teaching about man and nature.

It is my intention to suggest a new light in which to reconsider Hobbes's doctrine of method and the role it plays in the whole of his teaching about man and nature. I shall argue that Hobbes's teaching is comprehensive and unified because it is governed by the doctrine of method. The unifying role of the doctrine of method can be understood only as a function of Hobbes's intention. Hobbes believed that the theoretical reflection about politics was an essential characteristic of human nature. His intention was to reform the previously defective understanding of the relationship between this theoretical reflection and politi-

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[1] These two interpretations are not necessarily clearly stated in the Hobbes literature. However, the distinction between them is clearly at the root of the issue of the autonomy of Hobbes's theory of obligation from his empirical psychology. The two extremes are best represented by Leslie Stephens, *Hobbes* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1904), p. 73, on the one hand and A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," *Philosophy*, 13 (October, 1938), 406–24, on the other. See also M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 228, 242; Stuart M. Brown, Jr., "The Taylor Thesis: Some Objections," in *Hobbes Studies*, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 57–71; and the literature generated by Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). The dichotomy between these two interpretations, and the question of the "scientific" versus the "moral" nature of the doctrine of man are usually imposed upon Hobbes exegesis by a preinterpretive (Kantian-positivist) understanding of man and nature. Those who would seem to occupy a middle position between the two interpretations and between the question of "science" versus "morality" presuppose the distinction fashioned by the two extremes. See R. S. Peters, *Hobbes* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 43–74, 151–55, 159–62, 165–67; J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas* (London: Hutchinson, 1965), pp. 75–81. In contrast to these errors, see Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 1–5; *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 169–177.

[2] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 11 vols. (London: John Bohn, 1839–45), hereafter EW, I, 73.

[3] EW, I, 8, 73; *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), Intro., pp. 81–83.

cal practice. In the light of this intention, the doctrine of method will be shown to consist in a new rhetoric that links the resolution of the human problem to the resolution of the problem of nature facilitated by the new science of nature. Illumination of the grounds of this new rhetoric will show why the doctrine of method is less than transparent. This in turn will show the degree to which Hobbes's reformation of the traditional relationship between practice and theory stands within that very tradition.

Theory and Practice

Hobbes presents his teaching about politics as the fourth and last part of a presentation of the elements of philosophy, the parts and order of which are determined by method which "ought to be kept in all sorts of philosophy" and which determines "that such things as . . . are to be taught last cannot be demonstrated, till such as are propounded to be first treated of, be fully understood."[4] Hobbes insists that philosophy properly understood is a unified whole whose parts differ in name "because of the diversity of the matter about which they are conversant." These parts relate to the unified core of philosophy as the branches of a tree relate to the trunk, or as the seas relate to the whole of the ocean: "For treating of figures, it is called geometry, of motion, physic, of natural right, morals; put together they make up philosophy. Just as the British, the Atlantic, and the Indian seas, being diversely christened from the diversity of their shores, do notwithstanding all together make up the ocean."[5] According to the images of the tree and the ocean, the proper understanding of method ensures the unity of philosophy. With respect to practical affairs, the proper use of method will provide a "true and certain rule of our actions by which we might know whether that which we undertake be just or unjust."[6]

For Hobbes, method properly understood unites the study of human action and the study of all the things that are so as to abolish the traditional disharmony of theory and practice. It is this successful unity that illuminates the scope of Hobbes's self-proclaimed reformation of all prior teachings.[7] Hobbes's criticism of the ancients is directed not at an abstraction from the problems of political practice, but rather at a failure to resolve the problems of political practice. Hobbes does not criticize the ancients for their concern for the opinions of the vulgar; rather, he criticizes the tradition of political philosophy for merely mirroring the opinions of the vulgar. The reason for this defect was the "want of clear and exact method," which resulted in the persistence of "warring factions of philosophers," each with its own opinion of the human good and bad. Because the ancient philosophers mirrored the manifold opinions of the vulgar, they were unable to persuade the multitude as such to accept their manifold philosophic opinions.[8] Classical political philosophy was defective because of its practical inefficacy; for want of method its teachings were manifold and problematic, but diverse problematic teachings are worse than useless in practical affairs.

Since method unites the whole of philosophy so as to harmonize theory and practice, and since the defect of the ancients was want of true method, we must conclude that, for Hobbes, the practical inefficacy of the ancients was caused by their ignorance of the proper relationship between theory and practice, i.e., by their ignorance of the true unity of philosophy as such.[9]

In framing his criticism of the ancient tradition in terms of the problem of theory and practice or practical opinion, Hobbes agrees with the tradition that philosophy is linked to common opinion in an important way. For the ancients, man's practical concerns and speech led to his theoretical concerns and speech. The question of the good and the bad as it arose from practical concerns led to the question of the human good as such, and the question of the human good led to the question of the nature of human being as such. Insofar as the articulation of the human good was sought from the understanding of the whatness or being of man, it was ultimately dependent upon the understanding of the permanent or eternal structure of being in general, the whatness or nature of nature.[10]

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[4] EW, I, 87–88.

[5] *De Cive, Ep. Ded.*, EW, II, iii–iv.

[6] EW, I, 9.

[7] EW, I, ix; VII, 471; Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, pp. 1–2; Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics*, pp. 228–229; cf. Quentin Skinner, "The Ideological Context of Hobbes' Political Thought," *Historical Journal*, 9 (1966), 286–317; and Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 97.

[8] *De Cive, Ep. Ded.*, EW, II, i–vii; EW, I, 1–2, 8–10; EW, IV, 1.

[9] While the ancient geometers acquitted themselves well, the ancient moral philosophers failed to discharge their theoretical duties. For "were the nature of human actions as distinctly known as the nature of *quantity* in geometrical figures, the strength of *avarice* and *ambition*, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar as touching the nature of right and wrong, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace. . . ." EW, II, iv.

[10] *ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῆ φύσει πάση.*

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 982a19–b10; cf. *Nic. Eth.* 1094a19–27, 1096a11–1096b9, 1098a21–1098b8, 1141-

For the ancients, every prephilosophic opinion of the human good depended upon some understanding of those virtues which constitute a complete or whole human being. That is, the unarticulated theoretical content of common speech pointed to the whatness of human nature as the model for the perfection of human nature. Because common opinions were political and exclusive, they pointed to a perfection of the whole of human nature, and the perfection of this whole was manifested in the perfection of a part. Hence, just as the vulgar presumed natural superiority of some men, so the classical political philosophers took as thematic the problem of the natural superiority of some men over others, or the perfection of the whole in the light of the perfection of a part. Since the theoretical articulation of the structure of being as such was related to the prior, irreducible problems of common speech, the question of being was the metaphysical question of parts and wholes. The problem inherent in common opinion, the problem of how some men could be defective, incomplete, or less than men, was reflected in the metaphysical problem of intermediate wholes, or how wholes could be wholes by virtue of their participation in some larger whole.[11] Yet the relationship between the intelligible parts and wholes of nature remained controversial in classical metaphysics. Since the completion of practical speech depended upon the completeness of theoretical speech, the problematic nature of theoretical speech coupled with the serious urgency of practical concerns produced what Hobbes judged to be a disastrous disharmony between theory and practice. For Hobbes, the traditional ascent from practice to theory simply exacerbated the original practical problems.

When we consider the images of the tree and the seas and the criticism of the disharmony of classical philosophy, we see that Hobbes attacked neither the scope of classical thought nor its conception of the origin of theoretical speech in practice or common sense. Hobbes's teaching about method represents not a revision of a discrete teaching about man, but rather a revision of the comprehensive teaching about man and nature. We shall see that it was the aim of Hobbes's methodological revolution to preserve the traditional ascent from practice to theory, but to do so in a way that eliminated the problematic consequences of this ascent. Insofar as method unites the parts of philosophy, the teaching about method illuminates the whole of which man is a part, and in so doing, method provides the way to a demonstrable political science, a true and certain rule of human action. Hobbes was correct to recognize the connection between traditional moral doctrines, traditional metaphysics, and common opinion, and he was doubly correct to find the locus of the political problem in the problem of natural superiority. Hobbes agreed with the ancients in two important respects. First, the question of the nature of nature springs from the prior question of the human good. Second, the question of the human good is rooted (first and foremost) in vulgar or common opinion. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Hobbes's teaching begins with and is grounded upon a careful and comprehensive account of the sources and nature of human speech.

Human Nature and the Ascent From Practice to Theory

In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes presents his analysis of human speech as a part of an analysis of man's cognitive powers in general, and he discusses these powers so as to distinguish between man and the brutes. The most general classification of cognitive powers is formed by the distinction between single imaginations and "trains" of imaginations. Single imaginations are twofold. One kind, which Hobbes calls simple imaginations, represents a whole object given in sense. Hobbes calls this mode of cognition the "sense and memory of things," and he says that it is shared by man and the brutes. The other kind of single imaginations is compound imaginations, or the result of conceiving, which produces fictions of the mind such as centaurs. Unlike simple imaginations, the conceiving of compounded imaginations is "understanding" and, as such, is unique to man. For "that understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other forms of speech." The facility for compounding imaginations, understanding or the conceiving of "fictions of the mind," is the product of speech and is peculiar to man and denied to the brutes.[12]

Trains of imaginations are twofold. One kind is unregulated, where there is no "passionate

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a9–20; Plato *Republic* 504b1–541b5. For the ancients the distinction between theory and practice, speech and deed, depended upon the thematic connection between them. See Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963), p. 167.

[11] See Plato *Republic* 514a–520d; *Meno* 70a1–4, 71b–c1, 72a6–d1, 86e1–87d8. *Apology* 37e2–38a10; Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1023b13–1024a10; *Nic. Eth.* 1097a15–1098b7, 1102a5–1102a28, 1141a9–1141b14, 1177a13–1179a33; *Politics* 1252b28–1253a1, 1253a7–19, 1261a17–25, 1274b39–1275a5, 1276b16–1277b33, 1324a23–33.

[12] *Leviathan*, chap. 2, pp. 89, 93–94; chap. 3, pp. 94–99; cf. EW, I, 399.

thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself, as the end and scope of some desire or other passion."[13] Conversely, regulated trains of imaginations or thoughts are governed by some directing desire or design. As a general classification, trains of imaginations are common to both man and the brutes. That is, mental discourse, in the most general sense, is shared by man and the brutes. But regulated trains of thoughts or imaginations are also twofold. One kind is "when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast." The other kind is "when imagining any thing whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it."[14] This distinction between regulated thought from effect to a possible cause and regulated thought from a cause to a possible effect is described by Hobbes as the distinction between mere prudence and science. The possibility of science is grounded on the possibility of speech and reason, which are "attained by industry in the apt imposing of names." Hobbes argues, then, that while prudence is common to man and beast, science is unique to man.[15] In the *Leviathan*, the distinctly human capacities of speech and reason, which produce conceptions or fictions of the mind and science, constitute an essential difference between man and the brutes.

In his earlier writings, Hobbes is very careful to point out that man differs essentially from the brutes because of speech and reason and that speech and reason are always manifested as the problematic articulation of the good and the bad. In the *De Homine* Hobbes argues that the speech-like communication of the animals is not, in fact, speech because "animals do not know that words are constituted by the will of man for the purpose of signification," and because any possible signification that does occur when the animals call is "forced out," not by will, but "out of the necessity of nature."[16] Man is different from the brutes because of reason and speech, and this difference reflects the difference between instinct and will.

Speech and reason facilitate the willful articulation of need and desire, and the nature of human reason and speech is primordially practical. In the *De Homine* and in the early presentation of his political science in the *De Cive*, Hobbes is very explicit about the meaning of the difference between man and the brutes. There Hobbes argues that the natural capacity of human speech results in the human opining about the good and the bad. It is for this reason that human society is fundamentally different from the society of bees or ants or any other brute (mute) creature. "In those creatures living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace among them, than barely their natural inclination." The brutes, devoid of speech and reason, can see no defect "in the administration of their commonweals," nor can they "distinguish between injury and harm."[17] The distinction between animal instinct and rational human will consists in the human opining about the good and the bad. To be human is to be rational, and to be rational is to be the speaker of opinion. This opinion is political and problematic, however, because in seeking the good it produces disagreements, conflict, and harm. When we consider the *De Homine*, the *De Cive*, and the *Leviathan*, we see that, for Hobbes, reflection about the nature of human speech reveals the incorrigible priority of practical speech or opinion. But opinion is inherently controversial. The difference between man and the brutes is that man is the rational and political animal.[18]

Hobbes's analysis of man as the speaking, rational, political animal suggests an essential difference between man and the brutes. It also suggests that a necessary characteristic of this essential humanity is a moral-political problematic that is in need of solution or resolution by the natural gift of articulate reason. It suggests the need, therefore, for a resolution of the metaphysical question of the whatness of human being as the ground for the articulation of human excellence or perfection. Hobbes's analysis of man's essential nature suggests the metaphysical ascent from practice to theory. However, that work which combines the description of man as the rational, political animal with a thematic account of the scope of man's cognitive powers subverts the possibility of the metaphysical ascent from practice to theory. In the *Leviathan*, the rational power of understanding or conceiving is limited to the production of fictions of the mind, and that reason which illuminates the nature of things is identified with a narrow understanding of science as the demonstrable knowledge of cause and effect.

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[13] *Leviathan*, chap. 3, p. 95; EW, IV, 14–15.

[14] *Ibid.*, chap. 3, p. 96.

[15] *Ibid.*, chap. 3, pp. 97–99; chap. 5, pp. 110–118; EW, IV, 28–29; cf. *De Homine*, X. 1, *Thomae Hobbes, Malmesburiensis, Opera Philosophica Quae Latine Scripsit Omnia*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 5 vols. (London: John Bohn, 1839–1845), hereafter LW, II, 89.

[16] *De Homine*, X, 1, LW, II, 88–89. I have used the translation in *Man and Citizen*, ed. Bernard Gert (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 37–38.

[17] *De Cive*, V, EW, II, 66–67.

[18] *De Homine*, X, 3, LW, II, 90–92, Gert, *Man and Citizen*, pp. 39–41; *Leviathan*, chap. 3, p. 98; chap. 4, pp. 100–102; chap. 5, p. 115–18; chap. 6.

In the thematic discussion of speech and reason in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes argues that speech makes possible the "registration of the consequences of our thoughts," the signification of conceptions one to another, and the signification of desires and fears. He refines this to a fourfold list of commodities: registration of what we find to be the cause of things present or past, and what things present will produce an effect, showing others what knowledge we have attained, making known our wills for mutual help, and, finally, the pleasing or delighting of ourselves. The virtue of speech is truth, and the means to this virtue is right definition, "so that in right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science."[19] As he continues, however, the first use of reason becomes the only use of reason and hence the sole perfection of reason. So reason is defined as the adding and subtracting (of words or numbers) that is the "conceiving of the consequences of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part to the name of the other part."[20] This reason is perfected by the "apt imposing of names" by "getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another. . . . " The aim of this proceeding is to "come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that it is men call science."[21] The scope of the knowledge produced by science is, however, strictly limited to the knowledge of cause and effect. For Hobbes then argues that

> whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact [and common to man and beast], which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which what we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power we see how to produce the like effect.[22]

In the *Leviathan*, the scope of human reason is identified with science understood as the knowledge of cause and effect. That mode of reason which would illuminate the potentially metaphysical question of the whatness of things is said to produce fictions of the mind or, as nonfictional, is dismissed as "nothing else but sense and memory," and, as such, is no part of the uniquely human capacity of reason.[23] The *Leviathan* admits the practical origins of human reason and then denies to reason the self-reflective capacity to resolve or account for the problems that are equiprimordial with the practical origins of reason. In the *Leviathan*, the ends and perfection of reason are based upon abstraction from the origins of speech and reason. Hence the question of the whatness of things, which, by means of the metaphysical ascent from practice to theory, would account for the problems illuminated by practical speech, is assimilated to the question of the "how" or material causes of things revealed by the knowledge of cause and effect.

Although the *Leviathan* suggests a teaching about the essential nature or being of man, it subverts the speech necessary for the complete articulation of human nature or being. The account of reason and speech in the *Leviathan* supports the interpretation that construes Hobbes's doctrine of method as identical with his mechanistic, materialistic science of nature, which admits as the only intelligible question the "how" of cause and effect. In the *Leviathan*, method is presented as the beginning of discourse with proper definition or the apt imposition of names for the purpose of seeking knowledge of cause and effect. It is on the basis of this understanding of method that, in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes presents a debunking attack on the "absurdity" of scholastic or traditional metaphysics.[24]

But there is something curiously weak about Hobbes's attack on traditional metaphysics. If method is the beginning of discourse with agreed-upon definitions, then surely the practitioners of traditional metaphysics were proper users of method. In fact, it is obvious that Hobbes's criticism is directed not at the failure to begin with definitions, but rather at the failure to begin with certain *specific* definitions, those of body and accident.[25] But the discussion of speech and reason in the *Leviathan* provides no thematic account of proper and defective definitions, or, specifically, of the proper and defective notions of body and accident. The *Leviathan* provides no account of why the perfection of reason must be identified with the perfection of science as the knowledge of cause and effect. The account of speech, reason, and method in the *Leviathan* is too weak to ground an attack upon traditional metaphysics and, therefore, shows a disproportion between the teaching of the *Leviathan* and its rhetorical or polemical content.[26] Moreover, with respect to the foundations of a methodological political science, there is no account of the relationship between the definitions of proper method and the maxims of introspective common sense. It would seem, however, that the explication of this relationship is crucial to the very possibility of a new demonstrable political science. In sum, the *Leviathan* provides little or no information about the method which accounts for the superiority of Hobbes's science of politics over all prior teachings. The *Leviathan*, however, does not present the only Hobbesian account of reason, speech, and method. Whereas the *Leviathan* appears to debunk the rational and metaphysical question of the whatness of things, the account of method in the *De Corpore* depends upon the distinction between the questions of the "how" and the "what" and maintains the integrity of both. There is a rhetorical veil over the positive teaching of the *Leviathan*, and this veil is not immediately apparent.

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[19] *Leviathan,* chap. 4, pp. 101–102, 104–106.

[20] *Ibid.,* chap. 5, p. 110.

[21] *Ibid.,* chap. 5, p. 115.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.,* chap. 7, p. 131; chap. 9, pp. 147–148.

[24] *Ibid.,* chap. 1, pp. 86–87; chap. 4, pp. 107–108; chap. 5, pp. 112–115; chap. 8, pp. 146–147.

[25] *Ibid.,* chap. 5, pp. 114–15; see EW, I, 55–62.

[26] In chapter 34 of the *Leviathan,* Hobbes provides no thematic discussion of body and thus no defense or discussion of why "substance" is identical to "body" or why the universe is simply "the Aggregate of all Bodies." Hobbes appeals to the "general Acceptation"

The Doctrine of Method

Hobbes begins the *De Corpore* with a discussion of the nature of philosophy, reason, and method. Philosophy "is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation: And again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects."[27] Hobbes follows this definition with a remark about the distinction between sense and memory, on the one hand, and philosophy on the other. Sense and memory are not to be thought of as philosophy because they are not "gotten by ratiocination," that is, they are not the product of regulated thoughts and words or speech. In an echo of the *Leviathan*, Hobbes debunks the cognitive status of prudence, which, being but memory, "is not to be esteemed philosophy." In the *De Corpore*, however, Hobbes uses the term "philosophy" rather than "science" for the ratiocinative knowledge of cause and effect. "Science" (*scientia*) is used for the more general notion of knowledge as such. Also, whereas sense and memory are described as *cognitiones* simply, *philosophia* is described as *cognitiones* governed by *ratiocinatio*.[28] In order to understand the difference between "philosophy" and prudence or mere sense and memory, it is necessary to understand the nature of human reason or ratiocination.

The discussion of ratiocination in the *De Corpore* reveals not simply a twofold cognitive distinction between prudence and philosophy, but a threefold cognitive distinction between prudence, ratiocinative knowledge, and philosophy as a part or kind of ratiocinative knowledge. The analysis of ratiocination in the *De Corpore* explicates the uniquely human capacity of conceiving or understanding and shows it to be linked to the phenomenon of human will. But unlike the *Leviathan*, the *De Corpore* does not limit the scope of reason or intelligibility to fictive imagination and the knowledge of cause and effect. The distinction between "*scientia*" and the specific term "philosophy" is introduced to expand the range of rational cognitive activity beyond the narrow limits of the *Leviathan*.[29]

Hobbes describes ratiocination as the conceptual computation or the collecting of the sum of many things added together or subtracted. Things so added or subtracted are things considered, computed, reasoned, or reckoned. Hobbes gives a revealing example of such ratiocination when he describes a man who sees something from afar and has the idea of "body." Coming closer, the new idea of "animated" is added to "body," and then, in similar fashion, the idea "rational" is added to those of "body" and "animated." Finally, the man looking "fully and distinctly" upon the object, he "conceives all that he has seen as one thing." "*Denique quando totam rem ut unam plene jam et distincte visam concipit. . . .*"[30] The last idea is compounded of the former ideas, "which are put together in the mind in the same order in which these three single names, body, animated, rational, are in speech compounded into this one name, body-animated-rational, or man." The function of ratiocination is the articulation of the properties of things, which are the

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of the word *body* in order to refute the fabulous religious dogma of incorporeal substance; there is no serious consideration of the problems of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In chapter 46 Hobbes clearly states his rhetorical intention. He attacks the "school Divinity," which transforms Aristotle's *Metaphysics* into "Books of supernatural philosophy," in order to prevent men from using its "vain philosophy" as the ground for appeal from government and obedience. It is rarely noted that in this chapter Hobbes suggests a difference between Aristotle, who feared the fate of Socrates, and the fabulous "Aristotelity" of the schools. *Leviathan*, chap. 34, pp. 428–429; chap. 46, pp. 688–689, 691–692. See pp. 1348–1349 and nn. 56–60, *infra*.

[27] EW, I, 3; cf. EW, I, 387.

[28] LW, I, 2–3. In describing the end of knowledge, Hobbes remarks, "*Scientia propter potentiam; Theorema (quod apud Geometras proprietatis investigatio est) propter problemata, id est propter artem construendi; omnis denique speculatio, actionis vel operis alicujus gratia instituta est.*" LW, I, 6. Given the prior composition and publication of the *Leviathan*, this usage, consistent throughout the *De Corpore*, cannot be attributed to an "earlier stage" of Hobbes's scientific development.

[29] Both terms are used in the *Leviathan*. They are not differentiated, however, by an analysis of ratiocination that articulates the possibility of knowing the whatness of things, which is not simply the knowing of cause and effect or mere "prudence." See *Leviathan*, chap. 9, p. 149; chap. 46, p. 682.

[30] LW, I, 3–4.

facilities or powers of bodies, which make us distinguish them from one another; that is to say, conceive one body to be equal or unequal, like or unlike, as in the example above, when coming near enough to any body, we perceive the motion and going of the same, we distinguish it thereby from a tree, a column, and other fixed bodies; and so that motion or going is the property thereof, as being proper to living creatures, and a faculty by which they make us distinguish them from the bodies.[31]

From these remarks about ratiocination it is clear that the most general function of human reason is to provide answers to the question of what a thing is rather than to the question of its material causes or how a thing is. Sense and memory simply are not ratiocination or rational and they are, therefore, not to be confused with "philosophy" which is. But there can be ratiocination *from* sense and memory which is not "philosophy" or the knowledge of cause and effect, and which is the articulation of the whatness or being of particulars. All "philosophy" is reason, but not all reason is "philosophy." As such, then, reason is the whole of intelligibility of which "philosophy," or knowledge of cause and effect, is a part. Indeed, in the sequel Hobbes argues for the logical priority of the question of "what" over the question of "how."

Hobbes is concerned to delimit the scope of "philosophy" or knowledge of cause and effect. The matter of which it treats is "every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which may, by consideration thereof, compare with other bodies or which is capable of composition and resolution; that is to say, every body of whose generation or properties we can have any knowledge."[32] This limit may be deduced from the definition of "philosophy" whose "profession it is to search out the properties of bodies from their generation, or their generation from their properties, and therefore, where there is no generation or property, there is no philosophy." This limit excludes theology, because of God "there is nothing neither to divide nor compound, nor any generation to be conceived"; it also excludes natural and political history, which are not the products of ratiocination. The important point to note here is that the rejection of God as a subject of "philosophy" depends upon the knowledge, general and negative as it may be, of the whatness of God, His eternity, ungeneratedness, and incomprehensibility. As such, the articulation of God's nature represents the limit of our powers of philosophizing. But, as the limiting condition of "philosophy", the general, negative knowledge of God is included in the intelligible scope of ratiocination.[33] History is excluded from the scope of "philosophy" because its subject matter does not consist of ratiocinated whatnesses but is simply the product of experience or sense and memory. The exclusion of history is determined, therefore, by the intelligible distinction between rationally articulated whatnesses and the unarticulated brute facts of nature. The scope of "philosophy" is determined by ratiocination, which is itself not identical with "philosophy" or the knowledge of cause and effect, and the question of "what" is, therefore, logically prior to the causal question of "how." The question of the properties of things is not identical to or reducible to the question of material causes or generation.

The autonomy and priority of the "what" question over the "philosophic" or "how" question suggests the possibility of the metaphysical ascent from practice to theory. It suggests that the problems generated by the theoretical content of practical speech may be resolved by a theoretical account of the whatness or being of man and nature. Hobbes's remarks about the ends of knowledge are, therefore, of especial importance.

Hobbes speaks first of the end or scope of "philosophy," which "is that we may use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that, by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength, and industry will permit, for the commodity of human life."[34] He then remarks that "the end of knowledge (*scientia*) is power," and that the scope of all speculation is "the performing of some action, or thing to be done." He argues that the utility of "philosophy," especially of natural philosophy and geometry, is best understood by "reckoning up the chief commodities of which mankind is capable." Thus the "end" and "utility" of "philosophy" are the same, that is, the "commodity of human life"; for "the inward glory and triumph of mind that a man may have for the mastering of some difficult and doubtful matter, or for the discovery of some hidden truth, is not worth so much pains as the study of philosophy requires. . . ."[35] Insofar as the end of "philosophy" is some human good, that good is identified with the useful. Hobbes speaks of the end of knowledge or speculation, that is, of the rational whole of which "philosophy" is a part, in terms of the Baconian equation of knowledge and power or human "commodity." This end is inherent in the very structure of human reason, which, to be reason, must be regulated by some desire or need. This end of utility encompasses reason and "philosophy," as whole and part, and, therefore, the questions of "what" and "how." The articulation of whatness, or beings or properties, is bounded and determined, then, by the structure and end of human reason, which is human utility or the good for man.[36]

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[31] EW, I, 3–6; LW, I, 5; cf. EW, IV, 24–27.

[32] EW, I, 10.

[33] The articulation of whatness and hence the objects of ratiocination can include, for Hobbes, negative properties. See EW, I, 27. Unless the existence of God is simply denied, the implication is that God is corporeal and finite. Hobbes repeats Bacon's Promethean heresy. EW, I, 98–101, 117–19, 411–12; cf. Bacon, *De Sapientia Veterum*, XI; *Essays*, XVI, XVII; "The Advancement of Learning," *Works*, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, 14 vols. (London: 1857–1874), III, 295–319. See pp. 1343–1344, *infra*.

[34] EW, I, 7.

[35] *Ibid.*

The end and scope of man's reason are co-determined by the articulation of the whatness of things and the conquest of man over nature. Thus, when men answer the question of the whatness of any thing in nature, the whatness articulated is the product of the ability of the thing to be sensed and then compounded by reason and the possibilities that make up its utile characteristics as the object of "philosophic" knowledge. For Hobbes, to be intelligible is to be the object of conceptual compounding and subtracting and to be the object of human use. Therefore, the intelligible entities illuminated by the answers to the questions of "what" and "how" must be characterized in some way by purposiveness or teleology. In the light of the scope and end of reason, which combine the questions of what and how, intelligible natural entities can be fully intelligible only in relation to the human good, which is articulated in terms of perfection and defect, or, to speak generally, wholes and parts.

We recall that, for Hobbes, theoretical speech springs from the prior question of the human good. Since all men are opiners about human excellence and hence about the whatness of man, the seeds of reason and knowledge as such are the prereflective moral opinions that constitute the problem of the public good.[37] Since the end of all knowledge is the human good, both the beginning and the end of reason and knowledge must be rooted in practical speech.

We recognize here the elements of the traditional ascent from practice to theory, but we see also the elements of Hobbes's reinterpretation of that ascent. The theoretical question of the whatness of things arises from practical discourse, but the being of nature is illuminated and constituted by the perfection of man's ability to complete himself through the conquest of nature by science. Science does not subvert the intelligibility of the question of the whatness of things; indeed the new science presupposes this question and its relation to practical discourse. Instead of debunking the very notion of final cause, Hobbes argues that "a final cause has no place but in such things as have sense and will; and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an efficient cause."[38] Man's study of the parts or the whole of nature is not the contemplation of the model of being, but is, rather, the study of how these parts become intelligible parts of an intelligible whole by means of human scientific power. Instead of natural teleology as the standard for morality, moral teleology is the standard of the intelligibility of nature or the whole of man and nature.

For the ancients, the teleology of nature was connected to the human good, or the teleology of man, because the proper understanding of the relationship between the parts and wholes of the intelligible beings of nature, or beings as such, provided an answer to the practical and prior question of the whatness of man and hence of the perfection of man. This ascent is metaphysical because the beings so illuminated are the eternal beings that provide stable guidance for the ephemeral, changeable speakers who seek out the whatness of man and nature. Thus both with respect to the practical content of prior common speech, and the way of metaphysical ascent itself, the metaphysical question is the question of whole and part. For the ancients, the strict resolution of the problems of practical discourse depended upon the resolution of the theoretical problem of natural, intelligible parts and wholes. Classical teleology was natural because the unstable moral context of speech was to be stabilized by the eternal teaching of theoretical speech. To the extent that natural teleology was problematic, then the understanding of the human good was problematic. In respect of the different requisites of practical and philosophic life, and in respect of the dependence of practical, political doctrine upon a problematic metaphysics of nature, the traditional ascent from practice to theory resulted in the disharmony of practice and theory.

As we have seen, Hobbes's intention was to preserve the traditional ascent from practice to theory, but to do so in a way that eliminated the disharmony of practice and theory. His intention was to replace the problematic metaphysics of nature with a putatively unproblematic conquest of man over nature, and the vehicle for this replacement was the doctrine of method. Within the framework of the ascent from practice to theory, the practical, yet moral-theoretical question of the whatness of man was to be answered and resolved by the metaphysics of man as the conqueror of nature, which identifies man as the locus of the intelligibility of nature.

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[36] "For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stediness of the minds motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence," *Leviathan*, chap. 8, p. 139.

[37] *De Cive*, V, EW, II, 66–67; *De Homine* X, 3, LW, II, 90–92. Man is, therefore, the speaking, rational, *political* animal. Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1252b28–1253a20.

[38] EW, I, 131–132. So " . . . the knowledge of the essence of anything is the cause of the knowledge of the thing itself; for, if I first know that a thing is *rational*, I know from thence, that the same is man; but this is no other than an efficient cause."

It is the conquest of nature by human science that permits the metaphysical ascent from practice to theory. For classical metaphysics, the whatnesses or wholes of nature were morally and theoretically intelligible by virtue of their eternal and unchanging natures: hence their status as eternal standards of guidance for the ephemeral and changeable circumstances of practical life. These beings were universals because of their eternity in contrast to the noneternal particulars of which they were models. In this sense philosophy was coextensive with political philosophy, and the question of natural right was *the* philosophic question.[39] For Hobbes, the eternal whatness or being of nature resolves the problems of practical discourse because being is intelligible in the light of the fulfillment or completion of human needs and desires. The metaphysical relation of eternal universal to noneternal particular exists because of the possible corruptibility of any particular, and yet the eternity of intelligible whatness or being depends upon the eternal possibility of at least one particular; the eternity of the intelligible whatness of nature consists in and depends upon the eternity of the human species. The new relationship of practice and theory produces an audacious scientific humanism: the world is an intelligible, eternal whole because man is the creature who can create his own eternity. It is no wonder, then, that Hobbes criticizes Socrates for trying to bring philosophy down from the heavens.[40]

In the light of the intended unproblematic ascent from practice to theory, the task of the doctrine of method is twofold. First, it must facilitate the articulation of nature so that nature will be intelligible *solely* in the light of human conquest. Method must harmonize the fact that, because of the natural structure of human speech and reason, nature conquered and articulated by man is theoretically and morally intelligible, with the requirement that nature conquered and articulated must not by itself be a model for human being or perfection. Since Hobbes teaches that the origin, structure, and end of speech and reason are practical, and that practical speech generates the practical-theoretical problem of parts and wholes, the doctrine of method must facilitate the illumination of nature in such a way that abstracts from the problem of parts and wholes. Nature conquered must be theoretically and morally intelligible, but it must be so in a way that tempts no attempt to secure from that intelligibility a solution to the problem of parts and wholes.

The second task of the doctrine of method is prescribed by the first. Since nature conquered must be stripped of its character as a model for human being, the *unproblematic* ascent from practice to theory depends upon the reformation of the *sources* of moral and theoretical discourse. The second task of the doctrine of method is, then, the reformation of common speech. However, because of the natural structure of speech and reason, this reformation can be accomplished only by means of a new methodological rhetoric.

Hobbes begins his thematic discussion of method with the crucial distinction between two kinds of knowledge, knowledge *that* something *is* and knowledge of *how* something is. He says that

> in knowledge by *sense*, the *whole* object is more known, than any *part* thereof; as when we see a man, the conception or whole idea of that man is first or more known, than the particular ideas of his being figurate, animate, and rational; that is, we first see the whole man, and take notice of his being, before we observe him in those other particulars. And therefore, in any knowledge of the ὅτι, or *that* anything *is*, the beginning of our search is from the whole idea; and contrarily, in our knowledge of the διότι, or the causes of anything, that is, in the sciences, we have more knowledge of the causes of the parts than of the whole. For the causes of the whole [in knowledge τοῦ διότι] is compounded of the causes of the parts; but it is necessary that we

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[39] So for the ancients although man was not the highest thing, the contemplation of the highest things was always mediated by the problems of the human things. See Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* 1141a21–1141b14; n. 10, *supra.*

[40] *De Cive,* Preface, EW, II, x. Hobbes argues that the most "profitable part of natural science" is the science of man's body. The new science of nature aims to fulfill the desire for eternal life denied man by a jealous God. For Hobbes, as for Bacon and Descartes, medicine is the real queen of the sciences. EW, I, viii; cf. Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode,* Sixième Partie, in *Oeuvres et Lettres,* ed. A. Bridoux (Paris, 1952), pp. 168–169; Bacon, *De Augmentis* IV: 3; *Novum Organum* II: 1. The fact that knowledge of the infinite is a function of human imagination and is limited by human imagination would be affected, of course, by the possible eternity of human imagination. Hobbes never argues that man is necessarily a finite or ephemeral being, but rather argues that knowledge of what is infinite can never be attained by a finite inquirer. The question of the infinite is not the question of the beginning or eternity of the world, but of the ability of man to conquer natural decay or the Baconian equation of knowledge and power. See EW, I, 7, 98–101, 411–412; cf. Bacon, *De Sapientia Veterum,* XI. Hobbes's science of nature does not result in a radical materialism. "First philosophy" does not exhaust the intelligible illumination of nature and does not result in a *materia prima* as the separable and ontologically real ground beneath a putative phenomenal reality. EW, I, 118. Hobbes unabashedly speaks of the accidents of "*Politique* Bodies"; surely such bodies are not merely corporeal entities. See n. 45, *infra.*

know the things that are to be compounded before we know the whole compound.[41]

Hobbes's terminological distinctions are a proximal guide to the interpretation of this important passage. Earlier in the *De Corpore*, sense and memory were described as unmodified *cognitiones* in contrast to "philosophy." The difference between the knowledge had by the brutes and that had by man was said to consist in ratiocination, which is *conceptual* computation and compounding. In the *De Corpore*, ratiocination as conception was *not* characterized as mere fictive imagination, and, more importantly, ratiocination proved to be first and foremost the knowledge of the whatness of things. As Hobbes introduced the term "*scientia*" to the dyad of prudence and "philosophy," so he introduced the ratiocinative knowledge of the whatness of things to the dyad of sense and memory and knowledge of cause and effect.[42] In the present context, the *cognitione autem sensuum*, which informs knowledge τοῦ ὅτι, is characterized as conceiving: "ut cum videmus hominem, prius notus, seu notior est *conceptus*, sive idea illa tota hominis, quam particulares ideae *figurati*, *animati*, *rationalis*. . . ."[43] The use of *conceptus* in the explanation of knowledge τοῦ ὅτι, in conjunction with the obvious choice of example, points to the prior discussion of ratiocination. In the light of this prior discussion, with its distinction and connection between sense and memory simply and the conceiving of the whatness of things, the discussion of knowledge τοῦ ὅτι must be seen not as the explication of brute facticity, but as the explication of the articulation of the whatness of things.

In speaking of our knowledge *that* a thing *is*, Hobbes uses a term, τό ὅτι, that points to the traditional account of substance. Thus he also points to the traditional distinctions between first and second substance and between τόδε τι (thisness) and τί ἐστι (whatness), and so to the way these concepts were related in the rich and complex problematic of substance. At the same time, however, Hobbes provides no comprehensive account or critique of the traditional problematic of substance. We must note the presence of a remarkably subtle and circumspect rhetoric. Hobbes speaks of knowledge τοῦ ὅτι, of the mere fact that things are, and yet directs us to his understanding of the question of the whatness of things. He indicates the way this understanding stands within the metaphysical tradition, and yet he abstracts from the problems generated by the tradition.

In the light of the logical priority of the question of the whatness of things, the knowledge of causes (τό διότι) is itself a mode of the knowledge of the whatness of things, though distinguished from the knowledge of the whatness of things simply. The distinction drawn here is not merely between the "what" and the "how," but is itself a division of the "what." This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the descriptions of both kinds of knowledge speak of wholes and parts, or the categories which govern conceiving or the articulation of the whatness of things. The crucial point, then, is the precise nature of these wholes and parts.[44]

From the perspective of the "that/what" simply, or common sense, every particular is a whole, e.g., a man. Thus with respect to our knowledge of "that/what" that is the rational extension of common sense, we are more concerned with, or "know more," things as they appear to us in common sense. When we reason about things or the parts of things, we reason about them as things toward which we comport ourselves in the everyday world. Thus when we speak of man in practical, moral discourse we speak of man as we encounter him in practical life and not as matter in motion. In the latter case man would not differ from elephants or trees, and this difference is essential for moral and practical discourse.[45] In the light of the practical origin and end of human reason, however, the question of the "that/what" simply is characterized by the moral and theoretical content of common speech. Since human reason is first characterized by opinion about the good and the bad and since this opinion is political and problematic, man's rational nature produces "diverse opinions concerning him who hath the supreme power." This diversity causes the fact that "those persons, who by some are looked on as best are by others esteemed to be the worst of all men."[46] The opinions of common speech articulate prereflective notions about those virtues which constitute human perfection. Because these opinions are political and exclusive, they claim to illuminate the perfection of the whole of man in the light of the perfection of a part. Thus the tendency of common speech is the articulation of the whatness of man that teaches natural superiority, or completeness and defect, and poses for theoretical resolution the problem of intermediate wholes, where parts can be wholes and wholes must be wholes by virtue of their participation in some larger whole.

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[41] EW, I, 66–67. Hobbes's emphasis.

[42] See pp. 1341–1343, *supra*.

[43] LW, I, 59.

[44] We are again reminded of the possibility of ratiocination from sense and memory, which is not simply reducible to reasoning about cause and effect, and of the logical priority of the question of the whatness of things.

[45] "Homo enim non modo *corpus naturale* est, sed etiam civitatis, id est (ut ita loquar) *corporis politici* pars. Quamobrem considerandus erat tum ut homo tum ut civis; id est, ultima physicae cum principiis politicae conjungenda erant, difficillima cum facillimis." *De Homine, Ep. Ded.*, LW, II. see also *Leviathan*, Intro., pp. 81–83; EW, I, 73–75.

[46] *De Cive*, VII, EW, II, 94. So among men there is, because of speech, a "contestation of honor and preferment," and "man scarce esteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more than that which others do possess," and some men suppose themselves "wiser than the others" and hence claim to rule. *De Cive*, V, EW, II, 66–67; see *Leviathan*, chap. 13, pp. 184–185; chap. 17, pp. 225 ff.

In this light Hobbes's remarks in the immediate sequel are important. Of the knowledge we have of the causes of things (τό διότι) he argues that "by parts I do not here mean parts of the thing itself, but parts of its nature as, by the parts of man, I do not understand his head, or his shoulders, his arms, etc., but his figure, quantity, motion, sense, reason, and the like; which accidents being compounded or put together constitute the whole nature of man, but not the man himself."[47] The import of these remarks is that wholes or whatnesses, when studied from the perspective of knowledge τοῦ διότι, are constituted of parts abstracted from wholes or whatnesses as they appear in common sense. As such they are determinate and differentiable like the wholes of common sense or practical speech, but they cannot be intermediate wholes. The problem of part and whole as it arises from common speech (parts as wholes and wholes as parts) is eliminated from wholes that are intelligible in the light of common (moral) speech. When we speak of wholes as the subject of knowledge τοῦ διότι, the knowledge of any particular is identical with the knowledge of any other like particular. The problem of the superiority or ontological completeness of any part or whole is simply unintelligible from the perspective of knowledge τοῦ διότι.

Hobbes concludes his discussion of parts and wholes by remarking that

> this is the meaning of that common saying, namely, that some things are more known to us, others more known to nature; for I do *not* think that they, which so distinguish, mean that something is known to nature, which is known to no man; and therefore, by those things, that are more known to us, we are to understand things we take note of by our senses, and by more known to nature, those we acquire the knowledge of by reason; for in this sense it is, that the whole, that is, those things that have universal names (which, for brevity's sake I call universal) are much more known to us than the parts, that is, such things as have names less universal (which I therefore call *singular*); and the causes of the parts are more known to nature than the cause of the whole; that is, universals than singulars.[48]

Hobbes again emphasizes that knowledge τοῦ ὅτι originates in common sense and ratiocination and adds that, with respect to the knowledge of cause and effect (τό διότι), the part is prior in importance to any phenomenal whole. Hence, in the knowledge of cause and effect we can abstract from things as they appear in common sense and see these wholes as the product of universal cause or, for Hobbes, matter in motion. As such the determinate and differentiable wholes are merely the inescapable phenomenal appearances that mediate the reality of universal matter in motion. Thus the beings articulated by the knowledge of cause and effect have twofold natures. First, they are determinate, differentiable wholes that are intelligible in the light of common sense and common (moral) speech.[49] Second, they are mere appearances or modes of universal cause and so susceptible to human use and conquest.[50] Wholes in this latter sense would have no inherent nature that would hinder their being subjected to human use, save for the limitations of matter.

It is the miracle of Hobbes's doctrine of method that the twofold nature of the wholes of knowledge τοῦ διότι links the morally intelligible whatnesses of common sense and practical speech to the beings that, according to the new science, are merely the objects of human utility.[51] The new science combines the illumination of the things of nature (including the human things) as morally determinate whatnesses with the reduction of those things for human use. The new science, then, facilitates the human conquest of nature whereby human being becomes the model for being as such. That is, insofar as the beings of knowledge τοῦ διότι are determinate wholes that originate in common sense, they become morally intelligible whatnesses by means of their being the objects of human use. They are morally intelligible in the light of the human needs and desires, articulated by common speech, that they complete or fulfill. The most important point for Hobbes is that the whatnesses illuminated by science answer the question of the "what" as it arises from practical discourse, but eliminate the problem of intermediate wholes. With this teaching about natural parts and wholes, Hobbes completes the first task of the doctrine of method.

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[47] EW, I, 67.

[48] EW, I, 67–68.

[49] The objects of universal cause must always be determinate, differentiable phenomenal wholes particularized "according to some certain accidents or accident" lest "all agents, seeing that all bodies are alike, would produce like effects in all patients." EW, I, 121.

[50] The principles of first philosophy are "the first principles by which we know the διότι of things." The metaphysics of first philosophy, or natural philosophy universal, which teaches the nature of motion as universal cause, is, therefore, determined by method and the distinction between knowledge τοῦ ὅτι and τοῦ διότι. The order of study that proceeds from first philosophy or the study of universal cause is from first philosophy to geometry, and then to mechanics or the study of the effects of one body upon another, then to physics, and finally to moral philosophy, which studies man as "the subject of physical contemplation." EW, I, 69–73, 87–88.

[51] See n. 22, *supra; Leviathan,* chap. 5, p. 115. Cf. EW, VII, 183–184. So far is the knowledge of cause and effect from being the sole knowledge of the phenomena of nature that physics is, of itself, indemonstrable. Only when causes are in our power is the knowledge of cause and effect demonstrable with respect to the phenomena of nature. It is for this reason that *both* knowledge from cause to effect and knowledge from effect to cause are parts of philosophy or science rather than science and prudence respectively.

It may be objected that this interpretation ignores the ambiguity of Hobbes's remarks about the nature of parts. They might seem to refer as much to his definition of knowledge τοῦ ὅτι as to knowledge τοῦ διότι. In fact, this ambiguity strengthens rather than weakens the present analysis of Hobbes's teaching about method. If his remarks refer also to knowledge τοῦ ὅτι, then it should be argued that Hobbes presents a new or different picture of common speech than has hitherto been seen. In fact, this is what Hobbes does. The theoretical perspective of knowledge τοῦ ὅτι, originating as it does in the moral context of common speech, illuminates the possibility of intermediate wholes, which is not the case for the theoretical perspective of knowledge τοῦ διότι. Thus the difference between wholes illuminated by the two perspectives consists in the possibility of intermediate wholes. Yet the ascent from practice to theory requires the theoretical explication of intermediate wholes; it requires the theoretical resolution of the problem inherent in the theoretical content of common speech. Thus, the conquest of nature facilitated by the new science of cause and effect makes possible the *unproblematic* ascent from practice to theory only if the perspectives of knowledge τοῦ ὅτι and knowledge τοῦ διότι can be harmonized. This harmony accounts for the superiority of method over classical philosophy and it is produced by the methodological reformation of common speech. Before we consider this reformation of common speech, the second task of the doctrine of method, we must consider Hobbes's remarks about body and accident and examine his apparent nominalism. This digression is important because it introduces Hobbes's philosophical—or perhaps we should say scientific—rhetoric, which proves to be the fundament of the reformation of common speech and of the doctrine of method as such.

Body, Accident, and Names

Hobbes's discussion of body and accident in the *De Corpore* provides the account that is missing in the *Leviathan*. The discussion of body and accident is part of the explication of "first philosophy." Since "first philosophy" is itself the product of method,[52] the distinction between body and accident presupposes the teaching about wholes and parts that is central to the doctrine of method. As a part of the discussion of "first philosophy," the distinction between body and accident is presented from the perspective of the knowledge of cause and effect. Therefore, Hobbes speaks of accidents as the vehicles for generation and change in contrast to bodies, which are ungenerated and changeless. In order for generation and change to exist, accidents cannot be material or "in" corporeal particulars lest "an accident would be a body also."[53] Hobbes is careful to argue that particular accidents "do perish continually" and then argues strangely that "bodies are things and not generated," while "accidents are generated and not things."[54] Unless we are willing to ascribe to Hobbes the opinion that nonthings can be generated, we must conclude that by "things" he means here simple corporeal particulars abstracted from any determinate character or form. Surely bodies with determinate forms are things, and surely they are generated and destroyed. The reason for the distinction between body and accident is that accidents are complex, while body as body is not. This complexity is composed of the difference between particular and universal. Particular accidents perish continually, but properties or "whole natures" do not. Likewise, insofar as accidents are changeable and generated, they are the subject of knowledge of cause and effect; but the doctrine of method teaches that the knowledge of cause and effect, generation and change, does not exhaust our rational knowledge of things. Thus Hobbes argues in the sequel that "that accident for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which dominates its subject, is commonly called the *essence* thereof, as rationality is the essence of man; whiteness of any white thing, and extension the essence of body. And the same essence, *in as much* as it is generated, is called the form."[55] Form may change while matter does not, but form in this context is a mode of "essence" considered from the perspective of generation, or the knowledge τοῦ διότι. We are again reminded that the metaphysical relation of eternal universals to noneternal particulars exists because of the corruptibility of any particular. That these universals are, in Hobbes's scheme, themselves generated by means of scientific conquest poses no problem of circularity; the generation of the morally intelligible eternal is the miracle of the new science of nature.

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[52] EW, I, 70–73, 87–88.

[53] EW, I, 104.

[54] EW, I, 117.

[55] *Ibid.* Eadem essentia quatenus generata, *forma* dicitur. LW, I, 104.

Although the distinction between body and accident is an extreme embarrassment to anyone who would have Hobbes a nominalist or materialist, it is true that Hobbes often sounds like a nominalist when he discusses universal names. In his attacks upon the universals of the schools, however, Hobbes presents no arguments why universals as such are impossible. He argues against the schools that unless the copulation of names takes place between names of the same kinds of things (bodies, accidents, phantasms, and names themselves) the result is "incoherence and false propositions."[56] Yet he provides no account of the kinds of things and hence of what names in fact refer to what kinds of things. Indeed the account of the kinds of things is to be found in the explication of method, which is profoundly antinominalist. Again, Hobbes argues like a nominalist that it is an error to say that "the idea *of anything* (conception) is universal; as if there could be in the mind an image of a man, which were not the image of some one man, but a man simply, which is impossible; for every idea is one, and of one thing. . . . " But in arguing so, he implies a materialistic atomism (every idea is of one thing) that is nowhere defended in his writings.[57] Hobbes's attack against the universals and metaphysics of the schools is a rhetorical polemic.

None of Hobbes's arguments aim at refuting the possibility of universals, but in the *De Corpore* his discussion of names reflects the understanding of universals, or intelligible whatnesses, articulated by his doctrine of method. Hobbes states that

> a common name, being the name of many things severally taken, but not collectively all together, (as man is not the name of all mankind, but of every one, as of Peter, John, and the rest severally) is therefore called a universal name; and therefore this word universal is never the name of anything existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when a living creature, a stone, a spirit, or any other thing, is said to be *universal*, it is not to be understood that *any* man, stone, etc., was or can be universal, but only that these words, *living creature*, *stone*, etc., are universal names, that is, names common to many things; and the conceptions answering to them in our mind, are the images and phantasms of several living creatures, or other things.[58]

The meaning of this remark is twofold. First, it clearly limits the level of abstraction allowed to our rational articulation of the things of nature. That is, there is no such thing in nature as the universal abstracted from body. When we use universal names, we always refer to wholes encountered as particulars. There is no speech about whatnesses that is not necessarily related to particular whatnesses. Thus, though accidents can never be identified with bodies or corporeal subjects, the abuse of abstract names springs from the belief that accidents can be completely abstracted or "separated from *all* bodies."[59] Since the beings of nature are morally intelligible by being subservient to man's self-perfection, the integrity of the eternal universal depends upon the existence of at least one human being. Second, this argument does not deny that universal names denote intelligible whatnesses that may be eternal while particulars perish, but only denies that the whatness articulated by a universal name can of itself have the nature of a particular. That is, the universal is not itself a particular thing and cannot, therefore, exist as a model for any particular thing with respect to its particularity. Thus the relationship between the intelligible universal and the particular is not teleological in the problematic sense of natural superiority. The difference between universal and particular, or whole and part, is exhausted by the distinction between the sempiternal and the ephemeral. Hobbes asserts that the most profitable part of the new science of nature is the science of man's body. In the light of the self-perfection promised by the new science, eternity is at least a possibility for man as such, if not for each and every human particular.[60]

Hobbes's attack against the metaphysics of the schools is a rhetorical polemic and not a consistent or carefully reasoned argument. Indeed, Hobbes's attack veils the metaphysics of the doctrine of method. This rhetorical veil points to the second task of the doctrine of method, which requires the use of rhetoric; it also points to the fact that, for the sake of presentability, the doctrine of method itself must consist in a new scientific rhetoric.

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[56] EW, I, 57–61. See *Leviathan*, chap. 4, p. 108; chap. 5, pp. 113–15; chap. 9, pp. 146–47.

[57] *Ibid.* This is the case whether this atomism is "epistemological" or "ontological." In either case Hobbes's argument begs the question of the kinds of things that exist, which question is, to repeat, comprehended by his teaching about method.

[58] EW, I, 19–20.

[59] EW, I, 33. Except for the most extreme and vulgar "Platonism," this remark would hardly be a scandal to the classical tradition. For Christianity it is an anathema.

[60] Hobbes's nominalism is at best very inconsistent. While the discussion of common and universal names in the *De Corpore* is consistent with the metaphysics of the doctrine of method, Hobbes's nominalism is much more radical in explicitly religious or political contexts. Hobbes's nominalism is a necessary component of his methodological rhetoric, which aims at the reformation of common speech and veils the comprehensive teaching about method. See pp. 1349–1351, *infra*. Watkins has noted the equivocal character of Hobbes's "nominalism" and even hints that practical or moral intentions may govern this nominalism. The point is, however, not whether or not Hobbes maintained a "Humpty-Dumpty theory of truth and falsity" but rather that Hobbes was a new kind of King's man. Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas*, pp. 144–50, 158.

Method as Rhetoric

For Hobbes, the identification of final cause with human will as efficient cause and the grounding of a morally intelligible natural whole on human conquest did not of themselves remedy the fundamental defect of classical natural and political philosophy. Unlike Descartes and Bacon, Hobbes believed the scientific project to be only partially completed with the possibility of man's conquest over the natural world. For if Hobbes agreed that knowledge is power, he also believed that his modern predecessors were but dimly aware of the true nature of power. It is in the science of natural justice that the full understanding of power is to be found.[61] This should not be surprising; since the coherence of the whole of man and nature depends upon the dominance of human desire or practice over nature, that which guarantees the coherence of desires is the key to the proper and complete reformation of science and philosophy.

The first task of the doctrine of method was to establish that nature could be theoretically and morally intelligible only in the light of the human conquest of nature. The guiding intention of this task was to subvert the possibility that an articulated but indifferent nature, or nature in itself, might serve as the model for resolving the practical-theoretical problems inherent in the natural structure of speech and reason. Although the metaphysical question of the whatness of things is answered in terms of human possibilities, this question does arise from the imperatives of practical, moral discourse. Because of the practical origin and structure of speech and reason, the newly central question of the whatness of man is bounded by the articulations of common speech. This fact is subversive of the unproblematic ascent from practice to theory because Hobbes admits that the problem of natural superiority is inherent in common speech.[62]

For Hobbes the true superiority of modern over ancient science depends not simply upon the scientific conquest of nature by man, but also upon the methodological resolution of the problematic relation between practice and theory. This requires what we have called the second task of the doctrine of method. Since practice is the beginning and end of human reason, the harmonious relationship of practice and theory, and hence the successful completion of practical speech by the scientific conquest of nature, depends upon the methodological reformation of common speech. The reason why scientific conquest is a sufficient teaching about nature is not that it provides answers to the problems engendered by common speech but that the methodological reformation of common speech eliminates the controversial problems of common speech. Thus the desires articulated by common, moral speech and completed by the new science of nature can be rendered unproblematic by Hobbes's new science of natural justice or sovereign political power. Although Hobbes claims that the first principles of his new political science can be discovered by simple introspection, we see that the new political science is a methodological science because it depends upon the second task of the doctrine of method.

The science of natural justice is presented, of course, in the *Leviathan*. In the *Leviathan*, the methodological reformation of common speech is resplendently simple and is contained in the assertion of natural equality. It is from the assertion of natural equality as the teaching of reformed common sense that the doctrines of natural justice and sovereignty are derived.[63] From this assertion it results that with respect to the being of man, part is equal to part and whole is equal to part. Nothing can be a property of the universal "man" that is not a property of *every individual* man; there can be no problem of intermediate wholes or natural superiority. The revised common speech of the *Leviathan* is rooted in the opinion of natural human equality, which only the fool refuses to acknowledge "in his heart." This equality makes it possible for Hobbes in the *Leviathan* to view the study of man and justice in terms of the science of cause and effect. The argument from the universal cause of fear is based on the theoretical claim of the commonsensical self-evidence of human equality.[64] The new political science, based on the assertion of human equality and on the trustworthy passion of fear, provides a simple and certain rule of action, whereby men's conflicting needs and desires can be unproblematically harmonized.[65]

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[61] Hobbes insists that because of his new political science the "Science of Naturall Justice is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns." *Leviathan*, chap. 31, p. 407. Hobbes was not a simple conventionalist, for the power and scope of his new political science depended on the possible harmony of nature and convention. Thus the positive precepts of civil law are "of equal extent" to or are contained by the laws of nature, to which men are obliged *in foro interno* in the prepolitical natural condition. *Leviathan*, chap. 14, pp. 189–192; chap. 15, pp. 201–206, 215; chap. 26, p. 314.

[62] See nn. 17, 18, 37, 46, *supra*.

[63] *Leviathan*, chap. 11, pp. 160–61; chap. 13, pp. 183–88; chaps. 14, 17, 18; *De Cive*, III, EW, II, 38–39; EW, IV, 102–105.

[64] *Leviathan*, chap. 15, pp. 203–204. So, too, Hobbes's defense of justice is grounded upon the argument for the commonsensical self-evidence of human equality; see *Leviathan*, Intro., pp. 81–83.

Although the *Leviathan* asserts the equality of men, the natural structure of speech, i.e., the theoretical tendency of any speech, requires some defense of this assertion. In the *Leviathan*, this defense is contained in the discussions of speech, reason, and method. It consists in a critique of those cognitive powers which would resolve the practical-theoretical problem of natural superiority generated by common speech. The *Leviathan* presents method as merely the proper use of definitions and narrows the scope of human reason to the knowledge of cause and effect simply. The *Leviathan* suggests that the moral and metaphysical question of the whatness of things is, in fact, either fictional or extrarational, or shared by the irrational, amoral brutes.[66]

The function of the defense of the assertion of equality is twofold. First, it satisfies the theoretical tendency of common speech because it is a theoretical defense. Second, in providing this satisfaction, it greatly limits the possibilities of theoretical speech. The aim of Hobbes's theoretical argument in the *Leviathan* is to truncate the theoretical tendency or content of common speech. The aim of the *Leviathan* is to incapacitate that speech which, unchecked, raises the problem of parts, wholes, and natural superiority and so might challenge the dogmatic assertion that eliminates the problem of parts, wholes, and natural superiority. It is only on the basis of this theoretical subversion of theory that the perspectives of knowledge *τοῦ ὅτι* and knowledge *τοῦ διότι* can be harmonized. Only on the basis of this harmony can the conquest of nature be the sufficient resolution of the problems of practical life and speech. In order for men to perfect science there must be peace. In order for there to be peace, science must provide the sufficient salvation for man. But both this peace and this salvation require that men be purged of the natural tendency toward the serious consideration of controversial speech.

Even though the defense of the assertion about human equality is a critical defense, it is theoretical. For this reason, then, the revision of common speech has its own theoretical teaching. This teaching is an apparent moral relativism supported by an antimetaphysical account of speech and reason.[67] This defensive teaching would seem to subvert the possibility of a doctrine of the natural good for man, but a careful inspection of Hobbes's arguments shows that the moral relativism or nominalism of the *Leviathan* rests upon a solid doctrine of the natural good for man.[68] All Hobbes's remarks that appear to defend radical moral relativism or nominalism refer to the description of particular goods that fall under a general, natural doctrine of the human good.[69] The ground of Hobbes's political teaching is inconsistent with the defensive dress in which he presents it.

We have seen that the theoretical dress of the *Leviathan* is skimpy and is an inadequate basis for the attack against traditional metaphysics. No argument is presented to explain why or how the narrow understanding of the meaningful scope of reason could be adequate for the doctrine of man presupposed in the *Leviathan* itself. We can now appreciate the fact that, in comparison with the teaching of the *De Corpore*, the discussion of speech, reason, and method in the *Leviathan* must present a partial or incomplete account of the human things. The political science of the *Leviathan*, and hence the second task of the doctrine of method, depends upon an incomplete teaching about human speech and reason. What is more, this incomplete teaching contradicts the comprehensive doctrine of method. Incompleteness, disproportion between its content and the implicit doctrine of man which it defends, and the want of explanation of how a theoretical subversion of theory is possible all point to the rhetorical character of the *Leviathan*'s theoretical teaching.

Whereas the comprehensive doctrine of method is a comprehensive doctrine of the human good, the theoretical teaching about method in the *Leviathan* is a rhetorical device necessitated by the conjunction of Hobbes's intention to reform the relation between theory and practice with the natural structure of speech and reason. As parts of such a device, the relativism and nominalism of the *Leviathan* present the problem of politics, which springs from the chaotic effects of human equality, so that, though its solution depends upon the teaching of the human good by nature, the eye is diverted from careful theoretical scrutiny of that human good. In the *Leviathan*, the problem of moral chaos is presented as a problem to be solved by the machinery provided by the sciences of justice and representative sovereignty. To the extent that the human good by nature is visible, it is presented as unproblematic and commonsensically self-evident.

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[65] This simplicity consists in the equation of the precepts of natural law with the precepts of civil law. *Leviathan*, chap. 26, p. 314.

[66] *Leviathan*, chap. 9, pp. 131, 147–148; cf. EW, IV, 26–30.

[67] *Leviathan*, chap. 6, p. 120; chap. 10, p. 150; chap. 11, p. 160; *De Homine*, XI. 4, LW, II, 96–97. *De Cive*, III, EW, II, 47–48.

[68] *Leviathan*, chap. 15, pp. 215–16; *De Homine*, XI. 5–15, LW, II, 96–103; *De Cive*, III, EW, II, 47–50.

[69] So ". . . though all men do agree in the commendation of the foresaid virtues, yet they disagree still concerning their nature, to wit, in what each of them doth consist." *De Cive*, III, EW, II, 48. Likewise, "theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries are forbid by the laws of nature; but what is to be called theft, what murder, what adultery, what injury in a citizen, this is not to be determined by the natural, but by the civil law." *De Cive*, VI, EW, II, 85; see *Leviathan*, chap. 26, p. 314.

The rhetoric of the *Leviathan* is necessitated by the intention of the doctrine of method. To remedy the traditional disharmony of practice and theory, the human good must become the center of a teaching about nature whereby the conquest of nature fulfills or completes human need and desire. In order for this to be a sufficient teaching about nature and the human good, a political science is required which presents and exhorts belief in the dogmatic assertion of the human good as dependent upon human equality, and which abstracts, as far as possible, from a comprehensive account of that good. Any comprehensive account of the human good would reveal the intelligible practical-metaphysical problem of ancient philosophy and Hobbes's scientific-philosophic rhetoric that veils the natural problematic of human speech and reason. It is because of the rhetoric of the *Leviathan*, a rhetoric necessitated by the comprehensive doctrine of method, that the *Leviathan* is equivocal about the role and status of method in political science. The true superiority of the new science of nature depends upon the new science of politics. But the superiority of the new science of politics depends upon the superiority of Hobbesian rhetoric over ancient rhetoric. Hobbes's methodological rhetoric hides the dogmatisim of the political doctrine of the human good. Small wonder it is, then, that Hobbes's new science of politics and its teaching about government have been characterized as a modern cloud.[70]

It is important to note that the teaching about method *is* comprehensive. It articulates man, nature, and the structure of the articulation of man and nature. When Hobbes speaks as the user of method he speaks as one who is cognizant of the problem of the relation between practice and theory. As he presents his doctrine of method, Hobbes stands outside the progression that begins with common speech and proceeds to the theoretical resolution of the problems of common speech. Method stands above or outside both practical and theoretical speech in order to resolve the problem of practice and theory. It would seem that this external stance would be crucial to any defense against the charge of the circularity of maintaining the incorrigible priority of common speech while at the same time presenting a theoretical reformation of common speech. However this stance might be defended, it is clear that Hobbes provides no such defense at all. In fact, Hobbes gives no direct account of method itself with respect to practice and theory. He simply presents method as if it stands outside of the two modes of human speech. The reason for this is that any more direct account of method must acknowledge that common speech presents problems to be solved, yet the ultimate success of method depends on the presentation of an unproblematic common sense or common speech. Method treats of problems which arise from common speech just as theory is derived from practice, yet method aims at the reformation of common speech to abolish the very problems from which it necessarily arises. Although the doctrine of method is a comprehensive teaching about man and the human good, it does not and cannot provide a comprehensive theoretical resolution of the problems inherent in common speech. Moreover, with respect to its intention, the doctrine of method cannot resolve theoretically the theoretical problem of how a teaching that insists upon the logical priority of common speech can revise the content of that speech. The doctrine of method is comprehensive not because it is theoretically complete, but because it founds and explicates the new rhetoric that helps the promise of modern science overshadow the problems of both practice and theory.

It is Hobbes's intention to reform the relationship between practice and theory and his recognition of the intelligible, ineradicable problems of practice and theory that necessitate the indirect presentation of the doctrine of method. It is this intention and recognition that govern Hobbes's careful terminology, his apparent nominalism, and his indirect manipulation of the traditional doctrine of substance. The new methodological rhetoric, which dresses the necessary political science, must also veil the doctrine of method itself. In this respect, the new methodological rhetoric is the substantial core of the comprehensive doctrine of method.

Conclusion

Hobbes's rhetoric has been remarkably successful. To the degree that serious philosophic controversy arises within the Hobbesian tradition, the problem of obligation is the surviving rump of all that was obfuscated by Hobbes's doctrine of method.[71] Yet the still much discussed and unresolved problem of obligation and the corollary problem of the delimitation of sovereign power stand as monuments to Hobbes's success.

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[70] Mansfield, *Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government*, p. 110. If the teaching of the *Leviathan* is a modern cloud it is a familiar cloud. Its common opinion is what would today be called "enlightened" common opinion. As such it champions the quasi-theoretical principles of moral relativism and the equation of reason and science in the name of a presupposed absolute understanding of the human good. Hence we see that the *Leviathan*, which purports to spring from the heart-searching of introspective common sense, in fact begins with a doctrine of man based upon the theoretical abstractions of "passion" and "power."

The result of Hobbes's revision of common sense is the quasi-theoretical doctrine of radical individualism. From the perspective of radical human equality, the essential characteristics predicable of man are only those characteristics predicable of each and every individual. For Hobbes, man is the animal species of which it can be said that each individual is a rational seeker of his own preservation. The doctrine of representative sovereignty is grounded upon this individualist perspective. To speak of representative sovereignty as that which solves the human problem must be no more or less than to speak of representative sovereignty as that which solves the problem of each and every individual. This is, of course, why Hobbes begins his discussion of government with men being equal in the state of nature, and it is for this reason that in the state of nature there is right but no duty, and rightful killing but no injustice or infringement of right.[72] There is right in the state of nature, but no violation of right in the state of nature, so great is the identification of "man" with every *individual* man. There can be no violation of right because the possibility of such violation would require the delimitation of an individual man's actions by a standard applicable to all men. It is clear, then, why the state of nature is the starting point for Hobbes's political teaching and why the doctrine of natural right, which is learned from contemplating the state of nature, is the sole standard for evaluating any possible mode of government. For the teaching of natural right in the state of nature presents the clearest and most extreme repudiation of any possible natural superiority that might be illuminated by the consideration of man's practical circumstances. The state of nature, then, is the clearest example of Hobbes's reformation of common opinion and thus is an intermediate and positive stage in the process of enlightenment.

It is central to the individualist origin of Hobbes's teaching of natural right that natural right always be prior to any possible claim of natural law or duty. The commands of the sovereign, which Hobbes insists are necessary for the consistent harmony of the precepts of natural right and the end of natural right, are always problematic.[73] In fact, the commands of the sovereign raise the very question supposedly eliminated by methodological political science. They originate in the rational necessity of each and all, but also, because of the necessary absoluteness of the sovereign, possibly from the rational necessity of all at the expense of some or one. Hence the sovereign can kill without injustice or violation of right.[74] Natural right dictates the submission to sovereign power and hence obligation to the sovereign, and yet sovereign power can be a potential danger to the end of natural right and hence no object of obligation at all. It is not sufficient to argue that the return of the individual to the state of nature solves this problem because sovereignty is a rational and necessary corollary of the state of nature.[75] The problem of obligation is an ineradicable contradiction at the heart of Hobbes's political science rather than a problem to be solved.

To see the problem of obligation as the crucial question of political philosophy is to accept the fundamental principles of Hobbes's political science. Yet the only problem which protrudes from the rhetorical veil of Hobbes's political science is insoluble of itself. However, it is precisely the insolubility of the problem of obligation that, for Hobbes, underscores the necessity of government itself. For the contradiction of the problem of obligation presents man with the sole and stark alternative of government simply or no government at all. What better support could there be for a political science that by eviscerating philosophic speech and providing a "sure measure" of political conduct serves the highest human conquest made possible by science? In order for Hobbes's political science to serve the Baconian hope of man's liberation from natural necessity, it must admit no alternative to a teaching that despises the distinction between liberty and tyranny.[76] Hobbes's political science fulfills the wish of the sophist; it harmonizes the harsh necessity of politics with the softness of speech and persuasion.

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[71] See note 1, *supra.* See also Peters, *Hobbes,* pp. 193–200, 201–203; Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas,* pp. 171 ff; John Plamenatz, "Mr. Warrender's Hobbes," *Hobbes Studies,* pp. 73–87; Howard Warrender, "Reply to Mr. Plamenatz," *Hobbes Studies,* pp. 89–100; Brian Barry, "Warrander and His Critics," in *Hobbes and Rousseau,* ed. M. Cranston and R. S. Peters (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 37–65; cf. Hume, "Of the Original Contract," *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 452–473.

[72] *Leviathan,* chap. 13, p. 188; chap. 14, pp. 189, 192; chap. 15, p. 215.

[73] *Ibid.,* chap. 14, pp. 189, 192, 196. The distinction between obligation *in foro interno* and *in foro externo* is transferred from the state of nature to civil society when Hobbes argues that "when therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: Otherwise there is." *Leviathan,* chap. 15, p. 215; chap. 21, pp. 269–274.

[74] *Ibid.,* chap. 13, p. 186; chap. 20, pp. 252–253; chap. 21, pp. 264–265. chap. 28, p. 354.

[75] *Ibid.,* chap. 14, p. 196; chap. 17, pp. 223–224; *De Cive,* V, EW, II, 65–66.

Hobbes's teaching, like those of the other early founders of modernity, is a comprehensive teaching about man and nature. It was not Hobbes's intention to debunk the scope and questions of classical metaphysics but rather to refashion them so as to reform the relation between practice and theory. Hobbes's attack against the tradition was rhetorical, and his teaching ultimately admits that any comprehensive account of man and nature reveals a set of ineradicable moral and theoretical problems that constitute the human condition. However, unlike the tradition, Hobbes does not counter these problems with a counsel for moderation. Rather, the human problems are to be solved methodologically. This means that, by means of methodological rhetoric and methodological political science, the human problems are to be submerged by the promise and hopes of modern science, which consist, at the very least, in the promise of long life and commodious living.

Hobbes's intention was to persuade those who think as well as those who do not. His persuasion reveals his distrust of most men who think as well as his distrust of those who do not. For just as the doctrine of method requires the use of philosophic rhetoric in the presentation of a necessary political science, so too the doctrine of method itself must be veiled by a subtle rhetoric. Hobbes's doctrine of method produces the curious paradoxes of modernity. For the many, the basest and most timorous standards serve as the ground of the most hubristic posture for mankind. For the few who think, the glory of conquest replaces trust in moderation for the moderation of the problematic human condition.

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[76] *Leviathan,* chap. 19, pp. 239–40.

Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm*

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Two major paradigms have come to dominate the scholarly analysis of public policy and quite possibly, the policy-making process itself. One is the decision model of incrementalism; the other a "divisibility" model of piecemeal public programs with negotiated and specialized pay-offs.

Incrementalism, described by Charles E. Lindblom, is a decision model which asserts the propensity of organizations to move in small steps.[1] Because of (1) disagreement on primary values and policy objectives, and (2) the difficulty of gathering and processing information on which to evaluate a wide range of potential policy options, policy makers typically arrive at their decisions by assessing only "limited comparisons to those policies that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect."[2] The strategy of incrementalism is one of continual policy readjustments in pursuit of marginally redefined policy goals. Long-term plans are abandoned in favor of short-term political implementation.

The divisibility paradigm is not unrelated to incrementalism. It asserts, basically, that any large policy undertaking is simply the aggregation of many politically self-contained subprograms and activities. Policy is the distribution of discrete goods in portions—in line with prevailing configurations of power or publicized need.[3] This divisibility assumption, of course, lies behind the concept of "pluralism" invariably applied to the analysis of industrialized democracies.[4] It is implicit in the emerging "public choice" school of policy analysis.[5]

The divisibility paradigm supports the perception of the public interest as simply the sum total of countless individual interests.[6] As Anthony Downs has aptly described the paradigm in practice: "Each decision-maker or actor makes whatever choices seem to him to be the most appropriate at that moment, in light of his own interests and his own view of the public welfare."[7]

These two paradigms, as mentioned, enjoy a currency both in policy analysis and policy practice. Few critiques of these outlooks have appeared, and those criticisms which are offered suffer from inflated normative judgments and anemic descriptive insights.[8]

Yet the breadth of application accorded incremental and divisibility outlooks has not been without its costs. In particular, these paradigms have deprived policy analysis and public administration of attention to a class of policy enterprises which fit into neither framework. This essay is about that class of policies. These are enterprises distinguished by their demand for *comprehensive* rather than incremental decisions; synoptic rather than piecemeal outlooks and vision. These policies are characterized by an *indivisibility* in the political commitment and resources they require for success.

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[1] See Charles E. Lindblom, "The 'Science' of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, 19 (Spring, 1959), 79–88; Lindblom and David Braybrooke, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: The Free Press, 1963); and Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-Making Through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[2] Lindblom, "The 'Science' of Muddling Through," p. 84.

[3] For a description of "divisible" policy making see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953); E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); and Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). A more critical appraisal of the same phenomenon can be found in Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969).

[4] For the classic statement regarding pluralism see, of course, David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

[5] The public choice or economic market models of the policy process are presented in such works as James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Robert L. Curry and L. L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and William C. Mitchell, *Public Choice in America* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971).

[6] An excellent description of this "realist" approach to the public interest can be found in Glendon A. Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), ch. 4.

[7] Anthony Downs, *Urban Problems and Prospects* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), p. 37.

[8] See, for example, Yehezkel Dror, "Muddling Through—'Science' or Inertia?" *Public Administration Review*, 24 (September, 1964), 153–157; Dror, *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968); and Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning: A 'Third' Approach to Decision-Making," *Public Administration Review*, 27 (December, 1967), 385–392.

This class of nonincremental, indivisible policies is perhaps small but is nonetheless significant. It consists of large-scale government undertakings commanding major shares of the public budget. Frequently these undertakings involve the application of new technologies to major political or social problems. Nonincremental policies must be cast within large-scale and risk-taking frameworks if they are even to approximate acceptable levels of goal-seeking performance. Again, as we shall see, these are characteristics for which conventional analytical models are inadequate.

In order to explore adequately the implications of nonincremental, indivisible policy, one case has been selected from this class for explication. Its analysis, supplemented by references to additional policy examples, will illustrate three primary characteristics of major significance—characteristics which elude the present coverage of policy-making models. The policy is U.S. manned space exploration—a large and revealing public undertaking.

The Nonincremental Policy Start-up

The first characteristic associated with this special class of policies to which we have been referring is important. *Nonincremental, indivisible policy pursuits are beset by organizational thresholds or "critical mass" points closely associated with their initiation and subsequent development.* These policies must rely for their success upon factors which come into play only at high levels of political and resource commitment. Manned space exploration elaborately illustrates this point.

On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy, in a special message to Congress, proclaimed the goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. This was to be accomplished before the end of the decade—an undertaking explicitly designated as a major national commitment. In communicating his intentions to the Congress the President indicated that space-related budget allocations were to be enlarged, and that the pace of spacecraft and booster development was to be accelerated. In the ensuing five fiscal years National Aeronautics and Space Administration appropriations rose from $1.8 billion to $5.2 billion, and the total number of employees associated with space exploration programs (both within and outside of NASA) climbed from less than 60,000 to 420,000 at its peak.[9]

Yet the Kennedy announcement came a full four years after the birth of the "space race"—the launching of the Soviet satellite Sputnik I. What had happened to the nation's space enterprise during this four year interim? The answer is highly significant. It illustrates the "start-up" dilemmas of the nonincremental policy enterprise.

Public Policy vs. Public Pressure

The history of manned space exploration in this interim period between the Sputnik launch and the Kennedy commitment is one of opinion intensity in the midst of organizational insufficiency. The Sputnik launch (and its even more spectacular sequel—the canine-carrying Sputnik II) had aroused in the United States both alarm at the technological and projected military capabilities of the Soviet Union, and exasperation at the slow pace of U.S. missile and rocket development. Although survey data during the immediate post-Sputnik period are sketchy, available studies suggest both a high degree of worldwide awareness of space events and a subsequent belief that space achievement was in some way linked to national prestige and international power.[10]

Gabriel Almond, in an early survey of opinion in Great Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, and the United States, discovered an "extraordinarily high" public recognition of initial satellite launch achievements. "Almost every respondent in the countries surveyed was aware of the launching of the first satellite and of the fact that Russia had launched it. Subsequent awareness of the first American success was also high."[11] This awareness was reinforced by the perceived linkage of space achievement to national strength. As Almond concluded, "One of the most stable popular beliefs of the postwar era—the belief in the scientific and technological superiority of the United States—has been rudely shaken, and its place has been taken by anxious estimating that fluctuates with each report of a significant step forward in satellite launchings."[12]

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[9] "Statistical Report," *National Aeronautics and Space Administration,* Programs and Special Documents Division (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). For a review of the process of commitment see John M. Logsdon. *The Decision To Go To The Moon* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970).

[10] See Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology," in *Outer Space in World Politics,* ed. Joseph M. Goldsden (New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1963), pp. 71–96; Donald N. Michael, "The Beginning of the Space Age and American Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 24 (Winter, 1960), 573–582; and Albert J. Lott and Bernice E. Lott, "Ethnocentrism and Space Superiority Judgments Following Cosmonaut and Astronaut Flights," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 27 (Winter, 1963), 604–611.

[11] Almond, :"Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology," pp. 73–74.

In the United States itself, opinion intensity was high following the Sputnik launches—even though public attitudes were not particularly coherent. "The opinions held by many Americans regarding this first step into space were sometimes inconsistent, occasionally rich in *non sequiturs*, and frequently illogical."[13] Nevertheless, public demand for a policy response to the Sputnik achievement was strong. A Survey Research Center poll conducted shortly after Sputnik reported that "77 per cent thought that the Russian satellite should make 'a difference in what we are doing about the defense of this country', with . . . 47 per cent going for a crash program on weapons development."[14]

Set apart from this intensive public arousal was the inchoate and disordered organizational and administrative framework associated with the development of United States space exploration capabilities. The major components in this matrix were: the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), a small research and consultative agency for the aeronautics industry and other divisions of the Federal government; the three military branches, each conducting piecemeal research and development operations in line with its own particularistic notions of what space exploration was all about; and, of course, the U.S. aircraft industry, only marginally involved in space flight research (apart from weapons development projects) and confronted with a traditional reliance on "in-house" rocket development on the part of such government organizations as the Army Ballistic Missile Agency.[15]

This period in the development of the space program—in which high levels of public arousal confront underdeveloped organizational forms—is extremely interesting for it illustrates an important relationship between public policy and public pressure. Public pressure generally oscillates freely within a political system—frequently enlarging rapidly, then declining suddenly.[16] Such oscillations can occur anywhere along a continuum of intensity primarily as a function of complex determinants of attitude and attention.

Yet public policy is not similarly free to move along a continuum insofar as its scale is concerned. Again much has been said in policy analysis about the incremental nature of program advances. Yet *relative to public pressure*, public policy is beset by a dependence upon organizational features which cause it to enlarge or contract in discontinuous "jumps"—as jurisdictional, manpower or budgetary plateaus are reached.

In fact, given the highly disparate ways in which policy and pressure enlarge, *it is unlikely for them ever to be appropriately matched.* Pressure expands as a continuous function (although as mentioned earlier it is subject to wide and rapid fluctuations along its intensity continuum). Policy undertakings, on the other hand, enlarge as a step function; they are beset by discontinuities which reflect thresholds associated with their expansion. Enabling legislation, for example, is frequently required for the initiation of a policy pursuit. Once established, a policy does not expand far from the dimensions of its genesis without soon confronting jurisdictional, manpower, and appropriations boundaries. Then it must *leap* over these boundaries—it must secure an enlargement of its legislative authorization, upgrade its manpower supplies, and justify an increased level of appropriated funds.

Significantly, this process does not come to define a smooth gradient. It generally occurs in spurts. Nonincremental policies in particular must expand greatly *if they are to expand at all.* Only then can they overcome the inertia, external resistance, or internal start-up problems which act as barriers to policy expansion. It is perhaps a telling illustration of this all-too-ignored discontinuity of policy enlargement, that a general analysis of public programs by the Tax Foundation concluded: "The general pattern characterizing the growth of . . . new [Federal] programs is this: sharp increases in the first two years as the programs get into fuller operation, relatively modest increases in the third and and fourth years, followed by a steep jump of the sort depicting major expansion or legislative extensions of the program."[17]

Let us review again the policy-pressure relationships mentioned above. As pressure builds for government action within a specific issue setting it is likely to confront a partial vacuum in ongoing public policy. The beginnings of the ecology "movement" amply illustrate this phase—where increased public concern over problems of environmental quality quickly overbalanced the minimal regulatory standards of the federal government. This initial stage is one of *underscaling* in public policy. Such an underscaling also characterized the organizational insufficiencies of the space program in the period on which we have so far been concentrating.

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[13] Michael, "The Beginning of the Space Age," p. 581.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 579.

[15] See, for an account of this period, Richard S. Lewis, *Appointment on the Moon* (New York: The Viking Press, 1968).

[16] For an interesting discussion of public opinion "stages" and their determinants, see Anthony Downs, "The Issue Attention Cycle and the Political Economy of Improving our Environment," Royer Lectures, University of California, Berkeley, April 13–14, 1970.

[17] *Growth Trends of New Federal Programs: 1955–1968* (Washington, D.C.: The Tax Foundation, 1967), pp. 19–20.

Eventually, of course, public policies are generated in response to escalating public pressure. But, again, the discontinuous nature of policy expansion makes it difficult to match appropriately government performance with fluctuations in public "demand." Frequently, the appearance of government activity itself can contribute to the dissipation of public arousal. Secure in the symbolic reassurance that "something is being done," the public shifts its fleeting attentions to other issues of greater currency and fashion.[18] This decay in public concern can lead ultimately to a condition in which policy performance actually exceeds public demand, which might well be termed an *overscaling* dimension to public policy. At this extreme of the policy-pressure relationship, bureaucratic programs can persist long after generalized support for such pursuits has subsided. In regulatory policy making this is typically the stage at which the "capture" of the agency by a specialized constituency can occur. Because public arousal has waned, the regulatory agency must turn for its support to the one social component whose attention and watchfulness remain unwavering—the very interest which the agency seeks to regulate. Should policies in general fail to locate steadfast constituencies during this period of overscaling, the result must invariably be that saddest of administrative spectacles—the politically orphaned agency, an object (in Norton Long's words) "of contempt to its enemies and despair to its friends."[19] The overscaling dimension too has become an important part of the manned space exploration story.

In essence the expansion-support "game" is one at which the nonincremental, indivisible policy enterprise is considerably disadvantaged. This is so because of the extreme start-up lags to which it is subject. Nonincremental policy is beset by substantial discontinuities in both enlargement and payoff. Continuing the description of manned space exploration will illustrate this point more fully.

We left space exploration in the interim period between the first Soviet Sputniks and the Kennedy moon-landing commitment. This was an era of a "lagging, directionless space program,"[20] or, as one critic expressed it, a "space maze and missile mess in Washington."[21] In February of 1958 the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established in the Department of Defense to coordinate and oversee diverse military missile and space satellite programs. This was an initial effort to upgrade U.S. space exploration in light of conspicuous Soviet successes, yet it proved to be hopelessly underscaled in relation to distinctive organizational thresholds and inertia which had to be overcome. These thresholds are a critical feature of the nonincremental policy enterprise.

The Dilemma of "Thinking Small"

The first problem is a psychological one. Perhaps no barrier is more essential for nonincremental policy to breach and overcome permanently than the penchant for thinking small. Overcoming this trait is a major necessity in developing the imagination and receptivity closely associated with organizational innovation.[22] In addition, thinking small is also a detriment to the planning and jurisdictional extensions upon which nonincremental policy depends.

Before the lunar landing commitment, underestimates on the rate of technological advance and the engineering "do-ability" associated with manned space programming were commonplace. No less a figure than Hugh Dryden, NACA Director and a future Deputy Administrator of NASA, asserted a scant four years before Sputnik: "I am reasonably sure that travel to the moon will not occur in my lifetime. . . . "[23] Such myopia was certainly understandable, yet adequate space planning required both foresight and an obstinate faith in the future approaching that which drives the classic "revolution of rising expectations." It was not until this radical departure in perspective could find a congenial institutional environment that efficient preparation for manned missions could begin.

Thinking small also served as a barrier to the jurisdictional expansion upon which space exploration depended. NACA, the central research agency in the administrative network concerned with space exploration, actively resisted the Eisenhower administration's efforts to upgrade its policy-making jurisdiction. "By February 1958, as the Eisenhower administration began wrestling with the complexities of formulating a national program for space exploration, NACA had taken the official position that, with regard to space, it neither wanted nor expected more than its historic niche in government-financed science and engineering. While NACA should become a substantially bigger instrument for research, it should remain essentially a producer of data for use by others."[24]

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[18] In this context see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[19] Norton E. Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 9 (Autumn 1949), 257.

[20] Richard S. Lewis, "The Kennedy Effect," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 24 (March, 1968), 2.

[21] Donald W. Cox, *The Space Race* (New York: Chilton Books, 1962), p. 69.

[22] See, for example, Chris Argyris, *Organization and Innovation* (Homewood, Illinois: R. D. Irwin and Company, 1965) for a discussion of how innovative output can vary as a function of organizational culture.

[23] Hugh L. Dryden, as quoted in Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood and Charles C. Alexander, *This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 56.

This reluctance to accept an enlarged organizational assignment (and, indeed, to participate in a timely institutional growth) led ultimately to the demise of NACA later that same year. In its place the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 established a national space advisory council (The National Aeronautics and Space Council) and NASA (which absorbed most of NACA's personnel). NASA was created to attain another major threshold associated with a nonincremental policy such as space exploration. This was the requirement for administrative consolidation.

Consolidation Requirements

Even though the Space Act provided for a distinctive civilian/military apportionment of space exploration activity between NASA and DOD, NASA immediately upon its formation began to press for the acquisition of key research groups and programs located within the military services. In less than three months NASA had acquired Project Vanguard from the Navy (as well as the 150 staff members and $25 million in appropriations connected with it), lunar probe and earth satellite projects from the Air Force, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (complete with Caltech staff and $100 million in appropriations) from the Army.[25] It even attempted to take over the Army Ballistic Missile Agency amid shrieks of outrage from that service. Although delayed by Army opposition, NASA's ambitious consolidation plans were not to be denied. In March of 1960 NASA formally acquired the ABMA and most of its "von Braun team" of key researchers.

These acquisitions reflect the importance to the nonincremental, indivisible policy enterprise of consolidating control over those suboperations upon which it closely depends. In industrial settings consolidation of this type is referred to as vertical integration—an effort to amalgamate raw materials and component production processes within the same managerial framework as that governing the creation of a final marketable product for which these subprocesses are important. (Of course, at the same time NASA was accomplishing a type of horizontal integration—eliminating the potential sources of space exploration programming competition).

The nonincremental policy requires an extensive consolidation because of the close interdependency of its component parts. Uncertainty or performance failures in any one suboperation can threaten the success of them all. Many research and development projects require parallel breakthroughs on a variety of problem fronts. The development of a rocket guidance system, for example, demanded simultaneous advances in both computer miniaturization and thruster engine design.

For manned space exploration, consolidation was an essential organizational threshold to surpass, given the extremely diverse and ramified operations upon which any manned-mission plans would depend. "Whether it was given special responsibilities or not, NASA had to concern itself with the nation's overall space program *if it was to optimize its own.*"[26]

Administrative consolidation also allowed NASA to recruit, both from industry and from other government agencies, highly qualified technical personnel to work on its programs. In part, consolidation triggers the rising expectations essential to mobilize the manpower required for nonincremental policy making. As one NASA official observed: "We believe that we are attracting quality people . . . because we have salaries which are competitive, plus a new, attractive and exciting program, and an *expanding mission* which creates the possibilities of greater opportunities."[27]

Closely related to the administrative consolidation requirements are the following specific start-up thresholds which space exploration policy making had to overcome.

The Indivisibility Dimensions of Research

A great deal of organizational management theory centers around the importance and inevitability of specialization, both for bureaucratic supervision and for institutional problem solving. Yet this attention to specialization has resulted in the partial neglect of those operations for which specialization is not entirely appropriate. One of these, oddly enough, is the major research project —the very setting in which specialized knowledge would seem most important. But a large-scale research problem is frequently interdisciplinary—cutting across lines of specialization and imparting an indivisibility to organizational tasks. For problems such as these "research teams are only divisible down to a minimum effective scale."[28] Conversely, research teams must first attain this scale if they are to mount an effective attack upon a critical problem.

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[24] Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, *This New Ocean*, p. 77.

[25] Robert Rosholt, *An Administrative History of NASA: 1958–63* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 45–48.

[26] Rosholt, p. 106 (italics supplied).

[27] Abe Silverstein, Director, Space Flight Programs, NASA in *Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences*, June 7-12, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 177 (italics added).

Major research progress in space flight technology was delayed until interdisciplinary groups could be assembled on a scale which would multiply their problem-solving effectiveness. Below this threshold a host of conflicting theories and experimental results remained largely unreconciled while still other "good ideas" went begging for attention.

In discussing indivisibilities associated with space research it is also important to note the extent to which much of this research was "equipment-intensive." The study of acceleration tolerances, for example, required the construction of large centrifuges in order to simulate the stresses of space flight. Research into designs and materials which would safeguard spacecraft reentry into the earth's atmosphere depended upon sophisticated hypersonic wind tunnels and was delayed pending the construction of such devices. Advanced manned-mission planning in general was predicated upon prior unmanned missions of research and experimentation. It was considered essential "to strengthen NASA's program for the unmanned exploration of the moon, using hard-landing Ranger spacecraft and soft-landing Surveyor spacecraft. The unmanned exploration of the moon was considered an absolutely essential step prior to manned landing."[29]

This equipment-intensive characteristic of much space exploration research heightened the thresholds associated with its start-up. The design and construction of specialized instrumentation and simulation devices was expensive, and the scarcity of such equipment served to confine research activity to a few isolated groups with access to these devices. These expense and isolation problems which typified space research are not at all unlike the features associated with large-scale scientific research in general.[30] These were responsible for important lags in research progress prior to the policy acceleration which organized and funded research groups at critical levels of problem-solving effectiveness.

Land Acquisition and Facilities Construction

Another feature of manned space exploration to which start-up thresholds were attached was land acquisition and facilities construction. Enormous quantities of land and elaborate spacecraft tracking, construction and testing facilities were required before any manned mission planning could realistically begin.

The Atlantic Missile Range alone required more than 100,000 acres of land. While some of this land had been acquired earlier by the Air Force, far larger tracts were needed by NASA in order to construct an adequate launch facility at acceptable margins of safety. Their acquisition clearly reflects the threshold problems attendent upon the nonincremental policy enterprise. As it developed, the buying of land was a process not readily susceptible to gradualism. It required both executive branch clearance and specific congressional authorization—actions which in turn were predicated upon elaborate programming justifications. Significantly, it was not easy to attain these requisites on a small scale because of a peculiarity in the approval process. *Program plans had to be large if they were also to be persuasive.* Larger scale plans communicated a sense of urgency and purpose. In a very real sense, the scale of the acquisition request was a major factor in upgrading the probabilities of its own fulfillment.

A further problem in the land acquisition process was the need for land holdings to be concentrated at the early stages of agency planning. This was important because the very act of land acquisition (and the publicized prospect of its subsequent development) raised the price (and in some cases altered the zoning) of surrounding land in highly unfavorable directions. This made it far more difficult to acquire additional land later.

It was for precisely this reason that NASA Administrator James Webb, in requesting congressional authorization for land acquisition within the Atlantic Missile Range area, argued vigorously for permission "to take all the land we can visualize that would be required. Once we get this, I do not think it will be possible to get any more land there. It will be too expensive."[31]

Qualitative Correlates of Scale

A final class of start-up thresholds consists of those space exploration requisites which were only qualitatively realized under the impact of scale. Reliability in space hardware, for instance, a critical dimension to any manned-mission planning, was closely dependent upon a large number of trial tests and subsequent "de-bugging" after prolonged use. As one NASA official described the problem: "We never quite know, when we launch a satellite, what is going to be the limiting point because we have not been in business long enough to establish these numbers. What you need to do is the thing you have always needed to do to develop long operational life; that is, to start to develop, to debug, and to build life through use."[32]

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[28] Harry Townsend, *Scale, Innovation, Merger and Monopoly* (London: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 25.

[29] Rosholt, *Administrative History of NASA*, p. 194.

[30] For a discussion of the organizational features related to the conduct of large-scale scientific research, see Derek J. deSolla Price, *Little Science, Big Science* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); and Alvin M. Weinberg, "The Impact of Large-Scale Science Upon the United States," *Science*, 134 (July 21, 1961), 161–164.

[31] James E. Webb, Testimony in (FY 1963 Authorization) *Hearings Before The Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, Second Session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 35.

Another qualitatively derived function of scale is the external support upon which any nonincremental policy depends for success. Frequently, as mentioned, such support stems from the rising expectations which policy objectives are able to generate. In any case, major public approval and the prospect of its continuance is required to render the initial start-up costs worthwhile. An enormously expensive operation such as space exploration research "cannot be turned on and off like a faucet. It must be planned in advance, given adequate leadtime, and funded in such a way that there is assurance that it can move along systematically."[33]

As James Webb has contended:

> A common denominator of large-scale endeavors is the necessity of a continuing "critical mass" of support. There must be enough support and continuity of support to retain and keep directly engaged on the critical problems the highly talented people required to do the job, as well as to keep viable the entire organizational structure. . . . Any uncertainty or shortfall in the support factor is apt to have far-reaching effects and force the endeavor into serious difficulties.[34]

In a very real sense, a nonincremental, indivisible policy pursuit must attain a "capture point" of public goal and resource commitment. Albert O. Hirschman has stressed the importance of this capture point in a study of major development projects in third world nations. In observing these capital-intensive national enterprises Hirschman notes the extent to which potential project difficulties are frequently underestimated at their outset. He then asserts that if a development project is to overcome these misestimations "its operators must be 'caught' by the time the unsuspected difficulties appear—caught in the sense that having spent considerable money, time and energy and having committed their prestige, they will be strongly motivated to generate all of the problem-solving energy of which they are capable."[35]

Hirschman argues that many agricultural projects fail precisely because they are too short-term and small-scale to reach this capture point. When unanticipated problems arise, these projects are all too often prematurely abandoned. In effect, they fail because of a reluctance "to throw good money after what looks like bad, but could be turned into good, if only the requisite rescue effort were forthcoming."[36]

To be sure, this policy entrapment effect is not without its hazards. The attainment of a capture point may well lead after all to the casting of good money, time and effort after that which really *is* bad. This, it will be recalled, was a major argument against much of the United States military escalation in Vietnam.

Yet entrapment is important to the nonincremental public policy enterprise. It can assure the continuity of support so essential to policies of this class. At the same time, entrapment safeguards the nonincremental policy from many of the unanticipated problems associated with its pursuit. In space exploration, the Kennedy commitment sustained mission goals through even the darkest hours of equipment failure, cost overruns, and ultimately, the tragic spacecraft fire that took the lives of three Apollo astronauts.

Start-Up Requirements and Initial Space Decisions

In assessing these nonincremental start-up requisites, it is small wonder that a major political commitment, in fact a presidential mandate, was necessary to energize manned space exploration policy. As space administrators readily conceded, "Science is, and cannot be, the driving force for space exploration."[37] It was indeed President Kennedy's national commitment which "galvanized the lagging, directionless space effort around a dramatic, not-too-distant goal."[38]

The full magnitude of the start-up operations to which reference has been made is well illustrated by budgetary data compiled for the early period of the space program. The following chart illustrates NASA expenditures from fiscal years 1961 through 1966, and highlights the research and development component of these expendi-

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[32] Silverstein, *Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences*, p. 83.

[33] Rosholt, *Administrative History of NASA*, p. 88.

[34] James E. Webb, *Space-Age Management: The Large Scale Approach* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 62–63.

[35] Albert O. Hirschman, *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 18.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[37] Dr. Eberhard Rechtin, Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, in *Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 88th Congress, First Session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 138.

[38] Richard Lewis, "The Kennedy Effect," p. 2.



Figure 1. NASA Expenditures (FY 1961–1966)

tures. It is revealing to note two things in connection with these expenditures: the steeply rising rate of overall space spending, and the degree to which R&D-classified outlays approximate the the total NASA funds spent. Seldom has a government agency increased its appropriations as rapidly as NASA. This strongly reflects the political support associated with the Kennedy moon-landing commitment. But the proportion of R&D expenditures is also significant. More than 80 per cent of NASA's funds went into starting up the space exploration enterprise—filling the gaps in theory, technology, and equipment required for space exploration to advance. (It is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that in 1961, only 2.9 per cent of the total U.S. GNP was spent on R&D. In that year the average industry expenditure was 4 per cent of sales.[39])

Another illustration of the dimensions of the space exploration start-up is provided by employment data compiled during the 1960–66 period. This graph, depicting total employment on space exploration programs both within and outside of NASA, emphasizes the personnel mobilization required to pursue exploration objectives. This manpower pool represents substantial private industrial expansion as well as extensive programs of training and recruitment. It is unlikely that such a work force could have been assembled

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[39] Daniel Hamburg, *R&D: Essays on the Economics of Research and Development* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 13 and 41.



Figure 2. Total Employment on NASA Programs (1960–66)

without the prospect of a major *and continuing* space exploration commitment.

What we have seen so far of the start-up problems associated with manned space exploration illustrates the degree to which the model of incremental decisions fails conspicuously to account in this case for an observable reality. The start-up thresholds attached to nonincremental policy represent problems for which comprehensive (and even optimal) decisions are required. In reviewing the lunar landing program James Webb has argued: "We could not stop with doing 80 or 90 or 99 per cent of what we needed to do and come out reasonably well." Indeed, for a lunar landing "a partial success is likely to be a complete failure."[40]

Lindblom asserts, in his description of incrementalism, that "policy is not made once and for all; it is made and remade endlessly. Policy making is a process of successive approximations to some desired objectives in which *what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration*."[41] Yet contrast this with the extended planning and the continuity of support so essential to the nonincremental policy enterprise. The Kennedy commitment and the prospects for extended exploration missions were the major reasons that elaborate and expensive space start-up requirements were deemed worthwhile. Manpower training and recruitment closely depended upon the fixed future perceived for space programs. Shifts in policy objectives of the sort postulated by Lindblom would, under these circumstances, have jeopardized the future of the space program. They would have seriously undermined the continuity of support which space exploration policy, in this its start-up phase, so desperately required.

Finally, the incremental model of decision making greatly misrepresents the reality of administrative thresholds themselves. The appropriations, manpower, research, and facilities growth in the immediate aftermath of the Kennedy commitment was far more than marginally removed from the policy "state" by which it was preceded. Indeed marginal additions to a nonincremental, indivisible policy in the period of its start-up *will consistently fail to translate into incremental gains in policy performance*. Major, comprehensive commitments of personnel and resources are required before even limited pay-offs are derived. Thus it is extremely difficult to adjust input decisions to subsequent changes in output performance—a characteristic which renders nonincremental policy resistant to the process of marginal refinement postulated by Lindblom.

Instability in Nonincremental Policy

Apart from the problem of start-up thresholds, another major characteristic besets the nonincremental, indivisible policy pursuit: *nonincremental policy is in essence unstable—devoid of middle ground between self-generating states of growth and decay*. Again we turn to space exploration for the appropriate illustration.

During the mid-1960s manned space exploration rode the crest of what amounted to a dynamic and highly complex policy "movement"—a movement characterized by heightened technological and national aspiration, persistent political pressure for congressional appropriations, and seemingly open-ended prospects for organizational growth. It was perhaps during this period that a "match" was approached in that elusive balance between public policy and public pressure. Start-up thresholds had largely been overcome and space policy *outputs* (in the form of repeatedly successful manned missions) reached their maximum levels of public support.

Yet this match was to be short-lived. As Downs suggests in his analysis, "The Issue Attention Cycle," public support can quickly subside as a cycle of issue saliency runs its course.[42] This sudden ebb in public pressure can leave the nonincremental policy precariously overscaled relative to the political resources which exist for its support. It is precisely at this point that nonincremental policy may become exceedingly burdensome and vulnerable.

As both budgetary and employment data reveal, the sharply accelerating pace of space exploration in the early 1960s gave way toward the end of the decade to a major decline in policy support, even before the lunar landing objective was achieved. NASA appropriations declined from $5.2 billion in fiscal year 1965 to $2.8 billion in 1973. Even more dramatic evidence of space policy decline is provided by the statistics of total manpower employed on NASA programs. As Figure 3 depicts, total personnel dropped from the fiscal year 1965 peak of 420,000 to a low of approximately 108,000 in 1972.

Associated with this appropriations and manpower slide has been increased public and congressional criticism of space exploration in general, a decline in morale among remaining space program employees, and specific decays in organizational performance throughout the space policy bureaucracy itself.

As early as 1965, Gallup polls began to report

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[40] Webb, *Space-Age Management*, p. 149.

[41] Lindblom, "The 'Science' of Muddling Through," p. 86 (emphasis added).

[42] Downs, "The Issue Attention Cycle," pp. 12-15.



Figure 3. Downturn in Total Employment on NASA Programs (FY 1966–72)

significant erosion of both public interest and support where expensive, nonmilitary space exploration undertakings were concerned. A July 1965 Gallup poll, seeking to uncover opinion on the question "Which country—the United States or Russia—do you think is farther ahead in the field of space research?" elicited a 26 per cent "Don't know" response. This would seem to indicate a sizable disinterest in the space exploration "race" among the American people. The same poll revealed a 36 per cent preference among those contacted for decreased space exploration expenditures, as against 42 per cent in favor of keeping those expenditures the same and 16 per cent in support of their increase.[43]

Even more dramatic evidence of diminishing public space policy support is provided in a 1967 Gallup poll. Here, in response to the question "Do you think it is important or is it not important to try to send a man to the moon before Russia does?" a full 60 per cent of those interviewed assessed the landing race as "not important."[44]

By February 1969, in fact, 40 per cent of Gallup poll respondents called for a reduction in space research expenditures as against 41 per cent approving present levels of those expenditures. In addition, a July, 1969 poll (on the threshold of the lunar landing) revealed that 53 per cent of those interviewed opposed a Mars manned landing as a follow-on goal to the Apollo program. Only 39 per cent favored such a goal.[45]

Closely related to this erosion in general support for space policy was an increase in specific criticism directed at NASA programs and their expenditure requirements. A number of congressional critics began to question the "pork-barrel" distribution of NASA facilities. Public debates also began over the relative merits of manned versus unmanned flight. Such debates were particularly heated at times of NASA setbacks or Soviet achievements (such as the Lunakhod series) in purely instrumented space flight and experimentation.

National opinion leaders such as Senator Edward Kennedy and the Reverend Ralph Abernathy began to speak out against space exploration as a diversion of scarce national resources urgently needed elsewhere. In the aftermath of Vietnam war escalations, space exploration came to be viewed in some circles as an extension of military and defense policies and was opposed on that basis. Finally, "counterculture" values among a significant portion of the young led to a condemnation of space exploration as an extravagant exercise in mindless technology.

This increased opposition to space exploration has led in recent times to serious declines in morale within the space policy bureaucracy. Employee layoffs coupled with the failure to establish follow-on goals have contributed to the perception that the future is "running out" on the space program. This perceived termination of manned missions lies at the root of an intensified scientist-engineer controversy within NASA. The prospects of limited flight opportunity have intensified feelings of discrimination on the part of scientist-astronauts who have lost out in competition with pilot-astronauts in past mission assignments and for whom few future space flight opportunities remain.[46]

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[43] Gallup Opinion Index, no. 3 (August, 1965), p. 16.
[44] Gallup Opinion Index, no. 22 (April, 1967), p. 19.
[45] Gallup Opinion Index, no. 45 (March, 1969), p. 17 and no. 50 (August, 1969), p. 20.

Declines in Organizational Performance

The sense of decline which has developed within the space policy bureaucracy has had important consequences for the effectiveness of that organization in the attainment of its objectives. A number of specific performance problems have emerged that could become highly significant given the close ranges of control tolerance upon which successful space flights depend. One of these difficulties lies in the movement of highest quality personnel out of NASA into areas of greater perceived excitement and career opportunity. Despite indifferent, or distinctively unfavorable job markets, much of NASA's most valuable managerial and scientific talent has left the agency for brighter prospects in universities, private industry or other government agencies. This exodus has left the space program without some of its most imaginative and capable personnel. As one former NASA official privately asserted: "Programs like Apollo attract people who like challenges. Once the major problems are solved these people are no longer interested. Those left behind are really mediocre, and they establish a self-fulfilling mediocrity within the program."

One of the most consistent areas of concern throughout the history of the space program has been that of hardware reliability and quality control. Space flight equipment, of course, requires the greatest technical care and precision in its design and manufacture. The image of the "white room" with its sterilized, dirt-free environment has come to symbolize the "assembly line" of the space age. Yet behind the elaborate rules and assembly procedures, the monitoring and testing technology, is a recognition that no matter how detailed or sophisticated the safeguards "if the employee doesn't care whether or not he makes a mistake, he will probably err."[47]

Operating under this assumption NASA has carefully developed programs to add a motivational component to quality control. NASA astronauts have made repeated visits to divisional facilities and contractors in order to upgrade the morale of space employees by increasing their sense of importance and identity with respect to space exploration goals. The lunar landing commitment itself provided a major incentive for extra care in spacecraft assembly. Workers on Apollo hardware felt a special motivation to upgrade and sustain the quality of their job performance as a means of personal participation in an endeavor of historic proportions.

Yet, in recent times, along with the declines in public support and employee morale which have beset the space policy bureaucracy, an erosion has occurred in quality control capability. One NASA official conceded in a private interview that "the number of anomalies has risen alarmingly in each successive flight after [Apollo] 11." Another reports that with this erosion "worries about quality have become a fetish with higher management."

These statements are very important. Apollo 11, it will be remembered, was the first lunar landing mission. It marked the fulfillment of that commitment to which most of NASA's activities over the decade of the '60s had been dedicated. At the same time it represented the end of a period of clear direction for space exploration policy. One goal had lapsed, and no new ones had appeared to take its place.

This lack of direction probably contributed importantly to NASA's problems in quality control. Without the *esprit* which characterized the space challenges of the early '60s a lapse has developed in what might be termed the institutional "will to be careful." This may explain why hardware failures (or "gliches") have been occurring with increasing frequency in even tried and tested spacecraft systems.

Dissolution of the Space Policy Bureaucracy

In addition to performance shortfalls, related decays can now be observed in the structure of the space policy bureaucracy itself. An organizational fragmentation and contraction has hit the space program and appears to be moving it in the direction of the inchoate administrative arrangements which characterized the immediate post-Sputnik period. Appropriations and manpower cutbacks are, again, highly influential here but so too is the failure to establish follow-on goals for a nonincremental policy.

University laboratories represent one structural decay already well established. Cutbacks in NASA's training grants and the elimination of its Sustaining University Program have pushed a number of university labs out of their involvement with space programs. Those laboratories which remain attached to the program find the general decline in NASA's experimentation interest a deeply foreboding sign for the future. As one observer notes: "The dilemma of the laboratories is that they require lead times of 18 months to two years to develop instrumentation for satellite experiments and to train graduate students to handle the data. With nothing in the offing they can count on in the 1970's, they are having a difficult time maintaining a trained laboratory staff and keeping students on tap."[48]

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[46] See "NASA: Trouble in Paradise," *Newsweek*, 74 (September 22, 1969), 73–74; and Marti Mueller "Trouble at NASA: Space Scientists Resign," *Science*, 165 (August 22, 1969), 776-779.

[47] James F. Halpin, *Zero Defects: A New Dimension in Quality Control* (New York: McGraw-Hil, 1966), p. 3.

Besides university laboratories, a number of small aerospace contractors have either dissolved under the impact of space appropriations cutbacks or are in serious trouble to the extent of their dependence upon contract revenues. Other former contractors have detached themselves from space exploration assignments in favor of more promising long-term prospects elsewhere. Even major contractors have not escaped internal upheavals during the recent period of fiscal and manpower retrenchment. Shrinkage of the aerospace industry has raised among some the "immediate concern . . . that the . . . manufacturing and testing establishment developed to build Apollo will fall apart."[49]

These space exploration declines—in public support, appropriations, personnel, morale, organizational structure and performance—all illustrate the fundamental instability inherent in the nonincremental policy enterprise. Nonincremental policy is not likely to realize a point of equilibrium or "steady-state" between support-mobilizing expansion and downward spirals of disillusionment and decline. There is perhaps nothing which space exploration demonstrates more convincingly than this very point.

Recognizing these exceptionally thin margins between policy expansion and decay, space policy makers have exhibited an impressive resourcefulness in attempting to maintain growth in their programs. Both Soviet and American space administrators, for example, have repeatedly praised the achievements of the other side in an effort to generate competitive spirit for increased efforts at home.[50] In recent times, as the enthusiasm for international competition has waned, NASA officials have stressed the possibilities of international *cooperation* in space as an incentive to the Nixon and Ford administrations to upgrade space funding. As one astute observer describes it: "The reasoning goes like this: If NASA could establish an opportunity for improved Soviet-American relations through cooperation in space, this would presumably create the need for a series of post-Apollo missions of historic proportions. Considering the current politics of detente with the big powers, it would be hard for the White House or Congress to say no to funds for such an effort."[51]

The recent Soviet-American joint orbital flight, first announced during former President Nixon's Moscow summit, would appear to testify to at least the partial success of this new approach.

Attempts at a Policy Steady-State

To describe the instability associated with manned space exploration as a nonincremental policy, is not to deny that efforts have been made to find a point at which space programs could be stabilized. The Apollo Applications and Skylab projects have both been attempts to locate that intermediate ground where the continuity of space exploration missions could be assured. Skylab, in particular, was conceived as a balanced, well-paced series of orbital experimentation missions—a "holding program which keeps the technology alive, but barely so, until the nation recovers its interest in new frontiers and decides to become venturesome again."[52] But at its outset Skylab suffered in competition with the Army's Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program. Those Skylab missions which were undertaken were troubled by a public indifference as well as by manufacturing flaws in the Skylab itself.

Another stabilization effort, the Apollo Applications Program (AAP) failed dramatically to elicit the enthusiasm necessary to counterbalance the costs involved in its undertaking. In a study of post-Apollo planning in NASA, Emmette Redford and Orion White reported that "the AAP program remained throughout its development in a highly fluid state, without objectives ever being firmly decided upon."[53] They concluded:

> The AAP, after being squeezed into acceptable dimensions by NASA's top leadership, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congressional budget process, would have been given adequate support if it had not run into competition with other demands on national resources. What mainly brought it down . . . was apparently the budgetary stringency produced by the Vietnam war, the Great Society program, the riots in the cities and the fear of continued inflation.[54]

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[48] Richard S. Lewis, "Goal and No Goal: A New Policy in Space," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 23 (May, 1967), 19. See also in this connection W. Henry Lambright and Lauren L. Henry, "Using Universities: The NASA Experience," *Public Policy*, 20 (Winter, 1972), 61–82.

[49] Richard Lewis, "Our Terra-Lunar Transit System: Where Will It Take Us?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 25 (March, 1969), 22 .

[50] For a discussion of this point see Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), pp. 47–48.

[51] John Noble Wilford, "Cooperation in Space," *The New York Times*, December 6, 1971.

[52] Lewis, "The End of Apollo," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 24 (September, 1968), 5.

[53] Emmette S. Redford and Orion F. White, *What Manned Space Program After Reaching the Moon? Government Attempts to Decide: 1962-1968* (Syracuse: Inter-University Case Program, 1971), p. 140.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

In this conclusion, however, Redford and White ignore the essential nonincremental and indivisible nature of space exploration policy. It is equally plausible that what really destroyed the Apollo Applications Program was its very *formulation* as an incremental and balanced policy alternative. Once "squeezed into acceptable dimensions," it lost the persuasive content that would have justified its proposed expenditures. This is precisely the problem of nonincremental policy. Without major mobilizing commitments (such as landing a man on the moon and returning him safely) these policies simply cannot generate and sustain the support required for their collective payoffs.

A deepseated paradox is at work here. In order to fit comfortably into an incremental, piecemeal framework the AAP was cast in a form which was basically not large enough to be persuasive. Then, without being able to generate its own collective political commitment, the AAP was suddenly too large for available amounts of public support.

Escalation and the Space Shuttle

These dilemmas faced by space policy managers in sustaining their programs have certainly not gone unheeded by top leadership in either the aerospace industry or the White House itself. NASA has, of course, targeted many of its public pleas for support directly toward presidential ears. Intensive industry and congressional pressure has also been brought to bear for the upgrading of space exploration policy goals.

In response to these pressures President Nixon appointed in 1969 a special Space Task Group, consisting of then Vice-President Spiro Agnew, Science Advisor Lee A. Dubridge, Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans and NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine, to assess follow-on goals for space exploration. The group urged the adoption of a Mars manned landing goal, but at a "moderate pace"—no specific date and no overriding national prioriy were to be attached to the endeavor.[55] Yet the President was not yet willing to make any political commitment of this order, and efforts were continued toward finding some middle ground upon which space exploration policy (and expenditures) could unobtrusively rest.

As organizational decay continued, however, even a highly cautious Richard Nixon could not escape the dilemma of the nonincremental policy enterprise. On January 5, 1972, the President authorized NASA to undertake development of a partially reusable space "shuttle"—designed for near-space transit and estimated to cost approximately $5.5 billion within a six-year time period.

The space shuttle commitment represents an expansive goal with which to upgrade once again the manned space exploration program. The shuttle is predicated upon the notion that extensive investment is required in the immediate future in order to reduce the cost of space flight far in the future. The shuttle is a political commitment (by a reluctant President) to rescue the space policy bureaucracy from the decay spiral in which it had been caught. Thus it is with nonincremental policy—it is not readily susceptible to balance in any organizational steady-state.

At its height, space exploration constituted a policy "movement" fueled by high aspirations, public pressures, and seemingly open-ended prospects for organizational growth. Significantly, the instability described herein is a major characteristic of social movements in general. They must mobilize increasing numbers of persons to their support or they risk disintegration and decay. At the other extreme, the very success of a social movement can jeopardize its continuance insofar as success leads to institutionalization and its crystallization in bureaucratic form. Hannah Arendt has noted in this connection "the perpetual motion mania of totalitarian movements which can remain in power only so long as they keep moving and set everything around them in motion."[56] She contends that totalitarian movements "if they do not pursue global rule as their ultimate goal . . . are only too likely to lose whatever power they have already seized."[57]

The correspondence between social movements and nonincremental policy is striking and politically significant. Both require an extensive mobilization of public resources and support for their start-up. Both must then maintain this mobilization above a critical level or they will rapidly disintegrate. Both, in effect, require the presence of expansive goals as the primary means of protecting themselves from erosions in support.

The escalation of goals is a major requirement and a major dilemma of nonincremental policy. As Albert Hirschman has noted: "The promise of some sort of utopia is most characteristic of larger-scale undertakings such as the launching of social reforms or external aggression because they are likely to require heavy initial sacrifices."[58] Utopian promises (and sharply rising expectations) in themselves frequently contribute to explosive social instability. They are hardly likely to lead to public policies which are readily susceptible to balance or long-term steady-states.

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[55] See "The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future," *Space Task Group Report to the President* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

[56] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. 306.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 392.

[58] Hirschman, *Development Projects Observed*, p. 31.

Public Policy and Indivisibility

A final, summary trait of nonincremental policy now presents itself. *Nonincremental policies are beset by an indivisibility which defies disaggregation into piecemeal decisions or additive partial advancements.* This means simply that for nonincremental policies a "self-containment" demand must be observed. Policy requirements as well as outputs must be provided at high levels or they cannot be provided at all.

Space exploration required elaborate and expensive start-up investments before it really got underway. Because of the delayed pay-off of the policy, a major political commitment was essential in order that these initial start-up costs would be judged worthwhile. *No short-term, piecemeal, or incremental commitment* could have mobilized the support and generated the expectations that space exploration required to surpass its start-up thresholds.

Perhaps this "threshold effect" lies at the heart of nonincremental policy. Thresholds themselves are highly important to the understanding of a great many social processes. As Kenneth Boulding has observed:

> [Social] depreciation and appreciation are not continuous functions of use or load, but exhibit threshold or overload phenomena, which is what causes crises. . . . Continuous functions, which are fine for celestial mechanics, are characteristic of social mechanics only over small ranges of variation, and most social problems arise because of discontinuous functions—the road that suddenly jams up as one more car appears on it, the river that refuses to clean itself under a single addition of sewage, the international system that breaks down into war, or the city that erupts into riot when some small straw is laid onto some existing back.[59]

Thresholds make it exceedingly difficult for a series of small incremental steps to add up in cumulative fashion to one big comprehensive step. *They detach piecemeal decisions or resource commitments from corresponding or proportionate policy pay-offs.* This is a critical oversight in incrementalism and the divisible goods model of policy making, and an area to which a great deal of corrective attention should be directed.

In examining this last trait of nonincremental policy it is appropriate to offer additional examples of public enterprises which might fit into this class. Consider urban renewal undertakings, for instance. In urban areas it is becoming increasingly apparent that the rejuvenation of the inner city is an operation to which thresholds or critical masses are attached. Slums represent resource and structural "sinks"—downward cycles of dilapidation and capital depreciation. The influx of limited recovery-inducing elements into the slum environment—in the form of public housing projects, piecemeal slum clearance efforts and private capital investment—is rarely sufficient to overcome the "sink" effect which characterizes the slum. The decay rate of public housing, as well as shrinking inner-city investment returns testify to the failure of small-scale, incremental policy interventions to effect slum rejuvenation.[60]

Perhaps only massive efforts, commitments or expenditures will result in a cycle of rejuvenation which would overcome the sink effect and establish itself as self-sustaining. Major capital inflows will begin to justify private inner-city investment. This investment will in turn enlarge the urban job market, providing resources and incentives for the repair and rebuilding of slum housing. The subsequent appreciation of this housing will add to the supply of inner-city capital, and so on.[61]

If this were so, an urban redevelopment policy, unless cast on a scale approaching its critical resource thresholds, has little chance of realizing —*or even approximately realizing*—its ends. The potential challenge here to a strategy of incrementalism is unmistakable. A series of small decisions or steps, below a policy threshold, will not advance the policy even incrementally in the direction of its goals. Yet at a critical point of personnel or resource commitment, a "take-off" can occur in policy output—yielding vastly multiplied gains in goal-seeking performance.

The need to breach thresholds and to maintain an organizational transcendence of these limiting factors, places severe constraints on the "divisibility" of the nonincremental policy enterprise. It is likely that urban transportation policies frequently fall victim to their own indivisibility requirements. Rapid transit systems in particular possess underlying scale demands—they must attain a requisite coverage or they simply cannot cope with traffic densities in sufficient degree to justify their costs. Additionally, these systems require firm commitments to detailed plans, and an early construction start-up before labor and materials costs rise prohibitively, and before land acquisition and rezoning resistance coalesces.

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[59] Kenneth Boulding, "Discussion," in "The Political Economy of Environmental Quality," *American Economic Review,* 61 (May, 1971), 167.

[60] For a discussion of the urban decay spiral see William J. Baumol, "Macroeconomics and Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis," *American Economic Review,* 57 (June, 1967), 415–426. Also, Harry W. Richardson, *Urban Economics* (London: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 133–145.

[61] For an analysis of these potential "accelerator effects" in urban renewal see Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 299–302.

Given these requirements, it is easy to understand why, despite feasibility studies, campaign promises, and the establishment of urban transportation planning agencies, urban transport policy remains underdeveloped. Rapid transit systems, because of their indivisibility characteristics, acquire a rigidity which will not permit them to surmount successfully the compromise, delay, and reduction processes of urban political bargaining. These are essentially processes of *disaggregation*, and they push transportation ventures below those critical thresholds upon which they rely for success.

Indivisibility of the same type can also afflict large-scale planning efforts in general. Plans, after all, create their own support requirements and must generate political commitments and public aspiration in order to fulfill them. Disaggregation can undermine the base of support required for adequate plan implementation. It can seriously disrupt the internal "logic" upon which the plan must rely for its persuasiveness. In this connection Gerhard Colm has argued that "it is very important to recognize that a one-year plan cannot be obtained merely by dividing, say, a five-year plan into five equal parts."[62]

Indivisibility, of course, leads to a major vulnerability in the nonincremental policy enterprise. To a large extent its success depends on the degree to which it can be shielded from the ever-present forces of political disaggregation. Yet this very shielding requirement contains enormous political implications.

Nonincremental Policy and Its Political Consequences

It often happens that nonincremental policy managers, painfully aware of the vulnerabilities to which their programs are subject, will go to great lengths to establish congenial political environments. Frequently, a nonincremental policy will be "oversold" to the public in order to gain the support and resources deemed essential in the overcoming of thresholds. Once oversold, it becomes difficult to modify the basic objectives of the policy without threatening the political foundations upon which its support has been based. For manned space exploration the Kennedy lunar landing commitment became the major sustaining but at the same time the major constraining factor with which space policy makers had to deal.

Yet this overselling effect is not confined to space exploration alone. Theodore Lowi has noted an identical tendency in large-scale foreign policy undertakings as well. The war in Vietnam, Lowi argues, was rigidified by the very way in which it was sold to the public:

> No policy has escaped injury to itself and to national interests and international stability in the years since American statesmen have felt the need to oversell policies *in order to avoid coming up with a partial decision*. The war in Vietnam has been just another instance of the point. The fighting in the South was not of our making. The crisis was. The escalation was. The involvement in Vietnam was sold by American image-makers as a case of unambiguous aggression and therefore of the need for military victory. Perhaps it was both of these things, but to sell it on the front pages that way in order to ensure support at home left world diplomats, including our own, *with almost no options*.[63]

If Lowi's point is true, it hints strongly at major rigidities implicit in nonincremental foreign policies. The perceived need to accommodate thresholds (i.e., to avoid "partial decisions") can lock foreign policy makers into unyielding, "all-or-nothing" commitments.

This rigidity has major consequences for all policies of a nonincremental nature. It renders them resistant to the compromise and adjustment processes of political bargaining—frequently the major means by which public accountability is imposed. At the same time, their rigidity places nonincremental policies at a disadvantage in responding to shifting political coalitions—a demand essential to the maintenance of public support.

Compounding these difficulties is the instability of nonincremental policy itself. As mentioned earlier, policies in this class are unable to balance themselves within resource or aspirational steady-states. Because of this, a twofold political problem presents itself. In what way besides overselling are policy makers to ensure the requisite support for their undertakings? Without overselling, thresholds can render nonincremental policy so vulnerable to political "adjustments" that it exceeds existing capacities for bureaucratic support. Policy managers, in this case, are likely to experience a continuing frustration in starting up their programs and in mobilizing sufficient resources to offer an adequate chance of goal attainment.

The second half of the political dilemma is that of *disengaging* from rigid, nonincremental policy endeavors which have entered into a self-escalating spiral of growth. Disengagement is difficult to accomplish because of heightened aspirations and bureaucratic forces which support such spirals. (It is also likely if accomplished to lead to serious organizational perturbations as a concomitant retrenchment cycle sets in.) The war in Vietnam would appear to illustrate this disengagement dilemma to a frightening degree.

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[62] Gerhard Colm, *Integration of National Planning and Budgeting* (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1965), p. 24.

[63] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, p. 179 (emphasis added).

The Inapplicability of Trial Programs

Another policy implication attached to nonincremental, indivisible undertakings is their challenge to the ever-popular limited-scope trial program. These programs are frequently employed in policy settings because, in the event of failure, not too much in the way of prestige or organizational resources has been risked in them. If they succeed, they provide a blueprint for adjustments in design and an enlargement of application. These advantages have led many policy makers to urge that we "expand the area of governmental and public affairs activity in which new ideas can be tried out as limited-scale programs."[64]

If nothing else, this analysis of nonincremental policy suggests that trial programs can have severe limitations. It suggests that small-scale policy efforts may not necessarily replicate larger ones. Trial programs cannot hope to duplicate those critical commitment and resource thresholds upon which nonincremental, indivisible policy pursuits must rely.

As a result, limited-scale programs are likely to be seriously misleading indicators of nonincremental policy performance. Such programs may indicate a potential for success which is really mythical where larger forces must come into play. Perhaps more importantly, they may project failure where success is possible, given resource commitments on the requisite scale.

All of these policy implications hint strongly at the need for new analytical attention to nonincremental policy, and particularly the need to identify, prior to policy commitment, *which public undertakings are likely to have thresholds attached.* This identification might allow for more enlightened political decisions and the subsequent design of more congenial organizational environments should commitments to nonincremental policies be undertaken. In the meantime, however, no such analytical imagination appears likely until alternatives to the incremental and divisibility paradigms which dominate policy analysis are presented.

Nonincremental Policy: The Conceptual Challenge

To review briefly, this essay has described a class of policy undertakings which elude much of the analytical weaponry of political science. Nonincremental policies require large start-up investments unfulfillable by incremental or piecemeal commitments. They are policies which are nonequilibrating with respect to growth—that is, they are devoid of middle ground between expansion and decay. Lindblom, in his description of incrementalism, stresses the importance of marginal and continuous decisional refinements to the policy process. Yet the policies of which we have been speaking are precisely those for which this strategy is inappropriate. They cannot attain the equilibrium *which would allow these adjustive actions to be successful.*

It is important to recognize the extent to which incremental and equilibrating outlooks dominate political science. Policy analysis repeatedly stresses the degree to which marginal balances are struck between bureaucrat and client, between policy goals and public pressure, and between bureaucratic decisions of the present and organizational routines of the past.

In addition, many of the emerging trends in the analysis of public policy lead in the direction of further elevating decentralized, divisible processes as the "stuff" of policy making. The "public choice" school of policy analysis applies economic models to its assessment of policy activity. In effect, this approach assumes the existence of a decision "market" in which the disaggregated forces of competition, bargaining, and exchange are the determining factors in policy output. Related to this analytical outlook is a developing political persuasion which endorses the increased decentralization of public decision making.

Perhaps the best argument for this public policy "approach" has been presented by Alan Altshuler. Altshuler asserts that it is now necessary "to think more systematically about the virtues of disaggregation versus integration, pluralism versus coordination, and the free market versus regulation in social life."[65] Altshuler calls for a "debureaucratization" in public policy—wherein bureaucratic decisions are supplanted by popular decisions (as in citizen participation and community control) and by market decisions (in which a market adjustment of individual preferences, such as in voucher plans, replaces centralized efforts at planning or control).

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[64] Adam Yarmolinsky, "Ideas Into Programs," in *The Presidential Advisory System,* ed. Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 99. For a further discussion of experimental policy making see Alice M. Rivlin, *Systematic Thinking for Social Action* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 108–119.

[65] Alan Altshuler, "New Institutions to Serve the Individual," in *Environment and Policy: The Next Fifty Years,* ed. William R. Ewald (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 425.

There is obviously a great deal to be said in behalf of the public choice and decentralization movements in public policy. Yet there is a real danger, again, that such outlooks will command a disproportionate amount of both analytical attention *and* political support—at the expense of important nonincremental and indivisible policy objectives to which thresholds are attached. This is a problem of theoretical and practical dimensions.

In political theory at present, decision-making models as well as most models of the political system itself, describe deviance-minimizing, self-stabilizing, and equilibrating operations exclusively. Yet as we have seen, nonincremental policy frequently entails a high-level, unstable process of deviance *amplification*—a performance "take-off" based upon systems of mutual causation.[66] Entirely new models must be fashioned to account for deviance-amplifying processes before we can hope to analyze enterprises like manned space exploration adequately.

Meanwhile, a deep disillusionment has come to surround the public's assessment of nonincremental political commitments to large-scale policy. In this era of skepticism little support exists for ambitious and expensive undertakings in the public sector. Peculiarly, however, interest in large-scale *goals* remains; and herein lies a major dilemma. Solutions are still urgently sought to problems of poverty, unemployment, and urban decay. Demands continue for major improvements in transportation, housing, energy supply, and environmental quality. These are large-scale demands. Yet the decentralization movement may force us to rely for their resolution upon small-scale, disaggregated policy efforts.

It may well be that many of these efforts will be successful. But the danger exists that in a number of problem areas, incremental policy attempts will fail repeatedly as each falls below some critical effectiveness threshold. Perhaps only nonincremental modes of policy making will prove appropriate in satisfying many of our implicit societal aspirations. The decentralization movement threatens to undercut seriously the political support upon which such nonincremental enterprises would have to depend.

The point of this essay is not to attack the public choice or decentralization movements in public administration, nor even to challenge the utility of the incremental model of policy making. The purpose of this essay is to argue for *additional* analytical frameworks to account for phenomena which lie outside present theoretical coverage. New departures in policy analysis are called for if we are to understand many large-scale public undertakings and their problems. Such understanding is important—both to the development of political science and to the success of public policy.

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[66] For an excellent discussion of the deviance-amplification process see Margoroh Maruyama, "The Second Cybernetics: Deviance-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes," in *Modern Systems, Research for the Behavioral Scientist*, ed. Walter Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968), pp. 304–313.

The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies*

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In the same month of 1960 two articles were published on children's orientations toward the President of the United States. One, by Easton and Hess,[1] reported fixed-choice, pre-test data on white, suburban, midwestern children's responses to the questionaire these researchers later administered to a national sample of white urban children during the Kennedy Administration.[2] The other, my paper on "The Benevolent Leader,"[3] reported mainly open-ended data on a heterogeneous but largely white sample of New Haven, Connecticut, children. The findings of these two independent Eisenhower-years studies as well as Easton and Hess's Kennedy-years findings converged strikingly. American children appeared to have highly idealized views of the President.

Since 1960, the populations of children studied in the early political socialization research have increasingly been exposed to a political culture in which the themes of cynicism and distrust of political leaders are widely prevalent. Moreover, investigators have gone on to study subcultural variation in pre-adult political orientation within the United States, not least because such groups as blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, American Indians and poor Appalachian whites have become more self-consciously politicized, and have articulated their disaffection with "the system." A further sense of the potential variation in pre-adult political orientations has emerged from the growing body of research on children in numerous political systems. To complicate matters, the very phrase "political socialization," which was then a neologism, has since triggered several theoretical and methodological debates about the nature, consequences, and appropriate observation methods of pre-adult political learning.[4]

This paper presents data on children's orientations toward political leaders in a paradigmatically interesting triad of western democracies—Britain, France, and the United States. The data source consists of the protocols of tape-recorded interviews with small samples of children in the three countries, which were submitted to intensive content analysis in order to examine various standard assumptions about political culture and socialization among the three nations, as well as black-white differences in the United States. The interviews were collected in 1969–70—i.e., in Britain at a time when Harold Wilson was in office, somewhat preceding the interlude of Heath's prime ministership; in late-de Gaulle, early-Pompidou France; and in the early stages of Nixon's first term in office. In addition, a small sample of American children was interviewed during the June 1973 Watergate Hearings.

This paper describes in detail responses to two types of open-ended questions about the heads of state in the three countries and the Prime Ministers in Britain and France, and discusses these responses in the light of the contemporary political socialization literature, with special emphasis on the current applicability of the benevolent-leader findings on white American children at the beginning of the 1960s. My second concern is to calibrate different measures of pre-adult political orientation in an attempt to clarify certain theoretical and methodological issues that have arisen in the political socialization literature.

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* This is a revision and condensation of a paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. (Copyright 1973, The American Political Science Association.) For the original paper, see "Childrens Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies: The Benevolent Leader Revisited." (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms). The data reported are from a collaborative study designed and executed by the writer and Sidney Tarrow. Professor Tarrow's comments on the entire exposition have been of great help. I would like to thank Mary Williams, Richard Kronick, Leslie Margolin, and Barbara Young for research assistance well beyond the mechanical level, and the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Ford Foundation, and the Princeton Center of International Studies, and the Yale Urban Studies Program for financial aid at various stages of the project.

[1] Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (Winter, 1960), pp. 632–44.

[2] The two book-length reports of that study are Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967) and David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

[3] Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (December, 1960), 934–43, later expanded on in Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), chapter 3. Also see Fred I. Greenstein, "More on Children's Images of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 648–54.

[4] For references see notes 9 and 11 below.

Political Culture and Socialization in Britain, France and the United States

The following widely held or implied assumptions are what might be called the textbook theory of politics and society in the three nations with which this study is concerned.[5]

(1) Britain and the United States are "stable democracies."

(2) France is an "unstable democracy" marked by widespread distrust of political leaders and internal cleavage.

(3) Britain and the United States differ substantially in social structure and political psychology. Britons traditionally accept the legitimacy of political authority, whereas Americans are ambivalent, though not wholly negative, toward their leaders.

(4) Thus, the United States exhibits an uneasy compromise between French- and British-like properties. Indeed, if the United States were organized in the centralized fashion permitted by British social structure and values, unstable, French-style outcomes would result.

(5) American politics are more centrifugal than British politics, partly because of the greater social heterogeneity of the U.S., and particularly the greater number of potentially antagonistic groups. The single most enduring element of this politically explosive social heterogeneity results from the heritage of slavery. The presence of "two nations" in the United States has been a fundamental source of political conflict from the framing of the Constitution through the 1970s, by which time American blacks had become increasingly alienated and racially proud. By the 1970s, blacks were direct protagonists in American politics, and not merely the objects of political conflict and machination.

These deliberately simplified textbook claims imply assumptions about political socialization that would place white American children between English and French children in their evaluations of political leaders, but would predict that these aspects of political psychology do not take the same form among black and white American children. Blacks presumably would resemble the French in their distrust of their nation's leaders; whites would be more like the British children in their trust of leaders.

"The literature" speaks with many voices, however. Recent writings contain numerous observations and assertions that contradict the foregoing sketch, partly because of reassessment of the traditional assumptions. Here are some brief illustrations of how the conventional wisdom has altered with respect to the four comparison groups in this study and also the study of political socialization in general:

(1) A principal debate in the recent literature on English political culture and socialization is whether the Bagehot-derived presumption that the "English common people," are "deferential" to higher authorities stands up empirically. Indeed, important questions have been raised about whether the very notion of deference has been adequately explicated in the literature.[6]

(2) The emphasis of Gallic negativism toward political authority in the textbook account of French political culture has a corollary in the notion that the French populace consists of highly politicized citizens, each of whom is deeply committed to his own preferences among the panoply of subtly nuanced French political ideologies. In contrast to the "Frenchman-as-ideologue," recent studies have found an exceptionally apolitical (possibly antipolitical) French electorate that provides few restraints on the impulses of the thin political stratum of the populace to vie over what Freud called "the narcissism of small differences." Some interpretations of French politics also stress the putative "individualism" of the French, but other writings stress the importance of hierarchical, even autocratic, authority relations in French politics and society, more like the conventional

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[5] For a recent annotated presentation of standard sources on Britain and France, see the bibliography to Stanley Rothman, *European Society and Politics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). On the United States, see Michael McGiffert, ed., *The Character of Americans*, 2nd ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1970), which contains a useful collection of essays and valuable bibliographical references. The older national character literature is summarized in: Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in G. Linzey and E. Aronson, eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology* IV (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 418–506. On the more recent political-cultural approach see Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[6] Dennis Kavanagh, "The Deferential English: A Comparative Critique," *Government and Opposition*, 6 (Summer, 1971), pp. 333–60. The question of deference will not be discussed further in this article because it is treated extensively in Fred I. Greenstein, Valentine Herman, Robert N. Stradling and Elia Zureik, "The Child's Conception of the Queen and the Prime Minister," *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (July, 1974), 257–87. After that article was in print, we discovered technical errors in the data processing that shifted the percentages by one or two points in a number of tables as well as a substantial difference in the percentages reported for white American children and French children in rows 1 and 2 of Table 9, and for black American children in rows 1 and 2 of Table 7 in this paper. All the statistics in this paper have been rechecked to eliminate any further possibility of errors and discrepancies between the two articles, due to the errors noted above in the earlier article.

stereotype of "the Germans" than of "the French." After all, runs the *mot*, "Charlemagne was also Karl der Grosse."[7]

(3) The empirical studies of American adults conducted up to the early 1960s seem to suggest that the positive aspects of adult ambivalence toward leaders is considerably more consequential for political behavior than are negative attitudes such as generalized distrust for politicians.[8] As we have seen, the early studies of American children show almost unequivocally positive references to the "benevolence" of political leaders.[9] This early "benevolent leader literature" has since been referred to as an "irrelevant" characterization of a bygone era.[10] After all, this literature preceded the Vietnam protests, ghetto insurrections, increasing signs of deeper, ideological conflict and distrust of authorities in the adult population, protest activities by college and high school students during Johnson's final years in office, and, after the apparent calm of Nixon's first term, Watergate and its aftermath. That certain of these trends even occurred raises important questions about the value of the benevolent-leader literature. As more than one commentator has noted, some of the same pre-adolescents who blithely idealized Eisenhower and Kennedy in the early studies may well have been the leaders of protest against "the system" a few years later.[11]

In the second wave of mid- to late-1960s political socialization research, an important study of highly distinctive, culturally and physically isolated population of poor whites in Appalachia was instructively titled "The *Mal*evolent Leader."[12] To some extent this title came to represent the expectation that in the post-Eisenhower, post-New Frontier–Great Society era, *all* segments of the pre-adult American population were likely to acquire political orientations lacking the idealized qualities reported in the research a decade earlier. Another study by Tolley in 1971 of the attitudes of grade-school children toward the Vietnam conflict reported many indications of children's actual or hypothetical willingness to criticize the President for fostering military conflict. Tolley, who summarized his findings under the heading "The Fallible Leader, 1971," noted that although his data were not comparable to the data of the early studies, he felt sure there had been a reduction in children's idealization of the American President.[13]

(4) Substantial changes in the political consciousness and behavior of American blacks have occurred since the 1950s. Evidence exists that blacks at all age levels exhibit political negativism, distrust, and cynicism, but findings on this score are far from consistent, perhaps because race relations and "the black experience" in the United States, in spite of certain overriding uniformities, are highly variable from one context to another.

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[7] Relevant sources are reviewed in Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "The Study of French Political Socialization; Toward the Revocation of Paradox," *World Politics*, 22 (October, 1969), 95–137.

[8] For a review of the literature on adult ambivalence toward political authorities in the United States, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, pp. 27–31.

[9] See the references in notes one, two and three and the following useful anthologies: Norman Adler and Charles Harrington, eds., *The Learning of Political Behavior* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman, 1970); Roberta S. Sigel, ed., *Learning About Politics: A Reader in Political Socialization* (New York: Random House, 1970); Jack Dennis, ed., *Socialization to Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1973); Charles G. Bell, ed., *Growth and Change: A Reader in Political Socialization* (Encino and Belmont, Cal.: Dickenson, 1973); and Anthony Orum, ed., *The Seeds of Politics: Youth and Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The first and third of these works have excellent bibliographies. Recent extensive literature reviews include Michael P. Riccards, *The Making of the American Citizenry: An Introduction* (New York: Chandler, 1973); Dean Jaros, *Socialization to Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Robert Weissberg, *Political Learning, Choice and Citizenship* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); and David O. Sears, "Political Socialization," in *The Handbook of Political Science II*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), pp. 93–154. For a recent bibliography, see Jack Dennis, "Political Socialization Research: A Bibliography," *Sage Professional Papers in American Politics*, Vol. 1, Series No. 04-002 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973).

[10] W. Lee Johnson, Jr., Letter to the Editor, *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1317–1318.

[11] On the question of whether the positive orientations of children studied in the late 1950s and early 1960s should in principle have been expected to predict "pro-system" behavior, see Fred I. Greenstein, "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization': Definitions, Criticisms, and Strategies of Inquiry," *Journal of Politics*, 32 (November, 1970), 969–78.

[12] Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (June, 1968), 564–75.

[13] Howard Tolley, Jr., *Children and War: Socialization to International Conflict* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1973), pp. 129–31. Recently, a "multifarious leader" has been introduced into the literature by a pair of investigators who compare black and white American children with a President-worshipping sample of Amish children. Dean Jaros and Kenneth L. Kolson, "The Multifarious Leader: Political Socialization of Amish, 'Yanks', Blacks," in Richard G. Niemi and Associates, *The Politics of Future Citizens* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 41–62. For an exceptionally interesting study of the absence of conspicuous leadership, figures in post–World War II Japanese political socialization, see Joseph A. Massey, "The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority, *American Political Science Review*, 69 (March, 1975), 31–48.

In addition, black political orientations probably have a distinctive subcultural patterning, which needs to be characterized in its own terms and not merely as part of a continuum of French, American white, and English orientations.[14]

(5) One may also speculate about the adequacy *in general* of the empirical characterizations of pre-adult (and adult) political orientations toward leaders. Political scientists interested in political socialization have been relentlessly monistic in their use of paper-and-pencil surveys, especially fixed-choice questionnaires, in studying children. As a result, questions have been raised about the possible artifactuality of the early political socialization research. The same fixed-choice response can have different meanings to different respondents, and individuals whose attitudes are essentially the same sometimes choose different responses depending on how they perceive item wordings.[15] Worse yet, a choice may be made more or less arbitrarily because it sounds right or because of the respondent's desire to cooperate. These dangers are increased when such techniques are applied to young children who may not even recognize the terminology (e.g., the very word "government"), much less the rationale of an item such as the following from the Easton and Hess questionnaire: "What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do."[16] When fixed-choice procedures are used cross-culturally, the possibility for misleading findings is multiplied, a point that emerges strongly from British critiques of an application of the Easton and Hess instrument to an English pre-adult population.[17]

Even where open-ended approaches are used, problems of interpreting responses persist. In my New Haven study, the open-ended format made it possible to qualify or counter some interpretations suggested by the fixed-choice Easton and Hess study.[18] The final data collection was less than ideal, however, because a paper-and-pencil procedure was used. Even if interviewing had been possible it would still have been difficult to elicit responses without suggesting or structuring them, and to interpret the resulting verbiage. These problems of interpretation exist especially in characterizing children's orientations as "benevolent." Children, or at least American children, are rather free with words like "help" in describing political leaders. But what do children mean when they say a leader is "a helper?" Are they exhibiting basic assumptions about the benevolence of leaders? Or are they merely mouthing a bit of conventional language? In either case, to what degree are their statements affective and evaluative, and to what degree are they cognitive?[19]

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[14] On the politicization of contemporary black children in the United States see the following recent articles: Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black School Children: Two Explanations," *Journal of Politics,* 34 (November, 1972), 1243–75; Anthony M. Orum and Roberta S. Cohen, "The Development of Political Orientations Among Black and White Children," *American Sociological Review,* 38 (February, 1973), 62–74; and Sarah F. Liebschutz and Richard G. Niemi, "Political Attitudes Among Black Children," in Niemi and Associates, pp. 83–103. On the context-dependence of attitudes associated with race, see Howard Schuman and Barry Gruenberg, "The Impact of City on Racial Attitudes," *American Journal of Sociology,* 76 (September, 1970), 213–61. On blacks more generally, see Norval D. Glenn and Charles M. Bonjean, eds., *Blacks in the United States* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1969); Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark, eds., *The Negro American* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966); Dorothy B. Porter, *The Negro in the United States: A Selected Bibliography* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1970).

[15] For a classical demonstration of the extraordinarily different reasons why individuals may choose a fixed-choice alternative, see Richard S. Crutchfield and Donald A. Gordon, "Variations in Respondents' Interpretations of an Opinion-Poll Question," *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research,* 1 (1947), 1–12.

[16] Problems of using fixed-choice items in research on children are discussed in David O. Sears' review of Hess and Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children,* in *Harvard Educational Review,* 38 (Summer, 1968), 571–78. Also see Fred I. Greenstein's review of Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy,* in *Political Science Quarterly,* 87 (March, 1972), 98–102; and Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics,* Vol. 1, Series No. 01-009 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970). For a somewhat overstated but interesting critique of the use of questionnaires in general, see David Marsh, "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questionned," *British Journal of Political Science,* 1 (April, 1971), 453–66. Another line of critical discussion of political socialization studies is presented in Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz, and Alden E. Lind, "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review,* 67 (June, 1973), 415–32. See also two extensive rejoinders to this essay in the *American Political Science Review,* 68 (June, 1974), 720–25.

[17] The object of the critiques was the following article: Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, and Donald McCrone, "Support for Nation and Government Among English Children," *British Journal of Political Science,* 1 (April, 1971), 25–48. The critiques: March, "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned"; A. H. Birch, "Children's Attitudes and British Politics," *British Journal of Political Science,* 1 (October, 1971), 519–20; Ian Budge, "Support for Nation and Government Among English Children: A Comment," *British Journal of Political Science,* 1 (July 1971), 389–92; David Marsh, "Beliefs About Democracy Among English Adolescents: What Significance Are They?" *British Journal of Political Science,* 2 (April, 1972), 255–59.

[18] Greenstein, "More Children's Images of the President."

One reason for suspecting the accuracy of political socialization findings that stress reasonably well-patterned pre-adult political orientations is that survey research on adults has reported remarkably low levels of information and attitudinal consistency. The conclusions of the literature on lack of patterning in adult orientations[20] have since been softened both by events (the evident increase in attitudinal patterning as the "polarizing" political conflict of the 1960s proceeded), and by variant approaches to analyzing survey data on adults (e.g., approaches that emphasize the issues salient to an individual).[21] Furthermore, it seems desirable to examine adult orientations in ways that do not force a respondent to answer questions about the issues currently concerning the active minority of the political leadership stratum. Since survey items often use *categories of discourse* that characterize "elite" rather than "mass" political thought and discussion, more "naturalistic" modes of eliciting political orientation might possibly show *greater* patterning in adult orientations than is presently reported, and *less*, or at any rate, different patterning in pre-adult orientations.

Methodological Premises and Procedures

Although the methodological problems just discussed might seem to point to a search for a philosopher's stone that would make possible "perfect" measurement of political orientations, a different strategy is called for: that of multiple indicators and, in particular, *multiple methods*. As Campbell and Fiske point out in a classic paper still insufficiently appreciated by political scientists, it is axiomatic that particular measurement approaches contain "biases." The most efficacious research strategy is to take advantage of, rather than seek to eliminate, these biases by employing compensating types of observational techniques, which produce instrument effects in varying but known directions. The findings elicited by different measurement techniques can be compared by a process analogous to triangulation[22] as it is used in surveying. The multimethod research procedure used in the present study enables us to examine the convergences and divergences among findings of four types: conventional fixed-choice items, open-ended questions, semi-projective story completions, and verbatim response quotations, but in this paper we draw selectively only on the latter three classes of data.

The open-ended items were designed to elicit childrens perceptions of major roles and institutions in their political system. These questions were similar to those used, for example, in the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's election studies, but employed a more varied set of codes to analyze responses. The sequence of information items was somewhat unconventional because it was preceded by this statement:

> A new child comes to your school. He comes from another country. He says to you: "There are some things about [England, France, the United States] that I don't understand. Tell me what they are. . . . "

The "things" proved to be "the Queen," "the Prime Minister," "the President of the Republic," and other political roles and institutions.[23] The simple expedient of placing the child in a free-response circumstance sometimes elicited findings both contrary to and more accurate than those reported in previous research using fixed-choice items. For example, fixed-choice political socialization research points to great respect for the Supreme Court. Interviews show similar positive responses, but make clear that they are to the positively toned words "supreme" and "court," and do not reflect awareness of the activities of the institution.

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[19] Connell, on the basis of his own open-ended interviews with Australian children, questions whether the pre-adult assertions I treated as exhibiting benevolence do not have a "cognitive . . . rather than emotional . . . basis." R. W. Connell, *The Child's Construction of Politics* (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1971). As will be seen, the present analysis examines this possibility in detail. A far more complex question, which I will not attempt to deal with here, is whether the clearly demarcated gulf between fact and value in the purer varieties of analytic philosophy approximates the empirical processes of human thought, perception, feeling, judgment, and anticipation of action.

[20] Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," in *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. Edward R. Tufte (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 168–89.

[21] See, for example, David E. Repass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 389–400, and Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 415–28, 450–67.

[22] Donald T. Campbell and Donald W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," *Psychological Bulletin*, 56 (March, 1959), 81–105. For a recent contribution to the literature perfecting the psychometrics of this approach, see Arne L. Kalleberg and James R. Kluegel, "Analysis of Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix: Some Limitations and an Alternative," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 60 (February, 1975), 1–9. The term "triangulation" is first used in Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, *Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961).

[23] The verbatim response content makes clear that most children ignore the hypothetical foreign child and treat the item as a simple request for cognitive information. A few French children were explicitly suspicious of the foreign child and describe the precautions they would take in discussing politics with a stranger; a few English children cast themselves as tour guides, exhibiting Buckingham Palace to the young foreigner. In no case did the foreign child stimulus invoke nationalistic idealizations of domestic leaders or institutions. For a text of the interview schedule, see Greenstein and Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations," pp. 535–49

The most distinctive methodological departure was the use of numerous questions in which our respondents were presented with carefully contrived, incomplete stories and asked to imagine the conclusions, after the manner of the familiar Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The procedure is called *semi*-projective because it employs more culturally recognizable and less ambiguous stimuli than those used in orthodox projective tests, and the responses are analyzed in terms of surface psychocultural dispositions, such as cognitive and evaluative assumptions about political reality, rather than in terms of deep strata of the personality.

Unlike some projective testers, I do not argue that there is a uniquely penetrating quality to this type of procedure—a kind of psychic X-ray—but instead, that it is a *different* way of eliciting political orientations than the procedures described in the previous paragraphs, and therefore contributes to the triangulation of observational methods discussed above. An exceptionally interesting property of the story-completion procedure is that it can provide an insight not only into cognitive and affective orientations but also into *conative* orientations—i.e., into dispositions toward action in concrete situations.[24] The analysis that follows is devoted to contrasting the evidence on affect toward political leaders produced by an open-ended item in which the respondent describes national leaders to the imaginary foreign child, and a semi-projective item in which the respondent is asked to imagine the outcome of an episode in which the head of state's car is inadvertently stopped for speeding by a traffic policeman.

Throughout this report I also present numerous examples of verbatim responses because of a conviction that code categories, no matter how carefully and subtly conceived, fail to exhaust the meanings of the respondents' statements. The quotations show that children in the various comparison groups who responded in the same way in certain respects—and were so coded—nevertheless differed in still others. While more specific coding can reduce these residual points of difference, the data suggest inherent limits to the aim of comparative political psychology, stated by Przeworski and Teune, to convert national variance into variance between universal categories.[25] As will be seen, some of the differences even seem to reside in the national languages of our respondents. Verbatim response quotations are also invaluable in seeking to define the criteria for concluding, for example, that certain specified political orientations are affective rather than cognitive. At a minimum, by providing direct quotations, we can furnish evidence for others to draw their own conclusions.

The data that follow are derived from thirty- to sixty-minute taped interviews with 297 ten- to fourteen-year-old children in four comparison groups of the following sizes: English, 80; French, 106; U.S. whites, 86; U.S. blacks, 25. The comparison groups are essentially evenly divided by sex. The interviews were conducted in geographically diverse schools, so far as was possible: Connecticut, Eastern Pennsylvania, and upstate New York in the United States; the Paris area and Provence in France; and London and East Anglia in Britain. To facilitate subgroup comparisons, the samples were deliberately stratified rather than seeking to follow population frequencies. Unfortunately, our resources did not permit a large number of black interviews in the United States, and consequently the black-white comparisons should be treated as provisional. By using a large number of schools and classrooms, and numerous interviewers for the English, French, and white American groups, possible measurement error resulting from individual interviewer style and classroom climate were reduced. Black children were interviewed by a black, female interviewer.

The interviews conducted during the Watergate hearings were with white Connecticut children from the same schools where the previous Connecticut white interviews had taken place. A slightly truncated interview guide was used.

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[24] Semi-projective procedures do not elicit the same levels of psychological orientation from each individual. In some interviews, responses are patterned by underlying personality organization, but in others, responses are rather ephemeral and seem to be stimulated either by recent learning experiences such as classroom exercises, or even by stimuli contained in the interview itself. For this reason responses to story-completion items should be viewed more as patterns within populations than as stable properties of individual respondents. For a fuller discussion, see Greenstein and Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations," pp. 510–13.

[25] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1970). Not only are variables imperfectly comparable across cultures, but there are important problems of their contextual meaning when associated with other constellations of factors in different cultures. Compare Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), especially p. 23.

Although an attempt was made to match the groups by age, socioeconomic status, and community characteristics, some differences occurred. Analyses controlling for these factors made it clear that they were not responsible for the patterns in the tables to be presented. Sample size and space limitations preclude multivariate analysis in this presentation; instead marginals and verbatim content are extensively discussed and compared. I have abjured significance testing, which would give an aura of spurious precision to a richly complex but obviously exploratory body of data.

Children Explain Their Political Leaders and Institutions: Information, Images, and Affect

Tables 1 through 4 are based on the questions in which the respondent is asked to imagine a dialogue with a foreign child seeking information about respondent's country. Table 1 reports levels of information about the chief of state in each of the three nations and about the Prime Minister in Britain and France. To broaden the perspective on awareness of these five roles, information also is presented in Table 1 on awareness of the local member of the national legislature and the mayor but for the remainder of this analysis, only the chief of state and prime ministerial roles will be discussed.

At present there is a scattered array of findings about levels of awareness of these roles on the part of children and adults in the three countries. At all age levels, the President is certainly the best-known American,[26] and he is virtually the only public figure known to more than a small minority of children until late in adolescence.[27] Although both children and adults in the United States, when confronted with the appropriately worded questionnaire item, can be induced to say that the Congress is "more important" to the nation than the President, the available evidence suggests that at all age levels the President is considerably more salient than that Congress and the individual members of Congress.[28] A recent national study of children's awareness of their district congressman shows that by age thirteen only 11 per cent can name that individual—indeed only about 40 per cent of young adults can.[29] Awareness of local officials appears to vary from locality to locality in the United States. In my 1958 political socialization study, virtually all New Haven children by the fifth-grade level knew the name of that city's popular Mayor Richard C. Lee, whereas in the nearby community of East Haven only 40 per cent of a fifth-grade pretest sample were able to name the municipal chief executive.[30]

Comparably detailed documentation does not appear to be available for either British or French adults and children. Roig and Billon-Grand do, however, provide evidence of the wide general awareness of the President of the Republic among French children,[31] and Greenstein, Herman, Stradling, and Zureik report data that provide some sense of how English children perceive the Queen and the Prime Minister.[32]

Virtually all the children professed to have *heard* of the four British and French and three American political roles in their respective countries. Professions of knowledge are easy, however. They may reflect reluctance to admit ignorance; they may result from confusion ("Congress" for "Chamber of Commerce," for example); or they may be a mere recognition that the term *sounds* familiar. A more accurate assessment of the children's level of information can be found in Table 1, row 2, which indicates the frequency with which children were able to supply the names of role incumbents in response to an open-ended question. Because the French children were polled during the interval between de Gaulle's resignation and Pompidou's election, as well as during the early Pompidou period when there had been little time to absorb the President's name, we combined the figures for awareness of the present incumbent and awareness of the previous incumbent. Well over 90 per cent of the children in each nation were able to name their head of state. The somewhat lower incidence of awareness of the Queen's name in England reflects no lack of familiarity with the royal role, but instead a tendency to perceive "the Queen" rather than "Elizabeth II" as the designation of the Monarch.

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[26] Fred I. Greenstein, "The Psychological Functions of the Presidency for Citizens," in *The American Presidency: Vital Center*, ed. Elmer Cornwall, Jr. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1966) and, in somewhat different form, as "The Best Known American," *Trans-action*, 4 (November, 1966), 12–17. For a recent attempt to describe and explain the ebb and flow of presidential popularity, see John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973). For a 1970s review, see Fred I. Greenstein, "What the President Means to Americans: Presidential Choice Between Elections," in *Choosing the President*, ed. James David Barber (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 121–47.

[27] The survey findings are presented in Greenstein, "What the President Means to Americans: Presidential Choice Between Elections."

[28] Easton and Dennis, *Children and the Political System*, pp. 114–21, present fixed-choice data suggesting that older children attribute greater importance to Congress than to the President. Open-ended data on children's perceptions of the President and Congress from the present study, however, leave the impression that while this may be a typical verbal convention learned by older children, even the oldest respondents in the present study knew very little about Congress, much less about their own congressman, and were *far* more attentive to and psychologically stirred by the President. On the simple matter of awareness of the President versus legislators and the legislature, see Table 1 of this article. Adult *verbalizations* about the relative importance of President and Congress are summarized in Donald J. Devine, *The Political Culture of the United States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 155–63. Like older children, adults talk about the primacy of Congress, but are more likely to structure their political perceptions and affect around the President.

[29] See note 26.

[30] Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, p. 63n.

[31] C. Roig and F. Billon-Grand, *La socialisation politique des enfants* (Paris: Cahiers de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques 163, Armand Colin, 1968). For a summary in English of the findings of Roig and Billon-Grand, see Greenstein and Tarrow, "The Study of French Political Socialization." On the orientations of French adults to de Gaulle and the French presidency as manifested in the General, see Institut français d'opinion publique, *Les français et de Gaulle* (Plon, 1971).

[32] See Greenstein et al., "The Child's Conception of the Queen and the Prime Minister." On monarchy generally, see Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (January, 1969), 419–42.

This impression of uniformly high levels of political awareness quickly vanishes as one looks further into Table 1. Whereas almost every English child is able to name Harold Wilson, only about half the French children are able to name the Premier. An increase in the prominence of the Premier as a figure to whom French *adults* orient themselves as the politics of the Fifth Republic evolved has been argued by Jean-Luc Parodi[33] on the basis of time-series survey data, but at the pre-adult level the Premier appears to be at best a shadowy presence.

In all three countries, the legislative representative from the child's district is consistently less well known than any heads of state or prime ministers; only a quarter of the English, French, and U. S. white children and a mere 5 per cent of the U.S. black children were able to name their legislator.

The pattern of awareness of local executives strikingly suggests the importance of the mayoral role or its equivalent in the three political systems, a finding consistent with Roberta Sigel's observation that, in spite of the considerable affective component in early political learning and children's general inattention to government and politics, detailed, reasonably accurate cognitive learning about political roles and institutions *does* occur.[34] French children, brought up in a political system with intensely localistic traditions in which *maire* and *mairie* are familiar fixtures, exhibit more information about the mayor and his job than do the children in the other two countries. The French lead the other comparison groups in local awareness substantially, whereas on the other leadership roles the differences among the French and the English and American are in the opposite direction. Seventy-one per cent of the French respondents and roughly half of the American respondents were able to name their mayors, but only one-tenth of the English respondents would name the largely ceremonial and decorative mayors of their cities.

The Cognitive Content of Political Imagery. We can usefully begin to look beneath the surface of the information-level distinctions in Table 1 by submitting role descriptions to an analysis of cognitive content. Table 2 presents twelve of the most substantively interesting image categories used in coding the political leadership roles, including only categories applicable to most or all of the roles and institutions. The categories evolved from repeated perusal of the open-ended data and, where appropriate, from the code used to classify the open-ended responses in my 1958 study.[35] The image categories do not exhaust the themes that can be extracted from the open-ended data, but they do represent some of the most salient surface aspects of the children's descriptions of their national leadership roles and institutions.

I begin with an extended examination of the first category listed in Table 2—the seemingly workaday theme that the leader "rules, governs, or commands." This category is consistently used for the head of state, but rarely for the prime ministers, even in Britain, where the ceremonial leader (the Queen) rather than the effective leader (the Prime Minister) receives most references to ruling.

In view of the extensive literature on the dilemma of achieving equivalent meanings in cross-cultural measurement, it is striking to note the national variation in linguistic usage and connotation when children refer to general governance. The imagery used by the American children suggests a leader who is an important person with a high degree of control over his political system. In some responses the President appears as the only important decision maker in the political

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[33] Jean-Luc Parodi, "Sur deux courbes de popularité," *Revue française de science politique,* 21 (February, 1971), 129–214.

[34] Roberta S. Sigel, "Image of a President: Some Insights into Political Views of School Children," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (March, 1968), 216–26.

[35] The coding criteria and coded open-ended findings for my 1958 study are reported in Fred I. Greenstein, "Children's Political Perspectives," 1959, doctoral dissertation, Yale University (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms). Some open-ended political imagery findings were published in Greenstein, "More Children's Images of the President."

Table 1. Levels of Political Awareness[a]
(percentages)

Response	England				France				U. S. Whites			U.S. Blacks		
	Queen	Prime Minister	Legislator	Mayor	President	Premier	Legislator	Mayor	President	Legislator	Mayor	President	Legislator	Mayor
Claims to have heard of role	100	100	98	100	100	100	93	100	100	99	100	100	100	96
Can name role incumbent Can name previous incumbent	91 }94 3	96 }96 0	25	10 }10 0	68 }99 31	50 }52 2	24	71 }73 2	100 }100 0	27	49 }53 4	96 }96 0	5	40 }40 0
Mean number of images	3.3	3.0	1.9 (1.4)[b]	2.0	2.7	1.5	1.5 (.81)[b]	2.0	3.1	1.7	1.7	2.7	1.6 (1.3)[b]	1.8
Respondents with 0 images	0	10	20	14	0	0	50	2	0	10	17	0	36	12

[a] Row 1 is based on the following number of cases: 80 English, 106 French, 86 U.S. whites, 25 U.S. blacks, except that 1 English child was not asked about the mayor, 3 French children were not asked about the Premier, 12 French children were not asked about the legislator, and 2 U.S. black children were not asked about the legislator. In row 2 the following number of respondents were excluded: head of state—England 2, France 1; prime minister—England 2, France 3; legislator—England 2, France 13, U.S. whites 9, U.S. blacks 4; mayor—England 7, France 7, U.S. whites 1. Mean number of images (rows 3 and 4) is computed from fourteen image categories that were common to all or most of the roles and institutions. Twelve of these categories are shown in Table 2. The image scores, like the image-mentioned percentages in Table 2, are based only on those respondents who were asked about the role or institution and showed awareness of it. The number of cases on which rows 3 and 4 are based is the same as the number for each role and institution in Table 3.

[b] Mean number of images for legisla*ture*.

Table 2. Images of Political Roles and Institutions (percentages)

Image Categories	England		France		U.S. Whites	U.S. Blacks
	Queen	Prime Minister	President	Premier	President	President
Rules, governs, commands	62	24	86	0	64	42
Legislative, legal function	23	31	14	3	51	29
Makes decisions, solves problems	15	25	18	3	35	29
Communicative (makes speeches, etc.)	1	13	6	5	10	32
Economic role	8	28	12	3	8	12
Other domestic activity	13	17	11	8	15	20
International activities	9	13	14	4	44	40
Ceremonial activities	53	19	11	5	16	0
Symbolic representative of nation[a]	19	—	3	—	5	4
Trappings of office	35	16	3	1	9	8
Role with other government officials	35	69	33	87	18	12
Personal attributes	16	7	2	1	1	0
N[b]	(71–79)	(68–76)	(101–104)	(96–97)	(79–86)	(24–25)

[a] Not coded for the Prime Minister.

[b] Percentages based on those respondents familiar with the role, excluding those whose responses were coded as ambiguous.

Coding Status: Intercoder percentage agreement ranges from 89% (row 3) to 98% (rows 5, 6, 7, 10, 11), averaging 95%. Intercoder agreement was also calculated by Scott's pi, which takes into account the random expected value of agreement given the number of coding categories. For an explanation of Scott's pi, see Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis in the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 140–41. Pi values range from .66 (row 3) to .96 (row 11), averaging .83 (for the 60 cases double-coded).

system. Other children describe the constitutional checks and balances. In neither case do the responses of these children in 1969–70 suggest that the executive power of the leader is peremptory, frightening, or authoritarian, nor that he has absolute control. American children often say the President is "in charge," but quickly add that he cannot engage in extreme arbitrary behavior, for instance, capriciously ordering capital punishment. My impression is that when they add this qualification, they have in mind an implicit notion that at least in some other nations, leaders do have such power. The American respondents say, for example, that the President "governs," is the "ruler of the country," "leads the country," is "the leader of the people," "heads the U.S., "runs the United States," "runs the government," is the "chief executive," and, in one instance (without the connotations it would have to a lexicographer or a student of city political machines), is "the big boss."

Relatively few English children use the governance category in describing the Prime Minister, but many do in connection with the Queen. Their considerable use of verbs and nouns associated with monarchy is not surprising. Again, any connotation of sternness or oppressiveness in the wielding of power is notably absent. The Queen is described as "ruler of our country," "ruler of England and other nations that are in the Commonwealth," "ruler of Great Britain;" she "governs all of England," "rules over the people," "rules over the land," is "the reigning monarch," and "sovereign." As the foregoing quotations suggest, a substantial proportion of pre-adolescent English children think of their Queen as considerably more than a figurehead. Recent surveys of English school children make it clear that the English child first becomes aware of the political system through the monarch, who is perceived as the *effective* and not just the *formal* leader of the country.[36]

Turning to France, we find a much sterner quality in the linguistic usages of the overwhelming (86 per cent) majority of children who made statements describing de Gaulle or Pompidou in terms of governance. There is not a single reference to the Premier in these terms. This finding, combined with the low level of awareness of the Premier evident in Table 1 makes it clear that Fifth Republic children focus their attention to national executive leadership entirely on the President. Both the great prevalence of governance imagery in the descriptions of the President of the Republic and the specific connotations of many descriptions fit into a larger pattern of findings consistent with the notion that in France authorities are viewed in sternly hierarchical terms.

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[36] See Greenstein et al., "The Child's Conception of the Queen and the Prime Minister."

Some of the French governance references employ the same relatively neutral verbs that typify British and American responses: govern ("*gouverner*," "*gouverne la France*," "*gouverne tout le peuple*," "*gouverne l'état*,") or direct ("*dirige le pays*," "*dirige le peuple*," "*dirige la France*,"), or locutions like "*c'est le chef*," "*il est le le chef de l'état*." But on even a cursory reading of the interviews, one immediately senses the prevalence of the verb *commander*. Larousse first defines *commander* in the highly stringent sense of "to dominate" and only then in the less extreme sense of "command," which is a harsher and more imperious notion than that found in English or American children's usage. French informants assure us that our reading of *commander* as an indicator of a distinctly rigorous mode of authority is not off the mark. Almost a quarter of the French children interviewed use some form of this verb, which we also encounter in responses to the parapolitical items concerning the importance of adhering unquestioningly to parental dictates. Various children say of the president of the Republic that:

> *il commande, commande le pays, commande toute la France, est obligé de commander, commande tout le peuple, commande le gouvernement.*

Additional usages like "*il nous dit ce qu'il faut faire*," and "*il donne des ordres*" seem similarly authoritarian in emphasis.[37] Table 3 documents some of the semantic specifics just discussed with respect to the head of state in the three nations.

Similarly extended "horizontal" analyses would be possible for the other image categories in Table 2 but space does not permit an exhaustive discussion. Instead a good deal of information can be extracted by reading the role-imagery profiles vertically, first treating perceptions of the Queen and the Prime Minister in England, and the President and Premier of France as complementary units and then comparing the presidency imagery of the two American groups.

The role-imagery categories in Table 2, other than "rules, governs, commands," also show considerable country-to-country variation. The English children's role-imagery profiles of the Queen and the Prime Minister have very much the quality of interlocking jigsaw puzzle pieces. Not only are references to ruling, governing, and commanding much more common with respect to the Queen than to the Prime Minister, who is seen as devoting himself to practical aspects of leadership, coordinating the efforts of other officials, such as Cabinet members, and taking orders from the Queen. Data on the English also mention the Queen's ceremonial duties.[38]

The French children describe only their President with any complexity at all. Descriptions of the Premier are virtually confined to the "role with other government officials" category, and he is seen as connected with only one official—the President of the Republic—*as his subordinate.* The hierarchical conception of these two roles is highly congruent with the many references above to the President of the Republic's command functions. French children also see the Premier as having the very narrow duty of filling in for the President when he is out of the country or otherwise occupied. Note the following (translated) examples of this perception, which also illustrate more generally the preoccupation with power and authority relations in the French responses.

> . . . he is a man elected who isn't as strong as General de Gaulle. But he is the one who helps the General. It's the one . . . how to say it . . . he is the one who helps. For instance, if the General de Gaulle is in a country and there is a meeting in Paris, and he has to do something in Bordeaux, the Premier will go to Bordeaux to look after it.

> The Premier is second to the king [sic] in the affairs of state—say, if the king is ill, there isn't anyone to replace him except the Premier—and, if the king happens to die suddenly—well, the Premier replaces him. (YES, AND WHEN THERE IS NO KING?) Well, I meant the President of the Republic. [Several of the French respondents slipped into references to the President as king.—F. G.]

Apart from the overwhelming number of references to command functions, the President of the Republic is also perceived as a lawmaker or administrator, a decision maker or problem solver, a performer of a variety of domestic, political, and ceremonial functions, and an international actor. Yet in comparison to images of the two other heads of state and the British Prime Minister, the paucity of reference to categories other than general governance is striking. The second most prevalent theme applied to the President of the Republic is his role with other government offi-

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[37] Annick Percheron also distinguishes in her presentation between references to *gouverner* and *commander*. See her, "La conception d'authorité chez les enfants français," *Revue français de science politique*, 21 (February, 1971), 103–28. Also see her *L'univers politique des enfants* (Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Armand Colin, 1974) and "Political Vocabulary and Ideological Proximity in French Children," in *Socialization to Politics*, ed. Jack Dennis, pp. 211–30.

[38] For a full exposition of how English children perceive the Queen and the Prime Minister, see Greenstein et al., "The Child's Conception of the Queen and the Prime Minister.

Table 3. Specific Vocabulary Used in Connection with "Rules, Governs, Commands" Category: Head of State

Vocabulary	England		U.S. Whites		U.S. Blacks	
Ruler/rules (of the country, over, etc.)	(30)	38%	(3)	3%	(2)	8%
Runs (the country, the government, the whole set-up, etc.)	(2)	3	(11)	13	(2)	8
Leader, leads (of the people/country)	(3)	4	(10)	12	(1)	4
Decides/makes decisions	(4)	5	(5)	6	(2)	8
Governs	(5)	6	(3)	3	(1)	4
Takes care of	—	—	(6)	7	(1)	4
Controls	(2)	3	(5)	6	—	—
Head (of the U.S., of our country, of everything, etc.)	(4)	5	(7)	8	—	—
In charge of	(2)	3	(4)	5	(3)	12
Looks after	(4)	5	—	—	—	—
Keeps country in good shape, etc.	(4)	5	—	—	—	—
Tells (what to do, what should be done)	(1)	1	(1)	1	(4)	16
Makes up rules, laws	(2)	3	(2)	2	—	—
Like a king/president	(1)	1	(2)	2	(1)	4
Monarch	(2)	3	—	—	—	—
Reigns	(2)	3	—	—	—	—
Has power	—	—	—	—	(1)	4
Sovereign	(1)	1	—	—	—	—
Protects	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Big shot	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Big man	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Big Boss	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Guides	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Helps	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Top executive	—	—	(1)	1	—	—
Top guy	—	—	(1)	1	—	—

Vocabulary	France	
Governeur, gouverner (la France, tout le peuple, l'état, etc.)	(47)	45%
Commandant, commander (le pays, toute la France, le peuple, le gouvernement)	(24)	23
S'occuper de (le pays, les affaires de la France, la caisse, etc.)	(15)	14
Diriger (le pays, le peuple, la France)	(14)	13
Dit (donne, chois, fait faire) les lois	(9)	8
Chef (de l'état, du pays, etc.)	(7)	7
Donne des ordres (fait obéir aux ordres)	(7)	7
Comme un roi	(5)	5
Decider	(4)	4
Tête du pays	(2)	2
Fait regner l'ordre	(2)	2
Regner	(1)	1
Maintenir	(1)	1
Ordonner	(1)	1
Plus de voix	(1)	1
Guide	(1)	1
Responsible de ce qui se passe	(1)	1
Au pouvoir	(1)	1
Mener (le pays)	(1)	1
Administrer	(1)	1

Percentages are based on the number of children who were asked the political information items and exhibited some information (same percentage base as Table 2). Percentages do not add up to the percentage in the "rules," etc. category of Table 2 because some respondents used more than one word and some did not use brief verbal constructions suitable for listing here. We do not include every form of the words and phrases listed above—e.g., some of the "in charge of" responses are "has charge of."

cials. These statements typically indicate that the President *tells* these officials what to do.

> Well, the President of the Republic is a great man, a very respected man; he is very respected and well served. (BY WHOM?) By his ministers. (AND WHAT DOES HE DO?) He directs; he commands all the people; he gives orders and makes sure his orders are carried out. He looks after a bit of everything; he is an intelligent man.

> It is a man who directs France, to keep order. He commands people. As he can't go everywhere to see what is happening, he sends prefects and ministers—all that—who watch what happens in all the towns. And then after, they come and tell him all they've seen.

Given de Gaulle's distinctive leadership style, it is remarkable that virtually no children refer to the personal qualities of the President, nor was de Gaulle's preoccupation with international statesmanship apparent beyond the 14 per cent who mentioned an international role—a percentage that does not vary between de Gaulle and Pompidou. De Gaulle's interest in *grandeur* and civil dignity did not lead to much emphasis on ceremonial aspects of the presidency. Instead, there is the single constellation of "rules-governs-commands" images. This stress on governance and absence of personalism is precisely what Percheron, who used a substantially different (word association) instrument,[39] found in a 1969 study of children's images of the President of the Republic. Overall, the general "thinness" of imagery about these two French roles is more consistent with the apolitical than with the highly politicized conception of French political culture.

Turning directly to that widely studied phenomenon, American children's perceptions of their President, we note the frequent references to decision making and problem solving (35 per cent for whites, 29 per cent for blacks). Although the American presidency is said to derive some of its political leverage from the fusion of the ceremonial with the political functions, white American children were no more likely to refer to ceremonial duties of the President than were British children to mention the Prime Minister in ceremonial contexts, and black children were less likely to make such references. Mr. Nixon's early "low profile" presidency, of course, came nowhere near the British monarchy as a stimulus for reference to ceremonial duties, nor does it elicit personal references to the President among our respondents.

Perception of the President's international role also warrants special mention. This function is rarely mentioned with respect to the other leaders, but is mentioned by two fifths of the American children. Indeed, there is even reason to believe that children (not to speak of adults) in other countries perceive the American President in this fashion.[40] One need not fall back on dated patriotic clichés like "leader of the Free World," to recognize the accuracy of this perception even before Mr. Nixon's peripatetic diplomacy in China and the Soviet Union enhanced his standing in the polls and insured his margin of electoral victory.

Clearly the American President circa 1970 occupies substantial cognitive space in pre-adult political orientations, but what of the affective matters dealt with in the benevolent leader literature?

Evaluative Aspects of Political Imagery. Even though we asked respondents simply to *describe* the leadership positions of their polity to the imaginary foreign child, their responses exhibit considerable affective content. In seeking to characterize the feelings underlying the statements children made to us, we must tread warily because much of the response content is ambiguous.

Table 4, which reports the frequency of positive, negative, affectively mixed, and neutral role descriptions for those respondents able to describe a role, brings us directly to whether the American benevolent-leader findings reported in the early 1960s are applicable to later and different populations, as well as to how accurate were the interpretations of the original Eisenhower-Kennedy Administration findings. The table presents data on the heads of state and the Prime Ministers of England and France, and the President of the United States.

Table 4 is the result of an extended sequence of codings designed to disentangle genuine expressions of affect from cognitive statements and vague conventional usages. Beginning with the criteria established in my 1958 study, coders were provided with a comprehensive set of indicators

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[39] Percheron, "La conception d'authorité," especially pp. 110–19. It will be remembered that 39 of the 106 French respondents in the present study were interviewed during the de Gaulle presidency. One of Roig and Billon-Grand's respondents made a point of referring to de Gaulle's *grand nez*, but Roig and Billon-Grand (*La socialisation politique des enfants*) do not appear to have elicited a great deal of personal imagery. On the lack of "personalism" in the image de Gaulle sought to convey, see Stanley and Inge Hoffman, "The Will to Grandeur: de Gaulle as Political Artist," in *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership*, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow (New York: Braziller, 1970), pp. 248–315.

[40] In a small sample of sixth-grade Australian children studied by Connell in 1968, there was somewhat greater awareness of the President of the United States than of the Prime Minister of Australia! Connell, *The Child's Construction of Politics*, p. 125. For similar findings in a Canadian study, see Jon H. Pammett, "The Development of Political Orientations in Canadian School Children," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 4 (March, 1971), 132–41.

Table 4. Levels of Affect and Idealization Vis-à-Vis Political Roles (percentages)

Response	England		France		U.S. Whites	U.S. Blacks
	Queen	PM	President	Premier	President	President
Positive/idealized	47	28	30	3	55	32
Mixed	0	1	0	0	0	4
Negative	1	9	0	0	1	4
Neutral	51	62	69	97	43	60
Not ascertained	1	0	1	0	1	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N^a	(80)	(80)	(106)	(99)	(86)	(25)
Breakdown of Responses Coded as Positive/Idealized						
Explicit Positive Affect	15.0	2.5	7.5	0.0	29.1	16.0
Other Explicit Idealization	3.8	0.0	2.8	0.0	2.3	4.0
"Helps"	8.8	2.5	2.8	0.0	10.5	4.0
Does Good Things	5.0	6.3	8.5	0.0	9.3	4.0
Says What's Right	3.8	8.8	.9	1.0	1.2	0.0
"Important"	8.8	7.5	1.8	2.0	2.3	4.0
Must Be Obeyed	1.3	0.0	5.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-total	46.5	27.6	30.0	3.0	54.7	32.0
N^a	(38)	(22)	(32)	(3)	(47)	(8)

[a] Percentages based on those respondents familiar with role.

Coding Status: Initial reliabilities were deemed inadequate. Intercoder discrepancies were resolved and coding criteria further specified by F. G., and all protocols were coded by F. G. and a second coder with resolution of discrepancies by discussion.

of positive and negative affect. Positive affect was described as follows:

> Respondent describes duties in a positive or benevolent way: "The leader takes care of the country," "helps people," "makes things better," "improves conditions," "looks after us," "goes around to spread goodwill among the people," "most people look up to him or her," etc.

Negative affect included all negative or hostile references to the public figure or his duties, such as "hurts the country," "wastes time," and "does nothing but talk." Included in negative affect were criticisms of the current role-incumbent on partisan grounds even when it was evident that the child felt no animus toward the role itself. If the child indicated that the role was good but the individual holding it was not, or otherwise made both positive and negative statements, the "mixed" category was used. Neutral references included colorless and bland job descriptions.

This coding procedure produced striking patterns of cross-national and black-white American differences, but intercoder reliabilities were low, and some patterns of differences between roles within and between countries seemed inconsistent with our impressions from reading the interviews. For example, in the tabulation from the first coding, respondents were more positive toward the role of legislator than toward the President, whereas our impression from the interviews was that there was little cognizance of *or* affect toward the legislator. It turned out that "help" when used to describe a legislator often was an affectively neutral term, referring merely to the subordinate duties of an assistant. Even references to "helping the country" could not invariably be interpreted as evidence of positive affect, since it was not always certain that the term was more than a loose conventional usage.

A more differentiated set of criteria for distinguishing positive affect was therefore devised. (There had been little difficulty in securing agreement between the coders in the few role descriptions that conveyed negative connotations.) The differentiated code identifies the following subthemes that appear to evince positive affect: (1) *explicitly positive* evaluative statements that any reader would be hard pressed to interpret in nonaffective terms (several examples will be given below); (2) statements not explicitly affective that describe the *importance or power* of the leader in an idealized way; (3) generalized references to *helping* (excluding the brief case-carrying variant);[41] (4) references to unambiguously positive aspects of *role performance* (such as stopping wars or promoting economic prosperity); (5) references to the leader as a source of *moral guidance* or as a chooser of "right" policies, and (6) general statements about the importance of the leader, excluding any in which the word "important" seemed merely to be used mechanically as a synonym for "leader." After rereading the protocols several times, we added a seventh category, the variant of importance that stresses the *need to obey* the leader.

For each of the three countries, leadership role descriptions that fit any of the seven criteria are aggregated to produce the "positive-idealized" category of Table 4, which also reports the incidence of the differentiated positive affect subcategories.[42] One of the principal findings summarized in Table 4 has already been alluded to: given the open-ended stimulus of being asked to describe political leadership roles, very few of these end-of-the-1960s children spontaneously introduced negative assertions into their discourse. As we shall see in the analysis below of semi-projective story completions, the children were not *incapable* of making negative statements. Even the political information question produced *some* negative evaluations—by English children of the Prime Minister (these proved in every instance to be criticisms by middle-class children of Harold Wilson rather than of the prime ministerial role), and by black American children of the President. Although Percheron's word-association technique (used in 1969) and Roig and Billon-Grand's fixed-choice questions (used in 1962) did elicit negative pre-adult evaluations of the President of the Republic,[43] none of the French respondents we interviewed made negative statements about their President.

Turning to positive evaluations and focusing only on the heads of state and Prime Ministers, we see that apart from the absence of evaluations of the perceptually bland French Premier, assertions falling into the positive-affect category were made by between 30 per cent and somewhat more than 50 per cent of those children in the four comparison groups who were familiar with the roles. The variations in level of positive affect complement the image content data already presented. In England the Queen is far more likely to be described in a positive light than is the Prime Minister; this difference is especially evident if the ratio of positive to negative evaluations is considered. In France, there is modest positive affect toward the President and, again consistent with Percheron's interpretations of French political orientations, there are more neutral references to the head of state by French children than by any of the other comparison groups.

Finally, to my surprise, the first-term Nixon-Administration counterparts of children in the Eisenhower-Kennedy Administration studies—namely the white American respondents—*were extraordinarily positive in their spontaneous descriptions of the President.* A reminder that the study was conducted in 1969–70 and not 1960 is provided by the finding that the American black children were only a little more than half as likely as the whites to refer to the President in positive terms, and somewhat more likely to make negative statements. Even the blacks, however, made more positive than negative assertions.[44]

The following quotations give a concrete impression of the source of the statistics in Table 4 and as usual exhibit interesting nation-specific nuances, some of which I have italicized for emphasis.

England

The Queen goes on state visits to other parts of the Dominion or country and is quite prominent at opening new things, or at least one member of the Royal Family is. And goes around to *spread goodwill* between the people and save bitter arguments. . . . We don't see the Queen much. We want to see somebody. And she goes around quieting them . . . state visits . . . just to show her face sort of things.

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[41] Exclusion of this variant does indeed establish that American children exhibit more affect toward the President than toward members of Congress. For a description of the differentiated positive-affect categories, see Figure 2 of Fred I. Greenstein, "Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies: The Benevolent Leader Revisited" (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms), presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[42] When considering either the aggregate or the explicit positive-affect category, it should be remembered that we are dealing with spontaneous manifestations of affect in response to an item that simply asks for a description of the role. An explicitly evaluative question might produce a greater proportion of evaluative responses, but at the risk that some responses might stem from the stimulus of being questioned than from previously formed views and assumptions. If the incumbent rather than the role were made salient, there would probably be more negative evaluations, even if the leader was reasonably popular, and especially if surveying were close enough to elections to tap partisanship.

[43] See notes 31 and 37.

[44] The black respondents were drawn from two Connecticut communities: a New Haven suburb that has become increasingly black in recent years and the small industrial/college town of Middletown. Neither of these communities showed an absence of black consciousness in 1970, but neither community was in the vanguard of black militancy or alienation. On the situational determinants of blacks' political orientations, see Schuman and Gruenberg, "The Impact of City on Racial Attitudes."

She is a very important person and she is . . . the old kings and queens were her ancestors . . . and she is a model to all of England and she is very perfect . . . well, tries to be . . . and is always opening important things.

France

The President is a man who makes the laws . . . who *must be respected* because it is for our good. He travels to other countries so that countries can be friends. He tries to have the fewest possible wars.

The President of the Republic must look after the country from the moment that he's been elected until . . . I think it's for seven years. His role is to maintain a peaceful France, like strikes and that. If there were no Presidents of the Republic . . . we might not get along, because *it's required that there should be a President of the Republic* to hand out laws, for instance, for the tribunals. . . .

To capture more fully a sense of the unexpected spate of 1969–70 American benevolent-leader imagery, it is instructive to look at the assertions of a number of the American respondents. First, several quotations from white children.

The President of the United States is a man or a woman or whatever, who is, like, picked by the people to lead the country. And they try to make the person almost perfect. I mean, if he does anything wrong they down him . . . because *if a person is going to be the head of a country like the United States for years, he just has to be just about perfect.*

Respondent: Well, he's the person that helps guide the people. He doesn't like, rule but he helps people. Well, he makes decisions for what he thinks is best for the country.
Interviewer: What else does he do?
Respondent: Well, he decides how things should be done and how they should be run and what should be done about the problem.
Interviewer: Anything else?
Respondent: And [*he tries*] *to keep peace* among, like, the states. He tries to help people get along together, like, so there won't be any fighting and stuff around.

He answers the questions and he *tries to make America a better place* to live in ways, like, he tries his best to keep the war in Vietnam calm . . . he's trying to calm it and he's . . . and he's making sure that everybody he's sending, he doesn't always care about his country himself, too. Like, he, he is already conducted a Biafra fund . . . in New York.

The President of the United States is a very important man that is trying to make the U.S. a better place and, well, he takes care of problems that just a few people won't be able to take care of, like the war in Vietnam and like the men who have been over there for a long time. And *he tries to make things equal and fair* so that you know you won't really get mad on the taxes. He's, well, he's trying to make the United States a better place and he's trying to solve a lot of problems.

Here is an example of a positive perception of the President by a black respondent.

Respondent: Well, I would tell the foreign child he's just another man. . . . He studied for years to be a politician and so he runs. . . . Most likely he would start from the bottom and makes his way up, so he's just another man who wants to be the President and then has a very good chance of being, and so he starts from the bottom and works his way up, all the way up from the chairman of his town to the President.
Interviewer: Okay, what does the President do?
Respondent: He makes hard decisions . . . He's mostly busy with things about the war and economical problems of the United States and poverty. Some people are poor in the United States. He is just thinking of ways to help . . . help the country along much better than it is.

The relatively few negative references to the President are illustrated by the following two quotations, the first from the most negatively politicized of our black respondents, and the second from one of the few white children who expressed negative views of the President, a twelve-year old girl from a wealthy community in Connecticut's New York-commuting belt.

Respondent: I'd say [of the President] he's stupid and he don't know what he's doing.
Interviewer: What does he do?
Respondent: He doesn't do. . . . He doesn't let people do what they want to do. He always putting people in jail or somethin'. . . . He's supposed to help people, and he supposed to keep peace in the world, but he isn't doing that. . . . He isn't trying to stop anything.
Interviewer: Suppose a foreign child asks you what is the President of the United States?
Respondent: A rat.
Interviewer: Okay, try to give the foreign child an idea of what he does. What does he do?
Respondent: I can name a lot of things. . . . He prejudiced. . . . He lousy. He picked . . . Spiro Agnew. Spiro Agnew stinks, and he ain't no good, none of them.
Interviewer: What is the president's job?
Respondent: To try to make people happy, but he's making them miserable.

Respondent: Well, I'd say he's doing a pretty lousy job, first of all, and that the government should be changed, and it's based on pretty good grounds but most of it isn't all fair, and sometimes he makes bad mistakes. And, well it's not the worst type of government there is, but it should be better.

Interviewer: How would you like to see it changed or be better if you could do anything about it?

Respondent: Well, I think we got too involved in other countries' problems. You know, take enough care about people who are here. I tend more toward a person like Jerry Rubin than I would to the President. I think he's done a pretty bad job . . . like sending more troops into Cambodia, and I think we're too involved in other people's problems, and he doesn't care enough about people here.

Most of the 1969–70 American respondents reflect little of the political turmoil of the wider environment in which they had grown up, considering spontaneous content of their descriptions of the President.

Leaders Imagined in Action

The semi-projective, incomplete story items, which deal with expectations about how leaders and citizens would behave in specific situations, provide a complement to the more straightforward sequence of questions in which political information, imagery, and affect are elicited by the static procedure of asking the child simply to describe national leaders and institutions. Like the sequence of questions just discussed, the story-completion items also produce response protocols, each of which can be multiply coded for different aspects of cognitive and affective content. This layered quality of the story completions is illustrated in the following detailed discussion of a story-completion item that produces exceptionally fertile responses. The item text read as follows:

One day the President [substitute Queen in England, President of the Republic in France] was driving his car to a meeting. Because he was late, he was driving very fast. The police stop the car. Finish the story.

Definitions of the Situation. Table 5 reports definitions of the situations in the head of state-traffic policeman story, since challenges to a story's frame of reference often provide insights into the respondents' explicit or unarticulated major premises about the subject matter of the story. A potential ambiguity in the present story is "driving *his* (or *her*) car to a meeting." The verbal distinctions among the explicit item wording and "driving *in* his car" or "*being driven* in his car" are sufficiently subtle for a respondent with well-settled assumptions about the behavior of a national leader to "choose" not to perceive him (or her) as someone who personally engages in such mundane tasks.

Table 5 makes it clear that some children explicitly deny that the head of state would be driving, some automatically introduce a chauffeur into the scenario, and still others deny that the head of state would break a law or that a policeman would dare to stop a royal or a presidential car. All told, 8 per cent of the Americans, 1.8 per cent of the French, and 29 per cent of the English redefined the episode in one of these fashions.

The following examples of situation redefinitions include italicizations of phrases that seem, even within cross-nationally common categories, to have a residue of national distinctiveness.

England

I don't think the Queen's car has got any number plate like PRX2452, like any normal car will do. Probably have a lot of bodyguards around, and cars and plainclothes policemen. And probably have a big train of police cars around it. There would probably be someone sitting in the car, like a policeman sitting next to the chauffeur, or maybe a policeman driving the car. He would probably show him a [warrant] and he would say that's fine and probably call up a bodyguard, a couple of men on motorbikes to show them the way quickly.

France

He isn't the one to drive usually; he has a chauffeur. And he is late. The police stop him and I don't think . . . no, they don't stop him. Well, there, do I *have* to say that they stop him?

First of all, it isn't true that General de Gaulle drives his own car. He has a chauffeur and he can tell him to go very fast. *If he is stopped by a policeman, the policeman will have to let him go because General de Gaulle commands all of them—everyone—because they all must serve France and they are there to see that order is maintained in France.*

United States

Well, first of all, the story is wrong because the President wouldn't drive to a meeting. In fact, he wouldn't because he has chauffeurs and all kinds of things. And he would also not be alone in the car . . . he would have some kind of an escort . . . a police escort. And so I doubt if he would get a ticket.

Outcome of the Episode. Table 6 shows what happens in the episode. The American white children are roughly 15 per cent more likely than the English and French children to imagine that the head of state will be punished, with the American blacks falling between them. Some children in each group conclude that the head of state would

Table 5. The Head of State and the Policeman: Definitions of the Situation (percentages)

	England	France	U.S. Whites	U.S. Blacks
Eppisode challenged because Head of State would not be driving or would be escorted	10	13	6	4
Chauffeur driving[a]	18	3	2	4
Episode challenged because Head of State would not break laws	3	1	1	0
Episode challenged because the police would not stop the President	1	5	0	0
Total per cent of respondents redefining the situation	29	18	8	8
N	(78–80)	(103–104)	(85)	(25)

Note: Responses add up to more than the total proportion in England, France, and the United States because all themes mentioned by a respondent were coded, but we have totaled respon*dents* rather than respon*ses*.

[a] This category was used where the child has no trouble conceptualizing the story but tells a story with the chauffeur nonetheless.

Coding Status: Reliabilities not computed for this table or Table 1. In each case the criteria are highly specific and spot-checking shows great accuracy.

This and the remaining tables replace similar preliminary tables on the same variables used illustratively in Greenstein and Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children."

not be punished but would receive a verbal admonition not to speed again. This approach to completing the story is by far the most common in England, where the nonpolitical data also show evidence that authorities are respected, but they are not above verbal criticism.

The head of state is considerably more likely to get away with speeding in France where more than half of the respondents indicate that this would occur. "Gets away" is second most common among American blacks and least common among American whites, although the differences among the three non-French groups are not clear-cut. The occasional respondent who imagines that the *Policeman* would be punished for the crime of *lèse majesté* is noted below the row total in Table 6. Only in England and France do some children introduce this possibility.

The specific outcomes imagined by the children are varied and often marvelously original. The following examples of story outcomes also provide illustrations germane to Table 7 which reports affect toward the head of state revealed in completing the episode.

England

The police stopped the car, and they saw it was the Queen who was driving, but they didn't take any notice because they thought that even though it was the Queen, that as she was driving fast and exceeding the speed limit, she would have to be charged like any other person, and it wasn't right for her just to be let off because she ruled the country and just because she was an important person. It didn't matter and they charged her just the same. The Queen being quite a good Queen and thinking of other people, didn't mind paying because she thought everybody else who was

Table 6. The Head of State and the Policeman: Outcome of the Episode and Fate of the Policeman (percentages)

	England	France	U.S. Whites	U.S. Blacks
Head of State punished: ticket. fine, etc.	23	26	41	32
Head of State is only cautioned	35	18	20	24
Head of State gets away with speeding	42	56	39	44
	100	99	99	100
Policeman is punished	4	1	0	0
N[a]	(77)	(98)	(80)	(25)

[a] *N*'s are less than full sample size because one French respondent was not administered the story and several respondents in each group except the U.S. blacks were coded as "other" or "contingent."

Coding Status: 90 per cent agreement; pi = .84 (*N* = 60).

Table 7. The Head of State and the Policeman: Evaluation of the Head of State (percentages)

	England	France	U.S. Whites	U.S. Blacks
Positive: Praises policeman for doing his duty; urges policeman to give him a ticket; benevolent, friendly, nice, understanding; admission or tacit admission of being in the wrong; apologizes, is embarrassed, admits being wrong, says he's sorry and won't do it again, says he didn't realize he was going too fast, thinks it's fair that he got a ticket.	19	11	28	33
Mixed: President is portrayed both positively and negatively.	9	3	2	0
Negative: Angry, annoyed, unfriendly, arrogant; unfairly sacks policeman, threatens to sack policeman, speeds off again after being stopped, drives off in a huff, refuses to pay the fine, argues with the policeman, pulls rank arrogantly.	19	20	20	19
Neutral: President does enter into the story but his reactions, conversation, behavior are described in a colorless or neutral manner, or President has passive role.	53	66	49	48
	100	100	99	100
N[a]	(74)	(92)	(81)	(25)

[a] The Head of State does not appear in 4 English, 11 French, and 3 white American, and 4 black American stories; 1 English, 2 French, and 2 white American stories are coded "other" and 1 French respondent was not administered the story.

Coding Status: Consensual Coding.

going fast on that road would have to pay as well so she didn't see why she wouldn't have to. (Punished; positive affect.)

I suppose the Queen would sack him and get a new one; I know if I was the Queen and I was stopped by one I know I'd be very embarrassed. (WHAT DO YOU THINK THE QUEEN SAID TO THE POLICEMAN?) Be quiet, you silly thing. (Not punished; affect unclear.)

France

The President, believing that everything is allowed to him because he governs France, will say that he is in a hurry. The police will let him continue, and he'll settle the matter in another day. (Not punished; affect unclear.)

The President of the Republic, he drives very fast, and the policeman has to give him a fine. Then the President of the Republic says, "I'm in a great hurry; I'll pay next time." And the policeman, "I don't know . . . Why were you going so fast?" He says, "I'm late for a meeting and I have to hurry, and . . . after all . . . Let me go; I am the President of the Republic, . . . I'm no lawbreaker. I'll pay your fine. After all—the President of the Republic.' " (Punished; positive affect.)

United States

Well . . . well, I'm the President of the United States. I was in a hurry, and I wanted to get to the meeting fast, and I know I went through this, through . . . disobeyed the speed limit. And don't give me a ticket. (Episode goes on to indicate President not punished; negative affect.)

Evaluations of the Head of State. Successive codings of a single interview passage are analogous to lifting away successive transparency overlays. In Table 7, which seeks to isolate the evaluative levels in the responses, we treat as positive evaluations two classes of responses—those in which the head of state *praises* the policeman for doing his duty, and those in which there is explicit admission of wrongdoing by the head of state, or some sign of remorse or apology. We treat as negative those story completions in which the head of state is angry, annoyed, argues, fires the policeman, or pulls rank. (The full coding criteria are listed with the row labels in Table 7). As in the political information questions, the child is not explicitly *asked* to make an evaluative judgment; instead a stimulus is provided that makes spontaneous evaluation possible. While in all comparison groups the modal response is affectively neutral, there is notable variation among those children whose responses do contain affective elements. (In retrospect, I realize that a probe for affect would have enhanced this aspect of the interview. As the quotations above indicate, it is not always possible to infer evaluations from the child's report of the leader's behavior. In general we were conservative in inferring affect from the behavior described in the story completions.)

It is intriguing to compare the distribution of positive and negative evaluations of the behavior of the head of state in the traffic violation episode with that in the political information item (i.e., Table 7 with Table 4). The political information item merely refers to the head of state in the abstract. Some children do immediately supply details connected with the present role incumbent, but the interview content suggests that much of the preponderance of favorable over unfavorable affect reflects positive assumptions about the leadership *role* and its importance to society. Children appear able—in a wholly unself-conscious way—to distinguish between roles and the individuals who fill them. This does not mean that they recognize that they are making the distinction, any more than they need to know Chomskian grammar in order to use grammatical forms. Many of the neutrally coded entries in Table 4 also appear to be role related, although the negative references (especially those by the English to the Prime Minister and the American blacks to the President) are usually responses to the incumbent.

The traffic policeman episode leaves much less room for responding merely to an abstract vision of the role, since illegal behavior by the leader is part of the initial definition of the situation. In spite of the handful of children who establish a perimeter of defense that denies the very terms of the question (Table 5), most of them *can* envisage a head of state as a malefactor, and many are then prepared to portray him in negative terms.

In all comparison groups the ratio of positive to negative references decreases substantially between Table 4 and 7. The Queen "in the abstract" is a 47-to-1 object of positive evaluations; the Queen defined as traffic violator is described in a negative light by about a fifth of the English children—precisely as many as describe her favorably under those circumstances. All affectively toned descriptions by French children of the presidential role in the abstract are positive. But the French child's vision of how the President would respond to a policeman who interferes with his driving speed is twice as likely to be negative as positive.

The contrast between the findings on white American children in Table 7 and Table 4 are of special interest, given our concern with benevolent and not-so-benevolent leaders. The positive references by these 1969–70 white American children to the President, which have such a beginning-of-the-decade character when elicited in the abstract (55 per cent positive to one per cent negative), drop precipitously in the context of presidential lawbreaking. Even in this instance, however, pre-Watergate white American children were more likely to describe a presidential traffic violator favorably (28 per cent) than unfavorably (20 per cent). Frequently they imagine the American President as acting positively when his lawbreaking is brought to his attention, often even praising the policeman who tickets him. In sharp contrast, the French President, who is likely to escape punishment, is nevertheless more often described as behaving negatively than positively.

Clearly these white American children are not totally antagonistic to political leaders, but they are also not in the thralls of an idealized view of the President. Research on children during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years never explored the possible discrepancies between general views of the Presidency and responses to hypothetical presidential law infractions. As a result, the early studies may well have underemphasized the capacities of children in the 1950s and early 1960s to criticize political leaders, if given a suitable occasion.

The discrepancy between Tables 4 and 7 may provide a fundamental insight into why children from the age cohort that in the late 1950s and early 1960s described the President in terms reminiscent of the *Boy Scout Handbook* could have engaged in "off-the-system" behavior in the late 1960s.[45] Why was the early political socialization literature seemingly nonpredictive? The reason is probably connected to general aspects of how attitudes relate to behavior. There is no reason *in principle* to assume that abstract attitudes toward an object will serve as sufficient predictors of behavior toward it in the absence of further specification of other classes of variables, such as situational factors and contingent attitudes about how it is appropriate to act under specific circumstances.[46]

Thus, for example, an individual may value his country's leadership roles and institutions, but may also (perhaps precisely *because* of his commitment to "the system") value the absence of overseas military ventures, domestic political espionage, and other departures from his idealized view of national purpose. The generalized positive attitude to the nation and its leadership roles may not be irrelevant to the overall functioning of the individual's belief system, but instead may provide the raw material for disillusionment reflected either in political apathy or protest behavior. In a context such as the escalation of the Vietnam conflict or the Watergate revelations, although both kinds of attitudes may be consequential, the more concrete ones measured by an item specifying contingencies like those in the head of state/policeman episode may be more behaviorally relevant than attitudes evoked by an item on the presidency in general.

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[45] To the degree that these were the same children. Political idealization was more common among children of lower socioeconomic status in my 1958 study (*Children and Politics*, chapter 5). But college student protest was more common among students of upper SES backgrounds, especially before protest behavior became widely diffused in the late 1960s.

[46] The failure of attitudes to predict behavior is a common theme in the social psychological field of attitude studies. Recently, however, there has been a shift in emphasis from studies and literature reviews pointing to the lack of connection between measured attitudes and subsequent behavior to analyses such as Schuman's that refer to the real-world situations in which individual and collective action occurs that typically force individuals "to reconcile two or more conflicting values." Howard Schuman, "Attitudes vs. Actions versus Attitudes vs. Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (Fall, 1972), 347–54. Also see Alan G. Weinstein, "Predicting Behavior from Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (Fall, 1972), 335–60.

In sharp contrast to Table 4, in which the blacks were drastically less positive in their general descriptions of the President than were the whites, the racial differences in Table 7 indicate a greater expectancy by blacks of positive behavior by the President in his encounter with the policeman. One might have expected black responses to the President to be less positive than white responses in both tables,[47] but two factors (in addition to the statistical vagaries arising from the smallness of the black sample) are at work here: (1) black approval of the President is already low and therefore cannot go much lower; and (2) it is well documented that blacks have distinctive reactions to policemen—reactions that are negative and probably also more fearful of the power of police officers.[48] Hence the response in Table 7 may be that any citizen would act with some circumspection when encountering a policeman.

Table 8. Norm That Head of State is Equal Before the Law (percentages)

	England		France		U.S. Whites		U.S. Blacks	
Norm explicitly stated	13	17	21	24	30	35	8	8
Norm strongly implied	4		3		5		0	
Norm not expressed	84		76		65		92	
	101		100		100		100	
N[a]	(79)		(100)		(82)		(25)	

[a] Cases less than full sample size because some respondents fall in miscellaneous categories and story not administered to one French respondent.

Coding Status: Consensual coding.

Norms Governing the Episode. Tables 8 and 9 summarize references to two of the most frequent norms enunciated in completions of this fertile item—the principle that the head of state is above the law, and that everyone is equal before the law. We construed as norms the children's more or less explicit, verbalized justifications for the actions of the participants in the episode. Outcomes themselves were not interpreted tautologically as implying norms. Instead, there had to be one of two types of verbal justification: (1) statements in which the norm is strongly *implied*, or (2) *explicit, generalized normative statements.* (An example of an implicit statement of a norm is, "They saw it was the President; they let him go;" an explicit statement of a norm would be "Everyone has to obey the law.")

As is evident in Table 8, the norm of equality, whether expressed elliptically or as a general proposition, is more frequent among American whites than among the English or French children, and least frequent among American blacks. This, of course, is one of the most distinctive and enduring verbal formulas in American political culture, first noted by foreign observers as early as the 18th century. We code in Table 8 for the *enunciation* of the norm, whether or not it is actually adhered to. Thus, even if the President claims but does not receive legal immunity, the norm is tabulated. Some children, especially in the Watergate-period interviews, refer to both the norm of equality and to the norm that the Presi-

Table 9. Norm that Head of State is Above Law (percentages)

	England		France		U.S. Whites		U.S. Blacks	
Norm explicitly stated	18	28	24	43	21	31	16	32
Norm strongly implied	10		19		10		16	
Norm not expressed	72		57		69		68	
	100		100		100		100	
N[a]	(77)		(100)		(82)		(25)	

[a] Cases less than full sample size because some respondents fall in miscellaneous categories and story not administered to one French respondent.

Coding Status: Consensual coding.

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[47] Cross-tabulations between responses to the pair of items analyzed in this paper are not reported because of the small number of cases and because of the strategy indicated in note 24 of viewing the responses as properties of populations rather than of individuals. But it should be noted that individuals presenting the President "favorably" in Table 7 are not invariably the children who were coded as positive in Table 4.

[48] Black children's orientations to the police are reviewed in David O. Sears, "Political Socialization," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. *Handbook of Political Science,* II, pp. 93–153. For evidence that white children show more cynicism toward the President because of Watergate, but the already cynical responses of the black children remain, see Michael Lupfer and Charles Kenny, "Children's Reactions to the President: Pre- and Post-Watergate Findings," (mimeo) delivered at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

dent is above the law, and deal explicitly with the tension between the two norms.

Here are examples of references to the norm of equality, with the nation-specific nuances italicized.

England

I think that she would have to pay the fine as well as anyone in the end. Whether it's some local dustman, it's still the same for everyone. So they would have to pay the fine.

The policeman would stop her and say, "You're speeding over the limit so therefore I'm going to have you up. (Laughs) I'm sorry, but you're just like *any normal person* and we'll have to treat you like that." And so the Queen's had up for driving too fast. (Great mirth) I don't think she's taken to court, but the judge comes to see her, and she has to pay a fine for £15 for driving too fast!

France

Perhaps he is stronger than the other men, but he ought to get a summons because he hasn't kept to the speed regulations. Agreed, he's high up, a big man, but also a man like the others. He's got to do like them. He must pay attention. He could kill someone like that. (WHAT DOES THE POLICEMAN SAY WHEN THEY STOP THE CAR?) "You may be General de Gaulle, but we have to stop you. You could run over someone like that and, since we do it to others, I don't see why we shouldn't do it to you." So he gives him a ticket, and Charles de Gaulle has to pay.

(AND WHAT DOES POMPIDOU DO IN THE END?) He says, "Since that's how it is, do to me what you would to anybody else." And the policeman *don't want to, but Pompidou makes them.* (WELL, DOES HE PAY A FINE?) Well, yes. [A distinctly Gallic combination of egalitarianism with authoritarianism—F.G.]

O.K., the policeman stops him and M. the President stops. So the policeman draws near and *when he sees M. Pompidou he immediately stands at attention.* Then M. Pompidou says, "O.K. Well, you have no reason to stand at attention. On the contrary, there's no reason that because I am the President that I should do anything I want to." So the policeman, he doesn't know what to say. He is moved, so he tells M. Pompidou, "What do you think I ought to do?" So he replies, "Well, give me a fine like anybody else, because some people might say, "Oh, you see . . . just because it's M. Pomidou they cancelled the fine and we, poor people, we're only drivers but we get fines. That's not fair."

United States Whites

Well, if I was the policeman, I would have given the President a ticket. Because it doesn't make a difference who you are in this country, you still have to obey the laws. . . . If he was a good President, he would congratulate the policeman for giving him a ticket and not letting him go with just a warning. . . . I think he would tell the policeman, you know, that it was a good thing that he did stop him. (O.K., THEN WHAT'S THE PRESIDENT SAY?) I don't know. He'd probably tell the policeman that he deserved it or something, We have to follow his rules [the President's], so probably he'll have to follow the policeman's rules too.

Well, if the police stopped the car, I think that the President should get a fine if he was speeding, because he isn't really . . . he isn't one special . . . *he isn't the guy that runs the country, really. He just helps.* He just helps run it, like, so he . . . he should get a ticket. He should be able to obey the rules, the laws and orders that he makes. (WHAT DO YOU THINK THE PRESIDENT WOULD SAY?) He'd . . . he's probably say O.K. *because the Presidents are decided by the people who believe that they should be treated as equals.*

United States Blacks

Well, the police stopped the car and they noted that it was the President, and, hm, they would probably give him a ticket, being fair to everyone. But, you know, he wouldn't keep him too long so he could get to his meeting. . . . If he was a good President, he wouldn't mind that the police gave him a ticket because he would want them to be fair to everyone.

In Table 9, reporting verbalizations of the norm that the Head of State is above the law, there are again no differences between American whites and blacks. The French, however, are particularly likely to state or imply this belief. Table 9 is abstracted from statements such as the following:

England

The desk sergeant says to the policeman after the Queen is inadvertently arrested: "You silly chump. *This is the Queen, not an ordinary person.* We're sorry for this delay."

"I thought it was somebody else, because you know you shouldn't go over the speed. All right, Madam, because you're the Queen. You've made up the regulations."

France

Well, normally he'd have to get a ticket, but as he is the President of the Republic they let him go. . . . But really it is dangerous, because if he drives again he might do the same stupid thing and cause accidents, and even if he's in the wrong, they'll reimburse everything to him because he is President.

If it's the President of the Republic, even if he exceeds the speed limit, if he drives too fast, *the police have no right to stop him.*

United States Whites

Respondent:	Probably he felt that if it was the President then he shouldn't give it to him.
Interviewer:	But does he?

Respondent: I don't think he should because *he's supposed to be going somewhere for us.*

United States Blacks

Since he was the President, he let him go and he said that, well, he made the world what it is . . . really is, so he let him go.

A Comparison of Post-Watergate American White Children with the 1969–70 Respondents

During the first two weeks of June, 1973, while the televised Watergate Hearings were in progress, we arranged to interview seventh-grade white children in the Connecticut schools in which our 1960–70 interview had been conducted. We used the same interview questions, but omitted some of the parapolitical items. Fifty-nine interviews were completed; the resulting population was evenly divided by sex and roughly by socio-economic status.

At the time of our interviews, Mr. Nixon's national Gallup rating among adults was 44 per cent approval, 45 per cent disapproval, making him the third President in the history of national surveys to have more disapproving than approving evaluations at any time during his term. As recently as January 1973, his Gallup approval rating had been 68 per cent.[49] We assumed that Watergate would produce the greatest reduction in positive imagery among white children since this group had been so surprisingly positive toward the President in 1969–70.

The interviewers were instructed not to introduce references to Watergate and not to probe in a leading manner if the children referred to Watergate-related matters. Consequently, any observations the children introduced on that topic were spontaneous. Such references—either directly to Watergate or to some alternative way of labeling that constellation of events: "that robbery in Washington," "the bugging they're arguing about"—were made by half of the group at one time or another in the interview. Thirteen of these 30 children mentioned Watergate in more than one information or story completion-item. Here are examples:

Interviewer: Suppose a foreign child asked you, "What is the President?"
Respondent: Richard M. Nixon.
Interviewer: What does he do?
Respondent: He's the President. He signs papers and, like, helps turn out the laws, and stuff like that.
Interviewer: Anything else?
Respondent: Well . . . he gets in trouble a lot.
Interviewer: What kind of trouble?
Respondent: I don't know. The Watergate and everything like that now.

Respondent: He's one man, he lives in a big house, and he has children, a wife, and they go on trips, and try to end wars, and try to make things better in the United States. And sometimes they make, when they make, um, what is it? . . . Well, anyways, when they agree with sometime like another place, and afterwards they don't do it, and he has a man that works for him and tries to get to agree on something. He's just like any other person, and he tries to make things better for the United States.
Interviewer: Anything else that he does?
Respondent: He makes talks on TV.
Interviewer: What does he talk about?
Respondent: Sometimes there's a war, and he was talking about that. And he talks about Watergate. I don't really understand what the Watergate is about. I don't know what it is.

These references were atypical in that they were introduced in the item that begins the sequence of political questions.[50] Most of the Watergate references came later in the interview in connection with the questions on media behavior, and the questions on the political parties and voting, or on the Supreme Court, which a number of children described as "trying the most important cases—like Watergate."[51] But the examples quoted above were typical in two respects: the references were not presented as part of a critical indictment of the President (a number of children volunteered that "in spite of Watergate" they still preferred Nixon to McGovern[52]); and there was clearly not much detailed understanding of Watergate at the time of the Ervin Committee

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[49] American Institute of Public Opinion release, June 23, 1973. On presidential popularity over the years, see Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion.*

[50] The basic interview schedule begins with nine story-completion items set in the child's immediate environment (school, home and peer group), more than half of which were retained in the post-Watergate schedule, since they help to build rapport. Then follows the sequence of political information questions in which the foreign child seeks information, and the explicitly political story completions such as the head of state/policeman story.

[51] Children know virtually nothing about the structure and practice of the Supreme Court, but instead they respond to the connotations of the two words "supreme" and "court," usually describing a non-appellate court dealing with "important cases." In 1969–70, one illustration sometimes given of "an important case" was the trial of a presidential assassin. Watergate and the punishment of presidents who break the law were the results of the same thought processes in 1973.

[52] Compare the Gallup report of a June 1973 "trial heat" between Nixon and McGovern in which Nixon won—though by a plurality much less than his November 1972 election margin. American Institute of Public Opinion release, July 5, 1973.

Hearings. Another aspect of the two quotations bears comment. Each has a troubled quality that seems to be induced by Watergate. The first refers vaguely to the President's own "trouble." The second employs the now familiar benevolent-leader formula ("tries to make things better"), but hems and haws through a confused discussion of problems of obtaining agreement, which is not characteristic of pre-Watergate interviews.

On first reading the post-Watergate transcripts, I had two divergent impressions, which were somewhat qualified by the quantitative data. First, I was struck by the presence of references to bribery, corruption, and impeachment. These themes were not present in my 1958 open-ended, paper-and-pencil questionnaire responses, nor were they noticed when we were deriving the cognitive content code from the 1969–70 interviews. When we tabulated references to bribery, corruption, and impeachment, however, we found that only about a half-dozen post-Watergate respondents had mentioned bribery and corruption, and about the same number had mentioned impeachment. Moreover, a retabulation of the 1969–70 protocols showed some references to these themes as well. There was a difference between 1969–70 and 1973, however. Post-Watergate references were not merely "academic." They implied real possibilities of presidential malfeasance. Post-Watergate references tended to be from McGovern supporters and especially from the very small minority of respondents who had absorbed the ideology of the antiwar movement. The most well-developed example follows, the President-policeman story completion of a boy from the same wealthy suburban community that yielded the Jerry Rubin supporter quoted above.

"Well, he says "May I please see your—oh! Excuse me, Mr. President. Um, may I please see your license?"

"You know who I *am*. Don't give me any of this bunk! Look, here's fifty dollars for your trouble. (In a very annoyed tone.) I have to go to the meeting! Would you please just get off my back and let me go."

"No, I have to take you in. You offered me a bribe, and you were also speeding."

"Well, what about my meeting?"

"Cancel it. It doesn't bother me whether you cancel it or not. I didn't even vote for you."

"Well, all right." So he goes and talks to the chief and says "Look, can't you just let me out on bail? I can pay for anything. Any amount of bail."

"Well, since you have to go for a meeting, I will let you out on bail."

"How much is bail?"

"Five thousand dollars for offering a bribe. Well, not five thousand, um, we'll let you go without bail, but you'll still be summoned to court, traffic court, and then we'll put you on charges of bribery."

"Can't you just—I'll give you a hundred-thousand dollars if you don't tell anybody. I could get impeached for this!"

"Well you can get impeached, but impeachment doesn't mean you'll be kicked out of office."

"Yes, but for offering a bribe I should be kicked out of office."

"Well, I'll try not to let it go out, but it's gonna get out somehow. . . . I'm gonna have to let you go now, to go to your meeting. Just don't leave, because if you leave you're gonna be in trouble. Cause we can usually find the people. The FBI's usually pretty good, even if they *are* on your side."

So he finally gets impeached, but the Congress doesn't vote to kick him out of office . . . but now he's not a very strong [President] now. Congress doesn't usually go along with his bills.

Needless to say the young man who produced this extraordinary skein of fantasy is exceptionally politicized and informed by adult as well as pre-adult standards, and he is exceptionally disposed to use Watergate-related imagery in negatively evaluating the President. Yet his negative judgment seems to be of presidential role *performance*, not of the role itself. There are manifestations of respect for the presidency even in this story completion (the President is allowed to go to his meeting, his bail is reduced, etc.).

The respect for the presidency as a role even in our most vivid corruption-laden, impeachment story-completion leads to the second impression that emerged from an initial reading of the 1973 protocols: A remarkable number of these respondents seemed, Watergate notwithstanding, to be making precisely the same sort of "old-fashioned" idealized statements about the President so familiar to anyone who encourages white American children to describe their nation's political roles and institutions. For example:

Respondent: I'd say that he was a very good President, and he's Republican, and his name is Richard M. Nixon.

Interviewer: Could you tell (the foreign child) what he does?

Respondent: Well he got the POW's out of Vietnam and you know he tries to do something for the United States. So you know it would be a better world to live in. . . .

Interviewer: What is the job of the President?

Respondent: To make people happy. . . He helps

> other people in other countries too, and tries to make (things) better for everyone.

> He helps different people, like if something happens, like a hurricane or something, he'll like pay for the damages.

> He tries to stop pollution and he finished the war in Vietnam, and he does lots of stuff that's good.

Moreover, the negative and mixed examples—like the following two—were remarkably temperate:

> [His job includes] taxes and stuff like that, and the war you know, he tries to stop it and stuff like that. If he can. He's not doing such a hot job.

> He decides a lot of things, like about the wars, and makes decisions about a lot of things, and like he really controls the country and you really have to do what he tells you to do. And that you shouldn't say "Well, he's wrong all the time, but he's right most of the time." And that, well he makes some good laws and some not-so-good laws. But you should obey him anyhow.

Could it be that even in a period of widespread adult criticism and distrust of the President, children would continue to idealize him?[53] This possibility is suggested by the finding in my 1958 study that there were substantially (about 30 per cent) more positive pre-adult than adult evaluations of the President in response to fixed-choice questions.[54] At the time I speculated that a number of converging influences, some in children's environments and others in their own dispositions and perceptual proclivities, would tend to insulate them from negative aspects of adult political psychology and from political realities in general. These include the child's inattention to the wider environment, the tendency for some adults to mute their own political cynicism in explaining politics to children, and the congeniality to children of the reassuring view that the adult authorities on whom they are dependent (and therefore the "leading" adult in the nation) have favorable qualities.[55]

Even American adults were far from uniformly negative toward President Nixon during the period of our interviews, which preceded such dramatic events as the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, and the eventual release of the tapes directly implicating Nixon in the Watergate coverup. Not only was the percentage of citizens disapproving of the President's handling of his job roughly matched by an equal percentage approving, but there was a general public reluctance to condemn him completely. For example, a Gallup Poll of June 22–25, 1973 found that although 71 per cent of a national sample claimed presidential complicity in either the Watergate activities or their coverup, only 19 per cent felt he should be compelled to leave office.[56]

The quantitative results of our post-Watergate interviews are summarized in Table 10, which compares post-Watergate and pre-Watergate white American respondents. Considering the findings one by one, we note first that the overall level of affect and idealization in the descriptions of the President to the imaginary foreign child differs in spite of the continuation of benevolent-leader imagery: pre-Watergate, 55 per cent positive to 1 per cent negative; post-Watergate, 45 per cent positive to 5 per cent negative. Among the components of positive affect toward the President the decline is greatest in the more explicitly positive subcategories bracketed in Table 10. Moreover, the percentage of responses coded in the subcategory "must be obeyed" increased slightly. This distinctly cool mode of idealizing authority was absent in the pre-Watergate American interviews, and was evident in 1969–70 largely among the authority-cowed French children (Table 4). In short, detailed analysis of the political information question about the President suggests a slight decline in idealization during the early Watergate period, as well as a change in the qualitative *tenor* of presidential idealizations.

In the traffic policeman episode, which accounts for the remainder of the comparisons in Table 10, we see a greater post-Watergate willingness (by 16 per cent) to envisage punishment for the President as the outcome of the episode and a lesser proclivity to describe him as getting away with speeding. The President's comportment in the episode is evaluated negatively by more post-Watergate children than those who evaluate him positively, a reverse of the direction of the positive-negative relationship in 1969–70, although the absolute shift in response distribution is not substantial.

The two themes reported in Tables 8 and 9 show the most striking pre- post-Watergate differences: The enunciation of the norm that all Americans are equal and the assertion that the President is above the law. The norm of equality is mentioned by 14 per cent more children in the

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[53] F. Christopher Arterton, "The Impact of Watergate on Children's Attitudes Toward Political Authority," *Political Science Quarterly,* 89 (June, 1974), 269–324. Watergate has encouraged a spate of research, not all of which had been completed by the time this article went to print. See the special issues devoted entirely to Watergate of the *American Politics Quarterly,* 3 (October, 1975); and *Communications Research,* 1 (October, 1974).

[54] Greenstein, *Children and Politics,* p. 37.

[55] *Ibid.,* pp. 43–52.

[56] Gallup Opinion Index, September 1973.

Table 10. Responses of Pre- and Post-Watergate U.S. White Children to the President of the United States (percentages)

	Pre-Watergate Respondents		Post-Watergate Respondents	
(1) Level of affect/idealization				
Positive	55		45	
Mixed	0		2	
Negative	1		5	
Neutral	43		44	
Not ascertained	1		3	
	100		99	
	(86)		(59)	
(1a) Differentiated positive affect (Table 4)				
Explicit positive affect	29.1		20.3	
Other explicit idealization	2.3		1.7	
"Helps"	10.5		5.8	
Does good things	9.3	54.7	8.5	44.8
Says what's right	1.2		1.7	
Important	2.3		3.4	
Must be obeyed	0.0		3.4	
(2) Outcome of traffic policeman episode (Table 6)				
President punished	41		57	
President only cautioned	20		18	
President gets away with speeding	39		25	
	100		100	
	(80)		(56)	
(3) Evaluation of head of state in traffic policeman episode (Table 7)				
Positive	28		21	
Mixed	2		5	
Negative	20		26	
Neutral	49		47	
	99		99	
	(81)		(55)	
(4) President equal before law (Table 8)				
Norm explicitly stated	30	35	44	49
Norm implied	5		5	
Norm not expressed	65		51	
	100		100	
	(82)		(59)	
(5) President above the law (Table 9)				
Norm explicitly stated	21	31	14	58
Norm implied	10		44	
No norm expressed	69		42	
	100		100	
	(82)		(59)	

Coding Status: Consensual coding of items 1, 3, 4, and 5. Reliability of item 2 is 90 per cent agreement; pi = .84.

post- than in the pre-Watergate group. The norm that the President is above the law increased even more substantially between the two interview periods. This increase is the most substantial difference between the two populations—27 per cent. Frequently, the same child refers to both norms, stating either that everyone should be equal but that the President will use his status to evade punishment, or, alternatively, that equality triumphs in spite of evocation of the contrary notion that the President is above the law.

Here are examples of how post-Watergate

children enunciated norms in the President-policeman story:

> The President says "I'm the President. You shouldn't give me a ticket." He thinks he's higher than everybody, but you're supposed to treat people equal. The policeman wasn't playing favorites, so he just gave him a ticket. [both norms evoked].

> First of all, I don't think the police would stop him, but if he would, I don't think he'd do anything. . . . I think the police would be scared, sort of. [President above law].

> Probably the policeman would stand at attention. I don't think they would do anything to the President. . . . They *should* do something to him, like they should give him a citation. Just because he's the President doesn't mean he's God. But they would probably be scared. [Both norms evoked]

> I don't think he'd give him a ticket. But if he was a good policeman, he'd give him a ticket just as well as anybody else. On account that he's human just like anybody else. They get a ticket, he oughta get a ticket. If one gets away with it, they all should get away with it. [Norm of equality]

> "Sorry, Sir, you're gonna have to pay a traffic ticket of fifteen dollars." "I'm the President, I'm not gonna pay *any* traffic ticket." "You are the one, the man that makes the laws, with all your help from Congress. . . . You make the laws, you should enforce them. You're not enforcing them right now." [Both norms evoked].

These post-Watergate American white children were considerably more likely to employ the President-above-the-law theme than were the two pre-Watergate groups most prone to exhibit them—the French and the American blacks. At this relatively early stage in the unraveling Watergate scandal, the very substantial difference in the use of the above-the-law theme suggested a distressing possibility. Would the main effect of "stonewalling" by a president obdurately refusing to clarify his role in a scandal be to foster attitudes of quiescence and fatalism in children? With the 20/20 vision afforded by hindsight, it is apparent that although these children still idealized the presidential role in the abstract, they were prepared to punish a presidential malefactor.[57] By the end of 1973, when Nixon's popularity with the adult population plummeted to an all-time low for the six presidents on whom national survey data were available, children as well as adults were able to make numerous negative statements about the President, as Arterton's November 1973 study makes clear.[58] At that time many more children would probably have joined the precocious suburban boy quoted above in envisioning the use of the "rusted blunderbus" of American politics—presidential impeachment.

Summary and Conclusions

This study suggests the following touchstones for further research on Britain, France, and the United States.

(1) English children[59] begin their political socialization with benign views of the Queen, whom they regard as their nation's effective ruler, and much more balanced views of the Prime Minister. They perceive both the Queen and the Prime minister in considerable detail, and sense a highly complementary division of labor between the incumbents of these two offices.

(2) Fifth-Republic children, at least prior to Giscard d'Estaing's time in office, focus their attention almost solely on the President of the Republic, and perceive the Premier (whose name they commonly do not even know) as a minor official who stands in for the President when the latter is otherwise occupied. Their descriptions of the President and their perceptions of him in action are characterized by authoritarian imagery and vocabulary. They see him as a formidable personage rather than an attractive, positively valued figure.

(3) The benevolent-leader imagery used by white American children to describe the President during the early years of the Nixon Administration is evidence of their remarkable insulation from the turmoil of the 1960s. In spite of their idealized views, however, these 1969–70 respondents also revealed a capacity to criticize the President when presented with a hypothetical scenario involving presidential lawbreaking. A comparable group of American children interviewed early in the Watergate scandal perceived the presidential role in a less explicitly idealized fashion. The most important difference between the pre- and post-Watergate groups was the greater sensitivity of the post-Watergate children to the possibility that the President might claim to be above the law; but this claim evidently produced a backlash. The post-Watergate children were also more likely to say that all Americans are equal before the law, and to imagine that the policeman would punish the presidential traffic violator.

(4) The small 1969–70 sample of black children, which did not include respondents from the most depressed of the central city ghettos, produced a surprising number of idealizations of the President. Nevertheless, in contrast to the pro-Presi-

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[57] For an extended discussion, see *New Society*, 30 (19 December 1974), 751–3.

[58] Gallup Opinion Index, December 1973. Also see note 52.

[59] All of the respondents in this study were from the more commonly studied South of England.

dent black populations studied during the Kennedy and early Johnson Administrations, a number of black respondents in the present study held solidly entrenched negative views of the President (more so of Mr. Nixon than of the presidency in general). Although black Americans ranked closer to their white American counterparts than to the children in the other two countries in their views of whether a law-breaking head of state would be punished, the black respondents were at the opposite end of the four-comparison-group continuum from the white American children in the use of one of the most long-standing themes in American political culture—the belief that all Americans are equal.

(5) Methodologically, the findings point in several directions. Detailed examination of open-ended data, especially from a population such as children, who are very vulnerable to response set, makes it possible to tap the diversity of private meanings and imagery that becomes artifactually homogenized in responses to fixed-choice items. Moreover, the use of open-ended items overcomes the problem encountered with fixed-choice procedures of interpreting purely item-produced responses as if they were salient, phenomenologically "real" political perceptions and beliefs. Both the story-completions items and the straightforward open-ended items also leave room for serendipitous findings not conceived as part of the original research design.

The story completions complement the open-ended questions in eliciting evidence of how children define situations and imagine behavior would occur in specific circumstances. The pair of items compared in this article—an open-ended question that appears to evoke expectations about the presidential role in the abstract, and a story-completion item dealing with contingencies under which the President breaks the law—provide an instructive juxtaposition. Discrepancies between responses to these items help explain why members of the same cohort of children who in the late-1950s and early 1960s strongly idealized the President became so deeply disillusioned by incumbents who did not live up to their expectations. If political-psychological data are to be predictive of behavior, questions about abstract attitudes and cognitions must be supplemented by contingent questions about how individuals respond in concrete circumstances where more than one value is implicit.[60] Therefore, the conventions of recent years that stress measurement of cognition and affect need to be expanded to take into account a third aspect of mental functioning —*conations*, i.e., dispositions toward action in specific circumstances.

Finally, this article stresses the desirability not only of multiple indicators but also of multiple methods that enable triangulations of observations on human dispositions and behavior. Instead of seeking an illusory, bias-free way of ascertaining the "truth," one should progressively seek to specify variations in behavior depending on particular circumstances.

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[60] For discussions of the centrality of contingent (or "interaction") relationships in political psychology, see the preface to the Norton Library edition of Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization* (New York: Norton, 1975); the editors' introductions to essays in Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, eds., *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968, now distributed by Humanities press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.); and Greenstein, "Personality and Politics" in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science,* II, 1–92.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Inertial Effect of Incumbency and Two-Party Politics: Elections to the House of Representatives from the South, 1952–1974.

TO THE EDITOR:

There has been a good deal of recent discussion in political science circles about the importance of incumbency as an "effect" which helps congressmen running for reelection by a given number of percentage points.[1] Although no attempt to measure the "incumbency effect" has been conclusive, recent elections to the House of Representatives have demonstrated its importance.[2] Despite this incumbency advantage, however, no one has drawn from it what is perhaps the most significant generalization to be made: that incumbency acts as an important contextual distortion of the distribution of party identification among the electorate. Since most incumbents are reelected despite the turbulent issues of a particular campaign, incumbency can act as an inertial influence on voting behavior, prolonging a party's success in a series of elections, despite underlying changes in party identification.

The South, because it is the only region in the United States displaying a major secular trend in changing party identification, provides an unusual opportunity to test this generalization. By comparing elections in the South involving incumbents with those involving nonincumbents, I will show that incumbency may substantially delay changes in voting which might otherwise have been expected given changes in party identification.

One could hardly make a less surprising announcement than to proclaim the demise of the Democratic "solid South."[3] The South has not been completely solid in presidential elections since the last Roosevelt victory in 1944. In 1952, 94 per cent of southern congressional districts were Democratic, compared to just 69 per cent in 1972 and 75 per cent in 1974. This increasing Republican share of House seats, however, seems small when compared to changes in party identification and voting in presidential elections. Table 1 gives the available party identification figures in the South for the last six presidential elections, and compares this with the percentage of House seats won by Republicans and Democrats in the same period. Democratic identification steadily declined during the period 1952 to 1974, while identification with the Republican party increased. It appears that the distribution of congressmen by parties has not changed proportionately with changes in the underlying partisan alignment. Democrats have consistently maintained an edge in seats greater than one might expect on the basis of party identification figures. Table 2 makes it clear that this edge results from the inertial effect of incumbency.

Table 2 compares elections to the House of Representatives in the South involving incumbents from 1952 to 1974. The Table indicates, first, that southern Democratic incumbents have been more successful in being reelected than southern Republican incumbents. Democrats defeated about nine per cent of southern Republican incumbents over the twelve elections depicted (Column A), and lost only 3.3 per cent of their incumbent seats—a 96.7 per cent record of successful reelection (Column B). Second, despite this track record of incumbent success, there has been a nearly perfect downward trend in the Democratic proportion of southern congressmen since 1960. The overall proportion of southern Democratic congressmen declined from 94 to 75 per cent, as indicated in Column E.

Columns C and D demonstrate that this Democratic erosion has occurred in elections involving nonincumbents. Column C shows the proportion

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[1] The degree to which incumbency is a separable "effect" in itself is a matter of dispute. Traditionally, it has been assumed that incumbency is a distinct advantage to congressmen seeking reelection. Warren Lee Kostroski has spelled out the advantages commonly cited as working in favor of incumbents: they are likely to accumulate considerable political skill and experience, have better voter recognition than their nonincumbent opponents, and have some clout within their party because of favors, patronage, and fund-raising activities. Robert S. Erikson, in 1971, suggested that incumbency was worth about 2 per cent of the vote. A year later, Erikson suggested that while 2 per cent was probably the valid figure for the 1950s, by the late 1960s, the advantage had more than doubled to about 5 per cent of the vote. See Warren Lee Kostroski, "Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and Models," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1217; Robert S. Erikson, "Research Note: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," *Polity*, 3, No. 3 (Spring, 1971), 395–405; Charles M. Tidmarch, "Communications: A Comment on Erikson's Analysis of the Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," *Polity*, 4, No. 4 (Summer, 1972), 523–529; and Erikson's response to Tidmarch.

[2] Of those congressmen who decided to run for reelection in the past decade, roughly 90 per cent of the Representatives and 80 per cent of the Senators have been reelected. In 1974, comparatively a year of wholesale slaughter, only 10.4 per cent of the Representatives seeking reelection were defeated. From 1966 to 1972, about 86 per cent of the entire membership of the House were incumbents. See Kostroski, "Party and Incumbency."

[3] In this regard, see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Robert B. Arseneau, "Partisan Change in the South, 1952–72," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 2, 1974. I define "the South" as the eleven former Confederate states.

Table 1. Percentage Decline of Southern Democratic Party Identifiers, and Seats in the House of Representatives, 1952 to 1974

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972
Per Cent Democratic Party Identifiers	75	65	65	72	67	58
Per Cent Democratic Seats in House	94	93	93	84	75	69

Source: Michigan Survey Research Center data on party identification.

Table 2. Elections to the House of Representatives from the South, 1952 to 1974, Involving Incumbents and Nonincumbents, by Party[a]

	A	B	C	D	E
	% Incumbent Republican Seats Won by Democrats	% Incumbent Democratic Seats Won by Democrats	% of Nonincumbent seats Won by Democrats	Difference between B and C	% of Total Seats Won by Democrats
1952	0% (0/2)	98% (83/85)	89% (17/19)	9	94 (100/106)
1954	17 (1/6)	99 (89/90)	90 (9/10)	9	93 (99/106)
1956	0 (0/7)	100 (91/91)	100 (8/8)	0	93 (99/106)
1958	13 (1/8)	100 (94/94)	100 (4/4)	0	93 (99/106)
1960	0 (0/6)	100 (93/93)	86 (6/7)	14	93 (99/106)
1962	0 (0/6)	98 (85/87)	77 (10/13)	21	90 (95/106)
1964	18 (2/11)	95 (79/83)	67 (8/12)	28	84 (89/106)
1966	13 (2/15)	93 (71/76)	67 (10/15)	26	78 (83/106)
1968	0 (0/22)	100 (72/72)	67 (8/12)	33	75 (80/106)
1970	0 (0/22)	100 (77/77)	40 (2/5)	60	75 (79/106)
1972	0 (0/23)	97 (61/63)	59 (13/22)	38	69 (74/108)
1974	26 (9/34)	100 (68/68)	67 (4/6)	33	75 (81/108)

[a] Table 2 was calculated from election results reported in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, Congressional Quarterly Service, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1950 to 1974. An election was counted as "incumbent" if any individual running was in office at the time of the election.

of elections where no incumbent was running which were won by Democrats. In the 1952 to 1958 series of elections, if the figures are averaged, Democrats won a comfortable 93 per cent of the 41 nonincumbent seats, and 99 per cent of the Democratic incumbents were reelected. By the 1968 to 1974 period, however, on the average, while 99 per cent of the Democratic incumbents were still reelected, Democrats won only 60 per cent of the 45 nonincumbent races.

As hypothesized above, incumbency is a stable crust underneath which Republicans as well as Democrats are contesting elections with increasingly improved chances of victory. The Democratic proportion of House seats exceeds the Democratic proportion of party identifiers because southern Democratic incumbents are nearly invulnerable. When finally they retire, however, only about six in ten of the Democrats running for the same seats at present are able to retain their seats. The change in the partisan temperament of the district has already occurred. It is the effect of incumbency which was responsible for the delay in changing the party holding the seat. From this we must conclude that incumbency can have a considerable effect on the outcome of elections and is not simply an influence which reflects the underlying party identification.[4]

Column D makes this inertial effect of incumbency explicit, and it shows that the difference between the success of southern Democratic incumbents and of nonincumbents has been steadily increasing. In the 1950s, Democrats won only 6 percentage points fewer of the nonincumbent races than of the races involving incumbents, on the average. By 1960, however, this gap between the two sorts of contests increased to an average of 39 per cent in the elections from 1968 through 1974. In other words, when the advantage of incumbency was removed, Democrats tended to win fewer and fewer elections than when it was present. It appears that the longer-range prospects for Republican success in southern congressional elections are better than a cursory examination of the numbers of southern Republican congressmen might indicate.[5]

In one sense, it is absurd to speak about the congressional delegation from the South as being more representative of Democrats "than it should be." Incumbents and nonincumbents are elected in the same way. And to the degree that citizens know anything about the substantive positions of the candidates running for office, they probably know more about incumbents than about nonincumbents. On the other hand, the results of elections involving nonincumbents lead to the expectation that should all southern congressional incombents suddenly retire, their elected replacements would include considerably fewer Democrats.

The three general findings of this communication can be summarized as follows: First, incumbency has a considerable effect on the outcome of elections, an influence that is clearly not merely an artifact of a constituency's underlying partisan loyalties. Second, the data indicate that incumbency can delay partisan change in a region's representation in Congress considerably. And third, the erosion of Democratic strength in the South appears to be greater than many observers have realized.

RICHARD G. HUTCHESON III
University of California, Berkeley

B. F. Skinner and Values

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Stillman's argument (*APSR*, 69 [March, 1975], 202–213) that B. F. Skinner's position regarding values is philosophically inconsistent can be summarized as follows:

(1) If something is a value, then that thing has a reinforcing effect (specifically, something "good" is something which positively reinforces, something "bad" is something which negatively reinforces).

(2) If something has a reinforcing effect, then that thing is subjective (i.e., all reinforcing effects are the perceptions of specific sentient individuals such that no reinforcing effect experienced by any two or more specific sentient individuals need necessarily be identical).

(3) Therefore, if something is a value, then that thing is subjective.

Viewing points (1) and (2) as premises, conclusion point (3) follows necessarily by means of the inference rule known as "hypothetical syllogism." Symbolically the argument can be represented as follows:

$$(x)(V_x \supset R_x)$$
$$(x)(R_x \supset S_x)$$
$$(x)(V_x \supset S_x)$$

where "*V*" stands for "is a value," "*R*" symbolizes "has a reinforcing effect," and "*S*" symbolizes "is subjective." Professor Stillman believes Skinner is inconsistent as soon as he posits survival as a positive value and yet admits that certain forms of destructive behavior (e.g., enjoying heroin) may be positively reinforcing. This problem, however, is too simply put.

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[4] This indication that incumbency delays changes between parties suggests the possibility that incumbency may act to delay change *within* a party as well. Given the "nationalization" of southern politics, the Democratic incumbents are more likely to be "old style" southern Democrats, while the Democratic nonincumbents are more likely to be national Democrats, virtually indistinguishable from their Northern colleagues. Hence, incumbency also may act to delay change within the Democratic party.

[5] Wolfinger and Arsenau also document this point strikingly by differentiating "contested" and "uncontested" elections to the House. See Wolfinger and Arsenau, p. 4.

To begin with, even should Skinner accept premise (1) positing that all values are reinforcing, this premise does not necessarily imply that all reinforcing things are values.[1] The full escape is achieved once Skinner maintains that species survival is a value unlike all other values in that it functions as the decision criterion in the system.[2] Thus, when two or more things presented as choices for behavioral control are each positively reinforcing, those contributing to the standard of species survival are preferred over those detrimental to the species survival standard, and those equally contributing to the standard are ranked indifferently. Why else would Skinner need a behavioral engineer or talk about redesigning environments? To point out that some men take heroin or that moths fly into flames is merely to point out that those men and moths are stupid (i.e., in Skinner's terminology, they have designed or had designed for them reinforcement schedules which entail the ultimate negative reinforcement consequence, or at least the cessation of all reinforcement). It does not demonstrate that the system is inconsistent. On this construction, Skinner falls less into an Epicurean tradition (that all types of pleasures are equivalent provided they are equally pleasant) than he does into a Benthamite tradition (that a criterion, such as the greatest happiness principle, distinguishes the more perfect from the less perfect pleasures).

Yet there are deeper levels upon which the issue of logical consistency can be raised. Possibly species survival itself might become negatively reinforcing if circumstances were such that to be alive were to be alive painfully. If species survival itself becomes negatively reinforcing then the rational standard has departed from its reinforcement base and the system has become inconsistent with premise (1) in that the valued thing, species survival itself, is no longer positively reinforcing. Professor Stillman presented a variation of these difficulties as a political problem of countercontrol, i.e., how do the experts proceed when what is necessary for species survival is not positively reinforcing to individuals. The problems he raised there are genuine and important. However, looked at here, they reveal that the logical grounds upon which the system stands may entail an abandonment of the contention that the valuable is rooted in the reinforcing. Premise (1) functions more as an article of faith than an empirically demonstrated synthetic postulate given the development of the system. Either the valuable is linked to the reinforcing by analytic definition (here a form of question begging which would assert that $(x)(R_x \equiv V_x)$ rather than the material implication originally stated), or the behaviorist merely hopes rather than demonstrates that all things positively valued (i.e., all things following as deductions from the species survival criterion) will be positively reinforcing. In the first instance a nonempirical operation, and in the second instance a nonempirical assumption, rests squarely at the base of a system tolerating only emprícism.

JEROME R. CORSI

Franconia College

TO THE EDITOR:

Despite Professor Corsi's argument, I hold to my original formulation. It seems to me that Skinner equates values and reinforcement by his stipulative definition of values, so that the valued and the reinforcing are identical by definition (or faith), without the need for syllogisms. From this identity follow the subjectivity of values and Skinner's contradiction in seeing survival as a special value, i.e., the objective decision criterion of his system. Skinner clearly wishes to escape this contradiction, and to justify survival as a nonsubjective and validly derived decision criterion. But he equally clearly has not yet escaped, for he has not given an objective or a valid derivation as a special value, nor has he shown how survival could in practice operate as a decision criterion (e.g., he has not treated the practical difficulties of accurately and fully predicting the future so that the behavioral engineers will be able to assess the survival potential of different courses of action).

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[1] At first glance it may appear that Professor Stillman has stated premise (1) differently than posited here. On p. 206 of his article, for instance, the following sentence appears: "Thus, things are good if they are positively reinforcing, bad if they are negatively reinforcing." That this should be read $(x)\ (V_x \supset R_x)$ is apparent from the proper translation of the horseshoe symbol into the English words "only if," as in the statement "*p* only if *q*" (see W. V. Quine, *Methods of Logic* [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Third Edition, 1972], p. 44). Absent the quantification terminology, the argument as it presently stands is a valid categorical syllogism of the form AAA-1 (note what is stated as the second premise would have to be considered the first since it contains the major term). If what is written here as premise (1) were cast $(x)\ (R_x \supset V_x)$, there would be no argument at all as the syllogism would then be of the invalid form AAA-3.

[2] That Skinner does utilize species survival as a decision criterion is articulated in many of his writings. Consider, for example, the following:

> A rigorous science of behavior makes a different sort of remote consequence effective when it leads us to recognize survival as a criterion in evaluating a controlling practice. We have seen that happiness, justice, knowledge, and so on are not far removed from certain immediate consequences which reinforce the individual in selecting one culture or one practice against another. But just as the immediate advantage gained through punishment is eventually matched by later disadvantages, these immediate consequences of a cultural practice may be followed by others of a different sort. A scientific analysis may lead us to resist the more immediate blandishments of freedom, knowledge, or happiness in considering the long-run consequence of survival.

Science and Human Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1965 paperback edition), pp. 435–436.

But Skinner's lack of precision in writing does make him difficult to interpret. Thus, Professor Corsi, not I, may well be correct. In either case, however, it is clear that Skinner does fall into serious contradiction. Furthermore, in his final paragraph and especially in his final point, Professor Corsi does raise additional telling objections to Skinner's social and political thought.

PETER G. STILLMAN

Vassar College

More on The Pentagon Papers

TO THE EDITOR:

As a footnote to the review-articles on *The Pentagon Papers* by George McT. Kahin and H. Bradford Westerfield (*APSR*, June 1975), the four "negotiating volumes" originally omitted from the Gravel and Hebert editions have recently been made public (although marred by lengthy deletions) and they can be purchased by sending a check for $30.80 to Mr. Charles W. Hinkle, Director, Freedom of Information and Security Review, Room 2C-757, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. The check should be made payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

Interested readers will also wish to consult the excellent articles on the negotiating volumes by Murrey Marder and Don Oberdorfer in *The Washington Post*, June 27, 1972 and by Neil Sheehan and Bernard Gwertzman in *The New York Times*, June 28, 1972.

WALLACE J. THIES

University of Connecticut

More on New Theories of Revolution

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Bernard S. Morris, in reviewing my book, *New Theories of Revolution* in the December 1974 issue of your journal, ends by stating that Fanon, Debray and Marcuse "may be wrong, but at least they treat theory as a creative tool instead of clinging, as Woddis does, to the conventional ideas of Marxism-Leninism in a radically changed world."

Using Marxism-Leninism as a creative tool does not consist of overturning the main ideas of Marxism-Leninism, without any evidence whatsoever to back up such "creativity." The test of any new theory is whether or not it is confirmed by the facts, by experience, by the revolutionary processes themselves. As I explain more than once in my book, it is vital for revolutionaries not to regard every Marxist idea as sacrosanct if developments in life show it to be no longer valid. But it is my contention, which I have presented at length backed up by a detailed and factual examination of the theories of Fanon, Debray and Marcuse *as they have worked out in practice in Africa, Latin America and the Western world*, that in reality all their theories have been found wanting when put through the severe test of reality.

If I had simply attempted to answer them by dogmatic reassertions of the views of Marx and Lenin there might have been some point to Mr. Morris's criticism. But as he himself admits at the beginning of the review, I offer "a prodigious collection of data" and it is this, not a mechanical clinging to theoretical tenets, which I have presented as my evidence. To date, no reviewer anywhere has been able to challenge the facts of my case.

JACK WODDIS

Essex, England

TO THE EDITOR:

A prodigious collection of data does not necessarily add up to a validation of theory, in this case, a conventional rendition of Marxism-Leninism. The theories of Fanon, Debray and Marcuse may be found wanting but not by virtue of reference to the texts and tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

BERNARD S. MORRIS

Indiana University

More on Participation

TO THE EDITOR:

In her review of my monograph *Participation, Planning and Exchange in Old and New Communities: A Collaborative Paradigm* (*APSR*, 68 [Dec. 1974], 1766–67), Judith May makes three basic criticisms:

(1) I am more successful in creating a normative ideal, citizen-government collaboration, than a descriptive model of citizen participation in planning.

(2) I use the social control, partisan influence, and exchange perspectives to describe both the evaluative orientations of observers of participation and the relative power of participants, expecting a change in relative power to follow a change in evaluative orientation.

(3) I fail to recognize the real world of participation with its economic inequities, racial conflicts, political history, federal programs, and the like, instead testing the usefulness of the collaborative approach in two new towns—a test that "ignores the political and historical context of citizen participation and trivializes the transforma-

tive citizen participation movement of the 1960's."

In response, I cheerfully plead guilty to the first two charges, and suggest that the third charge be thrown out for lack of evidence.

On the first count, it was my *objective* to create a normative model of collaborative participation, in order to provide a bench mark against which various public participation programs could be measured. My thesis was that, without such a model, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of participation programs that have been attempted, or to design new participation programs. There are several descriptive models of citizen participation; among those that I reviewed are the ones by Gamson, Arnstein, Mogulof, Verba, Gans, Spiegel and Mittenthal, Kaplan, and Moynihan. Most of the instances of public participation using these models are judged by the authors describing them to be failures. Yet these descriptive models of failed programs do not necessarily provide useful guidelines for evaluating or designing effective participatory planning programs.

On the second count, it also was my objective to provide a changed perspective from which to view participation, on the grounds that until such a change has occurred there will be little chance of a shift in the relative power of participants. Unless the designers of participation programs see them as more than after-the-fact educational efforts for controlling and persuading the public, or as defenses against aggressive partisan interest group efforts, then the present disparaties in planning power are bound to continue. Only if planners and public officials understand that there is a workable alternative to social control, and the interest groups understand that there is a workable alternative to partisan influence, can they take the necessary steps to create authentic power sharing. I did not claim that such a change in orientation was a sufficient condition for achieving collaborative planning, only that it was necessary to develop a concept of reality for public participation that looks beyond the narrow limits of descriptive social science. In proposing this new paradigm I am not alone, but share the distinctive company of Amitai Etzioni (*The Active Society*, 1968), Edgar Dunn (*Economic and Social Development*, 1971), John Friedmann (*Retracking America*, 1971), and Donald Michael (*On Learning to Plan—and Planning to Learn*, 1973). Fortunately, this new reality also is beginning to be recognized in some public programs of the 1970's such as transportation (the Boston transportation planning review is an important example) and water resources planning (the new federal 208 program has strong and explicit participation guidelines).

On the third count, apparently Prof. May substituted her own values toward participation for the facts from my monograph. Otherwise, she could not have supported her sweeping criticism of my paradigm on the grounds that it ignored the realities of economic inequities, racial conflicts, political history, federal programs, mayors, bureaucracies, etc. In fact, I reviewed six cases from the literature, including Boston's South End Urban Renewal Project; the Model Cities Programs in Atlanta, West Oakland, and North Philadelphia; and the new communities of Levittown, New Jersey, and of Fort Lincoln. These cases, which were replete with economic inequities, racial and political conflicts, and all the other elements that were supposedly left out of my study, were then compared with my field studies of Reston and Columbia. In fact, I presented a general model of the community environment for planning and governance, which identified as important community context variables the community's demography, geograpny, economy, political history, organizational structure, and influence pattern. In fact, I devoted a chapter to tracing the transformation of the citizen participation movement of the 1960s, from the typical blue ribbon advisory committee of the early days of Urban Renewal to the radical community conflicts of some Model Cities and War on Poverty programs. In fact, I found in Reston and Columbia much more important instances of participation than the responses to surveys that Prof. May mentions, including a level of activism and involvement in community development issues that was high for American communities. In fact, the collaborative paradigm explicitly recognizes problems of unequal power, and of barriers to acceptance of innovation and change.

In light of these facts, I feel that Prof. May's review has ignored the full context of my work and has trivialized the importance of my concepts, in order to emphasize her own viewpoint about what belongs within the citizen participation movement of the 1960s. Perhaps readers with different biases will accept a wider range of experience and ideas.

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TO THE EDITOR:

I regret having used the word "trivializes" to describe David Godschalk's treatment of citizen participation. Let me reiterate my criticism in other words.

In his monograph, Godschalk creates a normative ideal for citizen participation in planning, which he characterizes as citizen-government collaboration (the exchange perspective), and which he distinguishes from citizen-government relationships dominated either by the authorities (the social control perspective) or by citizens (the partisan influence perspective). In doing so, he reviews an enormous amount of literature, including case-studies. However, Godschalk uses this literature to demonstrate the usefulness of distinguishing among the social control, partisan influence, and exchange perspectives, and not to "ground" his theory by identifying the conditions under which each is likely to occur. Although he lists certain contextual variables in "a conceptual model of the community environment for planning and governance" (demography, geography, economy, political history, organizational structure, and influence pattern), he makes little effort to identify the properties of these variables and to link them in systematic ways with aspects of citizen participation in planning. Compare Godschalk's conceptual elaborations (e.g., "*Organizational structure* includes the formal legal structure for planning and governance, as well as the political parties and voluntary organizations. This would include both authorities and partisan interest groups.") with those of J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson in *Race and Authority in Urban Politics* or Roland L. Warren, Stephen M. Rose, and Ann F. Bergunder in *The Structure of Urban Reform.*

Godschalk hopes that changing perspectives on citizen participation will help to change the relative power of the participants. I would like to have seen more attention paid to the conditions under which his normative ideal is likely to be realized. How much authority over what kinds of decisions at what stages of the decision-making process will permit citizens to approach parity with authorities? What kinds of incentives arranged in what kinds of structures will motivate authorities to share decision-making responsibility with citizens? What kinds of conflict will be encouraged by the pursuit of what kinds of goals with what consequences for the durability of the authority-sharing arrangements? Without this careful specification of conditions, Godschalk has difficulty fulfilling the task he has set for himself—judging whether, in any particular case, citizens and authorities have achieved a proper balance.

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Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay*

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A decade ago the French political scene was characterized by the existence of a majority rightist party whose ascendancy seemed assured, and a muddled and disparate left which had barely regrouped once again in the opposition camp. Today the French political scene is characterized by the existence of a new rightist majority whose structure and ideology remain as yet only loosely defined, and a renovated and united left in a position to achieve governmental power—which it very nearly did in May 1974. Yet the left's struggle for realignment has tended to go relatively ignored by American political scientists for a variety of reasons: the primacy in the political system of the rightist majority, a fascination with unique political phenomena such as Gaullism, and an assumption of the French left's inability to offer anything in the way of successful political opposition. The disparate and therefore nonviable status of the left seemed a foregone conclusion, reflected in the old dictum that "while nothing could be done without the Communists, neither could anything be done with them." But while the electoral history of the Fifth Republic had proved that nothing in fact could be done by the left without the Communists, profound changes within both the *Parti communiste français* (PCF) and the democratic socialist SFIO suddenly made it seem by 1971 that a good deal could—after all—be done *with* the Communists. The result was the creation a year later of a Popular Front-type alliance among Socialists, Communists, and leftist Radicals. This virtually unprecedented alliance differed from the historic 1936 Popular Front agreement in that the PCF was now willing to enter a leftist coalition government and it differed from the 1945–47 alignment mainly in that the alliance was cemented by the signing of an extremely detailed Common Governmental Program designed to "open the way to socialism in France."

Eight recent French publications illuminate how the French left grappled with and eventually overcame the immobilization that had plagued it so long under the Fifth Republic. Together, they portray the new Popular Front alliance emerging as an alternative to Gaullism; individually, they reveal most of the salient themes, problems, and issues that have confronted the left in the Fifth Republic. These include the structural and philosophical metamorphosis of the old democratic socialist left into the present *Parti socialiste* (PS) of François Mitterrand, the Communists' concurrent *rapprochement* with the Socialists made possible by the PCF's ideological revisionism, the culmination of the Popular Front strategy in the form of the *Programme commun de gouvernement* of June 1972, the role of François Mitterrand, and the Communists' present state of theorizing. From an analysis of these works, it may be concluded that the Popular Front alliance has increased the possibility that, for the first time since World War II, the Socialists will displace the Communists as the predominant party on the left.

The New Socialist Party

One of the most consequential changes on the left concerns the transformation and rejuvenation of the former SFIO (a party on the decline since 1945 in terms of membership, votes, and vigor) into the new *Parti socialiste,* which is analyzed by Pierre Guidoni in *Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste.* While the author (a political scientist and left-wing PS militant) deals with developments from 1968 to 1973, his most original contribution lies in the treatment of the PS's 1969–1971 "transitional period." The July 1969 "constituent congress" of the PS had marked an important step in uniting the non-Communist left by accomplishing the fusion of the SFIO, several political club groupings (such as the UCRG of Alain Savary, the UGCS of Jean Poperen), and a small percentage of members from Mitterrand's *Convention des institutions républicaines* (CIR). With the renovator Savary as the top leader, this regroupment was expected to permit the "great leap forward" so desperately needed in the democratic socialist camp. But Guidoni makes it clear that any dynamic movement was extremely difficult to achieve because of the new leadership's failure to accomplish most of the four main tasks assigned to it.

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* Pierre Guidoni, *Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste* (Paris: Tema-Action, 1973. Pp. 405. 26 F.)
Didier Motchane, *Clefs pour le socialisme* (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1973. Pp. 310. 14 F.)
André Laurens and Thierry Pfister, *Les nouveaux communistes* (Paris: Stock, 1973. Pp. 262. 28 F.)
Programme commun de gouvernement: Parti socialiste, Parti communiste, Mouvement des radicaux de gauche (Socialist edition, Paris: Flammarion, 1973. Pp. 96, 3.50 F; Communist edition, Paris: Editions sociales, 1972. Pp. 192. 5 F.)
François Mitterrand, *La Rose au poing* (Paris: Flammarion, 1973. Pp. 224. 16 F.)
François Mitterrand, *Ma part de vérité* (Paris: Fayard, 1969. Pp. 192. 14.50 F.)
Jean-Marie Borzeix, *Mitterrand lui-même* (Paris: Stock, 1973. Pp. 220. 25 F.)
George Marchais, *Le Défi démocratique* (Paris: Grasset, 1973. Pp. 249. 15 F.)

First, despite giving the highest priority to renovation, renewal, and growth, the party experienced very little progress in any of these areas. New memberships still accounted for only 10–20 per cent of the total membership;[1] the much-heralded turnover (50 per cent by 1970) of Federation heads in many cases simply meant that a former SFIO member had been replaced by a younger former SFIO member; the majority of seats on the *Comité directeur, Bureau,* and *Secrétariat* were held consistently by former SFIO members rather than by former club or minority CIR members. So while Savary was highly regarded as an honest and scrupulous party leader, this respect was not matched—as it had to be—by his actual control of the leadership organs or by a widening of his political base at the grass-roots level.

Savary's second task concerned the formation of a party program and an electoral strategy. Drafting a program presented no problems within the party ranks; in fact, the party's *Plan d'Action* of 1970 very closely resembled the CIR's 1969 program[2] and the PSU's Manifesto of that year.[3] Electoral alliances proved to be quite another matter. The right wing of the PS expected to retain the liberty to make local and cantonal alliances with essentially everyone left of the Gaullists. The party's left wing, led by the CERES,[4] expected the PS to enforce its newly adopted Socialist-Communist alliance commitment right down to the bedrock of Socialist support—the municipalities. When Savary pushed through a very loose compromise solution at an October 1970 conference, the party's internal tensions began to become public as the CERES unhesitatingly revealed its growing fear that the party had not progressed beyond "Molletism" and that under the circumstances the *bond en avant* expected after 1969 had no real chance of occurring.

Guidoni discusses how further criticism within the party was fueled with the completion in December 1970 of Savary's third task—exploratory ideological talks with the Communists. The commitment to "talks leading to a common governmental program" had been a key plank in the 1969 final congressional motion. Yet, after one and a half years (with six weeks of actual discussion), Savary managed only to present to the party a balance-sheet of several pages, listing some ideological convergences but mainly a multitude of divergences between the Socialists and Communists. This was dismal, indeed.

Only in his final task—uniting the socialists—did Savary achieve success. And ironically, by accomplishing that task, he lost his position as First Secretary of the party to François Mitterrand. Ever since the spring of 1969, when the CIR-SFIO fusion plans were disrupted,[5] Mitterrand and the CIR had not ceased to call for unity. By November 1970, Savary felt he could no longer put off the inevitable, and accepted Mitterrand's proposal for the creation of a *Délégation nationale pour l'unité des socialistes,* which would work out arrangements for a grand Socialist Unity Congress in the summer of 1971.

Guidoni's portrait of the Savary transition years is excellent. He discerns, under the surface flow of events, the ideological divisions and *tendances* of a party trying to move leftward from its stagnation under Mollet. Guidoni elucidates the influence and standing of his own CERES wing, the nature of its militancy, and the radicalness of its democratic socialist ideology. Such an emphasis is valuable precisely because that CERES viewpoint prevailed to a great extent at the 1971 Unity Congress at Epinay. But Guidoni does not tell how such a dramatic change occurred within the seemingly stalled PS. A chapter in Jean-Marie Borzeix's *Mitterrand lui-même* tells that fascinating story,[6] although even his lively account is not complete. The truth of the matter is that things were not so straightforward as the public and the press thought in the months preceding the unity congress. As early as October 1970, secret meetings had begun among a handful of men who sought to affect the outcome of the by-then inevitable unification. They included Gérard Jaquet and Gaston Defferre from the Bouches-du-Rhône/Nord wing of the PS, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Georges Sarre, and Didier Motchane from the CERES, and Pierre Joxe and François Mitterrand from the CIR. Their accumulated list of personal and ideological grievances against the incumbent party leadership had gone unnoticed owing to the all-too-obvious differences among them—particularly between the CERES and Defferre-Mauroy wings of the PS. But their formidable common interest—"to get rid of Guy Mollet once and for all," as they bluntly put it—brought them together to cut the Gordian knot so long entangling the French democratic socialists. A tacit and loose agreement emerged from these meetings. If the situation permitted, the alliance members would "bypass" Savary and Mollet by putting through a motion unequivocably calling for the formulation of a common governmental program with the Communists in anticipation of the forthcoming legislative elections. Such a strategy represented a complete about-face for Defferre and Mauroy, but they reasoned that, *provided* the PS became truly renovated and strengthened, it *could* hold its own in any such arrangement with the PCF. Believing that only Mitterrand could accomplish this reversal, Defferre and Mauroy were ready to join an alliance which would permit his ascendancy.

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[1] Hurtig Christianne, *De la SFIO au nouveau parti socialiste* (Paris: Colin, 1970), p. 91.

[2] The CIR's program can be found in Mitterrand's *Un socialisme du possible* (Paris: Seuil, 1970), pp. 43–107.

[3] *Manifeste du Parti socialiste unifié* (Paris: Tema-Action, 1970). The PSU is a splinter group of "revolutionary democratic socialists," formed in 1960.

[4] The *Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes,* a ginger group, was originally set up in the SFIO by Mollet in 1966, but early on parted from his patronage.

[5] The disruption had been caused by the SFIO's unilateral actions regarding the creation of the new socialist party and its actions in the candidate selection for the June 1969 presidential race.

The almost fortuitous realization of the *coup d'Epinay* on that fateful first day of the unity congress is a story whose details are fascinating but too intricate to explore here.[7] Suffice it to say that the delegates, in voting on the technicalities of the party's internal electoral system, unknowingly determined the direction and leadership of the party. Because of these votes, Mitterrand's final motion, openly supported by Defferre, Mauroy, the CERES, and the CIR, became the majority motion and its supporters the majority on the party's ruling bodies. Savary, stung by the "immoral alliance of extremes" that confronted his leadership, refused to support a composite motion, thereby losing his position as party leader.

Democratic Socialist Ideology

In *Clefs pour le socialisme,* Didier Motchane (a political scientist and left-wing PS militant) complements Guidoni's description of the structural evolution of the PS by analyzing its ideological shifts. These have brought the PS around to a more revolutionary democratic socialism which distinguishes the French Socialists as probably the most radical and innovative in Western Europe. Motchane offers a comprehensive treatment of the "socialist revolution," but two major themes of the book illustrate the nature of current (non-Communist) Marxist thinking. The first criticizes "those two endemic sicknesses of the working movement," social democracy and bureaucratic centralism. The second weds the decentralizing notion of *autogestion,* or self-management, to the nationalization/democratic planning aspect of state socialism.

According to Motchane, the unconscionable deviation of the European social democrats is that their socialism is concerned solely with the *redistribution of the fruits of a capitalist society.* Instead of attempting to abolish classes that arise from unevenly divided relationships of production, the social democrats seek to "merge" these classes through a fairly even distribution of material and social benefits. Motchane traces this "socialism of resignation" to the days of Eduard Bernstein, when the revolution was deemed impossible and efforts turned to more easily obtainable legislative reforms. This shift away from original Marxism led the social democrats to rely almost exclusively on electoralism, and hence reduced them to attempts at changing the bourgeois institutional *superstructure* instead of that which ultimately determined it—the economic *substructure.* Before long, the social democrats became absorbed into the very bourgeoisie they supposedly opposed, since successful electoral battles necessitated moderation, placidity, and, above all, collaboration of classes in the form of electoral alliances with nonsocialists at all levels.[8]

If the PS had to guard within itself against a return to social democratic practices of the former SFIO, it also had to guard within the Popular Front alliance against a tendency toward bureaucratic centralism. The USSR (assuming it was still the PCF's model for socialism) was the land of the revolution, writes Motchane, but it did not become the land of socialism. Instead of using public ownership as a means to change social relationships, the Soviets have used it as unimaginatively as the social democrats have, simply going further in a redistribution of the collectively produced benefits. Motchane rejects the argument that the USSR has fulfilled Marx's basic conditions for socialism. To say that exploitation in the USSR has been eliminated because all surplus value is returned to the worker through a State which is run by the Communist party and which is itself synonymous with the workers is doubly fallacious. First, in the absence of political democracy, it has never been established that the interests of the State and party bureaucracies are synonymous with those of the workers. Second, jurisdictional ownership by the State is not *social ownership,* which requires the direct ownership, control, and management of the means of production by those who man them. Therefore, according to Motchane, the USSR is a form of state capitalism, in which the work force is still for sale, the workers still salaried, and therefore the extraction of surplus value still prevails.

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[6] Borzeix, pp. 163–184. Borzeix is a journalist.

[7] For a very detailed and lively account, see Guidoni, pp. 161–203.

[8] This reproach of electoralism is a major theme of Guidoni. He notes the demise of the social democratic current in 1969, when Gaston Defferre scraped together a humiliating 5 per cent in the presidential election first round: "the glaring defeat on their last terrain—that of elections—where their realist strategies could still pass as authoritative." Guidoni, p. 403.

Motchane would end the exploitation of man by man and thereby achieve socialism by doing away with the distinction between those who own the means of production and therefore command, and those who own only their labor and therefore only obey. To Motchane, collective ownership and economic democracy seem no less commonsensical than the Lockean precepts of political democracy seem to a democrat. A nation's economic life, like its political life, should ultimately be controlled by the very people *who collectively bring that life into existence.* To unlock the door to a more authentic socialism Motchane offers three concepts which have become the basis for the PS program, the Common Governmental Program, the PSU and CFDT programs—collective ownership of the means of production, democratic planning, and *autogestion.* Motchane is most innovative and instructive on the last of these concepts.

According to Motchane, *autogestion* in a general sense is absolute democracy—the permanent, real, and constitutional abolition of all separation between the governed and the governors.[9] Politically, it is the old dream of direct democracy; economically, it is the direct responsibility of workers or producers for all activity within their place of work.[10] If *autogestion* makes practical sense from the point of view of reducing cumbersome centralized bureaucracies, it also makes "socialist" sense from the standpoint of tackling the core problem of worker alienation by restoring to the worker the full fruits of his labor and by allowing his ability and creativity to flourish through enhanced responsibility.

Motchane proposes to proceed with *autogestion* within existing nationalized industries simply by permitting workers to begin to exercise overall control, graduating eventually to actual management of the workplace. In private industry, however, Motchane is on new ground. First, the National Assembly would have to pass a new "Work Code" to grant workers (via their elected work-place representative bodies and trade unions) a say in the basic physical work conditions and personnel policies, and to grant them access to all confidential information about the business. Ownership and management would not change, but the workers obviously would exert some control through an implicit veto power. The next step would be to grant the workers veto power over all business decisions concerning investments, profits, salaries, contracts, etc. For the final step, Motchane envisages a suppleness of juridical forms to achieve collective ownership. However, he stops short of saying whether the relationships of production can be reversed by substituting *de facto* social ownership (made possible by substantial workers' control) for *de jure* private ownership (which has lost all benefits of command and therefore power). Perhaps he does because he sees the concept of workers' control as something more than an end in itself, as the necessary *dynamique* for an ascendant movement which, because of unyielding contradictions between workers' control and private ownership, will produce "a permanent tension that can only lead to the progressive disappearance of private ownership of the means of production."[11] He is vague because he emphasizes the *movement* toward autogestion—and considers that movement, above all, a means to mobilize the masses, to stimulate their imagination and expectations, to recreate an active citizen/militant mentality.

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[9] Motchane, p. 242.

[10] It must be remembered that Motchane is not advocating the anarchosyndicalist dream of producer ownership, but collective ownership. The difference is that in the latter, self-managing workers are expected to operate within general national priorities as set out by the State in the "democratically formulated Plan"; in the former, self-managing workers would operate in a free market economy situation. Thus Motchane's is an attempt to achieve a coordinated decentralization and is very reminiscent of the thrust of the later Guild Socialist writings of G. D. H. Cole.

[11] Motchane, p. 261.

A difficult but fertile book such as Motchane's is important because it raises questions concerning the continuing debate on *autogestion* and the role of CERES theorizing within the PS. *Autogestion* as a long-range goal has recently been accepted by much of the French left. Indeed, it provides common philosophical ground for the moderate socialists, the majority of the PS, the non-Communist trade unions, the PSU, *and* the extreme left. It does this because these groups fundamentally oppose the bureaucratic centralist conception of a socialist economy which is thought to be the PCF's real aim. Nonetheless, because of the popularity of the issue, even the PCF has been compelled to talk about *autogestion* as a socialist goal. The Communists, however, call their notion "democratic management" and they stress the need to avoid a situation in which workers' spontaneity (read "anarchy") prevails over the more desirable direction afforded by workers' representatives (i.e., trade unions and Parliament, or the State). The debate on *autogestion* has become crucial because it lies at the heart of socialist historical development—a development that until recently lost sight of the vision of a decentralized "Proudhonian" socialist society in the face of the prevalent state-oriented socialisms of the European social democrats and the Soviet Communists.

Within the PS itself the battle for primacy in the theoretical sphere remains fierce. Motchane's CERES proved particularly influential in the party's first several years—as participants in the *coup d'Epinay,* as members on the ruling organs within the initial Mitterrand majority, as influential authors of the party's March 1972 governmental program, and as vocal and militant members of many of the more active departmental organizations. While the CERES members were removed from the Mitterrand ruling majority at the January 1975 party congress, their base of support within the party—as measured by votes on resolutions at the congress—rose from 21 per cent in 1973 to 25.5 per cent, indicating a growing grass-roots support of the CERES position. But the CERES has not gone unchallenged as the predominant force to the left of Mitterrand's ruling alliance. At an October 1974 *Assises du socialisme,* the PS, the PSU, the CFDT and other "third component" groups attending as individual members, explored the possible "regrouping" of all democratic socialists into the main PS body. By January 1975, the PS experienced an influx of "third component" members and of a minority of the PSU (led by Michel Rocard); the newcomer group thus presented the CERES with a formidable rival as spokesmen for *autogestion.* Though still afflicted with personal and factional disputes, the PS as a whole now stands strategically and philosophically well to the left of its SFIO ancestor, as well as the European social democratic mass parties. In this sense, Motchane enunciates many of the theoretical preoccupations of the new PS.

The New Communists

Unity of the left required substantial changes within the non-Communist left, but could not have been achieved without equally important changes within the PCF. André Laurens and Thierry Pfister (both political correspondents for *Le Monde*), in *Les nouveaux communistes,* provide a concise and straightforward account of the PCF's evolution over the past ten years. The authors' general conclusion is that the Communists' pursuit of leftist unity has paid off, but only after a heavy investment and possibly a very high price. The price was, basically, a chipping away of Lenin's famous 21 conditions that distinguished Communist parties from European democratic socialist mass parties. Annie Kriegel summarizes these conditions as the three "flying buttresses" of all Communist parties—proletarian internationalism (or loyalty to the USSR), democratic centralism (as opposed to bourgeois political democracy), and the dictatorship of the proletariat (or the concept of class).[12] Laurens and Pfister show that all three principles have been eroded and their analysis is especially valuable regarding the last point; that is, the current debate concerning the French working class.

The PCF's extrication from submissiveness toward the Soviet Union is perhaps the most familiar material in the book. Landmarks of this process include the renunciation of the CPSU as the "guiding party" after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 (and an angry PCF delegation's journey to Moscow to demand an explanation); the *Bureau politique's* "surprise and reprobation" at the Soviets' invasion of Prague in 1968 (its first public condemnation of the USSR); the party's condemnation of the Prague political trials in 1972; and its insistence on nonintervention in internal affairs of other Communist parties, on the right to criticize other Communist parties, and on the adaptation of socialism to national conditions and historical traditions.[13] These signs of independence were facilitated greatly both by external factors (such as the acceptance of "peaceful coexistence," the waning of the Cold War, and Gaullist *rapprochement* with the USSR) and by internal factors that led the Communists closer to the possibility of actually achieving a share of governmental power (such as bipolarization trends and the democratic socialists' leftward movement).

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[12] Annie Kriegel, *Les communistes français,* 2nd edition (Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 256.

Further revisionism, say Laurens and Pfister, is evinced by the party's many concessions to "bourgeois" political democracy. It is committed (in the Common Governmental Program of 1972, if not prior in the October 1971 governmental program or the 1968 *Manifeste de Champigny*) to permitting multiple parties in a socialist France (including non-socialist opposition parties), the sovereignty of universal suffrage (provided the verdict is the result of a fair and just electoral system, i.e., proportional representation) and hence the alternation of power, and the protection of basic individual and collective liberties. But these commitments apply to national politics. The party's internal politics remain based on strict democratic centralism. While the secret ballot was introduced in the early 1960s for party elections, authentic democracy continues to be averted by the prohibition of nonhierarchical contacts (which rules out the enunciation and formation of factions), the necessity for all candidates for intermediate and superior party positions to be approved from above, the granting of unlimited powers to the Secretary-General (under article 40 of the party statutes), the heavy reliance on permanent staff members in the party bureaucracy, and, finally, the absence of formalized competing motions and debate in (closed) party congresses.

On the third principle—the concept of class—Laurens and Pfister include an excellent statement of the perpetual debate among French Marxists concerning their true constituency. In a paraphrase of Roger Garaudy's arguments, the authors discuss the problem posed from a Marxist point of view by the emergence of a new technological stratum in the working class composed of scientists, technicians, researchers, engineers, draughtsmen, programmers, etc. Americans may consider these workers as middle class; French Marxists think otherwise. After all, Marx defined the middle class as those small agricultural holders, small businessmen, and individual craftsmen and artisans who were distinguishable from the working class because they *owned* their means of production and hence were not exploited through surplus value. But, says Garaudy, the traditional middle-class categories have diminished with technical and scientific progress, and have been overshadowed by the new technological class which, while perhaps enjoying a comparable living standard, nevertheless remains salaried, or subject to the laws of profit and surplus value. Therefore, concludes Garaudy, its solidarity with the working class is firm. He thus embraces the theoretical innovation of the Italian Communist Gramsci, which holds that a *new historical bloc* of all wage earners will replace the more traditional working class as the rallying point in the achievement of socialism.[14]

The Communists resolutely rejected Garaudy's intellectual contribution for tactical as well as ideological reasons. First, while the new historical bloc encompassed the 75 per cent of French working people who were salaried, and while half of those were manual workers, one-fourth *intellectuels salariés* (the technological stratum), and one-fourth *employés salariés du secteur tertiaire* (white collar workers in tertiary services), the Communists knew that the last two sectors were expanding the most rapidly and that it was in these sectors that the PS was likely to make the greatest in-roads in terms of members and votes. Secondly, as Laurens and Pfister discuss, the Communists accused Garaudy of ideological heresy. By down-playing the primary role of the working class in the struggle for socialism, Garaudy had "renounced dialectical and historical materialism as a universal method and conception of the world."[15] By this, the Communists meant that the heart of production lies in the primary sector and material goods, not services. In these primary industries, the work is not only the most vital to the economic life of society, but also the largest in scale or most collective. Here, then, the extraction of surplus value is the most direct, the fundamental contradictions of the relationships of production the clearest, and the political consciousness of this exploitation potentially ripest. The role of the technical and scientific revolution should not be overestimated, say the Communists, the pre-eminence of manual workers in the production process never underestimated. Indeed, the "new stratum" will never replace the traditional working class in revolutionary fervor because the latter is opposed to the bourgeoisie in every respect—relationships to production, lifestyles, class, mores. This is because while the new salaried white collar working class may be *"exclus de la décision,"* the working class is also *"exclus de la consommation."*

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[13] These last three positions are developed most recently in Marchais's *Le Défi démocratique.*

[14] For a more thorough discussion, see Roger Garaudy, *l'Alternative* (Paris: Laffont, 1972), pp. 173–198.

[15] Laurens and Pfister, pp. 190–191.

Finally, the PCF affirms, the working class is not only the poorest but the most numerous. And as the party of this working class, the PCF refuses to relinquish its claim to be the vanguard of the socialist revolution. The very doctrine of scientific socialism decrees that the revolution will fail without such a party. This concerns a central question in the Laurens/Pfister book. How much can the PCF evolve and change before becoming a "banal social democratic and reformist party"?[16] Roland Leroy, a prominent PCF leader, said ten years ago, "Ask anything you want of us, but do not ask us to cease being communists." This may have been puzzling at the time. After ten years of evolution, it evidently means simply a resolute *patriotisme de parti*—a willingness to compromise, to be flexible on ideology, tactics, anything, except on the party's very existence and on the internal device that is above all deemed necessary to maintain that autonomy—democratic centralism.

The Common Governmental Program

The June 1971 Congress decisively committed the PS to the formulation of a common governmental program with the Communists. The program was envisaged as a binding legislative contract which would specify measures to be taken by a Communist-Socialist majority in the course of a five-year legislative term. By the time negotiations began on the program in the spring of 1972, the respective parties had published their own party programs, from which the common program would undoubtedly emerge as a compromise. The PCF's *Changer de Cap: Programme pour un gouvernement démocratique d'union populaire* of October 1971—that party's first governmental program—adhered closely to its "new line" concerning a peaceful and parliamentary "French road to socialism."[17] New, not because it differed from the Thorez line after World War II, but because it said that a transitional period called a *démocratie avancée* had to be established between capitalism and socialism via a Popular Front government. This period would be characterized by a more complete extension of democratic rights in the political, economic, and social domains to the great majority of French people. It would be transitional because its object would be to eliminate the monopolistic nature of French capitalism and the personal power abuses of the Gaullist Fifth Republic. Only then could the alliance move on to a complete rupture with the capitalist system in general.

In many respects, *Changer de Cap* previewed the PS's program of March 1972 (*Changer la Vie: Programme de gouvernement du parti socialiste*), although the latter is long-range in intent, and hence a good deal more comprehensive and imaginative. The leftward swing within the PS, led by the CERES, former PSU members, and "May 1968" newcomers, found considerable expression in the program.

The negotiations on the Common Program, from late April to late June 1972, rarely were easy and agreement was by no means assured. Finally, at the end of an all-night bargaining session, the two parties produced on June 27, 1972, a *programme commun de gouvernement;* one of the most important political events for the left since 1920. The program contains just under a hundred pages[18] of detailed legislative proposals, whose contents can be summed up as a *democratization* of French life. Not surprisingly, the first section to be agreed upon concerned social matters. These proposals simply deepened the parties' commitment to a notion that most modern industrial nations have long since accepted—that one function of government is to provide for and coordinate the satisfaction of certain basic needs of the people, be they jobs, social security, health care, housing, transport, education, culture or leisure. The program did move ahead in one area in particular—namely, the emancipation of women and their place in society.

The second section—on economic matters—spelled out the triple axis of *autogestion* or democratic management, collective ownership, and democratic planning. With regard to the first, although all the section's specifics reinforced the PS's intent, the Communists refused to accept the term *autogestion* as the final goal of economic democracy. Particularly at the time the concept had vague anti-Communist connotations—partly because it meant rejection of the centralized *étatisation* associated with the USSR, and partly because the PS was purposely seeking to assert its independence in matters of socialist theory. So despite the actual consensus, the Common Program at this point was forced to resort to its only listing of divergences: ". . . the intervention of the workers in the management and direction of the enterprise will take new forms—which the *Parti socialiste* sees in the perspective of *autogestion* and the *Parti communiste français* in the continuous development of democratic management. . . ."[19]

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[16] Laurense and Pfister, p. 233.

[17] This new line was first enunciated in their 1968 *Manifeste de Champigny,* and developed in Waldeck Rochet's *l'Avenir du Parti communiste français* (Paris: Grasset, 1969).

[18] The Socialist edition runs 96 pages, the Communist edition 192 pages. The only difference is in the prefaces. The Socialist version gives some brief but valuable information concerning the negotiations themselves.

Concerning collective ownership of the means of production, the program stressed that this could take several forms—nationalizations, societies of mixed economy, cooperatives, mutualities, local public services. Nevertheless, a minimum threshold of nationalizations would have to be crossed to break the grip of monopolistic *féodalités* on the national economy. Using the same general criteria as the British Labour Party in 1945, the program would nationalize the following "commanding heights of the economy"—the entire banking and financial sector, the sectors of underground resources, arms, space and aeronautics industries, nuclear and pharmaceutical industries, and a large portion of electrical and chemical industries. Altogether this meant that nine (specified) companies would be nationalized outright and four (also specified) nationalized via state financial participation. The rest of the economic section presented no problems and stipulated the need for a democratically decided plan of broad national priorities, an agricultural and small and medium firms (PME, *Petites et Moyennes Entreprises*) policy favoring cooperative structures, a fiscal and monetary policy concerned with socially beneficial investment and redistribution of incomes through more progressive taxation.

The third section of the Common Program —on institutions and liberties—represented a vindication of the Mitterrand strategy over that of the former party leader Savary. Savary and his allies had insisted that a common governmental program could be drawn up only after a preliminary ideological discussion had elicited certain democratic guarantees from the PCF. The Mitterrand/CERES motion at the Epinay congress in 1971, however, stated that these guarantees would be written into the eventual common governmental program, and would therefore be binding on the PCF once it signed the legislative contract. Thus in the Common Program we find a commitment to respect the verdict of universal suffrage (alternation of power), to respect and extend personal liberties (freedom of speech, association, etc.), to ensure the plurality of parties and their independence from the State, as well as a commitment to the establishment of a Supreme Court for purposes of judicial review, *habeas corpus*, an ombudsman for liberties and to strengthen the legislative powers by revising the dozen Constitutional articles most flagrant in their invitation to presidential abuse.

Agreement was most difficult to reach on foreign policy. In the end, however, divergences were resolved—by Communist concessions. On at least five major issues, the Communists accepted the Socialist position: (1) the agreed-upon program calls for the renunciation of the strategic—but not tactical, as the Communists wanted—nuclear striking force; (2) it does not call for the destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, as the Communists wanted; (3) it does not call for immediate and unilateral withdrawal from NATO, as the Communists wanted; (4) it ensures the possible participation of the French armed forces in a system of European collective security, as the Socialists insisted; and (5) it ensures continued and active French participation in the EEC, as the Socialists insisted. The only Socialist concession[20] was the de-emphasis—in this five-year contract—on their long-range goal of political unity of Europe.

Initially, the Common Program appeared to benefit both parties.[21] The Communists' long-sought political integration was real and their fears of a Socialist return to a third force option (i.e. center-left coalition) were greatly assuaged. Clearly, the Socialists had predominated at the negotiating table. They had secured essential democratic guarantees and had brought the PCF further from its USSR alignment through the program's European security commitment. For both parties, the program represented the first clearly enunciated *programme de rupture* with capitalism and a tangible commitment to a democratic and peaceful transition to socialism.

As such, the Common Program dominated the campaign preceding the March 1973 legislative elections. Criticism of the document centered on two specific charges. An initial one concerned the old Red menace theme of "Communists in government." But this tactic may not have proved so effective as expected owing to several facts at which Mitterrand hammered away: de Gaulle himself originally brought Communists into his postwar government; since the days of the FGDS, Mitterrand had consistently excluded the possibility of the Communists' holding any of the key ministries (Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior); by December 1972, 59 per cent of the population, according to the polls, would find acceptable the fact of Communist participation in government;[22] finally, Mitterrand was generally regarded as the one man on the left who could keep the Communists in their place as minority partner.

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[19] Socialist edition, p. 48; Communist edition, p. 111.

[20] It might be thought that the Socialist conceded on the extension of nationalizations. While the PCF had approached the negotiations with a list of 26 companies it wanted nationalized, the Socialists came with 6 such names. The 13 companies decided upon in the Common Program, however, were (with one exception) either directly or indirectly included in the section on nationalizations in the PS's own program of 1972.

[21] The *Radicaux de gauche*, a small splinter group from Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's Radical Party, joined the Popular Front alliance in July, when they ratified the Common Program and contributed a short annex thereto.

So the right turned instead to a more cogent criticism of the Common Program—how did the left propose to finance such an ambitious program? Dutifully, Socialist and Communist economists in January 1973 presented a five-year budget to show where funds would come from (to pay for social security increases, public services and facilities, and nationalization costs), but much of the financing depended on a continuing healthy (8 per cent) growth rate, which of course was problematic. More broadly though, many on the left felt that the *jeu de chiffres* (numbers game) so dear to Giscard d'Estaing was an incomplete yardstick. The real question for them was, did the Common Program answer as honestly and as completely as possible the needs and priorities of the collectivity?

Despite the existence of the Common Program and unprecedented leftist unity, the left still fell short of unseating the Gaullist majority in the March 1973 election, although the majority's margin of seats was reduced considerably.[23] One important consequence arose, however, from within the still-unquestioned alliance. For the first time since the war, the democratic socialists had nearly matched the PCF's total vote on the first round—with 20.36 per cent for the UGSD (*Union de la gauche socialiste et démocrate,* a first-round electoral coalition comprising the PS and *radicaux de gauche*) and 21.25 per cent for the PCF. By contrast, the figures for 1967 were 18.96 per cent for the FGDS and 22.51 per cent for the PCF; for 1968, 16.53 per cent for the FGDS, 20.02 per cent for the PCF. In the Fourth Republic, the PCF had averaged around *25* per cent, the SFIO *15* per cent. Whether the Socialists' performance was due to the Common Program, Mitterrand's leadership image or the credibility of a renovated PS, the fact remained that, as the CERES was quick to note, "it was by adopting the most leftist program in its history that the PS obtained its highest number of votes."[24]

François Mitterrand

Another major factor in the realignment was François Mitterrand himself. Along with de Gaulle, he is the man most responsible for uniting the left into a viable opposition force. Mitterrand's accomplishment was no sudden accident. His general strategy had been decided on a decade and a half ago, his success had been long and difficult in the making. To know him, to understand his philosophy and his strategy, it is best to consider together Mitterrand's *Ma part de vérité* (which is especially good for his wide-ranging personal opinions and detailed analysis of the 1965–69 period), Borzeix's *Mitterrand lui-même* (which gives a good deal of insight into Mitterrand as a person and a politician), and Mitterrand's *La Rose au poing* (an expressive work of reflection and explanation of the Common Program and socialism).

The biographical picture which emerges from Borzeix's book is that of a man of bourgeois Catholic background; a student of law, political science, and literature; a prisoner-of-war escapee who returned to Resistance work and then to a long (and sometimes controversial) career in the ministries of the Fourth Republic. May 1958 abruptly changed that comfortable course. Mitterrand's reaction to de Gaulle's take-over accounts to a great extent for his remarkable "second career" in Fifth Republic politics. Unlike his Radical-Socialist and Socialist colleagues, Mitterrand read the Gaullist phenomenon as a long-term challenge that necessitated basic changes in the left opposition. As early as 1959, Mitterrand formulated his strategy of democratic socialist regroupment and renovation, augmented by a new Popular Front alliance with the French Communist party.[25] In pursuit of the first aim, Mitterrand flirted in 1960 with the PSU, became part of the growing club movement instead, in 1963–64 established contacts with anti-Molletist SFIO members in the *Colloques*

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[22] See the SOFRES poll in *Le Monde,* December 12, 1972.

[23] The majority seats fell from 360 to 262; the left's rose from 93 to 177. This, despite a first round total of 45.3 per cent for the united left, as compared to 38.48 per cent for the majority.

[24] Editorial in *Frontière,* April 1973, np.

[25] See his article in *La Nef,* April 1959; entitled "Front Populaire, coalition immorale?"; cited in Borzeix, p. 189.

socialistes, saw the tide turn in 1965 as he unexpectedly forced de Gaulle into a presidential runoff, and transferred his newly found national recognition and prestige into an enhanced leadership hold on the recently-created *Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste* (FGDS, which confederated the SFIO, CIR and Radical Party).

By 1966 the time had come for Mitterrand to attempt his second aim, an alliance with the Communists (who, after all, had unconditionally supported Mitterrand's presidential candidacy). The electoral accord struck for the 1967 legislative election enabled both FGDS and PCF candidates to gain large numbers of seats; then came the February 1968 *Accord*—a document which went the furthest ever in detailing the convergences and divergences between the two major leftist groups in France. Surprisingly, Mitterrand places this successful February 1968 *Accord* (rather than the more commonly accepted date of May 1968) as the "beginning of the end" of the FGDS. This was because he felt the *Accord* represented the limit to which Guy Mollet and the SFIO would go, structurally and ideologically. Mitterrand had pushed for fusion of the three FGDS member groups from the beginning. Mollet, in Mitterrand's opinion, was only using the formation as a "ford" at which to cross the difficult waters created by Mitterrand's leadership rivalry. Ideologically, Mitterrand felt the February 1968 *Accord* had pushed Mollet to the limit because of his social democratic stance—that is, his insistence on a program basically unchanged since the early years of the Fourth Republic and characterized, for example, by its very limited call for nationalizations, by a narrow trade union mentality with regard to economic demands and an absence of interest in economic democracy, and by a resolutely Atlanticist foreign policy.

These criticisms may sound strange from a man who never had been in the mainstream of democratic socialist ideology. Yet, these three books show the extent to which Mitterrand has moved leftward from his basic liberalism of the 1950s to a quite radical socialism in the 1970s. His conversion began in the 1950s, impelled by a falling away from the Church and ministerial agony over problems of decolonization, and it was fully realized in the 1960s by his growing belief that the root-evil of de Gaulle's republic lay not just in personal power, but in the very nature of the capitalist system itself. Mitterrand's reasons for rejecting liberalism parallel very closely those of Pierre Mendès-France in 1959, as well as many other European liberals-turned-socialists reaching back to Jean Jaurès and Keir Hardie. They were convinced that liberal measures (such as anti-trust legislation) have never been and cannot ever be effective in battling the monopolistic nature of capitalism because they fail to strike at the core of the problem—"economic conditions, the forms of production and of property."[26] If economic life is to operate in the service of society and not for the profit of individuals, Mitterrand believes, collective ownership is essential. But, basically rejecting Marxism, Mitterrand observes that "many socialists believe in a kind of mechanical law according to which a mere change in economic structures will raise them from one system to another. This error leads them to confuse the end and the means."[27] The end, of course, places Mitterrand on familiar *autogestion* ground: collective ownership must prepare social structures which will put an end to "the worst wastage engendered by the capitalist system: that of men's creative facilities, their sterilization, the alienation of workers."[28] Thus, Mitterrand rejects capitalism, not as a scientifically-condemned historical phase, but because it betrays certain moral principles—liberty, dignity, justice, solidarity. "The role of socialism is to liberate man from the constraints and the anguish that, in a capitalist society, have him by the throat. There can be no happiness for those who, all their lives, seek only to subsist."[29] The error of those on the right, continues Mitterrand, is that they perceive liberty as something of a "paradise lost." But liberty, for a socialist, does not exist in a natural state and he must instead "go out in search of ways to secure his liberty."[30] Therefore, says Mitterrand, "to organize society in order to liberate the individual, I know of no other mission for socialism."[31]

Mitterrand's critics in turn reply that if he conceives of socialism in such a way, it is indeed strange for him to make an alliance with a party whose comrades in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have not only failed to change the social structure, but have sacrificed individual liberties to a higher *raison d'état collectif.* Characteristically, Mitterrand meets head-on the question of the Communists' trustworthiness at the beginning of *La Rose au poing.* He recounts a friend's reminder to him, early in 1972, of "the long-humiliated about-to-be-executed cortège of democrats, liberals, and socialists of Eastern Europe who had thought it possible to collaborate with the Communists, who had advanced several steps in that short path dear to Lenin, and who, at its end, had met with prison, the gallows, or a bullet in the neck."[32] In pursuing an alliance with the PCF and in signing the Common Program, writes Mitterrand, "all the many questions that arose in my mind boiled down to just one: Had I served liberty?"[33] Because he believed the answer was "yes," Mitterrand wrote this book to explain why his friend's fears of the Communists' intentions were exaggerated, to justify the Common Program as the restorer of French liberties, and to plead eloquently the socialist case.

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[26] The quote is by Jean Jaurès, and is cited in *Ma part de vérité,* p. 172.

[27] *La Rose au poing,* p. 223.

[28] The quote is by Pierre Joxe, *Dire,* March 1969, p. 27, and is cited in *Ma part de vérité,* p. 184.

[29] Interview in *Le Nouvel observateur,* September 3, 1973, p. 47.

[30] *La Rose au poing,* p. 143.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 146.

Mitterrand's first contacts with the Communists date back to the war—"in the *stalags*," then in the Resistance, where "they taught me not to close my eyes if I didn't want to be crushed by their formidable machine. A difficult equilibrium to preserve between vigilance which permits nothing and confidence which permits all. I am still there."[34] After the war, Mitterrand sat in Cabinets containing Communist ministers. Once the Cold War began, stresses Mitterrand, the various Communist parties quietly left the ten Western European governments in which they participated. Then came the Fourth and early Fifth Republic years during which the PCF remained isolated. Mitterrand considered it a scandal at best, dangerous at worst, that one-fourth of the French voters remained outside national political life so long. By the 1970s, he was in a position to act on his conclusion that "millions of French people who work, produce, serve their country and love it"[35] should no longer be excluded from national public life because they vote Communist. Only a Popular Front alliance could integrate the Communist party and voters completely into the political system, and, alternatively, offer to the PCF voters the option of a viable democratic socialist party.[36] Each step toward integration, observes Mitterrand, has furthered the PCF's progress of destalinization. In defending the principles of political democracy as found in the Common Program, for example, the Communist party will become so impregnated with those very principles that to abandon them would risk the loss of a good many voters. Thus, "in reality the PCF is itself a prisoner of unity, it cannot go back now, and if it does, it will only see that outside the enchanted circle of unity, it is reduced to a marginal force."[37] Finally, Mitterrand simply feels that a Socialist-Communist alliance in France is a natural one. He regards the Common Program, then, as a "meeting place where those who have been torn apart by a half century of history have once again found each other."[38] The program's historical dimension in Mitterrand's mind is confirmed by his recollection of Léon Blum's words to the 1920 Tours congress: "All of us, although separated, remain socialists; in spite of all, we remain brothers, brothers who have been separated by a cruel quarrel, but a family quarrel, and whom a home may someday reunite."[39]

No, our alliance is not strange, continues Mitterrand, especially when our critics know the Socialists have never shrunk from outspoken criticism of the USSR (particularly during the long 1973 legislative election campaign) and when even the PCF has publicly disassociated itself from some of the Soviets' more blatantly repressive measures. What we *do* find strange is the record of the right with regard to the status of liberties in its *recognized* and *accepted* allies' internal politics. In *La rose au poing*, Mitterrand cites pages of painful Amnesty International documentation concerning actions taken by a dozen of France's allies in denying basic democratic liberties to their domestic opposition.[40] Torture, executions, massacres—not only did these acts evoke no condemnation nor even an outcry on the part of the French government, observes Mitterrand, but indeed they usually coincided with further sales of arms, a voting of further credit, further technical aid. Can the French right really be so concerned about Prague and liberty if it cares only for those on the right side, never for the opposition? But let us stick to France's own domestic liberties, says Mitterrand. Once again, the question is—liberty for whom? Mitterrand (backed by a thorough research team) examines closely the situation in France and the Common Program's provisions in the realm of institutional, political and personal liberties, and, most lucidly, economic liberties and rights. For, contrary to his rightist critics, Mitterrand perceives the Common Program as neither Socialist nor Communist—but as a "new code of liberty and property."

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[32] *La Rose poing*, p. 7.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[34] *Ma part de vérité*, p. 22.

[35] *La Rose au poing*, p. 21.

[36] Mitterrand frankly admitted in a speech to his colleagues in the Socialist International meeting in Vienna, June 28, 1972, "Our fundamental objective is to remake a great socialist party from the terrain occupied by the PCF itself in order to demonstrate that out of five million Communist voters, three million can vote socialist." Cited in *l'Express*, 17–23 July, 1972, p. 18.

[37] *Ma part de vérité*, p. 141.

[38] *La Rose au poing*, p. 34.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[40] For instance, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Iran, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Vietnam, Indonesia, Libya, Uganda, Central African Republic, Chad, Greece, not to mention Haiti, Angola, Yemen, and Paraguay. *La Rose au poing*, pp. 47–68.

> "It proposes to the French people a five-year experiment during which a leftist majority will put an end to the lawless regime which governs us, will institute a code guaranteeing public liberties, will eliminate monopolies in the key sectors of the economy, will prepare for workers' control in industry, will decentralize administrative and political decision making, will answer to basic economic demands, will practice a foreign policy of collective security, and will attempt to outline the contours of a model of civilization in which the individual will finally find the means to exercise his responsibility."[41]

But, the right persists in asking, what if the Communists are not truly sincere in accepting a document that is neither Socialist nor Communist? "The Socialists have no way of sounding out the hearts and souls of the Communists."[42] The only thing we can do is "to create conditions such that they have to act as though they were sincere."[43] Over the past ten years, Mitterrand has gone far in creating those very conditions.

The Communists' "Democratic Challenge"

Communist Secretary-General George Marchais, in *Le Défi démocratique,* parallels Mitterrand by justifying the Common Program from his party's point of view, explaining it more fully, and answering straightforwardly "the question thought to be the problem of problems for the Communists: democracy and liberty."[44] And therein lie the book's virtues and its sins. For despite an open and earnest analysis that scarcely differs from the Socialists', several jarring Stalinist concepts remain in Marchais's book to remind us of the great gap separating those two strategically aligned parties.

Marchais begins by developing and illustrating the universal leftist critique of capitalism—"In France today there are those who produce social riches and those who benefit from them. They are not the same."[45]—and discusses how the Common Program would set out to change that relationship. In fact, Marchais continues to speak for the left in general as he moves into the section on liberty. He deals with the standard bourgeois statement about freedom in the West—"One protests and rightly so against repression, but at least one *can* protest." Fine, says Marchais, but one can protest by what means? The vote? A sham, he maintains, when in 1958 the UDR with *fewer* votes than the PCF wound up with *twenty times* the number of seats; when in 1968, the right with only 3 per cent more votes than the left ended up with four times the number of seats. The French people may vote Communist, but "between the moment they cast their ballot and the moment the Assembly convenes, some strange hocus-pocus defrauds them of their vote" (p. 87). Despite constitutional guarantees for the right to strike in protest, continues Marchais, a multitude of impediments have been thrown up by the Gaullist regime. Nor can public protest meetings be held when a Gaullist-dominated City Council will not rent the appropriate public hall. The right to demonstrate risks CRS police brutality. Access to TV is controlled by a government which displays blatant favoritism. "In sum, everybody has a certain number of rights and liberties. But some have the means to exercise them, while others are deprived of those means" (p. 91). At any rate, Marchais continues, the Communists have another conception of liberty. That is the possibility not only to protest but for each person to realize himself to the fullest. "And there is no liberty unless all people have that liberty" (p. 92). There follows a clear and precise two-page restatement of what can be considered the heart of socialism—whether it be utopian, scientific or syndicalist. "Man becomes man by his work. It is by work that the human race can know, master, utilize nature. Thus if work is enchained, if its fruits are confiscated by others, man becomes a stranger to his work, to his own nature and cannot fully know his liberty" (pp. 93–4). That is why Marchais writes that "freedom is the freedom to work and to choose one's work, it is the freedom to learn and to cultivate oneself, the freedom to find housing, to enjoy leisure time and a happy old-age, the freedom to bring up with decency the number of children one chooses, the freedom of opinion, expression, association, the freedom to participate in the management of one's workplace and in the affairs of one's village, town, country . . . " (p. 96). Such freedom can only be assured by socialism, and therefore, in the eyes of the Communists, socialism and freedom are inseparable, socialism "being a superior degree of freedom" (p. 97).

Only as we enter the final section of Marchais' book are we reminded of the chasm separating the PCF's and PS' fundamental beliefs. For it is in discussing the necessity of the French Communists to pursue their own uniquely French road to socialism that Marchais reveals a view of the Soviet model that comes nowhere near to the Socialist view. Do the Socialists say, for example, that the Soviet worker is freer than his French comrade basically because of his greater social and economic security? That the Soviet Union is exemplary in terms of its citizens' democratic participation in all aspects of society because at any one time more than 25 million citizens are permanently associated in work committees of their local soviets; that the right to criticize is alive and well owing to the "what isn't working" columns that fill the Soviet press; that the trade unions in the Soviet Union have extensive rights; that it is normal to have only one party in the Soviet Union because "class oppositions have totally disappeared" (pp. 163 ff.)? Marchais acknowledges that the development of socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe has not been without faults (though he doesn't list them). But, he explains, "the dramatic violations of socialist legality committed by Stalin" were due to the siege mentality of a Soviet people resisting subversive attempts via Western imperialism, Hitlerism, and the Cold War. What counts in the long run is the *general tendency* of socialism, and that tendency is "a constant development and perfection of democracy" (p. 165). Above all, Marchais writes, in the USSR and Eastern Europe "socialism has already accomplished a liberating mission without equal in the world of humanity" (p. 167).

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[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 33–34.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 128.
[43] *Ma part de vérité,* p. 71.
[44] *Le Défi démocratique,* p. 9.
[45] *Ibid.,* p. 11. This is a simple but basic theme, also stressed by Mitterrand in his 1974 presidential campaign.

In effect, Marchais envisages a French model of socialism which differs from that of the Soviet Union *not* because the latter has betrayed the original Marxist vision, but because "the original character of each nation" will determine its own road to socialism. In this regard, it is perhaps surprising that Marchais writes that to think there would be a general uniformity of socialist countries "is to imagine there exists a mechanical link between the means of production and the level of economic development on the one hand, and institutions and mode of life on the other hand. Well, it just isn't like that. The mode of production does determine certain general traits of society, a given level of economic development carries certain very general consequences—but nothing more" (p. 179). Which means either we are all Marxists or no one is.

Such revisionism should not obscure the "unrevisable" role of the PCF within the Socialist-Communist *démocratie avancée* transition period. Marchais sees three conditions for socialism: the collective appropriation of major means of production and exchange, the exercise of political power by the working class, and the activity of a party that acts as the avant-garde of that working class, i.e., the Communist party. Nothing in scientific socialism, writes Marchais, says that the construction of a socialist society is dependent on the presence of one socialist party at the head of the government. Scientific socialism only says that there can be no movement to socialism without a party representing the interests and objectives of the working class. Now the PCF is one of several leftist parties—it contains men and women who are no different from their fellow French citizens, who do not form any particular "countersociety" with all its sinister implications.[46] What the PCF *does* have, and which sets it apart, is a "scientific theory—historical materialism"—which allows the party "to unravel events and to orient its actions with sureness toward the triumph of the working class objectives. It allows the Communists to understand better the situation at hand and in its complexity and originality, it allows them to resist modes and passing illusions."[47]

But this scientific theory demands a key corollary. Here, Marchais conveniently takes up the point about the PCF's real and probably permanent uniqueness—democratic centralism. If internal democratic discussion is the condition for arriving at a correct decision, agrees Marchais, once that decision is taken, discipline of action must take over or the party will lose all efficacy. Internal democracy cannot mean organized factions, because factions are the negation of democracy in that they crystallize positions which "set" opinions and hinder the free confrontation of ideas. Thus, factions result in a search for compromise within the party instead of the restatement of a "scientific" policy. Also, they imply the quest for tactical agreement in order to gain control of the leadership positions.[48] Perhaps this defense of democratic centralism is the most revealing of all Marchais' thoughts. For Marchais, historical materialism means there *is* only one possible answer, and that once that is perceived, the resulting course of action cannot be challenged validly. The Socialists may value extensive debate in order to arrive at what they consider the "best" choice—the Communists need debate only until the "correct" line becomes evident to all.

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[46] Obviously, Marchais wants to refute the common assertion, made for example by Annie Kriegel, that the Communist party members form a "closed society." By way of illustration, he notes that neither he nor Maurice Thorez *ever* raised a clenched fist as a greeting; nor does he personally follow the habit of some younger party members who automatically use the familiar form of address, *tu*, toward all PCF members!

[47] *Le Défi démocratique*, p. 193.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 201–2.

All of this helps explain how Marchais and the PCF perceive the Common Program. They regard the unity efforts over the last ten years as having been *instigated* and *led* by the PCF and claim the PCF finally managed to push a reluctant SFIO in a leftward direction, thereby enabling the signing of the Popular Front agreement. Although the Common Program is only a very preliminary step down the road to socialism, the Communists feel that it has enhanced the PCF's position as "watchdog" on the left and guardian of the will to proceed to socialism, and therefore has strengthened the Communists' predominant hold on the French left. Above all, they feel confident of their strategy since, according to their philosophy, the presence of a Communist party is the *sine qua non* of socialism's success.

Conclusion

Despite varying perceptions by which the PS and PCF each feels it is the dominant partner of the Popular Front alliance and will therefore reap the benefits more fully, what are the facts? In terms of a *program,* the Common Program's completion was contingent on major concessions by the Communists, and the program's thrust and provisions are practically identical to the Socialist program. In terms of *elections,* the Common Program and unity campaigns have unquestionably benefited the Socialists more than the Communists. One of the most important aspects of the 1973 legislative election was the near-equal balance in votes between the PS and PCF. More revealingly, the PS made an incontestable breakthrough in expanding its national voter implantation, while the PCF votes, though stable, tended to become more concentrated into fewer departments.[49] In terms of *presidential politics,* the May 1974 election saw Mitterrand endorsed unanimously by his party, with complete unconditional support (and active campaigning) from his PCF allies. In terms of *governmental power* arising from the possibility at some future date of a Mitterrand victory and a leftist legislative majority, the Communists are remarkably quiescent in their demands. Even after Mitterrand stated that his Prime Minister would be a Socialist but that the Cabinet would "reflect the presidential majority" (i.e., some Ministers from the PSU ranks, which supported his candidacy but not the Common Program), Marchais said that the six or seven ministries destined for the Communists need not include any key ministries. Finally, and perhaps crucially, since all the previous indicators may be determined by it ultimately, *membership strengths* have undergone dramatic changes. The PS continues to grow—from 75,000 in 1969 to 105,000 after the March 1973 legislative elections, to 150,000 at the January 1975 party congress.[50] In contrast, the PCF membership has remained stable in the 1960s and 70s, officially at around 400,000–425,000, although most non-Communist estimates put it as realistically more like 275,000–300,000.

In conclusion, then, by accomplishing virtually everything that the PCF had demanded of the Socialists over the last ten years—the transformation of the SFIO into an "authentic socialist party," union of the left, and a common governmental program—Mitterrand has come to pose a fundamental threat to the PCF's predominance on the left. Indeed, that fact was reflected in the PCF's actions following the September 1974 by-elections in which the Communists lost votes in four of the six constituencies concerned and in which the UGSD gained in all six. Faced with the dilemma of breaking an alliance they had so painstakingly sought (at the risk of alienating many of their voters and of returning to political isolation) or of maintaining the alliance in which the Socialists seemed likely to be the senior partner, the Communists grudgingly continued to accept the latter. Nonetheless, from their October 1974 congress until the spring of 1975, they carried on a vitriolic campaign against their Socialist ally. Ostensibly, the "vigilant" criticism was to prevent the PS from reverting to a social democratic stance by joining with Giscard in a reformist coalition government; for all practical purposes, this line of attack was to quiet internal rank and file discontent with the party's seeming subservience to the Socialists and with its post-May 1974 outstretched hand policy toward the Gaullists and Catholics.

With no scheduled national elections until 1978, the unity of the French left remains intact for the present and a review of the above publications may have helped to clarify why the Socialist-Communist alliance could endure and why the accompanying democratic socialist renaissance could conceivably transform the politics not only of the left but of France herself.

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[49] The number of departments in which the Socialists received less than 10 per cent of the vote *fell* from 9 in 1967 to 1 in 1973—the number in which the Communists received less than 10 per cent *rose* from 7 in 1967 to 10 in 1973. The Socialists' totals rose in 14 of the 21 regions, usually by 4 to 5 per cent—the Communists gained in only 3 of the 21 regions, and by an overall 1 per cent. See *Dossier sur les forces politiques et les élections de mars 1973,* published by *Le Monde,* Paris: 1973, p. 45.

[50] *Le Monde,* February 4, 1975.

BOOK REVIEWS

Welfare Versus Freedom. By Evan Bitsaxis. (Athens, Greece: Olympic Editions, Ltd., 1972. Pp. 383. $10.00.)

Welfare Versus Freedom—written in English—is by a Greek lawyer who also earned a Ph.D. degree in economics. In his varied career, Bitsaxis served in a number of Greek and American government posts, including an internship with the U.S. Bureau of the Budget.

The volume under review surveys classical political theory and modern welfare economics in a way that fosters the reader's understanding of both these fields. And it is Bitsaxis's perceptive review of the scholars in these areas which constitutes the principal value of the book. The primary focus is on Plato, Aristotle, Pigou, Keynes, and Galbraith. Of course, the Greek classics are staples of the political science curriculum, but major works of modern political economists are often neglected. Bitsaxis provides edifying summaries of such works as Pigou's *The Economics of Welfare;* Keynes's monumental *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money;* and many of Galbraith's principal contributions. Shorter—though still penetrating—analyses are supplied for works by such luminaries as Abram Bergson; I.M.D. Little; Pareto; Simon Kuznets; and Anthony Downs. An excellent detailed bibliography on social welfare issues closes Bitsaxis's helpful volume.

Bitsaxis calls for the development of a virtuous society as the critical objective of government. Virtue is defined as incorporating such traditionally accepted values as bravery, straightforwardness, self-sacrifice, and liberty. Classical political theory stressed these same values, but in Bitsaxis's interpretation, the ancients failed to advocate governmental promotion of materialistic well-being through such means as full employment and equitable distribution of income policies. "There is," the author argues, "no 'welfare norm' of help to modern economic theory to be drawn from the stream of Greek Philosophy" (p. 35). Bitsaxis urges that governmental job-creation and income-redistribution norms and policies are essential as conditions precedent to full societal development of the aforementioned virtues.

Bitsaxis insists that governmental adherence to economic science is essential to material well-being. "Proper economic thinking aided by sensible mathematics," the author maintains, ". . . will certainly show us the way to rationality" (p. 327). In this connection, Lord Keynes is presented as the "giant" intellect in economics. His "pump-priming" theory is advocated as a most efficacious full-employment mechanism.

Despite his deferential regard for economic thinking, Bitsaxis often dwells upon the inadequacies of economics, portraying that discipline as being in the developmental stage and thus exhibiting dramatic intelligence gaps. The shortcomings of economics are particularly acute insofar as the nature and control of inflation are concerned. In this area the author tells us ". . . economists only agree that something has to be done. No more" (p. 309).

As it has been for multitudes of political scholars and practitioners alike from time immemorial, the central political question for Bitsaxis is how to balance liberty and order. In short, how much freedom and how much regulation are necessary for the public good? To Bitsaxis, the democratic rule-making mechanism militates against a proper approach to this and the other perplexities of government. Modern democracy, he feels, is excessively guided by narrow-minded and selfish interests. Consequently, an efficient maximization of the general welfare is barred. Such a maximization requires rule by intellectual elites—by scientists. To quote: "The logic which leads to a dentist and not to a plumber, when a problem is a toothache, will drive us sooner or later to a Government of Scientists, for they are closer to the truth whether political, economic, or intellectual" (p. 141).

The advocacy of rule by an intellectual elite is not a new idea in political thought. Yet Bitsaxis fails to demonstrate that the intelligentsia does in fact have those special governmental talents he ascribes to it. Nor does Bitsaxis devote any analysis to that traditional main current in democratic thought alleging that popular direction in political affairs is a foundation of beneficial government.

Compounding these deficiencies is Bitsaxis's complete failure to probe the merits of the pluralist school. This school urges that the public interest is advanced not through rule by an intellectual elite but essentially through the promotion and achievement of compromises among competing particular interests in society, and by deference to the primary dimensions of popular opinion.

Shortcomings aside, *Welfare Versus Freedom* offers public policy students helpful reviews of major contributors to the field of political economy—reviews which would be particularly useful to novitiates seeking a broad survey of the literature. Additionally, the volume entices and prods the reader to grapple with the kaleidoscope of questions associated with such core political issues as the role of government in promoting a virtuous society, and the balancing of liberty with order. Importantly, the author's shortcomings in attacking these core problems challenge the reader to do better.

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The ABC of Communism. By N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky. Introduction by E. H. Carr. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1969. Pp. 481. $1.75.)

The ABC of Communism. By N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky. Introduction by Sidney Heitman. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1966. Pp. 422. $2.95.)

Imperialism and World Economy. By Nikolai Bukharin. Introduction by V. I. Lenin. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966. Pp. 173. $9.50.)

Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology. By Nikolai Bukharin. Introduction by Alfred G. Meyer. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1969. Pp. 320. $3.25.)

For many years after his execution, Nikolai Bukharin was remembered almost only as the chief defendant in the notorious Moscow Purge Trial of 1938. The result was to obscure his central and representative role as a Soviet founding father, and to distort an important era in Soviet history.

Until his political defeat by Stalin in 1929, Bukharin was the acknowledged official theorist of Russian Bolshevism and the international communist movement. More important, after Lenin's death in 1924, Bukharin became co-leader of the ruling Soviet party and the leading representative of a non-Stalinist form of Soviet development. To understand the nature and political strength of his domestic programs is to recognize as myth, promoted by Stalin and Trotsky alike, the commonplace notion that the factional struggles and debates of the 1920s revolved around a choice between Stalinism and Trotskyism. As most Bolsheviks, including Stalin, understood, the real alternative to Stalinism in "building socialism" was the gradualist policies originating with Lenin's NEP in 1921 and associated later with the party's Bukharinist wing. Based on political moderation, a combination of plan and market, and evolutionary development, they are policies revived in recent years by anti-Stalinist reformers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

These three reprints are only part of a current revival of Bukharin's publications. (Two of his major works have recently appeared for the first time in English translation: *The Economics of the Transformation Period* [New York: Bergman Publishers, 1971], a famous theoretical treatment of the party's policies during the Russian civil war of 1918–1921; and *Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital* [New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972], a critique of Rosa Luxemburg's theory. Basic statements of his ideas on Soviet development in the 1920s, notably *Put' k sotsializmu* [*The Road to Socialism*] and *Politicheskoe zaveshchanie Lenina* [*Lenin's Political Testament*], await translation.) They do not relate directly to his programmatic ideas of the 1920s, but they do indicate the theoretical work and reputation that preceded and enhanced his political role during that crucial decade. Though different in nature and purpose, the three books, and especially *The ABC of Communism and Historical Materialism,* became his most widely read and translated works. Together they formed the doctrinal education of a whole generation of Soviet and foreign Communists and were largely responsible for Bukharin's initial fame as the ideological spokesman of the Bolshevik revolution.

The ABC, however, should not be read as a specifically Bukharinist document. Written in 1919 with Evgenii Preobrazhenskii, another young Bolshevik leader and later Bukharin's main intellectual opponent in the debates of the 1920s, it was designed as a popular exposition of the party's newly adopted program, as "an elementary textbook of communist knowledge" accessible to "every worker and peasant," rather than as an original contribution to Marxist thought. The text follows that of the party program, detailing each point, omitting no important subject from the rise and collapse of capitalism to the situation in Soviet Russia and the future socialist organization of all aspects of social life. Comprehensive and plainly written, the book was a great success, quickly becoming a party canon and the most famous handbook of pre-Stalinist Bolshevism.

What gave *The ABC* its extraordinary appeal, and recommends it even today, is its encyclopedic chronicling of the party's utopian expectations and militant optimism during the heady civil war years. Fighting for survival against White and foreign armies, the Bolsheviks had improvised a set of extremist policies known ambiguously as "war communism," a hopeless tangle of military expediency and ideological fervor. By 1919 no one could separate the two elements, and indeed historians still debate which predominated. Though shortly outdated by events, *The ABC* speaks in the voice of this "heroic period" in the revolution, and thus provides scholars and students today with a vivid sense of Bolshevik thinking during those critical and formative years. Both of these new editions include the 1919 program as well as useful scholarly introductions, one by Sidney Heitman, an expert on Bukharin, the other by E. H. Carr, whose wide-ranging essay has the additional virtue of dispelling the charge that the great British historian lacks sympathy for utopian and losing causes in history.

While *Imperialism and World Economy* and *Historical Materialism* also became orthodox texts, they were more original and distinctly Bukharinist achievements. *Imperialism* retains its interest for two reasons. Written in 1915, it presented the first systematic theory of neocapialism and imperialism by a Bolshevik, developing the now famous formulation—monopoly capitalism leads to imperialism, imperialism to war, and war to proletarian revolution—a year before its enshrinement in Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.* Lenin's debt to Bukharin's book is clear, as is Bukharin's important role in the shaping of Communist ideology on the eve of the Russian revolution. (There is an even more striking relationship between Bukharin's 1915–16 writings on the state and Lenin's *State and Revolution,* written in 1917). If nothing else, this reminds us that "Leninist theory" was in fact the product of several minds.

Equally interesting, however, is the subtle but significant way Bukharin's conception of neocapitalism differed from Lenin's. Influenced by Rudolf Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (1910), and to a greater degree than Lenin, Bukharin portrayed national monopoly capitalism, or "state capitalism," as a system that through monopolization and trustification had virtually overcome the internal crises analyzed by Marx as the sources of socialist revolution. In *Imperialism,* and more explicitly later, Bukharin suggested that only external pressures of international war could now bring about revolutionary breakdowns in advanced capitalist systems. His innovative treatment of capitalism's internal reorganization and the new interventionist role of the modern state place him early and eminently among the disparate theorists, from Hilferding to Galbraith, who have perceived, with Marxist alarm or liberal relief, the rise of "organized capitalism" since Marx. During the wartime years of 1915–16, Bukharin's conception remained a little-noted theoretical difference between him and Lenin. But in 1928–29 it became a major issue in the fateful struggle between Stalinists and Bukharinists over Comintern policy, part of Bukharin's opposition to Stalin's claim that Western capitalism was on the verge of Communist revolution.

Historical Materialism was Bukharin's most "academic" book. Published in 1921, it was intended to serve three related purposes. One was to provide a popular exposition of Marxist social theory. Done systematically and with some flair, this gave *Historical Materialism* its great popularity, and, as Alfred G. Meyer points out in his perceptive introduction, makes it "an important landmark" between Engels's *Anti-Dühring* and the present-day Soviet compendium, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.* Bukharin's second and third purposes worked against this more conventional one: he wanted to answer Marx's most formidable critics, especially those representing the emerging schools of modern sociology, and to make his own original contribution to Marxist social theory.

As Seymour Martin Lipset has observed, *Historical Materialism* "represents the one sophisticated effort by a major Marxist to come to terms with the emerging body of sociological theory and research." (Introduction to Robert Michels, *Political Parties* [New York: Free Press, 1962], p. 27, n. 22.) Because he was an authentic "seeking Marxist," *Historical Materialism* shows also the influence on Bukharin of Marx's intellectual rivals—among them, Durkheim, Pareto, Weber, and Michels. Not the least evidence for this is suggested by the subtitle. In presenting historical materialism as a "system of sociology," Bukharin went against a substantial antisociological bias in earlier Marxist thought and at the same time established in Soviet thought a counterpoint to the subsequent Stalinist tradition, which proscribed the whole discipline of sociology for a quarter of a century.

His original contribution grew out of this effort to come to grips with modern sociology. To purge Marxism of what he regarded as its lingering, unscientific Hegelianism, Bukharin recast the concept of dialectics and social change in terms of a mechanical equilibrium model of society. His mechanism and reinterpretation of the Hegelian triad as equilibrium theory (original equilibrium; disturbance of equilibrium; re-establishment of equilibrium on a new basis) made *Historical Materialism* highly influential and controversial. And despite its crudities and inconsistencies, it remains an interesting chapter in contemporary social thought, relevant, for example, to ongoing disputes among social theorists and to the contention that the "choice of an equilibrium model logically precludes a revolutionary ethic. . . ." (Cynthia Eagle Russett, *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966] p. 53.)

That these and other of Bukharin's writings are being reprinted in translation is testimony to their importance as historical documents and chapters in the history of Marxist ideas. That they are still proscribed in the Soviet Union is further evidence of the present leadership's profound conservatism and disdain for its own revolutionary and intellectual heritage.

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Les Origines du Gauchisme. By Richard Gombin. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971. Pp. 186. 6F.)

The social upheaval in France of May-June, 1968, when the French Communist Party was seriously outflanked on its left for the first time, produced considerable interest in those extreme left-wing radicals who are called *gauchistes.* Several books on the far left have been published recently, among them this book by Richard Gombin, a researcher at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Gombin's book is an effort to describe the intellectual origins of the ideas that Gombin believes are central to the thinking of the people and groups who constitute the far left in France. The book treats in brief compass criticisms of the bureaucratic character of the Soviet Union, particularly those set forth during the 1950s in the review *Socialisme ou Barbarie;* revisions of Marxism proposed in the review *Arguments,* also during the 1950s; Henri Lefebvre's critique of daily life, which appears to have been adopted by the *Internationale situationniste* group and diffused as a form of cultural revolt; and the emphasis on *autogestion* by means of councils. (When employed in the context of industrial organization, *autogestion* means workers' control; when employed in a more general sense, as it often is by the far left, it is best translated as participatory democracy.) In a final chapter, Gombin discusses those ideas in the light of the confrontation politics of the late 1960s and admits that no clear relationships between those ideas and the shock tactics of that period have been established.

Gombin defines the *gauchistes* as "that fraction of the revolutionary movement which offers, or wants to offer, a radical alternative to marxism-leninism as a theory of the working-class movement and its development" (p. 18). The definition is highly restrictive and eliminates a large portion of the far left, including the *Parti socialiste unifié* (PSU), which is excluded because it combines revolutionary aspirations with reformism, as well as various dissident communist groups such as the Trotskyists and the Maoists. Gombin excludes the dissident communists because they operate within the marxist-leninist tradition as opposed to trying to replace it; "they offer an alternative," he says, "but an alternative to the direction of the party and not to marxism-leninism" (p. 19). That distinction seems strained and not fully consistent with the book. Gombin refers to Lukacs and Lefebvre as fountainheads of *gauchisme,* but it is doubtful that they were any less interested in influencing the conduct of communist parties than was Trotsky, whose followers Gombin does not count as *gauchistes,* although he believes that Trotsky provided *gauchisme* with "its point of attack: the Soviet bureaucracy" (p. 36).

Gombin emphasizes the more obscure, esoteric sources of *gauchisme* over the broad, historically evident currents of thought to which its main tenets, particularly *autogestion* in the form of workers' control, are related. There is much in the thought and behavior of the people on the far left that calls to mind Proudhon (minus his puritanism and contempt for women) and revolutionary syndicalism, which dominated the early years of the French working-class movement. Gombin mentions Proudhon in passing, and he refers briefly to the similarities between certain *gauchiste* themes and revolutionary syndicalism, but he questions whether the latter may be regarded as a source of *gauchisme* because there is no clear indication of how that tradition might have been passed on to contemporary actors. The question of how historical traditions are transmitted is perfectly legitimate, and in the case of revolutionary syndicalism, the answer is most likely to be found in the genealogy and sociometry of the leaders of the French trade union movement. But the question applies equally to some of the works which Gombin does treat as sources of *gauchisme.* How many *gauchistes* have heard of Anton Pannekoek, to whom Gombin attributes central importance in the development of the notion that workers' control should be exercised through councils?

The main elements of *gauchisme* that emerge from this book are alienation, adopted from the early writings of Marx and employed as a critical tool, and *autogestion,* which is never described in concrete institutional terms but which is proposed as a general solution to the problems of social and political organization. Gombin writes sympathetically and almost wholly uncritically about this current of thought, which seeks to put everything into question all at once, but never doubts its own concepts.

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The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis. By Z. A. Jordan. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 490. $13.45.)

Professor Jordan's polemic is aimed against the twin pillars of the edifice of Marxist theory: (i) the science of historical materialism (HM) and (ii) the philosophy of dialectical materialism (DM), the epistemological metatheory of the science. He conducts the polemic via a two-pronged attack:

(1) He rejects the view that a monolithic doctrine can be extracted from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. He splits the monolith by displaying theoretical ruptures, first between Marx and Engels, second between Marx-Engels and Lenin-Stalin (the latter rupture being uneasily bridged by Plekhanov). The claim here is that since Marx was not a philosophical materialist, he could not have been the father of the philosophical doctrine of DM; and since Marx had no coherent theory of history, if he was the father of HM, then HM too is incoherent.

(2) He rejects DM (now orphaned) on numerous grounds, most importantly because it allegedly infringes Popper's principle that a theory must be refutable if it is not to be mere metaphysics.

The following two arguments, from the first prong of the attack, are representative of the general level of the polemic:

(a) "Anthropological naturalism" (pp. 16–64). Jordan distinguishes materialism from naturalism. According to him, *anthropological naturalism* asserts "the priority of external nature" but abolishes the distinction between man and nature. From this arises the phenomenological view that the concept of nature is "a social and historical concept," i.e., the "social construction of reality." He defines *materialism* in reductivist terms: in history it "identifies the absolutely primary factor of history with some extraneous physical factor"; in social science it claims that "every sociological statement is logically reducible to a conjunction of psychological statements which themselves are reducible to statements about physiological or chemico-physical states of the human organism" (p. 54). Having thus characterized the two positions, he concludes that since Marx did not maintain the latter, and since the former can be extracted from certain of his texts, Marx was an anthropological naturalist, not a materialist. The beauty of this conclusion for Jordan is that it effectively immunizes Marx's theory from having any effect on historical or sociological explanation, since anthropological naturalism is essentially a noncausal, nonscientific ideology. But the conclusion does not in fact follow from the premisses presented, because anthropological naturalism is not the only alternative to reductive materialism to be found in Marx's texts. On the contrary, his mature texts provide the elements of a theory different from either reductive materialism or anthropological naturalism, namely the theory of determination by the mode of production. If by semantic fiat Jordan forbids us to call this theory materialism, nothing is lost (a rose by any other name . . .). The important principle is that we should not be driven into the innocuous vacuity of naturalism for fear of the unacceptable consequences of reductivism. (Note the innocent contempt for periodization of Marx's works, as Jordan extracts "Marx's philosophy" from selected passages of the *1844 Manuscripts, The German Ideology* and *Capital* I.7.)

(b) Marx and history (pp. 297–318). Here Jordan returns to the central concept of HM, determination by the mode of production. He distinguishes two theories within Marx's writings, the one "methodological," the other "metaphysical."

The *methodological* theory, according to Jordan, is not concerned with the ontological relationship of base to superstructure, but rather with "the principle of evolution and conformity of human behaviour to natural laws of coexistence and succession." Its basic assumption is that men's behavior and ideologies correspond to their material production and more specifically that ideological domination corresponds to economico-political domination. Posed in such general terms the theory is clearly untestable. Yet when in his political texts Marx makes the theory more specific, by demonstrating connections between the economic, political and ideological levels as reflected in the political class struggle, Jordan deems these developments of the theory illegitimate, and thus condemns the theory to the realm of untestable non-science (pp. 305–6). But even if Marx had appeared to produce a testable theory, Jordan could have trumped his card: "If Marx believed that his theory of history could be validated by testing the conclusions derived from it, as a hypothesis of natural science is tested, he was surely on the wrong track; it is clear today that no historical hypothesis can be validated in this way" (p. 305). Since Jordan apparently identifies scientific method with the hypothetico-deductive method (e.g., pp. 196, 200, 316), it follows that history for him is not a science, indeed that it cannot yield knowledge in the normal sense at all: "Marx held the naive belief, common at the time [*sic*] . . . that one and only one point of view can truly fit historical facts . . ." (p. 316).

The *metaphysical* theory (Jordan's name for the theory which causally relates base to superstructure) is rejected, first, because it cannot be validated, and second, because it employs theoretical entities (productive forces and productive relations) which are unreal: ". . . distinguishable from each other in thought only, not in fact . . . The construct of productive forces has a connotation but no denotation" (p. 310). This latter objection has now been largely overcome by E. Balibar, G. A. Cohen, and others, in their distinction between economic capacities and juridical rights and powers. To Jordan's statement: ". . . the modern supporters of the Marxian theories should be able to answer this objection" (p. 310), the answer is that Balibar already had in 1965. The first objection, concerning validation, still stands in need of a full theoretical reply, but one can be sure in advance, from the arguments cited above, that Jordan will rule out any such attempts as illegitimate. He has produced the perfectly self-validating prediction.

In this "philosophical and sociological analysis," philosophy is used to attack the logical structure of the theories, and sociology to explain how such illogical systems came to be imposed. But the sociological component is lightweight, consisting of the single reductivist notion of "socio-centric cosmology." The DM of Plekhanov, Lenin and Stalin is explained as a crude anthropomorphism which "first ascribes certain distinctively social attributes . . . to the universe, and having construed it as a socio-cosmic structure, derives from the order of the universe the basic characteristics of human society" (p. 206). This account has a certain intuitive appeal but lacks serious theoretical credentials. Jordan finds the real (?) origin and point of return of the ideological system in "a universe brimming over with strife, conflict and contradictions," which "offers self-evident advantages for a social and political theory based on the concept of class-antagonism": this "was the case with Plekhanov and continues to be so in the Soviet philosophy of today" (p. 205). The implications of the "explanation" seem to be first that there is no class-antagonism in capitalist countries since DM is not dominant in them, and second that the situation facing Plekhanov was identical, in relevant respects, with that facing Soviet philosophers today. Since these conclusions are evidently false, the "explanation" must be abandoned or radically modified, otherwise Jordan's own comment applies: "A theory that does not take any risk of being refuted has no scientific content" (p. 196). (In fact the first steps towards relating ideological developments under Stalinism to the class struggle have been made by N. Poulantzas in *Fascisme et Dictature,* a work firmly based on the fundamental concepts of HM.)

The book is excellently documented; the logical distinctions are lucid and many of the refutations of specific theses are more elegant than those of earlier critiques. But the polemic as a whole is profoundly ambivalent, reflecting the ambivalence of the author's own theoretical stance. His attitude towards history is totally skeptical, involving epistemological relativism and the assumption that history cannot fulfill the criteria of scientific discourse (pp. 308, 316). Yet elsewhere he champions the scientificity of history when he denounces the imposition of extraneous "methodological principles upon the natural, social and historical sciences" (p. 395). He uses relativism to exclude the very possibility of HM; he uses Popper's falsificationism to exclude DM and also to cope with the more specific theses of HM. Yet relativism and falsificationism are incompatible. Perhaps the ambivalences all stem from the curious conception of philosophy presented on p. 269: "Philosophy in the Socratic sense is a way of life characterized by devotion to truth and love of wisdom. Philosophy in a more pedestrian sense means submission to an intellectual discipline, the acceptance of logical rules and factual evidence, which enable others to ask questions. . . ." These criteria are designed to exclude Stalin from the class of philosophers, which they succeed in doing. But they fail to mark off philosophy from any other rigorous intellectual practice. The formulation is entirely empty and symbolizes the lack of any coherent account of the role of the epistemologist in political theory. Without such an account, this kind of *philosophical* polemic is doomed to failure.

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Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History. By Allen C. Kelley, Jeffrey G. Williamson and Russell J. Cheetham. (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1972. Pp. 339. $12.50.)

This volume represents a stimulating attempt to review some of the major theories of dualistic development, to present the authors' (henceforth K-W-C) own effort, and to evaluate it by reference to the Japanese historical experience. Since Japan represents one of the few available historical laboratories for an examination of competitive development theories claiming relevance to the contemporary developing world, the effort made in this volume is an entirely reasonable one, meriting the applause of both theorists and policy makers. Essentially three explanatory models are featured: the Fei-Ranis classical dualistic model, the Jorgenson neoclassical dualistic model, and K-W-C's own neoclassical dualistic model. Not surprisingly, their model wins hands down, Jorgenson places second, and Fei-Ranis is lucky to show. It is, nevertheless, more in a spirit of sorrow than wounded pride that I enter my reservations with respect to the present volume.

One critical comment of interest to the general reader is that the effort to survey the relevant development literature is, at one and the same time, too ambitious and not ambitious enough. Many bases are touched—Uzawa models, Chenery's work, uncertainty, consumption models—but mainly once over lightly, with neither the full scope of these contributions nor their relevance to the question at hand here fully demonstrated. While the specialist may find this only mildly irritating, it will antagonize those readers who may be looking for a less cavalier treatment of at least some of the important related discussions of dualistic growth and development.

But the main focus of this volume, on which it has to be judged, is the presentation of the K-W-C model and its performance in contrast to the two competitive entries. I found the summaries of the Jorgenson and Fei-Ranis attempts to model dualism both illuminating and essentially fair. Aside from the basic question of what precisely is meant by "dualism" in the neoclassical case (surely the wage-marginal product relationship on p. 37 was intended to be reversed), I have no particular quarrel with their bare-bones description of the two competitive models. The finding of Marglin and Dixit that both a classical and a neoclassical model of the Jorgenson type can be seen as consistent with the Japanese historical record—depending on the specific production function assumptions, etc. made—are quoted approvingly, (which should help put that particular phase of the *Methodenstreit* to rest). But since the volume claims to present a superior version of the neoclassical model in terms both of theoretical structure and of a superior fit to the historical Japanese experience, it is well to examine that claim.

The K-W-C view of the world is basically that full employment is observed—to which they are forced to add the assumption that the equilibrium wage is always in excess of the caloric minimum—a convenient but not necessarily accurate piece of neoclassical baggage (think of Java or Bangladesh). It is true (p. 41) that, in a dynamic context (i.e., when agricultural productivity is rising), changes in the wage rather than the applicability of the marginal productivity theory vs. classical/institutional theories are relevant. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to demonstrate the superiority of both the building blocks and the descriptive powers of their model.

First, the model itself differs in three major ways from the Jorgenson and Fei-Ranis versions, that is, capital instead of land is considered the main cooperating factor in the agricultural sector of the dualistic economy. Second, the rule of consumer demand is brought in explicitly through the stipulation of dualistic demand conditions. Third, special types of technology change are assumed for the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. There is very little empirical defense of this "revisionism" concerning the building blocks. For instance, with respect to the introduction of capital into the agricultural production function, K-W-C have surely committed a worse crime by omitting land (see the work of Ohkawa and Rosovsky). I believe the dualistic demand conditions to be overspecified—a somewhat technical point. Moreover, since the specific (factor-augmenting) type of technological change assumed is not defended in terms of any extra-model inductive evidence, one suspects it was no accident that such assumptions were necessary to generate the needed (and unusual) constant wage pattern in a neoclassical world.

So much for the machinery. Other questions arise when the Japanese data are fed into it. Given initial conditions based on an amalgam of contemporary developing country parameters, the model is then permitted to generate such common indices of growth as labor productivity, savings rates, sectoral employment, output distribution, etc. which are then compared to the actual historical values. The correspondence is found to be "close," which naturally encourages the authors to enshrine their model as superior.

The issue of "closeness of fit" is difficult but can be addressed in at least two ways: first, while I do not wish to dispute the authors' judgment, it is not clear by what standards an unfavorable verdict would have been rendered (e.g., even when they undertake a nontrivial shift from an equilibrium to a disequilibrium version of their model, the fit remains "good"). Second, I believe that a very large number of sensible competitive models would give a "close" approximation to the stylized facts of Japanese economic history, just as a variety of modern growth models have been harnessed to "explain" the stylized facts of the advanced economy. Models are indeed "a dime a dozen" —and an inventive mind can find a substantial number of combinations of assumptions on the production function, on technology, on factor growth rates, etc. to yield any "desired" outcome. What is less easy and more costly is the defense of a particular model in terms of the underlying richness of the behavioral assumptions made. And it is here that we unfortunately find the K-W-C candidate wanting, in spite of the claims made for it.

In the final analysis, a volume of this kind must be judged in terms of the new ground it breaks. Unfortunately, there is relatively little to point to here. The hitherto neglected open economy dimension, involving trade, technology transfer and foreign capital, which is certainly of central importance to an explanation of dualism in the Japanese case, remains unaddressed and unresolved. No attempt is made to break down the Japanese historical record into analytically meaningful subphases such as a classical period followed by a neoclassical and/or a land-based phase followed by unskilled labor-based growth phase. The demographic dimension is treated conventionally, i.e., exogenously, a special disappointment given the unusual expertise of the authors in this field. All in all, the present authors must be applauded for presenting an interesting, if highly selective and incomplete, survey of the current literature on the very important subject of economic dualism; they fall short in their claims with respect to the presentation of a superior paradigm; I join them in the call for more work, including more of their own perceptive contributions.

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The Pure Theory of Law. By Hans Kelsen. Translated by Max Knight from *Reine Rechtslehre,* 2nd edition, 1960. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. First published 1967. Pp. 356. $3.75, paper.)

What is Justice: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science. By Hans Kelsen. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. First published 1957. Pp. 397. $16.00.)

These reprints of two of the most celebrated works of the late Professor Hans Kelsen will constitute a valuable addition to the library of any student of legal or political theory. *The Pure Theory of Law* was the last full-length account given by Kelsen of the famous positivistic legal theory with which his name has been associated for more than half a century. Although the principal features of the theory remained unchanged throughout the many restatements of it made by Kelsen, there were important topics on which he changed his mind from time to time. *What is Justice* is a collection of essays in which the conclusions of his theory of law, and the theory of norms upon which it is based, are applied to a variety of topics within the traditional arena of political philosophy—justice, natural law, absolutism and relativism, coercion, obedience, "normative" and "scientific" judgments. In *What is Justice,* however, the version of his theory which is applied is not that contained in *The Pure Theory of Law,* but that appearing in an earlier work by Kelsen—*General Theory of Law and State, 1945.*

There are important differences between these versions of the theory. For example, in *General Theory of Law and State* and in *What is Justice,* Kelsen is at pains to repudiate the imperative theory of law: we do not need the concept of the individual human will in order to understand the nature of legal rules (norms). But in *The Pure Theory of Law,* although the identification of "norm" with "command" is still denied, yet we are told that every norm is the content of an act of will.

"It is incorrect, therefore, to characterize norms in general, and legal norms in particular, as the "will" or the "command" of the legislator or state, if by "will" or "command" a psychological act of will is meant. The norm is the *meaning* of an act of will, not the act of will" (*Pure Theory of Law,* p. 10).

Nor can *The Pure Theory of Law* necessarily be taken to represent Kelsen's last word on his own theory. He apparently approved this translation of a work in German published in 1960, but it would be bold to affirm that this approval entails a repudiation of anything published since 1960 in which Kelsen expresses opinions inconsistent with those of *The Pure Theory of Law.* For example, in an essay published in 1962, he asserts that which is denied in his other writings, namely, that it is possible for a legal scientist to describe two contradictory but simultaneously valid norms as parts of one and the same legal system ("Derogation," in *Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound,* R. Newman, ed.). For a detailed bibliography of the works of Kelsen published in English, see *Essays in Honor of Hans Kelsen* (*California Law Review* ed., 1971).

The central contention of Kelsen's pure theory is that "law" is to be understood as a system ("order") of abstract, normative propositions ("norms"). Law cannot be identified with any selection of datable occurrences in social life, nor with any set of statements of fact recording or predicting such occurrences. The philosophical proof for this contention is to be found by examining categorical, descriptive statements about the law. Statements conveying information about the law cannot be transmuted, without loss of meaning, into statements about past, present or future events. If I visit your town and ask you whether parking is permitted in the main square on a Saturday afternoon, you may tell me that it's illegal. You have not committed yourself to predicting that it is more or less likely that, if I do park, my car will be towed away or I will be fined. You may indeed go on to say: "Actually, the regulations are seldom enforced"; or: "The police can always be bribed." You have only committed yourself to the assertion that the normative proposition—"parking is prohibited in place X on Saturday afternoons"—is one which forms part of the present law of the country (having its origin in a legislative source authorized, ultimately, by the constitution of the country, and not so far having been repealed).

This view seems so obviously correct that it might be regarded as trite, were it not for the wealth of legal literature in which it has been denied. In this literature, the justifiable skepticism engendered by the many occasions on which eminent lawyers and judges express decided, but contradictory, views as to what the law requires, has been generalized into the manifestly false proposition that it is never possible to describe the law—in the sense of an abstract rule—about anything. (See, e.g., J. Frank: *Law and the Modern Mind.*) According to such skeptics, "law" *ought* to be equated with what judges and other officials do, or with statements describing or predicting what they do. It seems to be conceded, however, that, as things are, lawyers speak in terms of Kelsenian "law"; albeit they do this—so the argument runs—only as part of the gigantic social hoax, that knowable rules of law can ever clearly indicate what officials ought to do. Even from the standpoint of extreme skepticism, therefore, the "law" which Kelsen analyzes is the "law" which legal science *purports* to describe.

The motivation of this skepticism is to shift the center of legal interest away from rules to the social environment which produces and uses them. It is questionable whether this aim is furthered by denying that the nature of law is what Kelsen said it was. We must know what "law" is if we are to assess its effects on society: "The function of the legal norm for the sociology of law is to designate its own particular object, and lift it out of the whole of social events. To this extent, sociological jurisprudence presupposes normative jurisprudence" (*What is Justice,* p. 270).

One of Kelsen's principal failings was that he did not appreciate that lawyers ("legal scientists") may have professional information to give even where they cannot make categoric statements about the legality or illegality of conduct. Owing to the absence of binding precedent and legislation directly bearing on a topic, it may not be possible to point to a "valid norm"; yet it may be possible to make informed guesses as to the norms which the superior courts will, retrospectively, create. The guesses will be informed by pointing to those free-floating principles and policies embedded in legislative source materials which the courts are known to use as triggers for their legislative choices. (Cf. R. M. Dworkin 35 U. Chi. L. R. 14 [1967].)

Kelsen's central contention is marred by his attempt to pray in aid of it the moral philosophical cleavage between *is* and *ought.* No such support is needed; and whereas one regularly meets descriptive statements expressed in terms of "legal" or "illegal," "descriptive ought-statements" are unfamiliar and conceptually odd.

This is typical of a tension in Kelsen's writings between sensible insights (worthy of logical exegesis), and exotic pieces of philosophizing. It can be seen in his treatment of legal theory's oldest trip-wire—the concept of validity, and in his most famous invention—the "basic norm" ("grundnorm").

Kelsen investigates the way in which legal norms may be made the basis of relative value judgments. That they are so used is undoubtedly true: the values of legality and constitutionality form part of the artillery of political controversy, and it is because these values are role-values for officials that even a sociology of law with an institutional focus must presuppose the Kelsenian concept of law. Yet Kelsen—as a consequence of his neo-Kantian epistemology—is intoxicated with the idea that "valid" is an absolute quality, the equivalent for norms of "true" in the case of factual propositions; and this leads him to assert that conflicting legal and moral norms cannot both be valid. However, he revised this view in subsequent works; *vide* his *Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy* (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973).

Kelsen investigates the essential presupposition which must underlie any attempt to describe the law. He finds it in the sources existing in a historical constitution, or in customary practices, which are necessarily assumed to be the only ultimate sources from which valid legal norms can be derived. Legal science differs from ethics by its presupposition of a finite list of sources, hierarchically arranged; and by the fact that its utility depends on the sources it presupposes being those which are successfully used in any territory. These truths Kelsen expounds picturesquely, when he speaks of the presupposition of a (by and large effective) basic norm. This single concept has produced more literature about Kelsen than anything else he wrote, and his view that the basic norm changes when there is a revolution has been used by judges in Pakistan, Uganda and Rhodesia to justify their change of allegiance. (I have discussed these "revolution" cases in 29 C. L. J. 103 [1971].)

The term "pure," which Kelsen applies to his theory of law, can also mislead. It has a suggestion of superiority. By it, however, Kelsen merely intends to demarcate analytical jurisprudence, which must take as its context only the normative order which is the subject-matter of descriptive legal science, from moral or political evaluations, or sociological inquiries, which may have other contexts. To this end he attempts to distinguish the sense which concepts like duty, right, property, sanction, state, person and so on, have within the law from any sense given to them by other disciplines.

The contribution of analytical jurisprudence to legal and political thought may be valued high or low. As an exponent of it, no name has a wider international reputation than Kelsen's, and deservedly so.

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Means and Goals of Political Decentralization. By Lennart Lundquist. (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1972. Lund Political Studies, 12. Pp. 191. SK. 30.)

This doctoral thesis from the University of Lund in Sweden is an attempt first to analyze and define verbally the concept of decentralization and its elements, and then to apply these notions and definitions to a "content analysis" of the Swedish debate in the 1850s, and again in the 1960s, about the greater centralization or decentralization of municipal governments in regard to their structure and their tasks.

In the first, conceptual part of the work, Lundquist begins with David Easton's definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of values and applies it to the processes of political and administrative control. He then distinguishes several main stages of "the control process": 1. goal formulation; 2. prognosis about effectiveness of means and changes in the situation; 3. decision; 4. "steering" as the process by which the decision is transmitted to an "implementer"; 5. implementation by the implementer through the administrative process; 6. review, both as to the correctness of the manner of implementation and to the attainment of the outcome intended by the decision maker; and, though with less emphasis, 7. re-steering for correction.

Lundquist pays particular attention to the steering of the implementation process by the decision-making authority. Steering can be direct, through issuing specific orders and general rules, or indirect, through controlling the recruitment of personnel for the implementing agency, determining the organizational form of that agency, controlling its financial resources—or the flow of information to it—or some combination of these methods.

In terms of scale and territory, Lundquist distinguishes the "society," which corresponds to an entire country with its "political system" at that national level from its "political subsystem" of district or local government and politics.

From these distinctions, Lundquist derives his two concepts of "deconcentration" and "decentralization." In cases of concentration, he says, decisions are made and implemented centrally, at the level of the entire society and its national political system, whereas, conversely, in cases of deconcentration, decisions are still made centrally, but their implementation is dispersed and delegated to local agencies of the subsocieties of the central political system.

Genuine decentralization then differs from mere deconcentration in that the agencies at the subsociety level are primarily directed by, and responsible to, the political subsystem of that subsociety. Decisions here are made locally, their implementation being subject primarily to local steering, supervision, and review.

A fourth analytic chapter offers an overview of verbal "analysis categories" for the subsequent content analyses. These categories seem generally well conceived and clearly presented.

The next chapter presents a content analysis of the decentralization debate of the 1850s, based on about 1500 pages of Riksdag proceedings and about 200 press articles of the period. The analysis endeavors to show the distribution of themes, values, and schools of thought. The treatment is mainly qualitative; only one chart (Fig. 15, p. 135) indicates roughly the quantitative distribution of themes. The findings are modest.

In his sixth chapter, Lundquist identifies a merger school which stresses the need for greater resources and capabilities for local government. These are to be attained by the voluntary merging of several small, rural communities into larger units of local government, more fit to cope with a variety of emerging problems.

A second though smaller group of spokesmen is identified by Lundquist as the transfer school since it stresses the possible transfer of additional functions to the communes. This school doubts the general efficacy of mergers. Rather, it stresses the goal of close contacts between local government and the population, to be fostered through small communes and spatial proximity to those whom they are to serve.

A third, still smaller group is identified by Lundquist as the localization school which proposes mainly the transfer of substantial resources from the state to the communes, so as to compensate them for their reduced autonomous tax base and for the increased services required of them.

The author concludes that the debate in the 1850s was mainly concerned with sketching a single "ideal type" of decentralization in order to present demands for greater decentralization and popular participation against the then highly centralized Swedish government. In the 1960s, however, these general goals had become part of the prevailing political consensus, so that the debate now had to hinge upon the best methods for preserving and enhancing these agreed-on values. In this change, Lundquist sees a shift from a normative to an instrumental emphasis which he interprets as evidence for a larger debate on the alleged "death of ideology" in recent politics.

Lundquist's conceptual analysis is stimulating and potentially useful. It refers to a large body of professional literature, including much American writing, but this literature is often used with very limited understanding. As the author frankly admits, he has produced a taxonomy; he has done so with a taxonomist's mind, reminding us of Linnaeus rather than of Darwin. His approach most often remains close to the surface. As a model, it lacks dynamics; as description, its sense of history and politics is weak. It is innocent of mathematics, either as a technique or as a way of thinking. Some of the works Lundquist cites include mathematical analyses, but there is no evidence that he understands them.

His claim to have taken the first step toward a theory of decentralization is questionable. His description of the variables he proposes is not of the precision necessary for stating statistically testable hypotheses or making rigorous deductions. The logic of many arguments is quite loose. There is much opinion and speculation, and assumptions are not always clearly distinguished from conclusions. His conclusions are not easily verifiable by other analysts.

Despite these substantial weaknesses, Lundquist has done a prodigious amount of work. His rich compilation of ideas, problems, and evidence from public policy debates is likely to stimulate and help theorists to proceed with theory building. In a field that has long suffered from vagueness and neglect, he has made a worthwhile contribution.

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The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848. Edited by Francis E. Mineka. Introduction by F. A. Hayek. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. 2 volumes. Pp. xxvii, 784. $25.00.)

The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849–1873. Edited by Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. 4 volumes. Pp. xlvii, 2083. $95.00.)

(*Note:* These two collections form volumes 12–17 of the *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,* edited by J. M. Robson and others.)

Liberalism, individualism, utilitarianism—these are among the labels often used to describe John Stuart Mill's philosophic position. Yet it is awkward to classify him in this way, for he qualifies the views that seem to justify these labels and displays marked ambivalence with regard to them. Indeed, ambivalence is one of his distinguishing characteristics. He finds merit on both sides of many arguments. Of course he is liberal, yet he searches for a rationale for authority. He thinks of himself as a radical, yet he sometimes appears to be quite conservative. He is a utilitarian, yet sharply criticizes his Benthamite inheritance. He defends laissez-faire principles, but Sidney Webb was persuaded that had he lived another decade he would have been a Fabian Socialist. Always a democrat, he was an elitist as well. These mixed views had many sources. He was genuinely and remarkably open-minded. He cultivated a deliberate eclecticism that led him to combine the outlooks of Adam Smith and the St. Simonians; of his father and Tocqueville; of Bentham and Coleridge. But above all, his mixed views resulted from his determination to hold on to old views even after they were undermined by disillusionment and new understanding. He described this process in the *Autobiography:* "I found the fabric of my old and taught opinions giving way in many fresh places, and I never allowed it to fall to pieces, but was incessantly occupied in weaving it anew." The result was his attempt to combine what he called the philosophies of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth and his wish to be "many-sided," mixing the many "half-truths" by which he was surrounded.

The main outlines of his mixed views are revealed in his major writings, but a full, detailed statement, along with evidence on how his ideas changed and developed, is to be found only in the vast quantity of subsidiary writings —in the many essays and reviews published in the periodical press and in his letters, which in many cases are long, discursive, didactic, and revealing. The letters, therefore, provide important evidence that supplements the main corpus of his writings.

This is perhaps best illustrated by Mill's correspondence on democracy and the suffrage. Here we can trace the development of his views during four decades from the simple majoritarianism as advocated by his father and Bentham to a combination of universal suffrage with provision for minorities, especially the minority of the educated—one is strongly tempted and probably justified in saying the minority of intellectuals—who were not only to be represented, but were to have authority and leadership as well. Of course this understanding of "true democracy" was presented in *Considerations on Representative Government.* But the shifting path leading to it is to be found in the articles comprising "The Spirit of the Age" and in such essays as those on Samuel Bailey, Tocqueville, and John Austin—and in the lengthy letters to the St. Simonian d'Eichthal, to Tocqueville, Grote, Comte, Carlyle and many others. It is in these letters that we also find abundant evidence of Mill's brief rejection of majoritarianism and his frank defense of authority for an intellectual elite. And the letters also document the gradual modification of Mill's formulation of the relationship between the rival claims of the people and those with moral and intellectual authority. One can trace the shift from belief in rule by the intellectually best as a matter of propriety and efficiency to a later concern that the educated have a political role so as to avoid the suppression of their ideas and values. By 1860 it had become "a race against time, for if the American form of democracy [rule by "numerical majority"] overtakes us first, the majority will no more relax their despotism than a single despot would" (*Later Letters,* p. 672).

Oddly enough Mill's greatest hero in this connection was Thomas Hare, whose ideas on proportional representation appeared to Mill as a magic-like device that allowed for the representation of minorities (and therefore the educated) yet without sacrificing majoritarianism. Hare had "for the first time, solved the difficulty of popular representation; and by doing so, to have raised up the cloud of gloom and uncertainty which hung over the futurity of representative government and therefore of civilization" (*Later Letters,* pp. 598–99). Hare provided "the real basis of a reconciliation between Radicalism and Conservatism" (p. 608). During much of his life Mill had been "troubled by the difficulty of reconciling democratic institutions with the maintenance of a great social support for dissentient opinions. Now," he told Hare, "your plan distinctly solves this difficulty" (p. 653). And, "If the Americans would but adopt your plan (which I fear they never will) the bad side of their government and institutions, namely the practical exclusion of all the best minds from political influence, would soon cease" (p. 654).

While these letters supplement what is otherwise known about Mill's intellectual development, their greatest importance is for what they reveal about him biographically. Mill, after all, scooped his biographers by putting out his own version, which was highly selective and necessarily partial. Yet it has shaped the conventional interpretation of his life and thought. The letters provide additional information that greatly modifies what the *Autobiography* tells us on such subjects as his relations with his family and with Harriet Taylor, and they reveal a good deal about his political ambitions and his gradual shifts in opinion as he reacts to new friends and reflects upon events.

The first characteristic of biographical significance to notice is the restraint, control, and lack of spontaneity in most of the correspondence, including the letters to Harriet. In view of the value he placed on spontaneity in *On Liberty,* this is especially noteworthy. The letters give the impression of having been composed with great care, and in fact many were written from drafts. And in the case of letters written to members of his family and to estranged friends they appear to have been written with the care that usually goes into diplomatic communications. Compared with typical letters of, say, Hume or Macaulay or Carlyle they are without humor, passion, and verve—indeed, without much affect. Many are didactic; all are intellectual creations.

These volumes also reveal the changing character of Mill's political ambition. He was elected to the House of Commons in 1865, but his parliamentary ambition had been at its height during the 1830s when his appointment with the East India Company prevented his seeking election. The letters reveal how much his thoughts were focused on parliamentary politics and how much he wanted to lead the Radicals in bringing about a realignment of parties so they would reflect the struggle between aristocratic and democratic forces. The failure of this enterprise, combined with Mill's disillusionment with simple majoritarianism, led to a redirection of his ambition. The end was still political, but the means became intellectual. The improvement of mankind was to come from moral regeneration, a new spiritual impulse, and from education, rather than solely from changes in institutions. This gave the intellectuals special responsibilities, and circumstances provided them with opportunities, for "great historical change . . . [was] either dawning or approaching its crisis" (*Later Letters,* p. 739). Within this context of expectations, ideas would be particularly influential, and this justified Mill's special provision for men of intellect and his own sense of mission.

Undoubtedly the most important biographical gap filled by the letters concerns Mill's relationship to Harriet Taylor. (It is a matter for regret that this edition is without Harriet's letters to Mill, for which one must go to Professor Hayek's *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor* [Chicago, 1951].) Mill's extraordinary letters to her help us to evaluate his extravagant claims for her as a source of his ideas on the woman question, on economic organization, and on liberty. There is also evidence to support Ruth Borchard's argument that Harriet became for Mill a needed authority figure to replace his father. Mill sought her advice on all matters, trivial as well as serious, and even after she died it was, he said, "my principal anxiety . . . to do as exactly as I am able what would have been done if I had still my darling to guide me" (*Later Letters,* p. 671). Indeed, for the author of *On Liberty* this is surprising, though not the statement that his "entire faith in the ultimate possibilities of human nature was drawn from her own glorious character" (p. 601).

As a byproduct of the connection with Harriet, one finds evidence of Mill's atrocious conduct toward his sisters and mother, as well as to estranged friends such as Sarah Austin. The facets of his life that are revealed in these volumes seem endless. We find him struggling with serious illness—his own and his father's, his brother's, his wife's—and its anxieties. He shows himself to be the most enterprising of travelers—walking prodigiously and even climbing Parnassus and ignoring the threat of brigands as well. His accounts of such travels in Greece (to the historian Grote) pleasantly convey his fascination with the locale that he recalls from legend and history, and these are among the most attractive passages in these volumes (*Later Letters,* pp. 779–781). His first reaction to Darwin's *Origin of Species* is noteworthy: "Though he cannot be said to have proved the truth of his doctrine, he does seem to have proved that it *may* be true which I take to be as great a triumph as knowledge and ingenuity could possibly achieve on such a question" (p. 695). And one can only be disappointed but not surprised by his judgment of Hegel: "conversancy with him tends to deprave one's intellect" (p. 1324).

A final word should be said about the fine work by the editors. The notes are filled with explanations of allusions and events and with biographical details; although inconspicuous, they are available when wanted—just what such notes should be. One regrets that it is necessary to use two indexes; convenience would have been served if the index to the *Earlier Letters* (1963) had been incorporated into the index for the *Later Letters* (1972). The introduction to the *Later Letters* by Professors Mineka and Lindley is itself an important contribution to the literature on Mill's life, especially in its emphasis on Mill's taste for social isolation, which becomes important in view of the radical individualism of his social and political doctrines. This collection, which consists of almost 2,400 letters, most of them not before published, is the result of continuing and often ingenious searches over thirty years, beginning with Professor Hayek's efforts during World War II (described in his Introduction to *The Earlier Letters*) and continuing with the work of the editors. The result is a finely executed and important publication that will have an enduring influence on scholarship.

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The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation. By Claus Mueller. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 226. $7.95.)

Some of the most exciting research in the social sciences in recent decades has dealt with language, much of it focusing upon unconscious constraints upon thought and perception. The application of this work to political analysis is challenging and important, for it promises to throw new light upon virtually every facet of political science. The linguistic preshaping of cognition and behavior underlies a great deal of opinion change and many of the formal and informal interactions that take place in policy-making institutions. For political scientists, the challenge is to learn how to analyze the ties between language and our conventional subjects of study. Lévi-Strauss understandably regards linguistics as the basic social science.

About half of Claus Mueller's book deals with political language. Though brief and highly selective, his analysis is trenchant, especially in its exposition of the devices through which governmental regimes employ distorted communication to direct and constrain thought and behavior. There is also a discussion of "arrested communication," stemming from the limits a restricted speech code places upon the capacity to communicate, quite apart from governmental constraints. Professor Mueller presents lists of terms given new meanings under the Third Reich, and others that have acquired new meanings in East Germany in recent years. Though they make the point dramatically, these obvious examples may unintentionally create the impression that it is chiefly dictatorial regimes that employ distorted language to magnify support. All governments do so, and the effects may be especially powerful when skepticism is minimized by a setting of democracy and a distorting technique that is subtle or unintentional.

Because Mueller is so interested in the crude politicization of everyday life in totalitarian countries, he understates some of the most pervasive and subtle uses of distorted communication and legitimation in all societies. He recognizes, for example, that socially coerced political participation in totalitarian countries helps keep the individual powerless by shaping his thinking and legitimizing the regime. But socially coerced politicization that is touted as "self-government" curtails freedom, dignity, and meaningful dissent everywhere. It does so in extreme form among inmates of "progressive" mental hospitals, prisons, and schools in the United States; and in the measure that voting is a ritual of participation, politicization has something of this consequence for all voters. ITT has influence with little formal participation, and the resident of a "therapeutic community" participates all day without influence. The truly influential are free to avoid involvement in ritualistic politics. In this instance, as so often, political language confuses reason and shapes conformist behavior.

Some of the most significant contemporary research on language is being done by Basil Bernstein. He has identified a "restricted" language code common to the poor that severely inhibits their capacity to challenge conventional ideas and to develop as individuals. In contrast, the upper-middle class benefit from an "elaborated" language code that facilitates these talents. Mueller's chapter on "Social Class as the Determinant of Political Communication," based on Bernstein and related work, seems to me the best in the book, though some attention to the criticisms of Bernstein would have made it even better.

The volume discusses a rather wide range of other topics, including the bearing of the mass media and of ideologies upon maintenance of the status quo, the decline of legislatures and the ascendance of executives, contemporary challenges to governmental authority, and the role of intellectuals and professionals in these challenges. These commentaries are perceptive and enlightening, though rather diffuse.

In the end the author seems more impressed with the crisis of authority than with the legitimating processes he has analyzed: "In advanced capitalist societies riddled by affluence and poverty, the absence of effective legitimating rationales constitutes a problem to which the political system has no answer" (p. 182). It is a difficult question, but I suspect that he seriously underestimates the efficacy of language codes and other legitimating devices in advanced capitalist societies. The very national crises that constantly recur help legitimate political authorities and economic elites, for they justify augmentation of executive power and inequality of sacrifice; and though they are rarely "solved," they are inevitably succeeded by new crises with the same consequences.

MURRAY EDELMAN

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The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham. Vols. I and II edited by T. L. S. Sprigge; Vol. III edited by I. R. Christie. (London: Athlone Press, 1968. Vol. I: Pp. xlv, 383; Vol. II: Pp. xiv, 542. £12.00, set; Vol. III: Pp. xxxiv, 647. £12.00.)

Jeremy Bentham is the most influential of classical political theorists yet paradoxically the most neglected. Utilitarian assumptions pervade economics, the most developed social science and the model for others; they are encapsulated in the rational choice approaches increasingly applied in sociology and political science, and they provide a framework for such founding fathers of the contemporary discipline as Lasswell and Dahl. They are also endemic in the practical criteria applied within the "administrative culture" of Britain and probably the United States: indeed most British politicians could be said to be practicing Utilitarians.

Why then the neglect of Bentham? There are three reasons, all declining in cogency at the present time so that we may well see a revival of attention within the next decade. The first is the intense dislike which Bentham's want-regarding libertarianism and rationalistic critique of established institutions arouses among philosophic idealists and conservatives. Since most people's ideas about his position are derived from the straw man in idealist writings, this hostility has been distinctly harmful to Bentham's intellectual reputation. It has led to acceptance of John Stuart Mill's version of Utilitarianism as a stronger defense than Bentham's, when in fact it subverts the whole argument by distinguishing higher from lower pleasures.

The second reason for neglect of Bentham stems from a kind of intellectual snobbery which concentrates on the pure fount of an intellectual tradition rather than on the expositor who imposed its present form. It is unfortunate for Bentham that the fount is in his case so great a philosopher as Hobbes. Certainly Bentham placed little value on production of an original philosophy, being content to borrow and adapt where he could (from Helvetius for example) to provide foundations for his main evaluation of law and other political institutions. In the process, however, he had to supply a complete statement of his fundamental assumptions, which because of his concern with practice had to be operational in form rather than literary. Hence his surprisingly modern concern with measurement, which makes the crucial transition from hedonistic philosophy to modern social science.

It must be admitted, third, that Bentham also suffers from his failure to systematize and discipline his own work. No other major thinker left so many alternative drafts of important books unpublished on his death. In spite of redactors like Bowring and (more able) Dumont, and sympathetic modern editors like Ogden and Stark, most remain unknown. An enlightened attempt to remedy the situation by publishing a properly edited and collected edition of all Bentham's writings is now being made by the Athlone Press of the University of London, under the general supervision of Professor J. H. Burns. The splendid volumes under review are part of this enterprise (taking the correspondence from the earliest letters up to 1788). A new edition of "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" has also been published, with a manuscript work, "Of Laws in General," in which Bentham discusses related problems.

None of these volumes can be commended too highly for their careful assembly of a definitive text, illuminating yet restrained comment, and annotations which place each document in its proper place in Bentham's intellectual development. They are essential to any library that claims adequate coverage of political thought, and most economically priced for what they offer, arousing the highest expectations about the thirty-odd volumes still to come.

The correspondence itself, of course, cannot offer any startling new insights into Bentham's thinking. What it rather contributes are the detailed practical concerns which (more in Bentham's case than in most others) produced his theoretical work and set his intellectual agenda. For those whose image of Bentham is taken from the end of his life—the Hermit of Queen's Square—it will be something of a shock to find him a young intellectual about town, closely concerned with his brother Sam's advancement, though less so with his own. His brother's mechanical and business pursuits as naval architect and Russian administrator, provided a constant stimulus to Bentham's theoretical generalizations. The Panopticon itself—Bentham's grand scheme for a completely controlled prison environment (also applicable to schools!)—emerged from his brother's concept of an industrial "inspection house" on Prince Potemkin's estates. Thinking which foreshadows the Theory of Fictions occurs in the mathematical briefs prepared for his brother's education in the 1770s. The precise form taken by his early legal writings (and hence of his most readable general works, the Fragment and Introduction) of an adjustment of rewards and penalties through laws imposed from above, owes much to the Benthams' concrete plan of presenting a complete reasoned law code to Catharine II. Jeremy himself made a two and a half-year visit to Russia to join Sam from 1785 to 1788, and was not unfavorably impressed by what he saw there and by prospects for reform under a benevolent despot.

Relations with his father are also illuminated by the correspondence. This most radical and subversive thinker of modern times, scrutinizing every institution and practice by its potentiality to maximize human wants, was also a dutiful eighteenth-century son, abandoning his one love affair because of his father's disapproval. This episode did not undermine his filial sense of love and duty. On one point only (the most important from his point of view) did he resist his father: he must devote himself to reforming the law rather than practicing it as it stood. A letter of 14 October 1772, written at the age of 24, stands as a tactful declaration of independence on this point—accepted, albeit reluctantly, by Jeremiah. Psychoanalytic biographers might ponder the secure background of family relationships from which radical Utilitarianism emerged.

The correspondence as a whole aptly reflects the way in which, for Bentham, detailed practical problems were viewed as manifestations of general social processes, which required both empirical description and public moral control. Indeed Bentham did not distinguish the enterprises: society could both be interpreted as mens' pursuit of want-satisfaction and manipulated so as to maximize it. A few years ago such an intimate link with moral concerns would have been dismissed for getting in the way of value-free political science. Now that natural science itself appears riddled with values, this viewpoint, and criticisms of Bentham based on it, appear passé. Empirical political scientists are increasingly asking how moral concerns can legitimately be introduced into their work. For this problem, Bentham, a congenial exemplar, may yet provide the basis of a solution.

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R. H. Tawney and His Times. By Ross Terrill. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. x, 273. $15.00.)

It ought to be a source of some discomfort to a good many British political theorists that the first full-length appraisal of the work and ideas of R. H. Tawney should have to emerge from Harvard rather than from Balliol or the London School of Economics. It ought to be a source of rather more discomfort that Ross Terrill is so much more sympathetic to Tawney, both intellectually and politically, than recent political theorists in Britain have been.

R. H. Tawney and His Times falls into three sections of roughly equal length, the first biographical, the second theoretical, and the third devoted to an assessment of Tawney's present importance. The biography is neatly and unobtrusively done; it is Tawney as he would have presented himself, with not much fuss about the details of his *vie intérieure*. Here, we see the educator, the driving force behind the Workers' Educational Association, the economic historian, the socialist gadfly on the Sankey Commission, the sage of the London School of Economics and recipient of innumerable doctorates. Dr. Terrill is perceptive and amusing about the odd phenomenon of upper-middle-class English socialism, with its total contempt for the bourgeois virtues of tidiness and thrift and its unconcern with material comfort, and he comments wrily on the faint air of disapproval with which Tawney watched the newly prosperous postwar working class accumulating its consumer durables; but he insists quite fiercely that although Tawney was marked by the extraordinary highmindedness of his Balliol background, he was free of the unconscious paternalism that all too often accompanied it.

The only complaint to be leveled against Terrill's picture of Tawney is that it makes it difficult to see quite why Tawney exerted the influence he did. Terrill, I suspect, likes Tawney much better when he is exciting W.E.A. classes in the Potteries than when he is a Reader at the L.S.E.; the trouble is that this makes the last forty years of Tawney's life something of an anticlimax, and one never quite knows if this is indeed how Terrill sees it.

Tawney's crucial contribution to socialism, so far as Dr. Terrill is concerned, was his picture of socialism as "fellowship." This is an elusive notion, and Dr. Terrill does well not to strain after too precise a blueprint; rather, he points out those things which are inimical to fellowship as Tawney conceived it, and whose abolition was what building socialism must amount to. Thus, gross inequalities of wealth or income cut men off from one another; functionless ownership, an ethic of profit rather than public purpose, tended to create such inequalities and was anyway divisive; but too much faith in the virtues of *groups* rather than *individuals* was equally inimical to fellowship, a fact which escaped the guild socialists but did not escape Tawney. A Christian emphasis on the infinite worth of every human creature lay behind Tawney's socialism, but not the Christian emphasis on hierarchy, for he believed that only egalitarian relationships could be relations of fellowship.

It is half a century since Tawney's best-known works were published; obviously, it is an open question whether they possess more than a historical curiosity value. Dr. Terrill makes the case against Tawney's relevance with some vigor; Tawney wrote as though there were no problem for Britain in pursuing a socialist path in lonely isolation, but fifty years after, Britain's dependence on the rest of the capitalist world makes such an assumption absurd; again, the Christian context in which he placed his ideas has lost much of its relevance, and the other great creed of our time, Marxism, has ceased to be an option which can be contemplated as calmly as Tawney contemplated it. But these are reasons why Tawney has temporarily lost his audience; they are not reasons for rejecting Tawney's ideas. And Dr. Terrill ends by claiming that the humanism, idealism, and moderation in Tawney's socialism are precisely what keeps it alive. Moral ideals are taken seriously, because the rest of us take moral ideals seriously, and Tawney had no vision of leading ignorant dupes to a utopia of his own devising; equally, socialism was not to be expected as the gift of history but striven for by men who were united by their moral ideals; and they had to travel the democratic road to socialism, not because it was tactically the right thing to do, but because it was the socialist path. In short, what Dr. Terrill argues is that Tawney's socialism is not currently fashionable, but that, as so often, being unfashionable is very different from being worn out.

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Psychological Bases of War. By Heinrich Winnik, Rafael Moses, and Mortimer Ostow. (New York: Quadrangle Books Inc., 1973. Pp. 261. $9.95.)

It would be surprising indeed if a conference made up of psychoanalysts, some American, some Israeli, called at this moment in history could solve the age-old problem of war. Indeed, according to the editors of these proceedings of a meeting of the Israel Psychoanalytic Society, they didn't expect to make more than a modest contribution to the prevention of war. Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether they have even achieved that aim, which is a pretty lofty one if you think about it. As contributor after contributor notes, psychoanalysis is concerned with individuals rather than groups, and psychoanalysts are peculiarly incapable of breaking away from the constraints of their own discipline.

Conference proceedings almost never seem to succeed in print. This particular volume is a specially sad one; it is almost like a collected confessional. Perhaps this is its main value: it throws some light on the effects which prolonged conflict has on the minds of liberal, earnest, introspective people unwillingly caught up in it. The contents list includes "The Subjectivity of Israeli Psychoanalysts in Discussing War," "Vicissitudes of Aggression Viewed Developmentally," "Psychoanalytic Implications of Reactions of Soldiers to the Six-Day War," "Cultural Patterns of Aggression," "Some Aspects of Children's Aggressive Behavior During States of Illness and Recovery." Each of these topics (and others) is tackled by one speaker and then immediately opposed by "Another View." The conscious efforts of many contributors to be "objective" are very apparent, but some relapse into simple self-justification of the Israelis' position. In some articles the self-consciousness borders on the embarrassing: "analysts should be able to discuss any theme in an objective scientific manner and to put personal emotions aside."

Even making allowances for some of these understandable difficulties, this book does not contribute a great deal to the literature on warfare. Psychology is a much bigger topic than psychoanalysis, so even the title is misleading. It may, on occasions, be apt to generalize from individual examples, but, for my taste, psychoanalysis is much too prone to do this and it is a philosophical error when dealing with a matter as complex as warfare to generalize from one conflict situation. It is an error largely to omit discussion of the other disciplines which are pertinent to the study of the psychology of war—psychology, sociology, history, anthropology, ethology, biology, and so forth. Of course psychoanalysts gathered together should talk primarily about psychoanalysis, but not as though their subject existed in a vacuum. Very few references are cited by contributors, although most authors constantly remind us of the writings of Freud and his essay "Why War?" written in 1933. This preoccupation with the Great Master and with other theoretical psychoanalysts operates to the detriment of psychoanalysis and gives it a religious flavor.

I suspect that political scientists will be disappointed if they read this volume. Unless they are completely unaware of how psychoanalysts view aggressive behavior in individuals they will not find much new information. Furthermore the book has been produced with that remarkable lack of concern for the reader's problem which is the hallmark of conference proceedings. Only four of the 25 articles have a reference list: the remaining authors who quote other authorities presumably do not expect their work to be of serious academic interest. There is no index, so we cannot delve, or use the book for reference. My copy was bound upside down, but I hesitate to interpret the symbolism of this.

JOHN GUNN

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Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing Policies? By Henry J. Aaron. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972. Pp. 238. $7.95.)

The Politics of Land Use: Planning, Zoning, and the Private Developer. By R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 166. $13.50.)

In reading *The Politics of Land Use* it becomes clear that Mr. Linowes and Prof. Allensworth condemn the resistance of too many communities to the winds of change, but fail to point out that planning commissions lack independence from the political system, often forcing the competent planning professional into pacifying a vociferous minority to the detriment of the public interest.

Land use controls, say Linowes and Allensworth, are almost the exclusive responsibility of local governments rather than of interjurisdictional bodies. They blame local rule for racial discrimination, economic segregation, and social class division, and they advocate an upward shift in some parts of the country for planning decisions as long as metropolitan planning does not go hand in hand with metropolitan government (p. 37). These two authors tell us that zoning is "rigged" (p. 64) because it serves only the protection of the single-family dwelling from "incompatible" uses (p. 65), is anti-development (p. 67), exclusionary (large-lot requirements effectively eliminate the poor and lower-income groups), and discourages diversity. The Euclidean principle looks perfectly "atrocious in practice" (p. 75). Zoning, finally, is prohibitive (excludes certain land uses).

According to Linowes and Allensworth, the use of land for single-family dwellings is by no means economically more advantageous to the community than industrial, commercial, and apartment uses are. Servicing a single-family home costs $17,000, compared with $6,000 to $9,000 for certain multi-family developments (p. 79). They advocate cluster zoning, planned unit development zoning, new-town zoning, vertical zoning (providing for different uses within the same structure), and site approval. The suggested contract or conditional zoning has been rejected by other authorities because of its weak social accountability.

The federal government, over the years, has been attacked for its detrimental influence on high-cost construction and high-priced housing (p. 98). Public housing (p. 98) has conspicuously failed to produce relief for the neediest. In order to achieve this desirable goal, in my opinion, we should stop locking in massive numbers of poor minorities in the least desirable locations without expert management, and we should emphasize instead superior quality, beauty, and social mix. If attractive buildings were located both in the suburbs and the inner city, the massive resistance of the single-family dweller could be broken. For this untenable situation the authors hold responsible primarily the narrow-minded leaders of the citizens associations and citizen groups who pretend to be progressive elements working for the advancement of the public interest (p. 38). Moreover, they place much blame on present zoning practices, which amount to no plans at all (p. 37), do not serve broad community needs (p. 44), serve class ends (p. 46), and do not adequately protect open space. The authors properly attack the monotony of cheap suburban housing, but do not discuss the necessity for a pleasant visual atmosphere as an important social burden on any viable community.

Among the innovative land-use controls capable of bringing about needed change, the authors recommend a Court of Ecology which would have the power to review all basic community-level planning and land-use control decisions. As attractive as this suggestion may appear, the practical difficulties would militate against this proposal.

In summary, the Linowes and Allensworth volume is a timely contribution to the continuing debate on a national land use policy, but we could have expected substantiation by case histories from the zoning attorney's extensive experience rather than the often repetitive and unnecessarily verbose statements.

On the other hand, Henry J. Aaron, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., amply documents the presentation in his book and fills a gap in the abundant literature on the subject of housing. Although the data are in part several years old, the validity of his critique of our national housing policies for the last thirty-seven years would not be the least bit diminished by more recent statistics. In examining the rationale for a housing policy, Aaron questions the most conspicuous omission of specific support for housing in such income-maintenance programs as welfare agencies (which divide payments in allowances for housing, food, clothing, and other commodities) or all federal transfer payments (e.g. veterans' benefits and pensions) (p. 3).

The author tells us that the value and importance of shelter to the buyer is determined by a wide range of residential services (public schools, stores, parks, public transportation, neighbors, and other amenities) as well as access (distance from jobs, stores, recreation, and the quality and price of the transportation network), attributes of neighbors, and very significantly the probability of crime (p. 5).

The housing markets of all households are linked by a process called "filtering" (p. 7); in other words, changes in the supply of one kind of housing affect other housing markets as well. Aaron convincingly demonstrates the often harmful effects of the financial intermediaries who determine not only the architectural styles and the racial composition of neighborhoods but also the location of the residences. He holds that one of the most sinister factors in the deterioration of the inner city has been the practice of "red-lining" by lending institutions; this practice directly abets the migratory trend to the suburbs by declaring territory off limits and by denying loans and insurance regardless of the purchaser's income or credit rating. Government policies have failed to produce the badly needed "green-lining" (abandonment of the practice of "red-lining") of America. They have frequently "altered housing markets by creating or destroying neighborhood ties through establishing attendance boundaries for public schools or construction of highways or preservation of open space" (p. 9).

The present methods reflect a collective judgment that general welfare will rise if some groups have more goods and services even at the expense of others. Economists—and Aaron is an economics professor at the University of Maryland—have long held that "from the family's standpoint a cash transfer would leave them at least as well off as would subsidized housing, and usually better off" (p. 10). Subsidies for construction, borrowing, or other housing costs do not benefit principally families with inadequate incomes. Instead, they "directly assist groups whose incomes and housing are adequate by most standards" (p. 11). A strong believer in the marketplace as the arbiter of economic decisions, Aaron argues very persuasively against those who regard "housing as a special kind of commodity in that many families care far more about how others are housed than about how they are clothed, entertained, or otherwise provided for" (p. 11). The Administration proposals in September 1973 for direct cash assistance to homeowners conceivably could achieve our goal of a decent home for all Americans. The chances for such legislation appear to be very slim, at least at the present time.

Whereas Linowes and Allensworth put the blame for the present dilemmas on the American sacred cow, the single-family home, the Aaron book emphasizes the fractionization of our society. "No market mechanism exists to induce the coordinated action that would benefit all. Each person pursues the selfish, beneficial short-run strategy to the long-run detriment of all" (p. 13).

It seems to me that in the development of desirable neighborhoods, builders and developers are not only frustrated by obsolete building methods, union policies, credit practices of the lending institutions, and myriad government insurance and subsidy regulations but also by the vaguely defined term "public purpose" which alone permits condemnation proceedings and thereby acquisition of larger land areas needed for planned developments. Efforts to reduce costs and to make available shelter for the lower-income groups have been foiled by the myopic laws administered by a vast and frequently thoughtless bureaucracy. The responsibility for this situation must be shared, however, by contractors resisting industrialized housing, by unions obstructing labor-saving devices, by greedy land speculators aided by the capital gains tax provisions and allowable interest deductions (questioned by Aaron on p. 55), and by the credit policies of the government and lending institutions which dominate the housing services more than the price of most other capital and consumer goods.

Both Aaron's criticism and my own suggest the need for radically different housing policies and income distribution. Aaron pleads for many institutional changes, for amendments of the tax laws directly benefiting intermediaries but not achieving desirable social goals, and for a re-examination of our public housing goals and policies. In addition to the few concrete changes in the tax structure suggested by Aaron (e.g., net imputed rent—p. 71) he could have elaborated on the many possible tax incentives and disincentives which because of their complicated nature elude most observers. He should also have exposed the often conflicting policies of the Farmers Home Administration and the Federal Housing Administration—agencies that should have been combined long ago into one agency working for a balance between rural and urban environments as envisaged by the recent Rural Development Act.

Government officials, planners, and developers will find Aaron's scholarly work particularly helpful in spotlighting some of the less obvious results of government policies and the socially unacceptable practices of the private sector in our society.

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Political Science and State and Local Government. (Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1973. Pp. 141. $2.75, paper.)

This book resulted from a conference to review APSA programs in the field of state and local government that had been funded by the Ford Foundation, and to consider future research and teaching in the field. As in other conference volumes, the pieces are mixed in both focus and quality. Three summarize research in selected areas of state and local government; three others deal with teaching approaches in the field; and two shorter items offer summary comments on the other papers and some general recommendations of their own.

The mixture of intellectual focus and style that appears in the papers reflects some of the range in the state-local field as a whole. Lawrence J. R. Herson writes in a literary style about the various intellectual currents that have focused on cities over much of the 19th and 20th centuries. He finds ingredients of pragmatism, invention, radical rejection, and ideology on the historical map; muses about the continued lack of agreement about policy substance among those who write about cities; and closes with "a question that is both elementary and ultimate: Given society's present and future needs, how is the city to be defined?" (p. 22). Such a query seems to fit Herson's style of dealing with the range of literature that he fits into his essay. Yet even while it is tantalizing, the question seems more an impediment than an aid to understanding urban issues.

Charles O. Jones takes on the studies of state and local policy process and output with a systematic survey of six major journals over the 1963–1972 period, classifying and assessing policy-oriented research in 24 categories. This is the most original piece in the whole volume, and is likely to attract the most attention. Jones faces up to the complexity in the literature at issue, finds that it may have raised more problems than it has solved, but considers it useful even if it has only begun the task of illuminating the problems inherent in analyzing policy process and substance. He also considers three representative works of "professional" (i.e., normative) writing: by Dewey, Lowi, and Dror, and finds them similarly helpful in pointing to the problems inherent in advocacy. In conclusion, Jones alludes to "those days of old when political scientists could judge and advocate without being so damn precise" (p. 46), but he sees no simple route that can ignore complexities we have already found.

In other essays, Alan Rosenthal writes about research focused on state legislatures; Earl M. Baker assesses the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 for political science education; Peter Bouxsein and Clara Penniman have separate pieces on public administration training programs; and Samuel C. Patterson and Ralph K. Huitt offer brief and insightful papers to summarize conference themes.

As these essays offer their descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions for research and training programs in the state and local field, they show several of the strains apparent in this part of the discipline. There are sentiments for giving high priority to the training of government employees or to the kinds of substantive policy research desired by policy makers; and other sentiments for giving the highest priority to the theoretical understanding of how the policy process works. There is some pooh-poohing of behavioral research, and no little advocacy that other political scientists do research that seems important to the conferees. For the most part, however, the participants find some merit in various approaches. It seems to have been an agreeable conference.

The conference organizers may find their narrow queries about APSA programs answered by these papers, but the volume cannot claim to represent the full spectrum of current interest in "state and local government." The participants did not include any of the political scientists who have published prominent policy studies focusing on the urban arena. Such participants might have reminded certain conferees that systematic studies of policy issues already exist in the literature, and that others are underway. The conference might have given more direct consideration to some of the fascinating quarrels about the measurement of political culture and public opinion in state or local policy making; or about the measurement of benefits and costs distributed by state and local policies; or to the studies dealing with courts, prosecutors, and police. In what this volume lacks, as well as in what it contains, there is some insight into the need to reconsider "state and local government" as a field of political science.

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Reframing the Constitution: An Imperative for Modern America. By Leland D. Baldwin. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press, 1972. Pp. xiv, 145. $15.00, cloth; $5.50, paper.)

Reframing the Constitution combines arguments for remaking the American political structure with a full and detailed draft of a new constitution. The author, an emeritus professor of history, provides little in his arguments which would startle political scientists, but his proposed constitution, despite many flaws, is an imaginative and instructive effort which could make sections of this book useful as teaching tools.

The first five chapters are largely historical and descriptive, providing few clues to Baldwin's structural prescriptions in Chapters 6–8. Chapters 3 and 4 do outline the proposed 14 regional states, but the consolidation is discussed largely in terms of sectional traditions. Parts of the historical argument rely heavily on the political science of James M. Burns, V. O. Key, and the 1950 APSA Committee on Political Parties. As a result, there is no consideration of current behavioral studies analyzing the impact of structural variables. For example, to what extent is the "antiquity" of state constitutions, as hypothesized on page 23, "one element" in their lack of political viability? Nor is the absence of behavioral data compensated for by any depth of philosophical analysis: democracy is tested "against a standard of flexibility and the degree to which it is open-ended" (p. 6) without systematic consideration of the concept of flexibility; the framers of 1787 are given only brief historical treatment; and superficial reformist phrases crop up. Thus it is "the complexities of the present era" which make inherited constitutional forms "inadequate for the solution of modern problems" (p. 18), and it is Congress which throws "obstacles in the way of effective administration" (p. 64). Baldwin approaches his work as an historian with a liberal faith in the value of institutional change and a populist distrust of wealth. He concludes that New York City "has pretty well dictated national policies, using Chicago and San Francisco as branch offices" (p. 56), and his criticism of John Marshall (p. 70) implicitly evokes V. L. Parrington.

It is the proposed constitution which provides for fascinating reading and speculation. (See pp. 82–100, 104–111, 118–142.) A unicameral Congress places the president within a parliamentary framework. A 100-member Senate reminiscent of the House of Lords assumes *inter alia* the investigative functions of the old Congress, and its 50 Law Senators are responsible for the judicial functions of the old Supreme Court. Parties are recognized and incorporated in the constitution. But what emerges is more of what already exists in our present system: the new president would be more powerful than any prime minister, because minority government would be constitutionally proscribed (pp. 87, 136); the Senate would provide a stronger and more independent national check than any existing institution; and the new group of states, stripped of much existing authority, would by dint of smaller numbers and regional organization be better able to press their demands upon national authorities. Baldwin may have wrought so well that all elements in the existing system gain—and conflict and deadlock are escalated.

Regardless of the merits of the proposed document (must the metric system be enshrined in the Constitution?), Baldwin's goal is to direct attention to the need for constitutional change. A converging goal of political science is to teach and test hypotheses about the effects of political arrangements. Thus a course in constitutional law could take Baldwin's proposals and analyze their political impact, moving beyond case law and the behavior of judges to raise constitutional questions central to an understanding of political behavior. A seminar in American or comparative politics could also use material from this book to sensitize students to the need for linkages between constitutional structure and political behavior. In this way present-day political science may be able to address and help answer the central question posed by this book: would the effort to frame a new United States Constitution be worth the trouble?

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Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-Making. Edited by Jewel Bellush and Stephen M. David. (New York: Praeger, 1971. Pp. 202. $7.50.)

Case studies that are rich in description and written with a larger analytical purpose can nicely reveal the limitations of even the most widely accepted political theories. Such is the aim of *Race and Politics in New York City.* This volume of five case studies and an introductory essay challenges many of the assumptions and conclusions of the pluralist school of political analysis. Drawing upon controversies that occurred in New York City in the 1960s, the contributors question the pluralistic nature of New York by illustrating how the city's political system has remained largely resistant in the face of demands made by the then newly mobilized black community. The essays relate New York's experience with the Community Action Program, Lindsay's futile attempts to set up a civilian review board and provide scattered site housing, the bitter school decentralization battle, and the failure of neighborhood poor to establish community mental health centers.

Unlike many of the school's critics, it is not the pluralist methodology which the eight contributors to this book take to task; rather, they employ the pluralist's own case study technique to identify three major flaws in the pluralist design. First, Professors Bellush and David contend that political scientists in the 1950s who characterized New York as exemplary of an open and responsive, if troubled, political system were basing their ideas on overly optimistic assumptions. Even when group primary goals are clearly threatened, not all groups are able to mobilize and secure a public decision that reflects at least some accommodation to their demands. Lack of information, scanty political resources and skills, and the unwillingness of officials to bargain are forms of systematic discrimination against blacks. As the case of scattered site housing suggests, black citizens had a major interest in getting housing outside of the ghetto, but they were dwarfed by the activity and access of white neighborhood groups. Too often, the editors contend, pluralists have neglected to go beyond their own beliefs about what participants in a controversy should reasonably expect and examine the extent that the actors themselves are satisfied with the "resultant." From this perspective blacks appear to be regular losers.

Second, the pluralist model is not particularly useful for understanding race politics in the 1960s. Pluralist writers, particularly Herbert Kaufman and the late Wallace Sayre, utilized a decision-making model which emphasized the activities of the leaders of small organized groups and uncovered the alliance-building strategies which seemed to be the key to most political decisions. Yet, given the unsuccessful record of blacks to find effective allies during the conflicts elaborated in *Race and Politics,* the pluralist pattern is hardly a universal tendency. Instead, the mobilization of broad social classes, overt clashes of interest and changes in the expectations of black and white masses appear more crucial elements in the evolution of big city politics in the "post-pluralist" era.

Third, the pluralists are criticized for shortsightedness. Attempting to demonstrate that no single elite could dominate decision making by revealing different functional arenas of participation, pluralists made little effort to determine the distribution of influence within the islands of decision. As John Lindsay discovered during the civilian review controversy, reform is unlikely when the police bureaucracy and their allies have the resources to close the system to antagonists.

Although most of the criticisms are hardly novel, their concise elaboration and the well-organized case study illustrations make this an interesting and informative book. It does, however, have some significant limitations. Given the highly ambitious scope of the work, the five cases could hardly back up all the hypotheses which the editors articulate. Nevertheless, the contributors could have attempted a more conscious testing of the volume's theoretical critique. As it is, each case tends to conform to a general pattern; the major participants and stakes are described, the strategies and activities of key actors are identified, and then the policy outcomes are evaluated in terms of the distribution of rewards. Although each study exhibits basically similar concerns, the theoretical significance of some of the essays is often quite indirect. For example, only one of the case studies (the civilian review board controversy) provides much data about changes in mass behavior even though the editors themselves argue that the pluralists concentrated excessively on the activities of elites. Ironically, the other cases focus largely on elite interest-group behavior in order to describe the conflict between the white and black communities.

Since this book concentrates on only the more visible racial controversies in New York, it cannot provide a testing of pluralist findings. Yet it does point to an important universe of political conflict which pluralism—and every other established theory—has neglected. On the whole, this is an excellent book for students of urban politics because it effectively combines well-written substantive material with good, solid theoretical criticism.

PAUL KANTOR

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Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy, 1947–1971: An Annotated Bibliography. Compiled by Richard Burt. Edited by Richard Burt and Geoffrey Kemp. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1974. Pp. xvi, 377. $5.95.)

This listing of defense-related hearings, primarily those held by the Armed Services Committees and parallel Appropriations Subcommittees of each house, is a useful addition to the gradually improving bibliographic resources available to social scientists and policy analysts. Some hearings have been omitted, but the exclusions are generally peripheral to the volume's main focus.

A more serious lack is the result of the editors' choice not to include committee reports and related materials. For some, an indication of committee recommendations or posture as contained in the appropriate report would be the most useful and needed information. To a lesser degree, some users will also lament the failure to include related documents and special studies.

The entries are organized chronologically by sessions of Congress, subdivided by committee and then by specific hearing. While this arrangement is probably the best possible, the usability of the bibliography would be markedly enhanced if it contained both subject and witness indexes. As it stands, most researchers would need to thumb through the entire contents to locate materials on particular facets of defense policy, or on the appearances of specific individuals as witnesses.

Each entry contains a listing of witnesses, and a brief précis of the subject of testimony given. Some annotations are restricted to topics discussed, while others give an indication of positions taken by witnesses. Obviously, more complete commentaries would be desirable, but undoubtedly were not feasible because of temporal and economic constraints.

The National Security Education Program of New York University, sponsors of this and several related volumes, is to be commended for its efforts to improve the quality of national security policy research. Researchers of whatever ideological or policy persuasion will find that the flaws of this straightforward volume are considerably outweighed by its merits.

William I. Bacchus

Washington, D.C.

State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness. By The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 498. $21.50.)

This is the third volume produced by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures dealing with the technical capabilities of the fifty state legislatures. It is the basic document on which the earlier studies—*Summary Report: An Evaluation of the Fifty State Legislatures* and *The Sometimes Governments*—were based. Part I of this volume is directed mainly to the interests of scholars of the state legislative process, since it describes in detail the research design and assumptional bases for the evaluation and ranking of the fifty legislatures. Part II, which carries specific recommendations for legislative improvement in each state, is likely to be of most interest to state legislators of a reformist bent and to civic organizations critical of the general institutional design of state legislatures and dedicated to their improvement.

The technical capability of the state legislature, this study holds, turns on the extent to which it is functional, accountable, informed, independent, and representative (FAIIR). Hoary, for the most part standard, prescriptions for the improvement of legislatures constitute the evaluative standards of FAIIR. For example, a legislature scoring high in functionality will possess, among other things, adequate time for the scheduling and management of legislative work, multi-purpose staff support for leaders and individual members, adequate chamber and committee room facilities, a membership of reasonable size with a moderate number of committee assignments per member, a variety of organizational and procedural devices for expediting legislative work, and a diffused and constrained leadership (the latter characteristic presumably serving to maximize the opportunities for initiative on the part of individual members).

A legislature notable for its independence will be able to control the frequency, duration, and agendas of legislative sessions, have a strong measure of independence from the executive branch (particularly in terms of its access to information and analysis), possess the capability for program review, governmental oversight, and program and expenditure audits, and function under statutes and rules that provide for comprehensive regulation and registration of lobbyists and that minimize the possibilities of conflict of interest and dilutions of legislative interest.

The overall ranking of the states is based on an aggregation of their scores on each of the FAIIR schedules. The California legislature ranks first, followed by New York, Illinois, Florida, and Wisconsin. The legislature ranking lowest in technical capability is that of Alabama, though Wyoming, Delaware, North Carolina, and Arkansas are not notably better. Six of the ten states at the bottom of the list are southern. Some legislatures that rank rather high on one dimension (e.g., independence) rank comparatively low on another (e.g., representativeness). Nevertheless, the pattern is clear: states achieving a high ranking overall are typically high on all counts, while states ranking low overall typically are low on all counts. California, for example, places no worse than third on any schedule, while Alabama is no better than 41st on any schedule.

It should be noted that each component in the FAIIR ranking system was valued equally, though variable weights were assigned the subcriteria within each component. For example, the most heavily weighted subcriterion in the functional schedule was committee structure, while the most heavily weighted subcriteria in the accountability schedule were those concerned with explicit rules and procedures and records of voting and deliberations.

Political scientists whose interests lie in the comparative study of state policy will find the chapter on the correlates of legislative capability especially instructive. In general, those states with impressive rankings on the FAIIR scales tend to be characterized by affluence, a high level of urbanization, and a well-educated and politically active citizenry. The political systems of these states tend to be distinguished by strong governors, professional legislatures, competitive and cohesive political parties, and strong local governments.

So much for the focus and findings of the study. What else may be said of it? In the first place, this study has produced the most comprehensive body of information available anywhere on all fifty legislatures. Additional data on each legislature are available in data banks established at the Citizens Conference and at the Institute of Governmental Studies of the University of California at Berkeley.

Second, the study ought to be evaluated on its own terms. It is, pure and simple, a comparative study of legislative organization, structure, and procedures. Except tangentially, it is not concerned with legislative leadership, the distribution of power in the legislature, legislative party organizations, interest group involvement in legislative decision making, or executive-legislative relations. One may well have doubts whether a geared-up, professional legislature necessarily better attends to public problems, better serves the interests of the citizenry, or passes "better" public policy. The quality of legislators, of state party organizations, of legislative leadership, and of state politics at large may be more critical to overall legislative performance and outcomes than a pastiche of reforms involving staff, chamber size, informational systems, interim committees, or anti-limbo provisions, to mention but a few. But to bootleg in this point is to be less than fair to FAIIR. All that the CCSL staff is arguing —implicitly some of the time, explicitly most of the time, unpretentiously all the time—is that certain structural and procedural arrangements *increase the probability* that legislatures can deal effectively and responsibly with state problems. Moreover, the authors of the report doubtless would agree that obviating structural and procedural defects in the institution is only one way out of several of rescuing disabled legislatures from their malaise.

William J. Keefe

University of Pittsburgh

The Planning—Programming—Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies. By Joon Chien Doh. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. xx, 192. $13.50.)

An account of the Planning—Programming—Budgeting (PPB) experiences of federal agencies is much needed. For almost a decade, writers on all sides of the issue have forcefully debated the purpose and implications of PPB, and their arguments have been driven more by passion than by evidence. The controversy between those who see PPB as a means of bringing more rationality to public choice and those who see it as violating cherished political values has been quieted by the demise of PPB in the early 1970s. But PPB was possibly the most significant administrative innovation of the 1960s, and the issues associated with it merit empirical investigation.

Unfortunately, Dr. Doh's study of three federal agencies (Agriculture, HEW, and NASA) does little to fill the void. Fully half of this brief book is a rehash of the old arguments, along with prescriptions of what PPB is supposed to do. The other half offers the inadequate yield of some 100 interviews with program and fiscal officers in the three agencies and the Bureau of the Budget. On the basis of the impressions of these people, Doh rates the extent to which the PPB materials have been used as well as the quality of the documents. These pseudodata are paraded in place of the real thing, as support for a dozen or more firm statements about whether PPB has progressed more in one or another of the agencies.

The flimsiness of the method is most apparent in Chapter 6, "The Quality of PPBS Documents," in which the author employs three separate tables rating with statistical exactitude the NASA, Agriculture, and HEW submissions to the Bureau of the Budget. At first glance, the evidence appears to be impressive, but the reader has to retreat some 80 pages to recall that only ten Budget Bureau officials were interviewed. In all likelihood, some of these officials never read a PPB document, and not more than one or two read (and was in a position to compare) the documents of all three agencies.

Doh devotes an entire chapter to PPB experiences in twelve bureaus within the three specimen agencies. The chapter is barely five pages long and does not contain a single scrap of evidence, but this does not deter the author from passing judgment on the PPB results in each of the agencies.

An examination of PPB implementation is no easy task, and the author is to be commended for trying. There are no reliable "before" and "after" comparisons, no sure method of testing the penetration of budgeting by the new procedures, no accepted way of distinguishing between the forms of PPB and its spirit. For these reasons, there have been few attempts to gauge the impact of PPB on resource allocations and policy decisions. The approach selected by Doh utilizes four "process" criteria: (1) the relationship of planning, analysis, and budgeting; (2) the use of analytic studies in budget making; (3) the quality of the PPB documents; and (4) an evaluation of agency capability. There is nothing inherently wrong with these criteria, but they require a great deal of observation and detailed scrutiny of an agency's decisional structures. Impressions filtered through catch-as-catch-can interviews are no substitute for a careful inspection of administrative decisions.

One finding that emerges from Doh's work suggests limitations in both his method and the concept of PPB. Doh ranks NASA last in terms of PPB implementation, yet that agency was most advanced in the application of analytic techniques to its decisional processes. This suggests that Doh focused excessively on the forms rather than the purpose of PPB, and that PPB itself concentrated excessively on conjoining analysis and budgeting. As I have argued in *Budget Innovation in the States,* analysis might have greater opportunity to flourish when it is freed from the constraining routines and traditions of the budgetary process.

Doh's book was published in 1971, at a time when the future of PPB was uncertain. In search for some clues about the Nixon administration's position, Doh read unwarranted optimism into such passing events as the appointment of a particular individual to the White House staff, a few words in the annual budget message, and the establishment of a national goals staff. PPB was officially terminated in June 1971. It had lived the unexamined life and was found wanting.

ALLEN SCHICK
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Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America. By Anthony Downs. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. 186 and appendix. $7.95.)

Anthony Downs's plan for *Opening Up the Suburbs* is almost certain to spark a major controversy about housing policies on the periphery of American cities. Writing in the style of an essayist, Professor Downs outlines the major arguments for introducing low- and moderate-income households into predominantly middle- and upper-middle-class suburbs. Students who expect to find an objective analysis of housing conditions in metropolitan areas are likely to be disappointed; in this volume, Downs has assumed the posture of an advocate for a specific strategy to attack residential segregation, which lies at the core of many metropolitan problems.

Downs's proposal forms the central focus of the book. It is an important proposal, because it may very well assume a high position on the agenda of conventional liberal solutions to urban ills. Basically, his plan calls for "dispersed economic integration," or the promotion of incentives and requirements for mixing low- and moderate-income households in suburban neighborhoods. His ideas implicitly seem to reflect a growing realization that the simple creation of "equality of opportunity," e.g., by providing some low-income households with increased resources to purchase better housing, is an inadequate strategy; it may be increasingly necessary to resort to quotas, allotments, and subsidies to overcome the persistent and endemic effects of poverty and racism.

Downs scores some excellent points in demonstrating how both the "trickle-down" process and municipal codes governing construction and zoning have worked to the benefit of upper-income groups and to the disadvantage of low-status segments of the population. Moreover, his plan for "opening up the suburbs," though vague in some details, generally seems to be a feasible and workable strategy for achieving his goals. But he leaves one crucial question unanswered: How will this proposal affect the efforts of low-income groups to gain increased political power and influence? In Chapters 7 and 15, he examines possible opposition to his plan; but he is primarily concerned with criticisms which might emanate from middle- and upper-class suburbanites rather than with objections from persons at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Concerning the number of low- and moderate-income households which might be allowed to enter the suburbs, Downs states:

> It must be absolutely large enough to give the incoming households a sense of identity and solidarity, to make their votes important to local politicians, and to be noticeable to local middle and upper-income residents. But it must also be a small enough percentage so that middle-class behavior patterns remain dominant . . . (p. 123).

Since his proposal implies that low- or moderate-income households will compose considerably less than a majority of suburban communities and that buildings designed for such groups will form only 10 to 20 per cent of new construction, it is unlikely that his plan would enable low-income residents to become either a cohesive political nucleus or a serious threat to prevailing middle-class values in American suburbs.

Fundamentally, therefore, Downs's plan to improve the plight of low-income groups, as well as similar proposals by other liberal commentators, must rely upon the benevolence of middle- and upper-class citizens. In asserting the need to maintain "middle-class dominance" of suburban neighborhoods, Downs is simply more candid about his own values than other writers have been. His perspective eventually leads him to conclude, in a final analysis of the political prospects of his proposal, that its chances hinge upon the altruism of policy makers and that it is likely to fail to gain adoption. Because of its critical dependence on the benevolence of high-status groups, similar pessimistic forecasts could be made regarding the ultimate success of his plan, even if it were adopted.

In describing the discriminatory effects of the operation of the existing housing market and in raising vital issues about institutional means of achieving social and economic integration in the suburbs, Downs has performed a commendable service. But his proposal fails to resolve the crucial political problem of enabling low-income groups to become a viable and potent political force in metropolitan areas. This problem increasingly may become both a major source of contention among political scientists and a critical factor in determining the fate of cities. *Opening up the Suburbs* clearly has not closed the debate concerning some of the most pressing questions of American politics.

HARLAN HAHN
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The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. I, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. By Julius Goebel, Jr. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1971. Pp. 865. $30.00.)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was in many ways a very remarkable man. One of the truly great Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court for thirty years, he died in 1935 at the age of 93. Quite characteristically, the Justice left his residual estate, amounting to about $263,000, to the federal government. It seems equally characteristic of the legislative process that Congress took twenty years to make up its mind as to what to do with the money. At long last, in 1955, Congress adopted an act creating the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Fund, which included the original bequest plus a single appropriation in lieu of interest. The statute set up a permanent committee consisting of four persons appointed by the President for eight-year terms, with the Librarian of Congress serving *ex officio* as chairman. The enabling act provided that the main project to be financed by the bequest was to be a history of the Supreme Court. Paul A. Freund, Carl M. Loeb University Professor at Harvard, was selected as editor-in-chief, and plans were made for a history of the Court to take the form of eleven hefty volumes.

The late Julius Goebel, Jr., George Welwood Murray Professor Emeritus of Legal History at the Columbia University School of Law, wrote the first volume, tracing the "antecedents and beginnings" of the Court down to 1801. At the same time, Volume VI of this series was published, this being Part One of a two-part survey of the period of reconstruction and reunion, 1864–88, written by Professor Charles Fairman. Some idea of the scope of this history is reflected in the fact that Goebel does not get around to mentioning the names of the first Justices appointed to the Court by President Washington until p. 552 of his volume. Fairman's Part One of his history of the reconstruction period runs to 1540 pages. Volume II (by George L. Haskins) will cover only the first 14 years of the Marshall Court; Volume III (by Gerald Gunther) will deal with the last ten years of the Marshall Court. Volume V (by the late Carl B. Swisher), which has just appeared, analyzes the Taney Court. Volume VIII (by Philip C. Neal and Owen M. Fiss) will cover the period 1888–1910. The late Alexander Bickel was scheduled to have written the next two volumes, concerned with the periods 1910–1921 and 1921–1930, respectively. Volume XI, by Professor Freund, will review the period 1930–1941. It is understandable that this history should end with 1941, but a great deal has happened since then, and one may hope that some money will be left over from the Holmes Fund, or found in some other place, to bring the narrative down to a much later date, at least to the end of the Warren Court.

Goebel was a very erudite scholar with an astonishing grasp of the history of Anglo-American law. The book is very heavily annotated, and however weary the reader may get, he should not skip over the annotations, since they are full of valuable bibliography and historical lore. For example, in one place, referring in the text to a minor event in early

American history, Goebel not only points out, in the footnote, that there are three books on the subject, but also tells you which is the best. In addition, this is a very handsome book, elegantly printed and bound, and replete with many pictures and facsimiles of various historic documents or legal papers. But since Goebel overwhelms with detail, the reader is well advised to take him a little bit at a time.

The book consists of seventeen chapters, together with a statistical analysis of the business of the Supreme Court from 1789 to 1801, and substantial notes on manuscript sources. Professor Goebel concludes with a "select bibliography" running to 16 pages. The first chapter deals with the transition of the law from the old world to the new. The second reviews the traditions of judicial control over legislation. In this connection it is worth noting that Goebel does not even bother to refute the well-worn argument that judicial review represented a usurpation of power by the courts. The third chapter deals with the principle of constitutional authority in the new states, while the fourth is concerned with the national judicial authority during the period of the Continental Congress. Chapter V deals with the Constitutional Convention of 1787, with special emphasis upon its treatment of the judiciary. The next four chapters recount in great detail the struggle over the ratification of the Constitution, but much of this section of the book is concerned with the judiciary only tangentially. Chapter X recounts the story of the framing and adopting of the Bill of Rights, Chapter XI reviews the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the next chapter analyzes in detail the Process Acts which followed, and which most histories ignore altogether. Chapters XIII and XIV deal with the Circuit Courts, and the last three chapters review appellate practice, and the political and constitutional issues with which the Court was concerned from 1789 to 1801.

By the end of the August, 1800, Term of Court, with which this volume ends, the Supreme Court had disposed of 79 cases which had been appealed either from the Circuit Courts (72 cases) or the state courts (7 cases). One of the main points made by this book is that much happened during the pre-Marshall period which mattered a great deal. During its first eleven years, Goebel concludes, the Court displayed both professional acumen and moral courage. In the admiralty cases, for example, he argues that the Court went about its business without being deterred by the pressure of foreign powers, or by "factious American opinion," or by political sentiment. The Court dealt with several important constitutional law issues during this brief early period, such as the suability of states in federal courts, the validity of advisory opinions, and the scope of the federal taxing power (in the carriage tax case). But even more important, it was during these early years that the Court made a lasting contribution in working out basic problems dealing with the regulation of appellate practice.

This volume is replete with fresh insights into aspects of early American legal and constitutional history, but one example will have to suffice for purposes of this review. On February 21, 1787, the Articles of Confederation Congress adopted a resolution advising the states to send delegates to a convention "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," and reporting back to Congress and the state legislatures. Many historians have referred to this resolution as a congressional "call for a convention," but Goebel points out very convincingly that this is incorrect. In fact, all but five states had already decided to appoint delegates to a constitutional convention before the resolve of Congress was put into circulation. He makes the interesting point, therefore, that the source of the delegates' authority lay in the enabling legislation of the states, and not in the resolve of the Congress. Furthermore, the restrictive words, "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," appeared in the enabling legislation of only three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York. Clearly, he argues, Congress was not delegating authority, because it had in this particular none to delegate. In fact, most state enabling statutes were cast in general terms and did not contain specific instructions. It follows that far from violating its "instructions," "the Philadelphia Convention was assured a greater freedom to act in the national interest than any assemblage yet convened" (p. 202). Authors of American government textbooks, please take note.

Space permits only one more example of this impressive work, to illustrate the tremendous effort that went into the research, and the author's grasp of detail. Goebel makes the point that the most onerous task of the early Justices was to ride the circuits as Circuit Judges, and in this connection he notes that President Washington would have been well advised to consider the health and vigor of each candidate he considered for a place on the Court. Then in a long footnote he summarizes what is known, or what he could discover, concerning the health of the Justices who sat on the Court during its first eleven years.

It turns out that Jay suffered from rheumatism; Cushing had a growth on his lip; Blair in his own words was afflicted with "a rattling distracting noise in my head," which Goebel guesses was an inner ear malady that led to his resignation; Rutledge suffered from gout; Iredell missed the February 1794 term of Court because of illness; Patterson wrote in the spring of that year that he "nearly went out of my head"; both Chase and Ellsworth were afflicted with gout and renal stones; and James Wilson, as is well known, suffered a complete nervous and physical breakdown in 1797. Unfortunately, Goebel could find nothing about the aches and pains of Bushrod Washington and Alfred Moore, though he carefully notes that they were Adams appointees.

This is obviously a distinguished contribution to American legal history. Himself a fine scholar, Holmes must be nodding his approval somewhere up there, where all great Justices finally go.

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin

Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics of Change. By Harlan Hahn. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971. Pp. 276. $10.00.)

Professor Hahn argues that while "conflict between the residents of urban-rural areas long has been a prominent feature of American politics" (p. 11), "published studies of American state politics have tended to neglect the role of urban-rural cleavage" (p. 14). And he views the increasingly substantial literature on party competitiveness in state politics as slighting the important effect urban-rural differences have on party competition.

The bulk of this volume consists of a political history of "the Republican tradition" in Iowa, from the founding of the Republican party in the State in 1856 through the 1964 election. As the symbol of Northern unity and loyalty during the Civil War, the Republican party became the only acceptable vehicle for political expression for the following seven decades. During this period, the party developed a remarkable capacity to absorb the rival demands of rural and urban residents within its own organizational framework, discouraging third parties or the revival of the Democratic party, dominant in the early days of statehood.

The factional strains between rural and urban interests in the Republican party increased in the 1920s, and the Roosevelt landslide of 1932 offered the Democratic party as a new alternative in Iowa politics. But, in 1938, Iowa became a one-party Republican state for another twenty years. However, in the mid-1950s, when the Republican coalition of small-town residents and urban business interests refused to budge on the issues of legislative reapportionment and the distribution of road-use taxes, urban voters increasingly began to see the Democratic party as a more appealing option than Republican stand-pattism.

Hahn analyzes the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote in the Iowa elections of 1948 through 1964 and concludes that "small towns have evidenced relatively steadfast Republican leanings, large cities have reflected a growing Democratic trend, and the farm vote has demonstrated a volatile political independence that could swing an otherwise evenly divided electorate toward either party" (p. 99). With increasing urbanization in the State, Hahn see "this politics of geography" as presaging a significant political realignment in Iowa. The five elections since Hahn concluded his study in 1964 appear to support his prediction. Today, both U.S. senators are Democrats, as are five of the six U.S. congressmen, and the Democratic Party controls both houses of the State legislature. Moreover, in the 1974 election, the Democrats captured one or more county courthouse offices in 75 of the 99 counties—the largest inroad into the traditional small-town Republican strength in Iowa's history.

This "size-of-place" theory of state politics is reminiscent of Epstein's seminal study in Wisconsin in 1958 and of Adamany's reconfirmation of the thesis in the same state in 1964. The 1958 study by Masters and Wright in Michigan, however, explicitly rejected the size-of-place analysis. Pending further studies, it can only be asserted that the Wisconsin and Iowa findings may be typical of some traditional Republican states in transition from small-town society and agricultural economy to increasingly urban and industrial dominance.

In the final chapter, the author reviews published political studies of the other 49 states, employing the urban-rural perspective of interpreting Iowa politics, hoping that "modest but significant progress can be made in formulating a comparative model of general applicability" (p. 220). From this comparative examination, Hahn concludes that "the specific features of Iowa politics have seemed to provide an adequate benchmark for the analysis of state political processes." It is evident that this analysis and its central conclusion are severely strained, when it is noted that twelve of the quoted studies were published in the 1940s and eighteen in the 1950s. Particularly disturbing is the repeated description of "contemporary" realities of state politics, expressed in the present tense, based on Key's comparative studies of 1949 and 1956. This is hardly the way to build a model for "the politics of change."

C. Edwin Gilmour

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Environmental Issues: Population, Pollution, and Economics. By L. G. Hines. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973. Pp. ix, 339. $9.75, cloth; $3.25, paper.); **Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered.** By E. F. Schumacher. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Pp. 290. $3.75, paper.)

Environmental deterioration is relatable to three kinds of events: *depletion, pollution,* and *ecological disruption.* Phenomena of nature (destructive winds, floods, droughts, and much else besides) contribute to environmental damage; but severely degenerative changes in our era are mainly attributable to human activities. Prevailing economic practices progressively *deplete* the "capital" latent in nature: e.g., fertile land, stored water, fossil fuels, other minerals, etc. Accelerative depletion of this capital contributes to *pollutions* of land, water, and air. Depletion and pollution *combine* to disrupt the systemic processes that sustain life, including human life.

These phenomena are all accelerative, doubling in rate and magnitude in shortening periods. It is generally conceded that many of the resultant impacts on individuals and communities are dysfunctional and that some are severely injurious. But experts disagree whether environmental depletion, pollution, and disruption pose serious threat to the human condition and prospect. Controversy also focuses on whether scientists and engineers can circumvent the "limits of the earth" and thereby enable humankind to dominate nature completely and with impunity. From here the debate fans out in various directions: among others, arguments regarding probable costs of maintaining a decently livable habitat; impacts of these costs on distribution of income and wealth and on other values; environmental responsibilities of public authorities and of entrepreneurs and other private persons and organizations; criteria for deciding what and how much environmental repair and protection should be undertaken; determining priorities among environmental, military, social and other claims on insufficient disposable resources; how to deal with depletion, pollution and ecological disruption of the oceans and other problems that transcend the unilateral capabilities of any and all governments; indeed, how to make any headway at all beyond one's own frontiers in our politically fragmented, tribalistic world in which national polities differ enormously in natural-resource endowment, stage of technological-economic development, ratio of population to accessible resources, and other salient respects.

Even the partial listing above indicates how deeply public authority is involved: in defining objectives, setting standards, gaining compliance, allocating resources, mobilizing public support, and much else in addition. A few political scientists have addressed themselves to the problems of environmental protection and management; and more are turning their attention to these concerns. But the politics of environmental management is still left largely to natural scientists, engineers, and economists. With a few notable exceptions, they have treated environmental politics simplistically—or bypassed political options and obstacles altogether.

The authors of the books reviewed here are both economists. It is noteworthy that Hines exhibits the characteristic bias of marketplace economics against governmental intervention in production and distribution. It is still more noteworthy that Schumacher scarcely touches the central issue of how to achieve the radical reforms which he deems imperative. Nevertheless, both books should be interesting and useful for political scientists. For example, Hines gives a comprehensive exposition of the expanding role of public authority in strategies for reduction and control of water pollution (chap. 10), air pollution (chap. 11), and disposal of solid wastes (chap. 12). He also includes a detailed case study of the interactions of public authorities and private parties, and of the uses and misuses of cost-benefit assessment, in the development of hydroelectric projects in the Snake River, Idaho (chap. 7). Schumacher demands changes in attitudes and practices that would almost certainly entail major expansion of governmental control over individuals and corporations. In short, both books pose problems for students of government who concern themselves with the substance of environmental politics.

The books reflect a core of common concerns, as well as contrasting perspectives, presuppositions, and prescriptions. Hines is primarily interested in abating pollutions, but does not ignore the salience of depletion. Schumacher gives more attention to depletion and ecological disruption, without ignoring the importance of pollutions. Hines speaks from a perspective close to, though mildly critical of, the party line of hard-core marketplace orthodoxy. Schumacher rejects most of the core doctrines of received marketplace theory, "calling its every assumption into question, right down to its psychological and metaphysical foundations" (p. 3).

Hines's stated objective is "to appraise environmental pressures in the United States, to determine the role of the government and of the market economy in environmental deterioration and its abatement, and to examine the range of corrective actions that are available . . ." (p. vii). He reviews the historical roots of today's environmental crisis, assessing the contributions of industrialism and of population growth. He deploys the tools that marketplace economics offers for arresting further environmental deterioration. He neither rejects nor defends very strongly the thesis that continuing economic growth is a necessary condition of environmental repair and protection. But he does summarily dismiss the alternative prescription of a steady-state economy, calling its advocates "well meaning but heroically naïve cranks" (p. 77)—which many of them manifestly are not! The book concludes with a sketch of worldwide issues, and a quick look toward the future, predicting that "the year 2000 will usher in an era with many more people, with the world still divided between rich and poor, with industrial output rising, but the natural environment more barren save for the abundance of man and his many works" (p. 330). One wishes the author had examined a little more closely whether all these conditions can occur simultaneously upon our increasingly crowded, depleted, polluted, and ecologically disrupted planet.

To this question Schumacher answers emphatically *no*. Production and acquisition of material wealth, he says, have become the "highest goals . . ." (p. 277). These reflect a philosophical posture (sanctified in both Marxist and marketplace theory) that recognizes no concept of "enough," only "more" (p. 23). Relentless pursuit of "more," he asserts, is acceleratively ruining our habitat, eroding communities, uprooting and disorienting people, and propelling humankind along a course that is injurious and self-defeating, to say the least (p. 31).

No business, Schumacher contends, could squander its capital and survive. Yet this is precisely what individuals, corporations, and governments are doing with "capital" extractable from the earth (p. 13). He emphasizes in particular the accelerative consumption of fossil fuels. These "are not made by men; they cannot be recycled. Once they are gone, they are gone forever" (p. 15). To seek escape via nuclear-fission energy is "to 'solve' the fuel problem" by creating an "environmental and ecological problem of . . . monstrous magnitude" (p. 18).

In the larger context of the world community, Schumacher finds the energy policies and practices of the "rich" populations especially injurious to the "poor." The former are "stripping the world of its once-for-all endowment of relatively cheap and simple fuels," with devastating impact on the prospect for relieving hunger and destitution in most of the Third World (p. 25).

There is a great deal more in this hard-hitting book. One must read it to experience the thrust of Schumacher's indictment of "growthmania" and the economic structures through which this ethic is given expression.

These books are prime exhibits of the intellectual chasm that separates scholars of unimpeachable competence and genuinely shared concerns whose philosophical outlook and experience reveal to them widely variant images of the present and expectations of the future. No one today possesses the knowledge and clairvoyance to assert dogmatically which, if either, picture the future will confirm. My own hunch is that Schumacher's theses and speculations will be closer to what happens than Hines's will. I am, however, not an economist, only an ecologically oriented student of politics.

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The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays. By James Willard Hurst. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971. Pp. 291. $12.00.)

The literature on treason against the United States is extremely sparse. Therefore, this book by Professor James Willard Hurst is welcomed, both because of its able scholarship and because it is virtually one of a kind. While this work is, for the most part, a collection of previously published articles and essays, it is definitely not a scissors-and-paste job. Professor Hurst became involved with his subject during World War II when the Navy Department loaned him to the Solicitor General's Office in order to prepare background material for the first treason case heard by the Supreme Court, *Cramer* v. *United States*, 320 U.S. 730 (1943). From that research came a series of articles, organized on a chronological and developmental theme, that first appeared in law journals during 1944 and 1945. These constitute the first five chapters in the collected work. The final and more recently completed chapter, "Treason Cases and Doctrine, 1945–1970," is an up-date of the research and an effort to draw some generalizations. Since the various parts stem from a common core of research and from a sustained interest of the author, this book has coherence that is not always found in collected works.

Treason, like impeachment, has both legal and political dimensions that make it an appropriate subject of inquiry by the two most relevant disciplines—law and political science. Combining historical and analytical approaches, Professor Hurst deals with a variety of subtle and complex legal questions growing out of treatises, constitutional provisions, and cases relating to treason. But in a larger sense, his work is about politics for it explores the permissible boundaries of political conflict and competition, and the reciprocal obligations of individuals and states. The latter characteristics make the book relevant to political science.

One of the essential themes in Professor Hurst's work is an elaboration of the restrictive policy of the Founding Fathers embodied in Article III, Section 3, of the Constitution. This provision narrowly defines both the elements of the crime of treason and the quantum of proof necessary for conviction. The clear intent was to limit Congress to providing a penalty for the offense and to deny the judiciary the discretionary power to create "constructive treason"—that dread practice from English tradition. But why was treason singled out for such special treatment? It has been commonly suggested that the Founding Fathers were sensitized to the dangers of abuse by their recent vulnerability to charges of treason had their efforts at revolution failed; however, the painstaking documentary search of Professor Hurst points to a higher order of concern and perhaps a better explanation for the restrictive policy. There is evidence that James Wilson (who had witnessed excesses attending earlier trials for treason in Pennsylvania), Benjamin Franklin, George Mason, and other influentials at the 1787 Convention in Philadelphia viewed the limitations on treason as the cornerstone in a constitutional plan to protect political discourse and legitimate competition among domestic political groups. The objective was to strengthen the integrative forces of national politics by reducing the corrosive effect that the abuse of treason power would have. To these men, then, the constitutional policy on treason contained an unarticulated premise which was later made more explicit in the words of the First Amendment.

If these were the expectations of the Framers, then history must record that their high hopes were only partially realized. True, the narrow definition of treason still stands, and as a result less than forty prosecutions have been initiated by federal authorities. It might also be said that since *United States* v. *Aaron Burr,* 1807, and excepting two famous state prosecutions (Thomas Dorr by Rhode Island and John Brown by Virginia), no treason trial has created widespread alarm nor posed any threat to ordinary political processes.

On the other side of the ledger, political decision makers quickly learned how to circumvent the restrictive treason policy by the enactment of sedition and espionage legislation. The Constitution was less than ten years old when Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798; thus, despite the treason clause and the First Amendment, the young nation was subjected to the divisive forces that the Framers had hoped to avoid. Nor have subsequent generations been spared the tribulations of alleged subversion and sedition. And it may be noted that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were not and probably could not have been charged with treason, but they were convicted and executed for a violation of the Federal Espionage Act.

Since there has been no great volume of cases nor "hue and cry" on treason, why be concerned with this subject in the 1970s? Perhaps it is a part of our getting back to basics. Whether intended or not, it fits the current mood to reconsider the fundamentals of our political system, and the policy on treason is indeed fundamental. This book is not likely to make the best-seller list, but, then, who could have predicted the sales volume of Raoul Berger's *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problem* at the time of its publication? For those who wish or need to learn about the legal and political nature of treason in the United States, Professor Hurst has provided an excellent source.

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Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach. Edited by Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Schaefer, and Susan O. White. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1972. Pp. 391. $10.95.)

This is a collection of articles, most of which have appeared before in the pages of the *Law and Society Review* and elsewhere. A couple of these essays are already in wide circulation and well known to practitioners; others are less well known and likely to remain so. All bear on the elusive concept of legal obedience—how, when, and why can we expect people to conform in their behavior to what the law requires.

Like most collections of this kind, the general subject of inquiry is about all that links the essays together. The utility of such a volume lies not in its theoretical integration but in the diversity of efforts and the breadth of research it represents. And in that respect this is a good, and useful, book. It provides samplings of compliance studies from several disciplines. As a group, these studies remind us that the empirical investigation of legal compliance is still in its infancy. Of course, the subject is as old as the law itself, and the problem it represents is endemic to all organized societies. But it is only recently that enough empirical work was under way even to contemplate a volume like this.

For the political scientist one message of these essays is clear enough: the theoretical payoff of single case compliance studies is distinctly limited. However interesting such case studies may be, the antecedents of compliance are to be found in more general inquiries about citizen attitudes toward the law and perceptions of the legitimacy of institutions and policy outputs, studies of personality types and group behavior, and other long-term factors. This is not to deny the validity of situational factors which are generally described in cost-benefit terms. There is as yet no general theory of law-abidingness which could explain the presence or absence of compliant behavior. But there is enough evidence to suggest that a predisposition to obey the law, either expressive of, or related to, a general feeling of obligation toward the system, is indeed characteristic of most citizens, and probably associated to some degree with actual compliance. Thus if we are to do more than merely describe how citizens respond to a particular law or Supreme Court decision, we must understand something of the compliance phenomenon generally.

Willingness—or ability—to comply with the law is a necessary focus of impact/outcome studies. Yet as the editors of this volume clearly note, the concepts of impact and compliance are quite different. Impact comprises a wider range of phenomena over a longer period of time; compliance or noncompliance may be a part of impact; indeed it may determine impact. But rarely will compliance complete the impact equation.

The identity between compliance and impact is close where, as in the school prayer cases, the cessation of the prohibited behavior (prayers) fulfills all of the stated or reasonably inferable goals of the policy source—the Supreme Court. Yet even in this relatively discrete policy area one could trace the indirect impact of the prayer decisions *and* the initial response to them to the generation of new sets of policy demands and decisions in related fields. Did the prayer cases clear away enough debris to facilitate further attacks on the accommodationist church-state position? Or, alternatively, did it facilitate the accommodationist position (e.g., support Parochaid plans) by satisfying those who sought some symbolic reassurance of a separation between church and state? What impact did school prayer controversies have on local politics generally? Did the widely reported lack of compliance with these decisions affect dispositions toward law-abidingness generally? Or was noncompliance self-excused as a rule exception justified (or rationalized) by a perceived lack of legitimacy in the policy itself? As these questions suggest, and as Richard Johnson and others have noted, any policy decision normally evokes a range of responses, of which compliance is but one. But it is often the initial response and may well set the tone of what is to follow.

Not only is compliance merely one part of a larger set of policy impacts, but often it is itself a continuum of responses within flexible limits, rather than a dichotomous variable. This is one of the most difficult problems to be met in compliance research. When laws are not clear or specific enough in what they require, the determination that a citizen is not complying is necessarily subjective. Even when laws seem clear enough on their face, official discretion in enforcement renders subjective the citizen's obligation to obey and his calculation as to the possible costs of noncompliance.

Two additional major problems of research are reflected by and discussed in this book. The first flows from the assumption that, almost by definition, the behavior of most people most of the time conforms to the law. It would be easy enough to establish that a large portion of conforming behavior is just—and only—that. The law is simply superfluous to individual choice; it operates at most as a very remote reminder of theoretical consequences which might ensue if certain actions are taken. Technically such conforming behavior is not in—or more properly, "resulting from"—compliance with the law.

Some have argued that compliance with the law should refer only to behavior which is consciously and knowingly responsive to the law. But this is a very narrow view. It excludes a whole range of ways in which the law might indirectly be the moving force in securing, or setting the conditions for, compliant behavior. Beyond that, few people really "know" what the law is in a technical sense; they may simply assume that what they think is improper is also illegal. Often they are correct. Traffic laws generally are probably an exception. Thus, it makes some sense in the study of compliance with traffic laws to distinguish between compliance and mere conformity. But to do so generally would be to restrict unnecessarily the focus of research and our understanding of the complexities of law as an instrument either of social control or social change. Law does not operate only on the knowing few.

A second problem of research, as the authors point out, has both theoretical and empirical referents. We would expect some difference between citizens' attitudes toward the obligation to obey the law and some objective measure of their law-abiding behavior. Yet there are relatively few studies, and few opportunities in research, to measure compliance objectively at the individual level. The predominant empirical research efforts have dealt with traffic law violations precisely because of the ease of measurement. But it is very difficult to generalize from traffic law compliance to the more important and more political interfaces between law and behavior. One way of measuring the degree of compliance with "other" laws is by asking citizens directly. But here there are failures of memory, and possibly considerable intentional inaccuracy stemming from a fear of embarrassment or even exposure to legal sanctions. We have no way of verifying subjective scales of reported noncompliance. Thus, any conclusions drawn about the convergence of attitudes and behavior with respect to legal compliance are at best provisional.

As in so many other areas of research, longitudinal studies provide a unique perspective on the impact of law on behavior. Yet these are difficult to construct, and in most cases we are left with quasi experimental situations which, at least at the aggregate level, attempt to measure legal impact. Richard Lempert's article in this collection, already a minor classic in its field, is rich in suggestions for measuring legal impact generally and compliance in particular.

The very fact that a collection like this is so noteworthy is itself worthy of note. Compliance with the law is, after all, a paradigm of the meaning of political power. It is surprising how little effort has been directed toward a subject of such central concern. What little concern political scientists have shown has come primarily from two fields within the discipline—political philosophy and public law. As important as these two subfields are, and as important as legal compliance is to them, it is a subject worthy of much wider attention by political scientists. One hopes that this book and other current research is but a harbinger of things to come.

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Rebellion in the University. By Seymour Martin Lipset. (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown and Co., 1972. Pp. 310. $3.95, paper.)

S. M. Lipset's volume on American student activism provides a useful summary to the large amount of research on students done as a result of the "student revolt" of the 'sixties. Originally published in 1971, when the results of the 'sixties research were available and yet before the current period of quiet on campus was evident, *Rebellion in the University* catches the flavor of the previous decade. Like much of Lipset's other recent work, this volume combines historical research concerning American student activism, secondary analysis of sociological data (mainly attitude surveys), and some comparative commentary dealing with student activism in other countries. The result of this combination of methodological approaches is a stimulating volume which provides a coherent discussion of some of the key issues relating to student political activism.

A number of themes emerge from *Rebellion in the University*. The fact that students should be in opposition to some of the major directions of contemporary societies is not surprising. Lipset points to data which stress the "oppositional" proclivities of students (and to some extent of faculty too). Some of these data are drawn from attitude surveys of American students, which Lipset argues indicate that students are considerably more liberal in their social and political attitudes than other segments of the American population. Historical data are cited to indicate that students have long been involved in activism in the United States, although there is no major tradition of student involvement in national politics in this country as there is in many other countries, particularly in the Third World. Lipset argues that the major theme of student activism has been liberal in orientation and often linked to foreign policy issues.

While there have been variations in the degree and orientation of student activism in American history, Lipset argues that there are common themes. Criticism of the academic environment, and locally oriented agitation have been recurring elements in student activism. Beginning in the period after the American Revolution, students have criticized and occasionally attacked parts of the educational system. Concern with foreign policy questions was important not only during the 'sixties, when Vietnam was the overriding issue of the student movement, but also during the 'thirties, the other period of major student activism in American history. The overwhelmingly liberal subculture of the American university, Lipset argues, contributes to the leftist direction of student activism. In an interesting chapter on faculty involvement in student activism, Lipset points out that during the 'sixties faculty members were involved in a significant number of activist demonstrations and that the political orientations of the American professoriate are well to the left of the general population.

In a concluding chapter, Lipset comments that there are many common elements in student activism throughout the world, and that in general students have been a liberal or radical force in their societies. Students, and to some extent faculty members and other intellectuals, have traditionally been politically "unreliable" regardless of the orientation of the society. In the Communist countries, students have spearheaded antiregime activism, as they have done in right-wing dictatorships. Student activism is, furthermore, unpredictable and sometimes counterproductive from the liberal or radical viewpoint. Lipset quotes various pro-left spokesmen to the effect that some elements of the student movement of the 'sixties were damaging to the university as a free and autonomous institution and perhaps to the political goals of the student movement itself. He also points out that the occasional violent tactics of the student movement can create a backlash among conservative or moderate elements.

No major theories emerge from this volume. One has the impression that student activism, in the United States and elsewhere, is no passing phenomenon and that despite the current quiet on campus, student activism could easily become part of the political scene once more. The traditions of activism are strong, and the institutional and sociological prerequisites for activism exist in the universities. While the orientation of student activism is generally leftist, the exact issues or tactics which are used by the student movement are quite unpredictable. Lipset's discussion of the links between student activism and the institutional and intellectual environment of the universities are particularly interesting. Despite the many insights and the by and largely effective use of secondary data, the reader is left wondering what it all means. To some extent, this is not Professor Lipset's fault, as no coherent theory has emerged from the veritable flood of literature on students that poured forth during the 'sixties. *Rebellion in the University* at least provides a summary of much of this literature, asks some interesting questions, and posits a few answers. One may argue with some of these answers, but the book provides stimulating reading.

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Who Makes the Laws? By David Price. (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972. Pp. ix, 380. $6.95.)

Twenty years ago Ralph Huitt demonstrated that a perceptive researcher could open up the inside of a Senate committee and explain how its members go about the business of lawmaking. Many students of the House of Representatives have followed Huitt's lead and exposed the internal operations of virtually every major house committee (and several minor ones). Now, with the publication of David Price's *Who Makes the Laws?,* students of the Senate and national policy making have a major work to place along side Huitt's work and the literature on the House. Professor Price's work on the Senate will, it is hoped, help stimulate more research on the Senate to bring our knowledge of that institution up to the level attained for the House.

The core of this book is a comparative analysis of 13 major bills handled by three Senate committees during the 89th Congress (1965–1966). But the book is not a plodding recitation of the legislative histories of these bills. Price treats his material within a broad theoretical framework that allows him to make suggestive generalizations about the role of the Senate and its committees in policy making. In the process, he demonstrates a nice feel for legislative politics, records numerous doubts about the tendency of political scientists to overgeneralize about the policy-making process, and develops an analytical framework that should prove useful to other students of national policy making. The book is marred only by occasional philosophical digressions about intentional behavior, phenomenology, and "human nature." Since these concerns are not fully developed nor central to the analysis, they strike the reader as rather jarring asides. For the most part, though, Price sticks close to his rich, unpretentious framework. The result is a rich, unpretentious book.

Instead of raising such global questions as which branch of government dominates legislation, Price develops a sixfold functional scheme of the policy-making process, and uses it to organize his materials. In order for proposals to become law, they must be *instigated and publicized, formulated* into specific remedies, and studied (*information gathering*). *Interest aggregation* and *mobilization* of support (the distinction between them is not too sharp), and *modification* of proposals, demarcate three additional phases of policy making. There is, of course, some similarity between this list of functions and Lasswell's well-known categories (intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, termination), but Price makes a persuasive case that since the legislative process is a thoroughly political process, the rather bloodless Lasswellian categories will not do.

In the course of exploring policy making in terms of these six functions, Price teaches us a great deal about the Senate Committees on Finance, Commerce, and Labor and Public Welfare. The Senate legislative process emerges as a messy and fascinating struggle among a vast number of interested parties. The policy process varies from committee to committee and even within committees from bill to bill. In the end, however, some generalizations emerge that neither strain the analytical schema nor merely support the conventional wisdom about Washington politics.

One of the most interesting findings is that even during the 89th Congress the legislature played a vital role in the policy-making process. The executive tended to perform the information-gathering function, and the committees tended to dominate the modification function, but the most impressive feature of the process is the extent to which most of the functions are shared by the executive and legislative branches of government. This, of course, poses difficulties for Lowi's theory of policy making based on the distributive, redistributive, or regulatory content of policy. Shared functions defy neat typologies but perhaps come closer to the reality of the situation than any of the models currently in vogue.

Many of Price's findings, as he himself makes clear, are limited by the nature of the case studies examined. All 13 bills were relatively major items, but some were more major than others. The time span is limited to one Congress, and only three committees are examined. Still, there is much in this book that confirms Polsby's suggestive theory about the capacity of the Senate to play an innovative role in policy making, to act as a crucial nerve-end of the polity. Those interested in the struggle to understand the Senate and how national policy is made would do well to read Price's book in the context of Polsby's theory. If such efforts are continued, the oft-heard lament about how little understood the Senate is compared to the House may soon be inaccurate.

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Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820. By Donald L. Robinson. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1971. Pp. xii, 564. $13.95.)

The political confrontation between North and South over slavery has traditionally been viewed as a conflict that began in the 1820s and 1830s. The founders of the American republic allegedly believed that the slave system of the South would stabilize and erode, and that it was therefore possible and politic to create a national government without coming to grips with the issue. But the unexpected vitality of slavery upset these calculations and set the stage for eventual conflict between the sections. The confrontation finally began when the application of Missouri for statehood threatened to disturb the balance of power in the national government. Most studies of the Missouri controversy stress the political calm that preceded the confrontation, and the eagerness of political leaders of both sections to keep slavery out of national politics.

Professor Donald L. Robinson, in *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820,* rejects this familiar analysis. He shows that slavery was not a dying institution at the time the American republic was founded, and that the decision of the founders to avoid challenging the system was based, not on confidence that it would gradually disappear, but on the conviction that slavery and racial bias were beyond political solution. The founders persuaded themselves that unless slavery could be excluded from national politics, the new republic would soon be torn apart by sectional conflict. But many of them also knew that by masking the contradiction between their racial practices and their professed ideals they were bequeathing a corrosive legacy to posterity. By failing to face the issue squarely, they implanted irreconcilable conflict at the very heart of the nation's political system.

The attempt to keep slavery out of national politics failed completely. Robinson shows that the issue was never dormant, that it surfaced repeatedly prior to 1820, and that the bitterness displayed on both sides poisoned political processes from the beginning. He traces the slavery conflict to the very inception of national life during the Revolutionary War. The slave system weakened the South militarily and inspired resentment about the relative contribution of the sections to the war effort. When the scene of battle shifted southward in 1779, Southerners resented the failure of the Continental Army to leave its northern base and come to their assistance. Northerners, for their part, deplored the failure of the South to offer effective resistance to the British invasion.

Robinson stresses the continuity of the slavery issue in the years following the war. He shows how sectional differences over slavery helped to define sectional attitudes on other issues that confronted the nation. It affected foreign relations and domestic policy alike; it was the issue that cropped up continually and divisively as the new nation struggled to take hold. The author draws an excellent portrait of differences in temperament between Northern and Southern leaders—differences that could be ascribed to slavery, and that raised the level of acrimony by several decibels.

This is an immensely valuable book, not only in the wealth of detail it provides, but in its penetrating analysis of how national policy evolved in the period before 1820. The writing and organization are admirable. Every chapter, indeed every paragraph, is carefully conceived and lucidly presented. Robinson has been able to separate the substance from the rhetoric of political conflict. The result is a reliable, comprehensive account of how slavery affected major political developments in the United States from the Revolution to the Compromise of 1820.

Despite its many excellent qualities, the book is sometimes flawed by discursiveness and an occasional loss of topicality. Material is included that has only a tenuous bearing on the slavery question, such as the description of military campaigns during the Revolution, intersectional rivalries under the Articles of Confederation, and the details of debates in the Constitutional Convention. If handled more concisely, these digressions might have provided useful background; they are carried to such length, however, that the book sometimes goes beyond the stated purpose of the author. This is not to say that the surplus material is not interesting and ably presented, only that it occasionally shifts the emphasis of the book out of its proper focus.

But such criticism is only minor in view of Robinson's overall achievement. He has written a thoughtful work of meticulous scholarship that not only illuminates a dark chapter of the American past but also speaks cogently to the present. Filled with ideas and fresh interpretations, it adds significantly to our understanding of the racial dilemma that has plagued this nation from the beginning. The book cannot be praised too highly.

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The Political Economy of Urban Poverty. By Charles Sackrey. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973. Pp. xii, 172. $6.95, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

This is an interesting and engagingly written volume by an economist who has done his subject-matter research well, and has, in addition, suffused his analysis of the political economy of urban poverty with a considerable amount of soul searching. It is a peculiar blend of several approaches, themes and styles. The elements in the mix include: a criticism of the work of many of his academic fellows in economics and generally in the social sciences; a penetrating and lucid discussion of the explanations which economists and others have offered as the causes of urban poverty; a polemic on the state of America's social order dripping with moral indignation; and an introspective political essay on the dilemma of a would-be and sometime rebel against the existing political and social system who, finding unacceptable the immorality of the means which the revolutionaries seemingly have to employ, must, therefore, come to some kind of terms with the realities of engaging in "liberal reform."

The author himself describes his work as ". . . an introduction to the study of these urban poor and possible solutions to their most serious problems. It is a work in 'political economy' in the sense that it combines an analysis of the economic factors which cause poverty with a discussion of the implications for political activity which are inherent in all such analyses" (p. 1). "These poor" are those millions of Americans whose poverty Professor Sackrey considers one of the most offensive characteristics of the social order which proclaims to have found the true path to material welfare. The relationship between this condition and his political economy concerns are obvious.

Sackrey reviews the methods by which we have determined the number of poor in the country and whether or not those who fall into the poverty category have increased or declined during recent years. He disagrees with both the methods heretofore used and the findings which followed.

His disagreements with the measurements of poverty that are in vogue stem from their concentration on income as the principal index of poorness, and the fact that what is being measured is absolute poverty rather than relative poverty. Beyond income, poverty must be measured in the disparities in services of various kinds and the character of the opportunity lacks which beset those who are poor and make their lives different in kind though the income differences may seem to be only matters of degree.

In order to make the poverty statistics tell you what reality is, Sackrey insists that they must be related to a meaningful explanation of the causes of the real poverty. In reviewing the causes from those clustering around the "unheavenly poor" theories to those stemming from the various econometric theories, he is bitingly critical because they explain in terms of variables without examination of the causes of the variables themselves. In short, they either paint a picture based on values which are accepted as given without examining the values themselves or explaining them against the backdrop of a social and economic system whose nature is simply accepted as a given. This sets the stage for his review and analysis of the causes of poverty as explained by the radical theories of poverty. These theories, he explains, are radical in that those economists offering them believe that "poverty cannot be eliminated in an advanced capitalist country" (n. 31, p. 30). In his elucidation of this theme, the author deftly and rather thoroughly introduces the reader to the body of radical literature which may be unfamiliar to many.

Since in Sackrey's judgment the black urban poor exemplify the worst evils of poverty in America, he devotes the bulk of his attention to them and the various explanations for the state in which that population grouping finds itself. The theories of black poverty he reviews fall into two main categories: the "liberal academic" explanations, which result in solutions to be pursued within the framework of the industrial capitalist system; and the "radical theorists" who see poverty as a consequence of the existing system, as wealth is the consequence of that same system. I find some weaknesses in his critique of the "academic liberals," and note that he misses some of the political implications of *those* explanations and the programs that flowed from them. The radical theories which were earlier touched upon are again elucidated forcefully and with discernment as he gives a detailed criticism of traditional economists' shortcomings. In a brilliant chapter on "Economics and Black Poverty" he pursues the explanation of his claim, "Show me your model and I'll tell you your politics."

In an unusual concluding chapter that serves as his political testament, Sackrey introspectively explains his embrace of and then his rejection of the radical political behavior that followed from his acceptance of the methods and conclusions of the radical political economists. He emerges with a willingness to accept the style and the program essence of the liberal reformer. Space does not allow for a full explanation of his rationale, nor for a description of his modified "academic liberal" program. Its major elements are a black economic development program, a guaranteed annual income, and a strategy for a nonviolent antipoverty politics that builds on some of the things to be learned from the anti-war movement of the '60's, the women's movement, and the counterculture politics.

This is a book aimed principally at students and designed to be most useful in conjunction with classroom pursuits. I do not know Professor Sackrey, but I would bet that he is an interesting, stimulating, and respected teacher.

SEYMOUR Z. MANN

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Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753–1776. By David Curtis Skaggs. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1973. Pp. 253. $12.00.)

In recent years, numerous political scientists and historians have researched in or borrowed from each other's discipline. Studies by scholars such as Burnham, Converse, and Pomper reflect an interest in the American past, while many historians have used political science concepts and methodology to examine electoral and legislative behavior in earlier periods of United States history.

David Curtis Skagg's book should be considered within this perspective. In focusing upon the question of whether colonial Maryland was or was not becoming a democracy in the years before the American Revolution, Professor Skaggs deals with aspects of electoral behavior and political leadership. Examining these topics in the first part of the book, he contends that many persons did not qualify to vote, because of a property qualification, and that political offices were controlled by the rich. From this evidence, he concludes that prerevolutionary Maryland was not democratic. The second part of the book, a narrative contingent upon the findings in the first section, traces the movement for democracy during the twenty-three years preceding the revolution.

Professor Skagg's attempt to define democracy rigorously and his efforts to collect and analyze a vast array of data are commendable, but his arguments are unconvincing. The discussion of suffrage reveals little awareness of recent findings on that subject. The examination of officeholding is far from complete since many offices are not included in the analysis (pp. 85–89). Frequently used terms, such as "radical," "moderate," and "conservative" are not defined (pp. 141–153, 176). Many calculations are based upon incorrect assumptions, e.g., that all Maryland counties had the same population breakdown as the colony overall (pp. 40–41). Statistical terms, including "average" and "correlation," are misused (pp. 41, 89, 217–219). All of these shortcomings undermine his conclusions.

As an example, he contends that about half of Maryland's white adult males could not meet the property qualification for voting (pp. 44–46). He concedes that there are no voting data for the period to verify that assertion (p. 20) but attempts to support it indirectly. There are, however, available election returns for the 1790s, when the property qualification was still in effect. In this period, voter turnout in some counties exceeded 90 per cent of the white adult male population, suggesting that few were actually disfranchised. Turnout was markedly lower in other counties, but the differences seemed to be more related to the presence or absence of competing political organizations that actively sought popular support. Where such organizations contested, turnout was generally high. Where they did not, it was low. This pattern suggests that an examination of suffrage has little substance without also considering whether elections were contested by broadly based political organizations.

This, along with other difficulties in the book, introduces more fundamental questions. By focusing upon the subject of democracy in prerevolutionary Maryland, Skaggs has attempted a subjective, difficult to resolve investigation. How do you determine precisely what is or what is not "democratic?" What is the basis for the comparison—that is, democratic or undemocratic relative to what? What is actually substantiated if a society is shown to be more or less "democratic?" A rigorous definition, by itself, cannot fully resolve such questions.

Professor Skaggs's emphasis on democracy was, then, unfortunate. In light of recent studies and the data he collected, there were, certainly, other analytical possibilities. By utilizing a variety of concepts and employing careful methodology, he could have dealt with other, more substantive issues. How relevant was the suffrage qualification? Who served in the numerous county level political offices not examined? What kinds of persons provided the leadership in the various groups that contested for power prior to the Revolution? Were there voting blocs in the colony's legislature? Skaggs has not resolved the question of to what extent colonial Maryland could be considered democratic and, by focusing upon that issue, he has left other potentially interesting questions unanswered.

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The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914–1970. By Robert Sobel. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972. Pp. xiii, 257. $9.00.)

This book is the seventh in the Greenwood Press series, *Contributions in Economics and Economic History*. It is readable and sticks to its point, which is to trace the main changes and general movements in the world of American business organization and experience from the early 20th century to the conglomerate era of the early 1970s. Had the book been written now it would no doubt contain a concise account of the international oil firms, their growth, and the organization of their cartel. As it stands, the obvious latest chapter in Mr. Sobel's book is missing.

The subject matter is the preserve of a very small group of academic specialists. Most economists and economic historians know little or nothing about the changing fine-structure of American business. So this little book fills a need. Possibly without being fully aware of it, Professor Sobel advances some striking theses and suggestions. For example, he maintains, supported by his selection of evidence, that the major oligopolies developed in the 1920s best withstood the erosion of the 1930s, and even experienced no little amount of growth in that period (pp. 126, 135, 136, 152). He is particularly good on the linkages between war-time government activities (in all four of our 20th century wars, and the Cold War as well) and subsequent developments of the specific connections between government and major business firms that resulted. Numerous well-chosen examples are given. Sobel's range of interest is shaped by the flow of new industries arising from changes in technology: organization, ownership, development linkages, entrepreneurship, these are the major foci of his interest. Furniture manufacturing will not be found here, but chain stores, automobiles, petrochemicals, motion pictures, TV, semiconductors, computery—these are covered. I found the book a fascinating "short course" on this subject. The book's blemishes are few enough so that they are startling when they occur, as in the discussion of international finance after World War I: ". . . the United States had emerged as the strongest financial power in the world, while Great Britain, whose pound still financed a large number of international transactions, was in stagnation and decline" (p. 82). That sounds vaguely like the author was not really sure just what it was he wanted to say. But such lapses are few. Sobel places a greater emphasis upon the vagaries of central-bank policies as causal elements in business conditions than would be considered tasteful by some economists. On the other hand, he is clear-eyed about the tendency for concentration and oligopoly to be the harbingers of business success in the modern American economy without taking a moral stance on this subject, which is so repugnant to the true believer in academe. Sobel also sees the steady expansion of government participation by way of controls, as a natural political consequence of these developments. I would recommend this book to any reader who wants a fast and accurate introduction to modern business history.

JONATHAN HUGHES
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Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy. By Stephen P. Strickland. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 329. $9.95.)

The growing maturity of political science is shown in the increasing concern of our colleagues in policy formulation and questions of policy outcomes; the best of this work reveals a fusion of methodological and theoretical sophistication with detailed examination of present and approaching issues of national interests. An excellent example of this type of work is the present volume. In the execution of his "brief history," Mr. Strickland makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the policy formulation process, especially in revealing the three-way relationship which combines legislators, high-ranking federal bureaucrats, and advocates of powerful if little-known interest groups. But more significantly, Strickland provides us with useful insights into the forces and ideologies which shape national health policy. The book could not have been more welcome, for it comes at a time when a series of legislative initiatives are under way in the health-care field; and while the study does not deal with national health insurance, those who are concerned with providing a new direction and set of alternatives in the health-care sector should read *Politics, Science, and Dread Disease* as a guide for their legislative efforts.

Strickland presents an account of the personalities and organizations which have shaped and directed federal cancer research policy. The arena is Congress, and the actors include subcommittee chairmen in both houses, top bureaucrats from the National Institutes of Health, and several representatives of private interest groups. The ubiquitous Mary Lasker is a dominant character, although Strickland makes it clear that other lobbyists were important and that none was able to control cancer research legislation. The key to control—and especially congressional appropriations—apparently is the medical researcher: physicians and scientists are brought before subcommittees by competing advocates, and they offer expert, recent, relevant advice—often incorporating information obtained from within the National Institutes of Health or one of its agencies but presented with apparent objectivity.

For those, and I confess to being one of them, who wonder about the criteria which congressional decision makers employ in arriving at their positions on highly technical items such as national cancer programs, Strickland's research, if we are willing to accept it at face value, is reassuring. He explains Congress's propensity for increasing medical research budgets above the figures requested by the Executive as reflecting substantive knowledge, certainty of goals, and sophistication regarding the technical aspects of reaching the proposed goals. Moreover, Congress would not have gone along with subcommittee increases, Strickland argues, had the subcommittees not vividly and comprehensively documented the need and adduced the proper scientific evidence.

Strickland's analysis emphasizes the formal actors and organizations; little mention is made of the broader forces of national politics, intraparty rivalry, or public opinion. Indeed, except for an occasional defeat of a key congressperson or an opinion poll, the public, whether ordinary citizens or members of a health related interest group such as the American Heart Association or the Cancer Society, seems to have played no role at all in national cancer policy. It may be that the author's concern with key congresspersons, bureaucrats, and lobbyists caused him to discount or ignore the "attentive public." But I suspect that few individuals beyond the handful of officials, politicians, and researchers discussed in the book were or are today even remotely involved in federal medical policy formation. Nor is the public especially welcome. When lobbyists attempt to inform the public and draw it into the struggle, politicians apparently resent the effort. Strickland reports that when in 1971 the American Cancer Society placed a full-page advertisement in major newspapers urging its point of view on the electorate, the ad created sharp indignation among the members of the House subcommittee, leading to the threat that the Society might have jeopardized its right to tax-exempt status by spending funds to educate the public in order to attempt to influence the votes of its representatives. The ignorance and noninvolvement of the public and the "old boy" style of decision making are the most striking general revelations which emerge from this account. It is regrettable that the author did not directly confront these issues; but his work does offer directional signals for further research.

In sum, Strickland has produced an important, useful, and timely study of an important national issue. It is a model of the successful application of social science techniques and of literate, sensitive writing. The result is a volume that should be read and used as a guide by others.

JERRY L. WEAVER
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To The Victor . . . : Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House. By Martin and Susan Tolchin. (New York: Random House, 1971. Pp. 370. $7.95.)

Much of the recent interpretive writing on American politics has argued the view that the process by which public policy is formulated and executed is more sensitive to narrow considerations of political advantage than to long-run conceptions of the public good. Different writers have located the sources of this condition in quite different places. Mills, for example, located it in the relationships between economic, political, and military elites. Lowi, on the other hand, attributed it to the pulling and hauling of interest groups, a process which he says has been legitimated by academic theories of the political process. In the volume under review, Martin and Susan Tolchin, the former the City Hall Bureau Chief for the New York Times and the latter a member of the political science department at Brooklyn College, point to an old and much abused bogey—the patronage system.

The thesis of the book seems to be that political leaders are only able to maintain themselves in office by promising to deliver to potential supporters a range of material benefits that are at their disposal. In turn, citizens become dependent upon such benefits so they have little choice but to support the politicians that deliver them. Written in the muckraking tradition, the book sets forth its argument through a series of anecdotes which purport to detail the adverse consequences of patronage at every governmental level. The authors offer numerous examples of how political appointments, contracts and preferments, and governmental expenditures are used to solidify the positions of incumbents. Though the authors note that "patronage can be used for good or evil" (p. 26), most of their comments are decidedly critical. The main problem with patronage in their view is that it leads to a system of unplanned and irrational policy making as leaders barter policy in exchange for political support.

As a remedy for this condition, the authors suggest a form of reverse patronage which would "harness government's enormous reward powers on behalf of rational planning, and on behalf of the public interest" (p. 311). Thus, they speak approvingly of Mayor Lindsay's proposal to use New York City's $11 million worth of holdings in General Motors stock to pressure the company to limit the pollution created by its automobiles. In addition, they suggest that state and federal monies be withdrawn from companies and institutions that practice discriminatory hiring. The latter is, of course, already being done in some areas.

Most readers will find it difficult to understand why the burden of guilt and the responsibility for change must be laid at the doorstep of patronage, especially since most studies of the subject have indicated that patronage now plays a much diminished role in the incentive structures of party organizations. The source of the confusion is that the Tolchins adopt a rather expansive definition of patronage. The conventional notion is that patronage is some material benefit, such as jobs or contracts, that political officials can distribute at their discretion. The authors, however, seem to look upon patronage as any exchange of political goods, which means that all policy becomes a form of patronage. Thus, when Mr. Nixon attempted to ease the pressure for integration in the South, he was actually doling out patronage: "What the Southern strategy amounted to in concrete terms was a massive payment, on a kind of patronage installment plan, of what Nixon considered his major political debt: his election to the Presidency" (p. 282). The argument that patronage is responsible for fragmented policy making thus hinges upon a dubious notion of what patronage actually involves. If the authors are suggesting that leaders exchange policy for political support, then there is not much to argue. But if they are suggesting that this is all a form of patronage politics, then the argument is difficult to accept.

The book is apparently not addressed to an academic market, for the authors do not attempt to deal seriously with the scholarly literature that has grown up around the issue, some of which actually defends patronage. For example, they do not consider the impacts upon party organizations that follow from the uses of material and nonmaterial incentives to recruit activists. The use of material incentives tends to give an organization greater flexibility in defining goals, selecting strategies, and formulating policy. If one believes that parties should be office-seeking organizations that respond to electoral pressures, then a case can be made for patronage in the conventional sense. The authors seem to believe that party leaders should respond primarily to some notion of the public interest without reference to electoral pressures, so they adopt a critical outlook. However, they do not appear to appreciate all the implications of this view.

The book is competently written, and it contains a number of interesting anecdotes about the abuses of patronage. It would not be a bad choice if one is interested in some supplementary reading on the subject, but if one is looking for some solid scholarship on the question of patronage, then one must look elsewhere.

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Federal Evaluation Policy: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs. By Joseph S. Wholey et al. (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1970. Pp. 134. $2.95, paper.)

Evaluation procedures and techniques are rapidly becoming of critical importance in the development of national social policies and in the administration of federal social programs. To insure that these policies and programs meet the demanding requirements of American society, it is imperative that agencies of government analyze their programs to determine the various consequences—in other words, to measure their successes and failures in achieving national objectives. It has long been evident to students of public administration that the federal government—and, for that matter, state and local government—has barely begun to develop the systems and methodologies necessary to produce viable assessments of this kind.

In this short volume, Wholey and four fellow policy analysts on the Urban Institute staff set forth their study of federal evaluation policies—concentrating on the organizational framework, the methodologies, and the amounts of national resources expended during the 1968–1969 period under investigation. Their research was funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and was carried out in close cooperation with the Executive Office of the President and the four agencies scrutinized: the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Office of Economic Opportunity; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and the Department of Labor.

The authors point out early in their study that "the most impressive finding about the evaluation of social programs in the federal government is that substantial work in the field has been almost nonexistent" (p. 15). They elaborate by declaring that those few previous evaluation studies were so poorly conceived and carried out with such a lack of uniformity of design and objective that the findings have not been related to or reflective of the problems confronting the makers of public policies. No comprehensive federal evaluation system exists. For example, the authors observe:

> Even within agencies, orderly and integrated evaluation operations have not been established. Funding has been low. Staffing has been worse, forcing undue reliance on outside contractors by agencies that lack the in-house capacity to monitor contract work. The most clear-cut evidence of the primitive state of federal self-evaluation lies in the widespread failure of agencies even to spell out program objectives. Unless goals are precisely stated, there is no standard against which to measure whether the direction of a program or its rate of progress is satisfactory (p. 15).

With this indictment as prologue, the study moves on to a brief but thorough discussion of the chief kinds of evaluation (program impact, program strategy, etc.), alternatives to evaluation (field experiments, experimental demonstration), and those activities that are evaluation-related (monitoring, reporting systems, cost analysis). Succeeding chapters examine the administration of an evaluation system; organizational relationships and responsibilities; the resources appropriate and available for purposes of evaluation; methodology (research design and method) for achieving sound techniques of evaluation. Each of these sections contains rather extensive lists of recommendations—related to the evaluative process—that the authors strongly believe should be widely adopted by federal agencies and departments.

The concluding chapter to this "cookbook-y" approach to evaluation contains an extensive review of the major recommendations for enhancing the ability of federal officials to analyze comprehensively the effects of their myriad public programs.

This administrative repair manual, while sometimes dull and plodding, has its moments of great insight, and the many remedial measures set forth are sound and capable of relatively rapid achievement within our bureaucracy. This work clearly belongs to the fast-growing list of volumes concerned with "inside public administration" and should be read (whether with enjoyment or not) by both students and practitioners of the craft, especially those administrators who want to achieve the objectives of various government social policies with the least amount of human or financial resources.

In fairness to our bureaucrats, it should be acknowledged that the authors relate that a significant measure of change and improvement has occurred in evaluation techniques in the agencies and departments investigated since this study was initiated. Presumably, this increased sophistication and improvement have been eagerly promoted up to the present time.

Within its limited terms of reference, this volume does a most creditable job of touching on the principal characteristics and problems associated with the evaluative process and of stimulating the serious reader to further works on this general topic by means of an excellent select bibliography.

JOEL R. DICKINSON
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Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence, Analyses for Nine Countries. Edited by Weston H. Agor. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 576. $22.50.)

In the 1960s, when area studies were in bloom, irrigated by public and quasi-public money, "research agendas" began to appear in the land in great number. A recent one, calling for analysis of the "characters, roles and functions of national legislatures" in Latin America, led to this book. Eleven papers are collected here, all by young scholars (the oldest doctorate dates from 1963, near the zenith of the Ford Age). The collection aims at testing two propositions described by the editor as aspects of the conventional wisdom: (1) the view that Latin American legislatures are "rubber stamps, marginal to the decision-making process in the region," and (2) the view that the same legislatures are "obstacles to political and economic development" (p. xxvi).

It is hard to see how both these views can be held at the same time concerning the same legislature. Perhaps the editor meant to say that the assumed consensus view was an either/or proposition: Latin American legislatures, to the extent that they are not rubber stamps, are obstacles to development. So reformulated, the conventional wisdom emerges from these eleven studies not only unshaken but supported.

The nine legislatures studied are divided into three groups: the "modal cases," in which the legislature is weak in decisional influence (Venezuela, Colombia); the "deviant cases," in which the legislature is "relatively influential on a world scale" (Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay); and the "transitional cases," in which the legislature either demonstrates "increasing decisional influence" or has been closed down since 1960 (Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru). Since the book's publication, of course, Chile and Uruguay presumably have fought their way out of the "deviant" class and into the "transitional" class—although calling a legislature transitional when its doors have been closed by the generals is at least ironic.

It is the thesis of Terry McCoy's paper on Peru that the Congress has, indeed, played a significant role in Peruvian political life. That role, McCoy carefully shows, has been negative, impeding presidential action to the point where civilian government is paralyzed and military intervention unavoidable. Congressional power and independence, then, imply obstruction of development; Peruvian development proceeds when Congress is removed as an independent influence. Score one for the conventional wisdom. The cases of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile demonstrate that generals, too, are capable of failing the development test—but in none of those countries could it be argued seriously that the pre-coup legislature had been anything but an impediment to development.

Brazil's Congress was permitted to continue functioning in the immediate aftermath of the military coup of 1964. Robert Packenham's paper identifies a number of functions which the Congress performed during the period before 1966, when its role was reduced to near zero: (a) legitimation; (b) recruitment, socialization and training; and (c) decisional functions. The latter function, drastically reduced, was largely limited to a House-of-Lords style articulation of interests. But the legitimation function, as Packenham analyzes it, was an important one. In other words, the Brazilian Congress after 1964 made its most important mark on political life simply by continuing to meet, simulating an independence that helped legitimize the generals. It bears emphasis that any such legitimation by a rubber-stamp Congress is necessarily a short-term affair. The legitimacy so conferred is a wasting asset, dependent on a popular illusion of congressional independence, an illusion that becomes progressively harder to maintain as genuine independence recedes into history.

If Peru and Brazil are "transitional" cases, that term is used not in an historical sense but to describe phenomena lying somewhere between what the editor calls the "modal" and "deviant" cases. The vocabulary is dictated not by history but by science. In fact, much of the book consists of efforts at quantification and scaling. Thus we learn that in Argentina

> the fathers of legislators who completed their university training tended to be professionals, whereas those fathers who attended, but failed to complete, the university and those with a secondary school education usually entered the sphere of commerce or business (p. 209).

And in Guatemala, rightists have more university training and foreign-travel experience than do leftists (pp. 308, 314). In Venezuela, one "cultural variable" influencing the output levels of the Senate is the tradition of "multiple career patterns" (pp. 485–86). But do Venezuelan Senators do little because they have other jobs, or do they keep their other jobs because the Senate is a trivial place, offering them little to do?

The McCoy and Packenham papers, which I found the most useful, reject such sorties into science in favor of telling us what has happened in Peru and Brazil. They prompt me to suggest a formula as a guide to readers of this book. It is: $U = 1/Qv \cdot Qs$ in which $U =$ the utility of the paper, $Qv =$ the volume of quantification and Qs the sophistication of quantitative method.

My other major complaint goes to the near-absence of any discussion of the substantive interests at stake in the political systems studied. McCoy does tell us why the various actors acted as they did, what interests they were defending, and the like. And Ernest Duff, in his paper on Colombia, does treat briefly two "case studies" of the issues of agrarian reform and constitutional amendment. But even here the assumption seems to be that, at least in the context of land reform, legislation and the political process are the same thing. Colombia, of course, is the archetypal model for the proposition that one of the most effective instruments for avoiding a land reform is a land reform law.

Perhaps it is an old spouses' tale that Latin American legislatures are either ineffective or obstructionist. Nothing here convinces me that the tale is false.

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Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. By Robert J. Alexander. (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1973. Pp. 367. $12.00.)

Professor Alexander has produced an important addition to the literature in English that is helpful in explaining Latin American politics. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, according to Alexander, "is the most important political philosopher and ideologist of the democratic left that Latin America has had in the present century" (p. 3). Rereading Haya in Alexander's translation after 25 years confirms this judgment. Haya wrote more than 16 books and hundreds of articles, and Professor Alexander has carefully selected and translated the heart of this corpus. He includes sections about Haya's theory of historic space-time, about the Aprista movement's program, about the kind of political parties Latin America needs, about what kind of political machinery Peru should have, about democracy and dictatorship, about why the Latin American republics ought to unite into a federated state, and about what the relations of the future united Latin America ought to be with the United States of America. For each section of the book, Professor Alexander has provided an introductory note which synthesizes the material, and in a 27-page introduction he reviews Haya's life and the history of the Aprista party which he founded and has led for fifty years.

Haya de la Torre's political philosophy blends ideas about the unique character of Latin America with the general ideas of Western Christianity and European Marxism to create what he calls Aprismo. Haya's great contribution has been to emphasize that Latin America is different from Europe and the United States and therefore must cease imitating their political and economic institutions. He argues that most of Latin America's political leaders have always sought their inspiration and their models in foreign lands and not in the reality of Latin America. Thus, political, religious, and economic systems that had developed in Europe and the United States were introduced into Latin America where they failed, producing turmoil and backwardness. Haya emphasized that the Latin American leader must begin to base his programs on the true character of Latin America and develop political and other institutions which fit the customs of the people and were not copies of United States Constitutionalism, Soviet Communism, Adam Smith's free enterprise, Maoism, European Christian Democracy, or any other foreign model.

By 1974 most of the intelligent leaders of Latin America have accepted this concept first publicized by Haya. In Peru, a military dictatorship is introducing practically all of the specific planks of the Aprista program except democracy.

Haya de la Torre came to his ideas because he never seemed to be able to fit Peru into the European scheme of dividing world history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods. Haya was born in Trujillo, a small city on the Pacific coast of Peru located near the ruins of the pre-Colombian city of Chan-Chan. Where, he kept wondering, does Chan-Chan fit into the European scheme of world history? When the Peruvian dictatorship exiled Haya in 1923 he went looking for the answer to this question. In Russia he discussed Communism with the leaders of the Bolshevik Party; in Germany he observed the Nazi Party; in Italy he looked at Fascism. He spent long years studying in England, but he never found the answer to his question of where does one fit the indigenous people of America into the European scheme of world history. Whenever he looked at Peru he saw that half of the population continued to speak Quechua and Aymara, to wear its traditional clothes, and to follow its age-old customs. Haya kept wondering why this should be until he decided that there were two cultural groups in Peru which had to be blended into a new synthesis which would be truly Peruvian and neither traditional Indian or imported European.

It was from his speculations about the place of the Indian that Haya developed his philosophical concept of historical space-time. According to Haya, there is in each country a certain rhythm or spirit or collective consciousness which its people develop as a result of all the influences to which they have been exposed: historical, geographical, climatic, etc. This "X" quality which Haya named historical space-time motivates a people so that they develop in harmony with their historical space-time despite the introduction of social institutions from another area. The conclusion for Haya is clear: Latin Americans must cease copying the world and develop in harmony with their true character.

The only serious criticism of the book is that it lacks selections from Haya's writings about the connection between the means used to come to power and the ends achieved. Haya has always insisted that political leaders must not seek power with the gun, that only elections are valid means of creating governments, and that political leaders must learn to be responsible in opposition before they can serve successfully and responsibly in power.

Professor Alexander identifies many of the obscure references in Haya's text in footnotes and adds a very short bibliographic note. Unfortunately there is no index. This is a valuable book for understanding Latin America.

HARRY KANTOR

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Realignment of World Power: The Russo-Chinese Schism Under the Impact of Mao Tse-tung's Last Revolution, Vol. I and Vol. II. By Oton Ambroz. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1972. Vol. I. Pp. 338, Vol. II. Pp. 406. $12.50 each.)

Dr. Oton Ambroz, "a veteran journalist and political analyst on communist affairs," (quotation from jacket flap) has combed through and made use of a wealth of contemporary source materials to write a timely two-volume work. Sometimes his ready use of quotes tend to stifle the flow of his major ideas and concepts, but nonetheless, it does seem to bolster his main conclusions.

Dr. Ambroz believes that ideology is far from dead in our world. He makes the point, correctly in my opinion, that neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China believes ideology to be a receding element in either domestic or international affairs. These two Communist states are vying with one another for leadership among those countries now governed by Communist authoritarian governments and among those developing countries whose people may be susceptible to Communist promises. Dr. Ambroz assumes that this battle for ideological supremacy will continue and intensify in the future. He sees no compromise.

Ideological differences, however, form only part of the schism between the two largest Communist countries. Their "national-imperial" interests also meet head on, and in the view of Dr. Ambroz, this conflict is "much more important than . . . ideological squabbles" (II, 291). His quotations from Soviet sources on this are most compelling.

What all of this amounts to is that the author throughout his work is building up the case that the differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are well-nigh irreconcilable. He cites quotation after quotation from Chinese and Soviet leaders, magazines and newspapers which back up this contention. The rhetoric from both sides does seem overwhelming and definitive.

I do not dispute the fact that tensions between the USSR and the People's Republic of China are at a fever pitch or that the existence of such tensions will continue. A word of caution, however, may be in order. We have seen seemingly irreconcilable differences between states diminish almost overnight and make possible a *détente* if not an actual *entente*. This is particularly true for countries with similar political and social systems, as in the Soviet-German agreements of August, 1939. After all, as Dr. Ambroz makes clear in the preface of his work, quoting Professors Brzezinski and Friedrich, "fascist and communist totalitarian dictatorships are basically alike" (I, xiii). While the Soviet-Nazi arrangement was not long lasting, it did work for a time, during which the map of Europe was redrawn, Nazi power furthered, and Japan's decision to move southward in Asia toward confrontation with the United States brought closer.

A number of scenarios for the future of Sino-Soviet relations can be written ranging from military conflict, as one extreme, to *de facto* alliance as well as the present *de jure* alliance, as the other. Publications in Communist China today are carrying articles which indicate that differences exist within Chinese governing circles in part at least over China's international affairs. How deep and far-reaching these differences are, and to what extent they may presage a change in policy with a change in leadership is unknown to the outsider. It might be well for us to remember, however, that nothing is permanent in this world, even differences that appear to be irreconcilable.

Having made the above point, I should add that I support Dr. Ambroz's view that the Russo-Chinese schism is the essential element in what he terms the "realignment of world power." Without this schism, the United States could surely not have moved with any degree of success, as it has, to open relations with Peking and to better relations with Moscow. The United States has skillfully taken advantage of the Moscow-Peking confrontation to reduce tensions by adopting a negotiating attitude toward the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. These negotiations, however, can only be fruitful if the United States maintains her military strength and alliance structure. Negotiating from strength, after all, is essential for the United States and its allies during this period of changing relationships between and with Communist states. Those concerned with international affairs and America's role in world politics should read Dr. Ambroz's well-documented work on the Sino-Soviet dispute and the effect of this dispute on the global power structure.

GASTON J. SIGUR

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The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines. By Harvey A. Averch, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 234. $8.00.)

This is a sophisticated exercise in quantification. The book is devoted to the discussion of the perceptions of the political system, electoral politics, the "lurching" economy, crime, and dissidence. Thanks to their sponsorship by the AID and RAND, the authors (economists with the NSF, Rand and A.I.D.) had access to all sorts of official and semi-official data. They also relied on a stratified random sample survey especially carried out for them in 1969.

Rather triumphantly, the authors found the Philippines to be quite the opposite of what most observers, foreign and local, had pictured. The political system was "stable—hard to change and unlikely to disintegrate" (p. 26). The public, politicians and bureaucrats "all know what to expect from one another"; hence the political system "is responsive to the needs of the people . . ." (p. 45). As for the economy, its growth was "respectable" and "[spreading] broadly across the country" (p. 69). Unemployment was largely illusory as it was "concentrated in quite specific groups" (p. 75), affecting mostly individuals who had never been employed before. In short, "unemployment does not appear to be a widespread and mounting economic problem" (p. 78). Although the level of violence was *"relatively high"* (p. 120, italics in original), there was no crime wave and crime had actually been decreasing. Violent crime was largely related to politics and was "determined principally by ethnic factors and proximity to Manila" (p. 126). Finally, dissidence, primarily that of the Huks, had become only a "nuisance" to the government. The success of the HMB "rests in large measure on what they do rather than on the condition of . . . society . . ." (p. 150).

With these rather startling findings, the authors make a very strong claim for the virtues of rigorous empirical methods—in this case principally factor and regression analyses. Indeed, they seem to be saying that not much was actually upsetting in the Philippines (and other LDC's as well?) other than the inadequacy of data and analysis. There is of course a great deal to be said for the greater use of quantitative analysis and the dearth of reliable information is almost inherent in underdevelopment. The trouble is that the authors seem to have been too obsessed with their initial contractual commitment to the promise of quantification.

For one thing, there is too much ingenuity in the analysis. The authors consider the finding that 82 per cent of respondents perceive at least some politicians to be corrupt (Table II, p. 32) paradoxical in terms of the revelation that 90 per cent value honesty most in their candidates (p. 36). At any rate, the latter, together with another finding that 73 per cent of the respondents acknowledge the influence of government on their daily life and that 53 per cent of these also believe that their life would be worse without government activities (p. 28) is supposed to indicate political contentment. The authors simply dismiss an unemployment rate of about 38 per cent by saying that many of those considered jobless are simply without well-defined jobs and "are, by Philippine standards, far from destitute . . ." (p. 77). They also dismiss the less-than-bright national accounts as at best ambiguous. Economic growth is equated with the growth of the noncraft "modern labor force" in "regular, visible establishments" which happened to increase by about 60 per cent between 1960 and 1968 (Figure 8, p. 87). Most interestingly, the authors support their optimistic conclusion about dissidence with the fact that the respondents in the affected areas were not openly less respectful toward the government than other groups (pp. 136–8).

The book is also clever in a more fundamental way. Why did the authors choose to concentrate on those issues presented in the book? Why did they elect to analyze these particular aspects of those problems? Why, for example, should the size of the modern labor force be more indicative of economic development than, say, the standard of public health? No serious justification is offered. It is intriguing how the authors touch and then push aside such questions as the distribution of income and wealth, and social and economic disparities among the provinces. In the face of new and more active dissident movements in various parts of the country, the concentration on the Huks is, to say the least, puzzling.

Judging from their torrential condemnation of almost all aspects of the old society, one has to conclude that the leaders of the New Society do not share the authors' view about the contentment of the populace. Of course their rhetoric might have been merely tactical. But they could not have been simply the victims of the alleged general delusion, for they had at least been familiar with the authors' findings some time before September 1972. Indeed, Marcos himself had used the earlier RAND report version as the basis of the central chapter of his 1971 manifesto, *Today's Revolution: Democracy*.

The inherent shortcoming of a book like this is its innocence. We surely need good data, but one set of data may be more relevant or significant than another, equally rigorous set. Different analysts may not look at the same things or the same aspects of the same things. Exactly the same data may also be interpreted and evaluated differently. Certainly many students of development do not put much value on the size of the modern labor force as an indication of development. Marcos clearly knew that the highly personalistic politics was relatively stable but he obviously did not think it too hard to change.

One fashionable ideological stand is shared by the authors and the Marcos revolutionaries. Whatever it is, development is supposedly best achieved technocratically through the "politics of trying to be above politics." Such an approach is doomed to failure.

MOHD. A. NAWAWI
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Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War. By Henry Barbera. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. xiii, 213. $13.00.)

Some years ago, Theodore Caplow argued most persuasively that because of its reliability, accessibility, and congruence with alternative measures, telephones per capita should be adopted as the best single index of socioeconomic development. Professor Barbera, who is evidently one of Caplow's former students, has utilized the same measure as his sole dependent variable in an inquiry as to "whether or not war affects development and, if so, to what extent" (p. 2). His conclusion, supportive of what he terms the "irrelevant hypothesis," is that "the two total wars of this century have neither helped nor hindered development or noticeably affected the inequalities between rich nations and poor" (p. 121). The main thrust of this review will be to consider whether shortcomings in the author's research design and execution have yielded results that some readers will view as somewhat surprising.

Barbera examines four main characteristics of nations in the developmental hierarchy over the 40-year period, 1913–1952: *order* ("the relative rank stability of nations"); *integration* ("the diminishing of relative spread of nations"); *progress* ("the relative speed of material improvement"); and *satisfaction* ("the reduction of relative stress") [p. 28]. Each characteristic is evaluated by means of a single statistical test: order by product-moment correlation of the arrays at different points in time (1913/20, 1913/25, 1938/47, and 1938/52); integration by comparing coefficients of variation for each of the six years; progress by calculating regression (slope) coefficients for different groups of nations through time; and satisfaction by comparing ratios of "ranks involved in change" to "the number of nations that have changed ranks" (p. 109). The latter procedure, as might be expected, yields rather inconclusive results since the author himself confesses that he intends to "leap from an objective fact, rank changes, to a subjective state, stress" on the assumption that "an analysis of rank change will provide clues as to what a dominant subjective state might be" (p. 109). Furthermore, he evidently assumes that the *perception* of rank change by a nation's citizens will occur simultaneously with the *fact* of such change, thus ruling out the more than likely possibility of a time-lag relationship between the two phenomena. Collaterally, in evaluating rank stability, he appears oblivious to the commonly recognized problem of autocorrelation in calculating r-coefficients for time-series data; while in evaluating material progress, he does not consider the possibility that beta coefficients may be noncomparable because of scalar differences in arrays that are apparently unstandardized.

There are other problems that worry me. For example, Barbera's sample consists of 70 territorial units, including some two dozen that have only recently become independent and one (Mozambique) that, as of this writing, is still dependent. For many purposes, of course, the precise composition of the sample may be irrelevant if the latter can be defended as being reasonably representative of a larger universe. Crucial to Barbera's analysis, however, is his categorization of nations by "degree of war participation," which is operationally based on "years of involvement." This leads, however, to some distressing anomalies, such as the fact that India's degree of participation in World War I is coded the same as that of Germany, and that Ceylon's participation in World War II is construed as being equivalent to that of Belgium.

In addition to the matter of validity, Barbera also has some problems of comparability, as evidenced by his somewhat astonishing assertion that "it is quite legitimate to compare West Germany in 1952 with the Third Reich in 1938" (p. 26). In this case, it would have been a simple matter, for the one variable involved, to have analytically "reunited" the two contemporary Germanies in order to approximate comparability with the interwar state.

It is also difficult to see why Barbera felt constrained, in a time-series analysis, to limit himself to the year immediately before and the second and fifth years after World Wars I and II. Given the nature of his dependent variable, relevant *annual* data were certainly available, data which the author merely tells us he chose not to use "in the interest of parsimony and personal judgement" (p. 47). The decision may have been unfortunate, since my own test (based on annual data) of a portion of Barbera's analysis yields overall congruence with his findings for the first 12 years after each war, but a slightly widening "gap" between the rich nations and the poor thereafter. The latter results (which are admittedly inconclusive, at this point) would suggest that Barbera's rejection of the "negative hypothesis" (that war is developmentally dysfunctional) should be carefully re-examined.

Finally, while both Caplow and Barbera are probably right in identifying telephones per capita as the best *single* measure of development, it is obvious that it is not the *only* measure that might be so employed. Indeed, as I have indicated elsewhere ("Industrialization and Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 22 [January 1974]), a variety of quite different longitudinal trend lines, exhibiting markedly different patterns of "gap" between rich nations and poor, are possible, depending on the indices being employed. Most importantly, the "gap" (for the modern period) fluctuates *least* when communications indices are utilized.

Single measures are easier to work with and are intuitively more appealing than are composite measures, but they can rarely be construed as valid operational indicators of complex empirical phenomena, and when so employed, they have a tendency to yield either inconclusive or erroneous research results. Professor Barbera has produced an interesting (and remarkably well-written) book, but a more sophisticated analysis is required if his conclusion is to be substantiated.

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Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai. By Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972. Pp. 280. $1.95, paper.)

When China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began in the spring of 1966, "Dai Hsiao-ai" (a pseudonym) was a student leader at an elite upper-middle school in a suburb of Canton. By summer, participation in the Cultural Revolution occupied most of the students' time. Red Guard units were organized, and students patrolled the streets of Canton, confiscating or destroying items in people's homes which struck them as representing traditional or Western influences. Soon Dai and his comrades participated in "revolutionary tourism" in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai and elsewhere, combining sightseeing and adolescent hi-jinks with revolutionary activity.

Despite his enjoyment of these experiences, Dai became disillusioned with much of his political environment. Dai and his student comrades, perhaps like their counterparts in the United States, were struck by the relative conservatism of workers, peasants, and soldiers, who, according to Maoist doctrine, should be the most revolutionary of classes. The People's Liberation Army (PLA), which Dai and his fellow students had been taught to idolize, became the leading political authority at Kaochung middle school, and far from behaving like the spearhead of the revolution, suppressed the more radical of the student factions, of which Dai was the leader.

> In January and February [Dai wrote] we had risked our lives. Several of my fellows had been injured . . . and now we were penned up in the school while the army, our former heroes and models, consorted with conservative bastards. We had virtually succeeded in seizing power, in making a true revolution. Now the bastards had thrown it all away. . . . I was actually being attacked and suppressed by the very authorities to whom I had dedicated my life. It seemed they had used me and then cast me aside when I ceased to be of value to them. My bitterness knew no bounds (pp. 206–208).

In anger and disappointment, Dai returned home to his peasant family and discovered that the revolutionary activities which had dominated his life and thoughts for the past year and more had had little impact on his home village. The villagers complained constantly about their hard life, and about the scarcity of food. "To them Mao meant only compulsory grain deliveries, long hours of work for little reward, and movements which wasted the nation's time and money" (p. 214). Dai's own arguments in favor of the revolution were dismissed by the peasants. Exhausted, angry, thoroughly disillusioned, he grasped at the chance to escape to Hong Kong, where some relatives lived. Yet Dai did not become simply an anti-Communist exile, Bennett and Montaperto tell us. Still a close follower of events in China, he did not give up his commitment to the goals of Communism and the Cultural Revolution, though he continued to question the institutions and personalities expressing those goals in China today. Indeed he often also questioned his own decision to leave his country and his people in the midst of their struggle to build a new and better way of life.

Professors Gordon Bennett and Ronald Montaperto have performed an important service for everyone interested in contemporary China by arranging for Dai to write down his account of the events in which he participated, by translating it, and by providing informed background material on the course of the Cultural Revolution nationally as a backdrop to Dai's own experiences. The value of *Red Guard* lies not in providing new information about the Cultural Revolution but in recreating the ambience of that movement as seen and felt by a single active young citizen.

Since *Red Guard*'s most absorbing and useful sections are the long quotations from Dai's own accounts of his experiences and his reactions to them, Bennett and Montaperto's basic decision to present his account as it stands rather than to "correct his biases" seems a wise one. Yet their introductory comments suggest that even so they may have intruded on Dai's account more than would have been desirable: "When we felt that his views on a given matter were too one-sided or that they differed markedly from other sources, we asked him to reconsider his position. . . . In the two or three cases where Dai was intransigent, we have tried to explain why this might have been so" (p. xiv). A straightforward presentation of Dai's one-sided views, with Bennett and Montaperto's comments appended as notes, might have been preferable, distinguishing more clearly between Dai's recollections and impressions and the authors' own reconstruction of events.

In sum, *Red Guard* offers a unique perspective on the Cultural Revolution, and it is well worth the attention of those interested in understanding the meaning and impact of this movement on the lives and minds of China's new "generation of revolutionary successors."

SHELDON APPLETON

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Politics in New Guinea. Edited by R. M. Berndt and P. Lawrence. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973. Pp. 430. $15.00.)

This collection of papers is long overdue in publication and as a result suffers in content and presentation. The idea for the book was conceived in 1955, given multiple and lengthy birth in *Anthropological Forum* from 1965–70, and finally appeared in toto in the Australian edition in 1971 and the American edition of

1973. Thus the book's main title, *Politics in New Guinea* has become less appropriate than it would have been in 1955: with the expansion in the numbers of local government councils and the formation of the House of Assembly, "politics" in this book takes on a more specialized and restricted sense. It is a book "for the professional anthropologist" and "for those who are vitally concerned with Papuan-New Guinea political administration and government" (p. xviii). Although it is recognized that the papers "do not lend themselves easily to the anaysis of contact problems," it is claimed that the book is relevant because New Guinea cultures "have an influential role in contemporary politics" and "shape the attitudes of New Guineans toward the Western political institutions" and thus the book "provides an insight into New Guinea political values and processes in the emerging protonational situation" (p. 24). How valid is this claim?

The book could be useful for political scientists in two ways: it could provide information about particular people and particular areas, or it could provide a way of interpreting present reactions to political change. It is not completely successful in either role. It suffers as an informational resource from an inadequate index. Proper names are not always included, and while it could be argued that some minor characters should be excluded, others of district or national renown should have been included (e.g., Siune, p. 218; Jim Taylor, pp. 211, 258). Other groups are also excluded from the index (e.g., police, pp. 107, 243; Dani of West Irian, p. 248) as are topics such as education (pp. 216, 279), cash cropping/employment (p. 288) and ideology or norms (pp. 292, 298, 281) to name but a few. On a similar technical point, it would have been more convenient for readers if references to the other papers now collected here had been to the book itself rather than to their original references in *Anthropological Forum* (e.g., pp. 313, 319, 396).

The book is also not completely successful in interpreting political change. The research for some papers was carried out before the Second World War (e.g. Kaberry, Oliver), and while some of the papers were originally written in the mid-1950s (e.g. Kaberry, Oliver, Burridge, Lawrence, Berndt), the others were written in the mid-1960s. The varying Administration penetration pattern meant that some authors began their research when an area had been exposed to introduced institutions for some time (e.g., Oliver, Burridge, Chowning and Goodenough), while others first investigated the situation after an area had had only a few years of first-hand European contact (e.g., Berndt, Lowman-Vayda, Reay). Thus the degree to which the "traditional" societies had been affected by missions or by the Administration and its police and its appointment of officials vary, and the papers themselves vary in the time period they deal with. Watson's paper deals with a leader who died before the establishment of an Australian administration post in the area and thus is more of historical interest. Burridge's paper, on the other hand, shows the way in which the mission and the Administration have affected village life and that Administration-sponsored activities are generally only successful if the role of New Guinean official is combined with that of "traditional" manager (pp. 109–10). Unlike these papers however, Reay's paper stands out in making little concession to the uninitiated reader, and while making useful points about clan land as a resource in political competition, possibly requires the reader to have more background knowledge of the situation in the Wahgi Valley.

Generally the relevance of these papers to an understanding of present-day political processes in the "emerging protonational situation" in Papua New Guinea is tenuous and implicit rather than explicit. They outline the varying leadership patterns in their areas but are concerned with local, parochial issues, not district-wide ones. However some points have immediate application. In an area which recently has seen an increase in clan warfare and the burning down of coffee trees, it is noted (p. 306) that in the 1930s invaders of a village did not consider they had properly destroyed it until the trees (hand planted, individually owned) had been ring-barked. The 1973 Papua versus New Guinea football match which, like an earlier occasion, led to brawling and interregional fighting, could be interestingly compared with the use of football matches as a form of retaliatory action among the Garia of the Madang District (p. 88). Such points of immediate relevance, however, are few and far between.

This collection of papers thus has less relevance for political scientists than would have been the case if it had appeared when first mooted. It is to be hoped that the companion volume being planned on "contemporary political development" in Papua New Guinea (p. xvii) does not have such a long gestation.

PETA COLEBATCH
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Comparative Legislatures. By Jean Blondel. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973. Pp. 173. $7.95, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

The field of comparative legislatures is virgin territory, devoid of extensive theoretical work or empirical analysis. On a world map, imaginary dots would litter the landscape with studies of the political parties, bureaucracies, socialization processes, or cultural attributes of disparate nations. But few indeed would be the imaginary dots symbolizing non-American studies of nations whose legislatures have received systematic study as institutions. Fewer still are the crossnational studies seeking to compare and contrast legislatures. Against this backdrop, Jean Blondel has published *Comparative Legislatures.* The book is both a contribution to the discipline and a disappointment.

The first contribution Blondel makes is contained in the data he has collected—covering more than 100 countries in all regions of the world. For example, the appendix includes the following:

1. Constitutional Characteristics of Legislatures: size of lower chamber, voting restrictions in selection of legislators, nature of the party system, form of government, procedural independence of the legislature, emergency power of legislature, power and basis for selecting second chamber, existence of dissolution, power to remove executive, field of legislative jurisdiction.
2. Activities of the Lower House: number of days of sittings, number of bills passed, number of committees, percentage of members who participate on the floor.
3. Social Background and Turnover of Legislators: age, sex, profession, socioeconomic status, turnover.

Given the number of countries involved and the data collection problems that exist, Blondel has achieved a significant feat. It is the most extensive collection of data specific to legislatures of which I am aware. Based on these data, Blondel compares the general characteristics of legislatures across the 100 nations. These comparisons provide useful information establishing the parameters of legislative tendencies in the world and aiding the area specialist by placing particular legislatures in a broader perspective.

The second contribution Blondel makes is likewise impressive. He cuts through much of the haze on legislatures and their supposed impotence to emphasize their resiliency and to argue for a more realistic evaluation of their contributions to modern government. One of the main reasons legislatures have not received significant study (outside of the United States Congress and a few western parliaments) is because modern political analysts have become disheartened by the inability of legislatures to legislate—that is, to initiate, formulate, and pass public policy. The ensuing disenchantment has led comparative analysts to forsake legislatures as relics of the past. Blondel takes issue with this disenchantment, arguing that the "yardstick" by which analysts should determine the significance of legislatures should not be "whether the legislature 'really' passes all the statutes or even most of the rules of the country, and whether it is in a 'real' position to make and unmake governments." Blondel maintains that these are simply not the real "functions" of legislatures. "The function of the legislature is to provide a means of ensuring that there are channels of communication between the people and the executive, as a result of which it is possible for demands to be injected into the decision-making machinery whenever they exist and for the executive decisions to be checked if they raise difficulties, problems, and injustices" (p. 135). In his emphasis on the "constraining" and "informing" functions of legislatures, Blondel renews a perspective as old as Bagehot and Woodrow Wilson. And while he may oversimplify the ability of legislatures to inform or constrain executives when the legislatures lack real law-making powers, still Blondel directs us more clearly toward the real empirical question in regard to legislatures—not whether they fulfill expectations but whether they have systemic significance.

Unfortunately, serious shortcomings detract from these very important contributions. The basic problem is that Blondel's focus is so broad and comprehensive as to be misleading. Legislatures in dictatorial systems are included along with those in electoral systems. Basic comparisons are made along quantitative scales that may have totally different qualitative meaning in the different types of systems. Blondel recognizes these problems in his chapter on "The Methodological Difficulties of the Study of Legislatures," but the recognition does not seem to penetrate all of the study. And while focusing on the broad comparisons, Blondel avoids a systematic examination of legislatures in those electoral systems where they are generally more significant and where greater knowledge about them exists. For example, there is no full scale treatment of the nature of legislatures in parliamentary versus presidential systems; there is only cursory discussion of the role that committees play in legislatures, with little attempt to characterize and compare committee systems; the central role that party organizations and party systems often play in legislatures receives causal reference rather than rigorous investigation; and no feel is generated for the internal workings of legislatures or their varying decision-making processes. A student unfamiliar with such matters would scarcely find enlightenment in *Comparative Legislatures.*

Thus my evaluation of this book is mixed. Blondel chose to range widely across the untended field. That choice is understandable at this stage in comparative study of legislatures. Certainly "clearing away the underbrush" is a necessary task that Blondel performs well in places. But in the end Blondel has left us only a fallow field. Significant advancement in our understanding of legislatures now requires comparative attention to their inner workings. More limited comparative studies are necessary delineating the different types of organizational structure that exist, the influence of structure on internal behavior and external role, the relation of internal behavior to external authority. *Comparative Legislatures* is a useful reference in these tasks but it makes the work no less pressing.

LAWRENCE C. DODD
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From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism. By C. Ernest Dawn. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 212. $8.95.)

When George Antonius, with a skillful sense of the scope which personal interpretation allows the historian, wrote dramatically of the last weeks of 1918 in the Middle East, "The War was won, and for the first time in its history, the Arab national movement stood abreast of its destiny" (*The Arab Awkening,* New York: Capricorn, 1965, p. 276), he referred to a movement which may have been more amorphous than his objectives led him to disclose. In these collected essays, Professor Dawn examines critically the political origins, ideological aspirations, leadership, and membership of the Arab Revolt and the Arab nationalist movement. His argumentation and his conclusions often differ from those of Antonius.

Three main themes form the core of Dawn's investigations: first, that defense of an injured Eastern self-view against the West served as the catalyst for an examination of the causes of Eastern weaknesses; that defense of this injured self-view embodied, for Ottomanists and Arabists alike, a defense of Islam as a civilization; and that intra-elite conflict rather than class pressure or class change animated the adoption of Arabism by certain Arab leaders.

These themes are given support in Dawn's detailed examination of more specific items. In his analysis of the leadership of the Arab Revolt, the author raises the issue of the relationship of Arab nationalism to the Revolt and finds an indirect rather than an organic connection. Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, is convincingly portrayed as an artful dynastic opportunist for whom Arabism and a British alliance were seen to serve the same ends as Ottomanism previously had—the preservation of his freedom of action in the Hijaz at the expense of his Arab rivals. In Dawn's opinion, the Hashimite leadership did not develop ideological support for these actions through the use of Arabism as a consciously revolutionary ideology. Rather, both Husayn and his son Abdullah, on whose memoirs Dawn relies heavily, justified Arab rebellion out of a concern for Islamic reform and revival.

Outside the Arab peninsula, the development of an ideology of Arabism among more sophisticated theorists took a similar course. Dawn argues that a sense of ethnic nationalism emerged as a result of efforts to overcome the gap between East and West through the revitalization of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic civilization of which it was the guardian. Paradoxically, however, thinkers like Abduh and al-Kawakibi, in seeking the original dynamic of Islam, could not but emphasize the Arab element to the exclusion of others. As a result, "the theory of Arab nationalism thus grew out of the modernist diagnosis of Moslem decline and prescription for Moslem revival" (p. 140).

If the Hashimite leadership was motivated by dynastic considerations while Islamic concerns dominated the thoughts of Arab Ottomanist reformers, who were the Arab nationalists before 1914? In a densely packed essay, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria," Dawn explores this question of participants. He posits social attributes as indices of Arab separatist versus pro-Ottoman behavior in the years before 1914. Through a comparative, and heavily qualified, use of biographical data, the author eliminates as determinative the variables of age, education, and class. Instead, he finds that the holding of government office was the crucial factor determining political orientation—those Syrian Arabs with state positions tended to be pro-Ottoman while those without them, even if wealthy individuals, favored Arab nationalism. Dawn feels that what was essentially a traditional intra-elite conflict thus took on an added dimension when defined in terms of the new ideology of Arabism.

Given what the author says about the origins of the Arab nationalist movement, it is not surprising to find him asserting, in a challenging concluding essay, that Arab economic and social structures have experienced fewer disruptions in the years following World War I than other scholars have maintained. In particular, the behavioral scientists are chided for their claims to have discovered emerging classes. Dawn's interpretation provides a needed corrective to the historical periodization which tends to see all Ottoman influences among the Arabs terminated by the collapse of the Ottoman state and the creation of separate Arab polities. He shows clearly that the postwar Arab political leaders were mainly individuals who had supported, because they served, the Ottoman Empire during the War. Implicit in this analysis is a recognition of the lack of revolutionary legitimacy of the new Arab states. Nevertheless, one would have liked to have seen more supportive evidence for certain of the concluding generalizations, especially those on the limited impact of urbanization and the upper-class origins of most Arab army officers.

These essays, the richness of which can only be suggested here, constitute a truly significant contribution to the study of Arab nationalism. While the bulk of them has appeared previously, they retain their freshness and their collection in book form is most welcome. In his skillful use of sources and his carefully constructed argumentation, Dawn has produced essays which are not only important studies on the origins of Arabism, but also models of historical analysis.

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Serfs, Peasants and Socialists: A Former Serf Village in the Republic of Guinea. By William Derman. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 304. $12.00.)

Life for the average citizen of the Republic of Guinea has undergone profound—and even traumatic—changes since Guinea's historic "No" vote in the referendum of September 28, 1958. That vote made Guinea the first of the former French territories in Black Africa to reject membership in the nascent French Community. It made Sékou Touré, Guinea's volatile young president, a hero to much of the Third World and its sympathizers, and led to the collapse of General de Gaulle's grand design for a new relationship between metropolitan France and its overseas territories.

At the time Guinea embarked on its lonely and courageous adventure as an independent state, hopes were high in many quarters of the world for the success of the new nation. Virtually everyone in the American academic community then writing about this small country in West Africa readily acknowledged that Guinea's importance as a political entity far exceeded its relatively modest size (97,000 square miles; 3 million population in 1959). Its principal leaders at the time—Sékou Touré, head of the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG), and his two principal opponents, Barry Ibrahima (called Barry III), former head of the Guinean branch of the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain* (MSA), and Barry Diawadou, leader of the *Bloc Africain de Guinée* (BAG)—appeared willing to subordinate their differences to the common good and to work through Touré's PDG which had won a triumphant victory at the polls in the territorial elections of 1957.

Guinea, at the time it became independent, excited the imagination, for it held forth the promise of being a place where bold and innovative programs would be tested for the social and economic advancement not only of its own citizens but also of Africans everywhere. This new order in Guinea proclaimed itself proudly and defiantly as a society that would be both more humane and more just than any other—precolonial or colonial—which until then had held sway in the country.

Unfortunately—and for the people of Guinea, tragically—that promise was never fulfilled. Today, seventeen years after it gained its independence amid such hope and fanfare, Guinea remains what it has progressively become under Sékou Touré's ruthless dictatorship: a land of economic stagnation, political turmoil, and personal terror—a kind of West African Haiti.

It would be unfair to evaluate William Derman's book *Serfs, Peasants and Socialists: A Former Serf Village in the Republic of Guinea,* by the criteria used by political scientists, for Mr. Derman is an anthropologist. His book, based upon a doctoral dissertation prepared for the University of Michigan, is pre-eminently an anthropological study of the changes that have affected the social organization, economic life, and life style of a Fulbe serf village in the Fouta Djallon region of Guinea. Insofar as Mr. Derman deals with anthropological data, the book provides a wealth of carefully researched and well-documented detail concerning such topics as the social and economic relations under the impact of French colonial rule and, subsequently, of the new national government.

The book moves along smoothly for the first two-thirds, but begins to falter when it reaches the section dealing with ideology. Judging from the word "Socialist" in its title, one anticipates a detailed discussion of the nature and impact of the PDG's socialist ideology on the Fulbe and on their attitude toward their government, not merely an anthropological survey of such phenomena as life-cycle ceremonies, sorcery, and the nature of Islamic tradition in Fulbe society.

What we do not get from Mr. Derman's book is a true sense of the direction that social, economic, and political changes have taken in Guinea under the policies (ambitious but often ill-conceived) formulated and put into effect by Sékou Touré and the PDG. From a work that aspires to provide insights into the effects of socialist ideology on the serf and peasant classes of Guinea, the reader has a right to expect a discussion of some of the more critical developments that have occurred in Guinea during the period under examination: for example, the result of the intensive politicization that has taken place under Touré's leadership and the control of the country by the PDG. One would have liked to get some idea of what the problems have been between Touré and the Soussou-Malinké constituency (which he originally represented) and the Fulbe who were their traditional enemies and, significantly, the largest ethnic group in Guinea. Mr. Derman, regrettably, provides us with very little information on any of these topics. In brief, what the book lacks is a sustained attempt to relate the social and political implications of the microcosm of a serf village to the macrocosm that is the rest of the country.

One senses, instead, that in these pages there is a conscious effort to avoid at all costs broaching any but the most innocuous subjects: those that will not risk giving offense to the authorities back in Conakry. One cannot but be understanding of the author's timidity, for Guinea is one of the most difficult countries in which to do research. Government officials, particularly President Sékou Touré, resentful of criticism of their régime, have for years placed extraordinary obstacles in the way of anyone wishing to conduct research in their country, especially Westerners. If a researcher does not abstain totally from making any value judgments not in keeping with the accepted views of the party leadership, he runs the risks of being denied access to essential sources of information, and even of being expelled from the country.

Unless there is a fundamental change in the present xenophobia on the part of Guinea's leaders (a development unlikely to occur until there is a change in régime), the best that the academic community can probably expect is additional methodical but nonprovocative studies like the volume under review. The really important things that are happening in Guinea today, the tumultous events that have wrought dramatic and far-reaching changes of profound significance to that society and to the larger polity which is Africa, are part of a story that still remains to be told.

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The Pattern of the Chinese Past. By Mark Elvin. (London: Eyre Methuen; and Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973. Pp. 346. $12.50.)

Historical science may progress in two ways which are complementary: by deeply probing monographs or by broad syntheses which provide a general interpretation for long-term developments. Mark Elvin has daringly chosen the second path and has succeeded in following it with flawless logic, clarity and brilliance, which win the reader's admiration, if not always his conviction, Professor Elvin's ambition is to offer a general view of the evolution of Chinese economy and society from the third century B.C. through the nineteenth century A.D., a view "into which studies on particular aspects of Chinese history can be fitted, and from the partial modification of which their findings should gain their deepest significance" (p. 319). The changing pattern of the economics of technology is made the central point of reference for reasons of "practical convenience" (p. 317), because it emphasizes the interrelationship between politics, warfare, economics, institutions and ideas, and helps the solution of some basic historical problems.

The book gives equal consideration to three fundamental questions, connected both logically and chronologically. First, the explanation for the size and survival of a united Chinese Empire is found in the ability of the Chinese to keep ahead of their neighbors in the main technical skills—military, economic and organizational. Second, the change of technological capacity itself—what Elvin calls the "medieval economic revolution"—resulted from the combination of progress in farming productivity, organization of water transport, money and credit, market structure and large-scale urbanization, science and technology. Third, if on the basis of the prosperity and high level of economic organization attained by the early fourteenth century, China failed to develop a socioeconomic system like that of European capitalism, capable of producing a more rapid, sustained growth rate of per-capita product such as Western nations achieved after the eighteenth century, the blame, contrary to the common view, is not to be placed on the shortage of capital, the smallness of the market, or political, bureaucratic, or cultural obstacles. In fact, from 1500 to 1800 China did experience a renewal of vigorous economic growth, but almost no technological invention. The reasons for this qualitative standstill are complex. They include a paradoxical "high-level equilibrium trap," whereby traditional means of farming, water transport, and market organization were so perfected as to constitute an obstacle to the expansion of per-capita demand and thus discourage investment of time and money in technological improvements.

The bulk of the evidence brought forward by Elvin to sustain his argument relies primarily on studies by Japanese scholars. It is mostly from their works that the quotations from Chinese documents which enrich the book are borrowed. Unfortunately, the author often forgets to mention the date and original location of those quotations, as well as the sources from which he compiled his otherwise useful maps, and to provide a systematic list of the bibliography referred to in his notes.

However perceptive and challenging, such a bold survey of a two-thousand-year history is bound to have its limitations and shortcomings. One could point out a few hasty statements or generalizations, such as taking as proof of the reappearance of Chinese creativity "in the interior" (p. 315) the development in the 1870s of the Kwangtung silk industry, which was in fact located in the districts around Canton on the Pearl River delta. Of greater concern are some incomplete, disputable analyses, such as the case Elvin makes, with special emphasis (pp. 235–255 and 318), for the widespread survival of manor-like estates and serf-like landlord-tenant relationships until the late sixteenth century, the disappearance of serfdom being thus held as decisive in the demographic upsurge, the increased agricultural productivity, and the new type of power structure characteristic of the eighteenth century. But even this type of hypothesis may help to foster further research. Indeed, the whole book shows the need for more monographic studies before definite judgment can be made. If it is therefore likely to elicit heated controversy among sinologists, its great interest to the political scientist is that it breaks through a number of prejudices and false truths, raises major issues, and provides a framework not only for the understanding of China's past, but also for her present problems of economic development, and for comparative analysis with European history. Finally, it is rather the very nature of this framework which may call for the most serious reservations. The striking absence of reference to Chinese historiography and of direct discussion of Marxist interpretations (though a number of them are in fact dispelled), as well as the insistance on the beneficial effects of China's opening to the world market as a consequence of the Opium War leave one with the impression that it is not merely for "practical convenience" that the author focussed on the economics of technology, but that this approach is also borne out by definite assumptions about historical causation.

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Radical Politics in West Bengal. By Marcus F. Franda. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 287. $12.00.)

This book has been in search of an author for a long time. It analyzes the complex and rich culture of communism in West Bengal and attempts to answer the following questions (pp. 3–4): What are the sources of communism in West Bengal? Why have Bengalis been so active in the Communist movement while other Indians have for the most part sought alternative modes of political expression and participation? What are the Bengali Communists trying to accomplish, and how do they go about it? What has been the impact of the Bengali Communist movement on state and national politics, and on the Communists themselves?

Professor Franda's answers are difficult to summarize, but the following are his main points: First, Bengalis have adopted Marxism and communism to express their search for a regional identity and to have access to regional power. In doing so, they have drawn upon the traditions of their long struggle for autonomy from the central authorities at Delhi during the pre-British and British periods. Second, the Indian federal structure has stoked the psychology of discrimination, and the Communists have exploited the sense of defeat of the Bengali gentlemanly classes, the *bhadraloks*, who feel that they have lost to the Hindi-speaking Gangetic heartland of Hinduism. Third, Marxism came to Bengal mainly as a package of ideas, and naturally its appeal is primarily to the educated, upper caste gentry, who dominate the Communist movement. Indeed, a logical extension of this elitist radicalism is the slogan of the Bengali Maoists that mass work and organizational effort lead to revisionism and economism. Fourth, communism has not been creative in West Bengal and is subservient to the Communist movements outside India and their slightly jaded chairmen. This weakness is mainly due to the Bengali Communist's acute sense of incompetence vis-à-vis the Indian environment, so that he uses as an escape the unending debates and ideological battles within the international structure of communism. However, he *has* sometimes successfully exploited the dissensions within international communism for his own factional purposes. Fifth, in the affairs of West Bengal, the Communists have shown some initiative, but they are fettered by their inability to spill over the boundaries of West Bengal into the nearby states and by their internal factionalism.

These are important points, and the author supports them with a wealth of facts which, in spite of occasional slips, have been carefully marshaled and systematized. Particularly good are the discussions of Communist factionalism and the sociopolitical differences among the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI), the middle-of-the-road CPI (Marxist) and the pro-China CPI (Marxist-Leninist). These strengths make the book a valuable monograph on Indian radicalism.

Unfortunately the author has been badly let down by time (the book was written before the Bangladesh war in 1971) and the history of American scholarship (the book tends to overcorrect the earlier anti-Communist interpretations of Communist movements in India). Thus, he often overestimates the Bengali radicals, particularly the Maoists (e.g., pp. 176–181, 266–267). Given the small geographical spread and support base of the CPI(ML) even in its heyday, the speed with which it virtually vanished from the face of the state within a period of eighteen months, and the manner in which a large number of its activists joined the Congress youth groups in 1971–72 (the Maoist slogans were often left unaltered, and only the name of the redoubtable chairman was replaced by India's own materfamilias), one would have liked to see some analysis of the psychology of party allegiance in the *lumpen* elements who constituted the Maoist street gangs of greater Calcutta. On the other hand Mr. Franda, writing before the 1971 war, could not imagine that the Maoists would make a mess of the Bengalis' traditional struggle for autonomy from external authorities and support the West Pakistani regime against the Bangladeshis, that the CPI(M) would equate the West Pakistan government with the New Delhi government, or that the flat-footed Congress government at the Centre would suddenly swing into action to help create a Bengali nation next door (risking confrontation with China and inculcating in the *bhadraloks* a new sense of national pride and a new hostility toward the pro-China elements in India). Similarly, the author's analysis of the different possible coalitions in Parliament seems to assume that the ruling party would naturally move toward a coalition with the rightists whereas the Communist parties would ultimately work with each other and the socialists (pp. 255–258). Yet, already India's major Communist party, the CPI, has become an ornamental adjunct of the ruling party; the CPI(M) has been cornered as a political force, and the CPI(ML) has not only been forced to recognize India's "highly institutionalized military, police, judicial and bureaucratic network" (p. 257), but also the Bengali allegiance to regime norms which, some surveys show, is among the strongest in India. Evidently, in spite of its creaking wheels, the bullock cart called the Indian political system has once again shown its capacity to negotiate dissent and to falter toward a coalition of the hopes and aspirations of diverse sections of the Indian people, including West Bengal.

Actually, Mr. Franda has missed three enduring elements in the *bhadralok* identity which give Bengali communism much of its distinctiveness, though each of these elements is reflected in his own data. First, there is the deepseated *bhadralok* ambivalence toward all authority. Historically this has taken the community through cycles of total opposition and total submission. Bengal has always been peripheral to the greater Sanskritic culture; yet it is the place where often a new search for India's traditional self is mounted and where learning has the deepest Brahminic connotations. Similarly, during the British period, the *bhadraloks* were sometimes the most earnest supporters of the *raj;* at other times its most dedicated opponents. In post-Independence India too, no other group endows the concept of Indianness with such importance (after all, it was in nineteenth-century Bengal that the political concept of Indianness was first forged) and attaches such sanctity to systemic norms. Yet no other state has been a greater headache to the central authorities.

Second, there is the search for Brahminic purity by a community which, Mr. Franda admits, has always been somewhat peripheral to the heartland of Brahminic Hinduism. Thus, pure radicalism remains the ultimate goal of the various factions within factions, and the cruelest blood-feuds take place among those who are ideologically closest and threaten each other's purity. Of the persons killed by the CPI(ML), the largest number belonged not to the police or to the Congress party but to the

CPI(M); the number of military personnel and big businessmen killed in the "revolution" was exactly zero.

Third, Marxism being essentially an intellectual movement in Bengal, its utopian elements have been seized upon by the Bengali *bhadraloks,* so that all active intervention in the real world of persons and events, all micro-level organizational and mobilizational work are seen as detracting from the socalled "fundamental structural changes." It is this apocalyptic romance of a distant revolution which never comes, combined with a total lack of contact with those plebeian elements in whose name unfortunately revolutions have to be fought, that has powered the Marxism of the westernized *bhadraloks* and comprador literati of Bengal.

All this may sound dangerously psychologistic. But if Mr. Franda had scanned his data more carefully, he would have seen the clay feet of Bengali communism and foreseen its present plight. It neither has the strength of the Communist movements in some other parts of India nor has it contributed an iota to Marxian theory in spite of having within its ranks some of the finest minds of India. Thus, Mr. Franda could have written this book as a minor tragedy. He has preferred to write it as a long footnote. Perhaps that is what makes it a scientific study of politics.

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Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment: Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America. By Andre Gunder Frank. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Pp. 151. $6.00.)

In this volume Andre Gunder Frank attempts to answer some of the criticisms leveled at his influential *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* by Latin scholars. While praising Frank for his important contributions to a critical re-examination of Latin American development, and agreeing with him that underdevelopment is in part due to a long history of exploitation by the centers of world capitalism, his detractors felt that Frank overemphasized the importance of center-periphery ties. They argued that his focus on the drain of economic surplus from satellite countries to the metropolis was excessively static and should have included a more sophisticated analysis of the changing class structure of individual counties.

Frank argues that his earlier work was misunderstood, and that he does subscribe to the view that underdevelopment is as much due to internal patterns of class conflict as it is to patterns of dependence. His thesis is that Latin American underdevelopment is "the product of a bourgeois policy formulated in response to class interest and class structure, which are in turn determined by the dependence of the Latin American satellite on the colonialist, imperialist metropolis" (p. 1). He notes that as patterns of dependence changed over the centuries, transformations took place in the culture, economy and class structure of Latin American societies. These shifts, however, did not lead to a weakening of the dominant classes, who simply responded to change by creating new policies designed to aggravate Latin America's dependence and underdevelopment. Frank proposes to trace this phenomenon by analyzing economic dependence, class structure, and the resulting policy of underdevelopment in each of a series of chapters dealing with the Colonial Structure, the Agrarian Structure, Independence, the Civil Wars, Nationalism vs. Free Trade, the Liberal Reform, Imperialism, Bourgeois Nationalism, and Contemporary Neo-imperialism.

I agree with Frank and others that an analysis of Latin American underdevelopment focusing, at least in part, on relations of dependence is more viable than explanations which attribute underdevelopment to "feudal structures" or to simplistic cultural and psychological variables. *Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment,* however, is much too sketchy to buttress both empirically and conceptually a theory of Latin American underdevelopment. Several chapters are so short that they should not be major subdivisions of a book. (The chapter on Independence has only six pages, and the chapter on Liberal Reform has four.) Thus, documentation leaves much to be desired, and the author aggravates the problem by relying too heavily on extensive but highly selective quotes for his main arguments. Often these quotations raise more questions than answers.

As a result, Frank's analysis is not fully convincing. For example, it is not clear why changes in relations of dependence *necessarily* lead to policy changes which contribute to further dependence and underdevelopment. Frank argues categorically against the possibility that a nationalist group can emerge and cut off dependent ties. Yet, his model does not provide an adequate explanation for why nationalist groups emerged in the first place or why they were defeated. He provides no developed analysis of intra-elite clashes and little evidence on the sources of power of different groups. To say that the 19th-century bourgeoisie tied to the export sector won because it had greater strength in colonial times is begging the question. In refuting the contention that a nationalist elite is a possibility today, Frank does not use a theoretical argument, but simply refers to the failures of the military junta in Peru as sufficient evidence to buttress his thesis. Equally problematic is Frank's statement, without proof, that the only solution to underdevelopment is a violent revolution and socialism. It is never clear whether socialism is bound to emerge out of the contradictions in Latin American society—or whether it is just a conviction which the author shares.

The principal difficulty with Frank's analysis is that he has not fully overcome the static nature of his earlier efforts. He continues merely to *combine* an analysis of colonial relations with a class analysis lacking a dynamic or dialectical component that would be capable of sustaining theoretically his argument for the inevitability of the phenomena he describes.

In part this difficulty is due to a continued lack of definitional precision. Dependence means underdevelopment, and yet neither term is adequately explained. Thus, Frank does not distinguish conceptually between different levels or types of development and dependence. At one point he argues that the "Canadian Model" represents an advanced form of integration with imperialism which accelerates further underdevelopment (p. 122). Does this mean Canada is more underdeveloped than Nicaragua? Since he defined underdevelopment or lumpendevelopment as "wretched backwardness" (p. 5), his analysis would benefit by clarifying what "wretched backwardness" means. In conceptual terms, Frank is close to falling into a tautological trap by saying, on the one hand, that dependence causes underdevelopment; and, on the other, that underdevelopment is identified by the presence of dependence. In this reviewer's estimation, scholars such as Fernando Enrique Cardozo, Theotonio Dos Santos and Osvaldo Sunkel have more successfully overcome these difficulties.

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Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study. By Martin Harry Greenberg. (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1970. Pp. 158. $12.50.)

This tightly written volume is the first empirical study in English of a major department of the Mexican government. It is a skillful blend of comparative administration theory and administrative practice, providing a detailed examination of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (SRH), the agency responsible for development and utilization of Mexican water resources.

The Ministry is of interest because of its peculiar blend of modernism and traditionalism. It is modern because it utilizes modern technologies (civil engineering and economics) in its decision making and operational processes, and has developed for this purpose what the author calls a "quasi-merit system." But it is traditional because jobs and advancement are secured primarily through personal, party, and family relationships. Moreover, the really important decisions (i.e., policy or non-technical) are made on the basis of partisan-political considerations. The organization is shot through with graft and corruption.

To elaborate, such questions as how to build a dam, how to construct an irrigation district, what their structural characteristics will be, what are the reasonable costs and benefits (in the technical sense): these are technical questions and are left to the engineers and economists. *Where,* the dam, irrigation district, or sewer system is to be located, *who* is to be benefited, *how much* graft is allowed, *who* gets it: these questions are of a "policy" or a "polictical" nature. They involve the highest Ministry officials, party representatives, and members of the Office of the Ministry of the President.

Two parallel structures exist in the ministry, each dealing separately with the technical and the policy realms. Where the scheme gets interesting, and where the peculiar characteristics of the transitional regime emerge, is in the interaction of party, ministry, and technical officials. The patterns of organizational behaviors and ideologies they adopt are designed to prevent undue self-agrandizement of the more modern sector at the expense of the more traditional.

The party is ever-present in bureaucratic operations. The PRI, Mexico's mass party in what is essentially a one-party system, represents all the most important interest groups and carries forth the "revolutionary tradition." There is no preferment in Mexican political or bureaucratic life not sanctioned by the party. The party provides not only strong political leadership but also the active coordination of bureaucratic entities. This is an element often found lacking in other transitional polities.

Professor Greenberg warns that the very strength of the PRI makes it difficult for the analyst to distinguish political from bureaucratic functions, as well as the political from the economic. For example, bureaucrats are required to take part in partisan political activities. Politicians make important bureaucratic decisions. Not only that; there is a growing class of "bureaucratic capitalists." They use their government positions as a "base" and take advantage of "technical consultantships" widely available to bureaucratics elites in business enterprise. A whole new class of "bureaucratic capitalists" has grown up, causing conflicts of interests and further confusion of roles. Greenberg attributes this blurring of institutional roles to "intense overlapping"—utilizing to good effect a Riggsian term, with which the book is liberally sprinkled.

The country has been saved from an out-and-out authoritarian regime by the maneuverability, flexibility, and responsiveness of the PRI. Here Greenberg refers to the vaunted capability of the party to co-opt almost every dissident group within society. This co-option capability is an important factor in keeping the potentially explosive Mexican society together. The memory of the volence of the "revolution" is still alive. It is a factor in the party's favor. But it is based on a system of interlocking interest groups and numerous veto powers, exacting a high price in forward movement. It rewards political power with economic benefits. It leaves the politically unorganized and the economically weak almost out of the system altogether.

In the Ministry, potential for conflict between the technical branches and the policy-oriented branches is serious. It only occasionally breaks out in the open. Greenberg alludes to a continuing battle between those who favored the establishment of large irrigation projects, and those who demanded a higher priority for small irrigation (small farmers). The proponents of the latter consistently lost. "Sound economic reasons favored the greater emphasis on large irrigation, but another factor was the need for large scale projects for political purposes to enable the PRI to offer visible proof of its accomplishments" (p. 80). Also, one can surmise, large-scale projects offer more opportunities for patronage and corruption.

Another revealing comment illustrates how the rates of water users are set. The Ministry is supposed to take into account the ability to pay. This principle is unevenly applied, depending upon the user's political influence. Granted that this is not fair "in the western sense of the word" Greenberg explains that "in the Revolutionary context, some 'political' considerations often mean watching out for the interests of groups which (if neglected) could topple the fragile pattern of accord and compromise." The system, he says, benefits everyone in the society, even if some pay more than their "fair share" (p. 81).

In the name of revolutionary justice, Mexico gets institutionalized selfishness. This tendency has resulted, many believe, in a very highly skewed income distribution in Mexico. The rich grow richer. One wonders whether a more highly competitive political system (i.e., two or three competitive parties) might benefit larger segments of the Mexican people.

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Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling, 1887–1945. By Paul M. Hayes. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. $12.95.)

To write the biography of *Vidkun Quisling* is a fascinating task. The biographer encounters, however, serious problems connected with choice of methods and analytic focus.

Dr. Hayes employs a traditional historical approach. He presents a broad description of Quisling's life, his childhood and humanitarian activities, his turning to politics and a cabinet position, the launching of a party, contact with Germany before and during the occupation of Norway, his trial, sentence, and execution. Having delved diligently into a rich material, the author presents an interesting exposition of an extraordinary politician.

Still, the book remains unsatisfactory for several reasons. The author seems to be unaware of the general problems of political biography. (See for instance L. J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965] Chap. I, and Fred Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* [Chicago: Markham, 1969]). As a minimum, a conscious balance must be maintained among the choice of focus, of data, and of analytic method. Not only must the biographer employ a fair distribution of emphasis between "the man" and "the time"; he must also be aware of the complex borderlines between the "hero's" behavior, his inner motives and outer justifications; furthermore, his intended influence and actual role must be kept strictly apart. Problems of this kind are implicit in biographical analysis, but the author does not come to grips with them explicitly. Instead of offering a methodological clarification and arguments for his own line of approach, he limits himself "to allow Quisling's actions and words to speak for themselves" (p. 10).

In spite of—or rather because of—a detailed presentation of both "action and words," there emerges no clearly marked profile of Quisling, the man and the politician. Only a few pages are devoted to his ideas, thus forfeiting the promise given in the book's title. Ideological aspects are neither integrated with the historical narrative nor used to illuminate behavior. Quisling's lack of political realism and his unbounded faith in his own ability are, of course, mentioned (chap. 9), but not used as a key to an understanding of essential phases in his career.

The historical description is too broad, thus sometimes making Quisling too important, sometimes letting him almost disappear among the several actors mentioned. This lack of a clear theme is essential. From this point of view a series of factual blunders—arising from a rather uncritical interpretation of basic sources —remain less important. In spite of such weaknesses the author might have provided a well-balanced picture of Quisling had he attacked the problems more systematically.

It is to the author's credit that he took upon himself the task of giving us a scholarly biography of Quisling, long overdue. It is regrettable, however, that he has not responded fully to the challenge, although he has presented a very broad narrative and many keen observations.

The really absorbing problem presented by Quisling has more to do with treason as such than with historical details. In a century of conflicting loyalties the legal aspect of treason is to this reviewer less interesting than its moral and political implications, encompassing the human dilemma of an era.

Quisling was decidedly "more muddled than corrupted" (p. 317), and I have no argument with Dr. Hayes when he finds it clearly unfair to let Quisling's name remain a symbol of the notorious traitor. There were elements in him of the "true believer," an attitude which flagrantly contradicts the basic democratic demand for loyalty to a majority. His career leads us to ask under what circumstances, social and individual, does a political conviction turn into open disloyalty, to what and to whom?

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Social Change in Angola. Edited by Franz-Wilhelm Heimer. (Munich: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, Weltforum Verlag, 1973. Pp. 284.

This collection represents the first serious empirical studies of Angola. Heimer's volume includes sophisticated studies by Portuguese and non-Portuguese who through official support or toleration of their efforts were able to undertake field investigation.

The methods of the contributors vary. Joseph C. Miller's study of 19th-century slavery in Kasanje, and Douglas Wheeler and Diane Christensen's account of the 1902 Bailundo War are descriptively and analytically historical in approach. An article by Hermann Pössinger examines the historical, social, and economic evolution of the Ovimbundu peoples and elaborates on a thesis that Portuguese commercial and administrative penetration into the central highlands has resulted in a general decline of African society. Other studies are behavioral, relying strongly on survey technique. These include the editor's own contribution on change in the Cuíma region, as well as the reports by Elisete Marques da Silva and Ramiro Ladeiro Monteiro, who respectively focus on school children in suburban Luanda and family life in the *muceques* of the capital city. Finally, there are studies which incorporate a technical-scientific perspective. For example, Jorge Vieira da Silva and Júlio Artur de Morais make use of general ecosystems theory in a study of the Ovimbundu; while Vieira da Silva and Eduardo Cruz de Carvalho use a similar approach in presenting a mosaic of data and charts on the Cunene region. Gerald Bender systematically examines the records of the Angolan Provincial Settlement Board from 1961 to 1968 to give empirical support to his finding that the Portuguese rural settlement scheme in Angola never achieved its objectives.

Some of the essays deal with rural Angola. Miller offers a detailed analysis of how the slave trade was carried on within Angola a century ago. He traces the transformation of Imbangala society from a relatively large and cohesive lineage to a dispersal of power throughout the Kasanje state, the consequence of internal response to outside pressures for more slaves. Such an internal-external relationship was also evident among the Ovimbundu. The discussion by Wheeler and Christensen is a good synthesis of generally available (though not necessarily in English) material and information. They look at the Bailundo kingdom, the largest of some 22 kingdoms in the central highlands, and note the early trading patterns, the internal organization of African trade, kinship, and policy with neighboring African tribes. In a postscript, they focus on Portuguese interference with the African control of the caravan trade from central Angola to the coast.

Their essay serves as background material and therefore complements Pössinger's analysis which examines the early 20th-century decline of the Ovimbundu. He notes the creation of a capitalist economy, the role of women and men, the shift to a cash crop agriculture and the need for new land, the changes in the local hierarchy through the weakening of the power of the local chiefs, the Portuguese advance into the highlands and the cooptation of new and old chiefs with the colonial administrators, the relinquishing of judicial power to colonial authority, the influence of the Christian missionary schools, and the modifications in family structure.

The essay by Vieira da Silva and Morais goes another step further in this analysis. They turn to the decay of Ovimbundu political economy in the Huambo district. They show that changing economic patterns in the area relate closely to developments elsewhere, especially in the cities. They affirm a capitalist development of underdevelopment, such as suggested by Walter Rodney for Africa and André Gunder Frank and others for Latin America.

Heimer also directs attention to rural Angola as does Bender, and both studies relate to European influence in the colony. Elsewhere Heimer has revealed the massive data from his remarkable survey of education and society in rural Angola. The present essay is drawn from these data. His survey was undertaken in 20 villages of Cuíma among 114 heads of families. Let us hope that in some future essay, Heimer can carry his discussion to an in-depth analysis which probes the implications of his findings and hypothesis. In the present study his description of methods and results does not reveal the significance of his findings.

Bender's synthesis of planned rural settlements in Angola subtly but devastatingly reveals the failure of Portuguese objectives: to secure Portuguese sovereignty and civilization in the rural areas. Instead of ensuring the Portuguese hold upon the rural areas, most settlers moved to the cities after an initial stay in the countryside. The Portuguese goals to raise agricultural production and the cultural and economic level of Africans failed. Land conceded to Europeans in recent years has increased while that to the Africans has decreased, the impact being "catastrophic" on Africans. Over $100 million was spent on the planned rural settlements during the past two decades, yet only 840 European settlers remain in the rural areas, this representing about one percent of the entire European population in Angola!

The essay by Cruz de Caravalho and Vieira da Silva also looks at European influence with attention to southwestern Angola where European ranching has intruded into the traditional agro-pastoral structure of the region. They show how government plans in the area will lead to a reduction of pastoral use, and they express doubts that any significant agricultural production will take place. Their very technical and detailed study demonstrates the impact of outside private and public capital upon the potential underdevelopment of a region, thereby lending credence to a thesis which seems to emanate from other essays mentioned above.

Finally, the essays by Elisete Marques da Silva and Ramiro Ladeiro Monteiro focus on urban Angola. The former offers a "preliminary test of some hypotheses" and attempts to assess the impact of education upon African families in three muceques (slums) and two bairros populares (popular districts) of Luanda. The author's data are drawn from the Heimer survey and consist of a series of tables and cross-tabulations as well as some hypotheses which either are not confirmed or only weakly so. Monteiro also looks at *muceque* life of Luanda and his data, from a survey in 1971, are accompanied by description and analysis. His is the most readable and clearly stated of the behavioral essays in this volume as he looks into the traditional matrilinear system, paternal lines, the extended and nuclear family. One comes away with the sense that these two essays may well serve the Portuguese cause in Angola. Both probe into African behavior and life style and constitute an empirical basis for continued Portuguese manipulation of the African populations.

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India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement. By Francis G. Hutchins. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. 326. $14.00.)

The subject of this short but expensive volume should interest political scientists, especially those concerned with typologies of revolution. Dr. Hutchins has drawn from untapped sources, showing the strategy of the Indian revolutionary movement as well as of the British government in India. The total picture that emerges is coherent if controversial, and is highly relevant to general theories of revolution. About one-fifth of the book portrays Gandhi as a revolutionary leader, but its chief contribution is the suggestive comparison it makes between the American and the Indian revolutions.

Chapters two and three illustrate the many facets of the imperialist dilemma, mainly from the standpoint of political sociology. Imperialism is depicted as a social and political system as well as an ideology, supported by vested interests and supporting in turn institutions related to its perpetuation. Even benevolent intentions had pernicious consequences. The attempt to introduce a system of representation based on classes and interests merely resulted in the development of a radical political consciousness on factional lines. The infrastructure created by the imperialists became a continuing obstacle to postrevolutionary development.

Chapter four presents the nationalist dilemma in the context of cultural and social history. This chapter is a feat of compression, raising more questions than it can answer. Just as the French Revolution had a complex intellectual lineage in the different strands of the French Enlightenment, the Indian Revolution had its roots in an intellectual soil enriched by a wide-ranging interchange of ideas and converging cultural movements over an extended period. The author perceives three phases—the manipulative stage, involving religious or cultural conversion and collaboration with the regime; the phase of cultural assimilation, dependent upon foreign sponsorship; and the phase of rebellion, in which traditionalists seek to transform their cultural reaction into a political rebellion.

In Chapter five, we have an explicit recognition that revolutions are "intellectual events," involving perceptions, decisions, and acts of will. Predominantly plan-fulfilling revolutions are then contrasted with those that are essentially self-fulfilling. While it is meaningful to claim that a self-fulfilling revolution accomplishes more than it intends, the emphasis upon "accidental" factors could be questioned by Marxists as well as by Hegelians or Platonists. The author contends that India's leaders, like America's Founding Fathers, failed to perceive the extent of the transformation which the revolution had wrought. According to Francis Hutchins, every revolution is a "revolution of saints" (p. 85), and the line separating the reactionary from the revolutionary is thin. This thesis is applied to Gandhi. "As Gandhi's political tactics were drawn from those of political reactionaries—the extremists—so were his philosophical concepts modified versions of ideas first elaborated by philosophical reactionaries" (p. 91). Is the author committing the genetic fallacy both in regard to historical events and political ideas?

Chapter six deals with Gandhi as a revolutionary leader, the key to whose accomplishment lay in his rational modifications of tradition. He is portrayed not only as a charismatic leader "rooted in tradition and motivated by rationality" (p. 117), but also as an entrepreneur, amassing reserves, winning followers, and then creatively applying his resources to new purposes. His style and tactics are stressed, and the author endorses Erikson's claim that Gandhi's nonviolence had much in common with Freudian psychotherapy, i.e., that "Gandhi developed for the relations between social groups, many of the same insights Freud applied to private relationships (p. 127). When the book ventures into psychological analysis, it is less plausible than when it is content to invoke current classifications of social structures.

The next three chapters embody the fruits of much factual research. There is a convincing account of the logic and the limitations of the policies of the Viceroy, and of his disagreements with the Secretary of State. In elaborating the strategy behind the Quit India campaign, the author infers from Gandhi's dialectically confusing statements that he was conniving at the violence that accompanied his nonviolent struggle. The central thesis concerning "Spontaneous Revolution" is supported by references to the roles and views of underground militants. The final chapter comments on the decline in revolutionary fervor after independence, and concludes that Gandhi's disillusionment meant that he was working out a destiny which he had known was inevitable.

Francis Hutchins is happy to invoke King Lear repeatedly, in reference to the British Government in India as well as to Mahatma Gandhi in the last phase. This thought-provoking book is itself more suggestive of *Hamlet* than of *King Lear*, illustrating the insight that "the readiness is all" rather than the realization that "Ripeness is all."

RAGHAVAN IYER
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Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict. Compiled and annotated by Doreen Ingrams. (New York: George Braziller, 1973. Pp. 198, $6.95.)

Few contemporary historical problems are more shrouded in myth than the question of Palestine. The origins of this tragic dispute remain a favorite hunting-ground for both historians and propagandists; and the flood of literature about it has now reached gargantuan proportions. Much of it, of course, is highly tendentious, and can be easily dismissed. But with the relaxation of the "fifty-year rule" in 1968, the British records for the period became available for scholars. This is a rich treasurehouse indeed, and many recent books about Palestine have benefited enormously from dipping into it. Yet documents, like statistics, have to be treated with extreme caution. They are not an end in themselves; and however revealing, almost by definition they cannot tell the complete story.

The book under review, according to the dust-jacket, purports to relate "For the first time the story of Palestine from the Balfour Declaration to the British Mandate" as "presented by the official documents, memorandum and letters of those in power both in Whitehall and Palestine." This is a highly laudable aim. Unfortunately, it is not borne out by the contents of this volume. The documents here presented have been chosen on an extremely selective basis; it could hardly have been otherwise in a volume of 198 pages. Moreover, they have also been edited, at times most severely. Bridge-notes have been inserted in an attempt to link the various episodes, but they are scarcely adequate to give a comprehensible picture. The picture which does emerge is, inevitably, a distorted one. The overwhelming majority of these documents lend credence to the by now discredited view that Britain's Palestine policy was the result of some mysterious conspiracy foisted upon an unsuspecting government by a determined band of Zionists and their supporters. Well-known Zionists such as Leo Amery or Col. R. Meinertzhagen or Lord Balfour speak out. In particular, Balfour's celebrated and oft-quoted remark that "The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land" (pp 73).

But their observations are generally lost among the often bitter comments of the officials and the men-on-the-spot in the Palestine administration.

Why then, in the face of so much criticism, did Britain persevere in this policy? There is no clear, unequivocal answer to this intriguing question. Obstinacy? A sense of obligation? Ostrich-like blindness? The furtherance of British interests? Obviously all these elements played their role. Sadly, they make little impact in this book. Still, we have to be thankful for what we are given. Any collection of documents is valuable, provided one avoids the beckoning pitfalls.

One last word. Many of these documents first saw the light of day some years ago. Those familiar with the bibliography of the subject will know that many of them were made available in the important, official series, *Documents on British Foreign Policy*. And on the whole they were set in a more comprehensive and historical context.

Norman Rose

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Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies. By Fuad Jabber. Published for the International Institute For Strategic Studies. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971. Pp. 164. £2.50.)

Israel and Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts. The first reviews the institutional framework and its development since Israel made the first steps in its nuclear development; the second discusses requirements for nuclear weapons production as they relate to the country's scientific and economic potential, and the third reviews the ends and means of the Israeli nuclear strategy.

Israeli nuclear development started as early as 1949, a year after the state was founded. The first steps were the production of uranium as a byproduct of the phosphate industry and the development of what was regarded as a cheap way of producing heavy water. Various motives lay behind Israel's nuclear development. One is the use of nuclear power as a source for fuel due to the absence of local fuel sources. Another is the use of atomic energy for water resource development through desalination. The author stresses, however, the military and political implications of this endeavor. The key problem he is concerned with is the possible development of nuclear warheads and the strategic implications of this possibility. In developing nuclear weapons three stages seem necessary: the production of the fissible core, weapons design, and assembly and testing. Whereas weapons design and assembly do not pose a serious obstacle, Jabber tells us, conditions for testing of an Israeli bomb seem unfavorable because of the possible reactions of the superpowers and the Arab world. Testing is not however regarded as an absolute necessity. The major problem is the production of the fissible core and here the author assumes on the basis of available information that Israel has not reached the last stage which involves operating a chemical separation plant for plutonium production, though he does not rule out the possibility that Israel has entered this stage clandestinely.

Israeli nuclear policy has been described by the author as aiming at deterrence through uncertainty and ambiguity. Israel did not sign the non-proliferation treaty of 1968 but the officially declared government policy was that

Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear arms in the Middle East.

The author points to the fact that Israeli nuclear capacity served as a bargaining lever in the past. In 1966 Israel froze her operations at the Dimona nuclear center in return for an arms supply from the United States. The nuclear option seem to provide Israel with an alternative, in case the conventional power balance takes an unfavorable turn. The author suggests that nuclear deterrence could help in preserving the post June 1967 boundaries. He also considers the eventuality of a nuclear race between Israel and Egypt.

Since the book was written (in 1970) some developments have cast a new light on the nuclear problem in the Middle East. The October 1973 war illustrated that the nuclear deterrent did not figure directly, though Israel's nuclear capacity has probably not been ignored. The war has indirectly increased the probability of a Middle-Eastern nuclear race. It grew with president Nixon's visit to the Middle East in June 1974 and his pledge to support Egypt's nuclear development.

The possible results of this race either as a stabilizing factor due to mutual balance of horror or as an additional source for aggravating the conflict cannot be predicted. The problem could however be viewed in a broader context pointing to an inevitable proliferation of nuclear capacity and nuclear weapons in middle and small size countries.

Jabber's book is a well documented work that is probably the most authoritative source to date on the history of Israeli nuclear development. There seems, however, a reason to doubt the author's conception of Israel's strategy as well of its political culture.

JACOB REUVENY

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Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered. By Naum Jasny. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 218. Index. $12.50.)

The title of this book carries an implicit negative emphasis. This book is not about the economy or economics. The work offers a bird's-eye view of happenings in the Soviet economy over the period from the trebly escalated disaster (of World War I, the Civil War, and finally the War Communism which brought it to a virtual paralysis) through the recovery under the NEP (New Economic Policy) up to the crystalization of the mechanism for a highly centralist command economy and of a strategy for economic advance. It carries also a critical excursus into their sequel—the process of a "heroic" drive which was ultimately to bring the primitive economy to its present status in the world. (I use the word "heroic" in a neutral fashion, indicating supreme intensity of effort, not to convey any qualitative or ethical valuation.) All that the book gives the reader about these happenings is a sketch of the background: describing the environment in which the tragedy of the Soviet economy occurred.

Further, the book also offers broad sketches of some of the great issues of enonomic policy which confronted the Soviet generation of the time. Quite clearly it is Jasny's aim to give here a full analysis of these issues or of the conceptions underlying them. What is offered is no more than what is needed to make the roles of the actors of the tragedy intelligible; the actors are economists of the period. In a word the book is essentially *not* about the economy; it is *not* about economics; it is about economists, indeed *some* economists—as will be clear from what follows immediately.

In this presentation, the focus is on the opposition to the regime. As the author points out, while the opposition outside the country was mainly interested in politics, the opposition inside the country operated mainly in the economic field. The author, one of those who for a time had a large part in it, chooses the economists he discusses by a *political* criterion: participation in the oppositional movement, essentially the *mensheviks* and *neo*-narodniks (adherents of the "minoritarian" and "neopopulist" opposition). The specific area of conflict with official orthodoxy is here that of planning, its mechanism and principles.

Thus the central figure of the tragedy, Groman, appears as the author of a 1925 study on certain regularities empirically discovered in the economy, seen as the milestone of Soviet ideas on planning (true, his theoretical stand—the insistence on the need to pursue equilibrium in economic strategy—*is* mentioned). Yet another principal figure, Bazarov, is shown as a proponent of a "general"—very long-term—plan. Ginzburg is here identified with the draft of the pioneering first Five-Year plan (1927/28–1931/32); Kondratyev is depicted as the head of the Business-Cycle ("conjunctures") Institute (although some mention is made of his concept of the long cycle, known in literature as the "Kondratyev cycle," which was condemned by Soviet critics as granting new lease on life to capitalism).

The way the book was conceived and the criteria adopted account for the scant treatment given some of the most interesting figures among Soviet economists of the time. A most telling example: ever since Professor Domar discovered his remarkable work, Feldman has been considered by students interested in the formal modeling of economic growth as one of the most important pioneers in the field. Indeed, in the longer perspective it seems legitimate to see him as *the* greatest Soviet economist of the 1920s. Yet in this book, devoted, as the title announces, to "the Soviet economists of the Twenties" all that can be found about Feldman is a sentence describing him as an "arch-planner" and a footnote giving reference to his 1929 papers (now deservedly celebrated in Western literature)—papers which Jasny singles out as those from the pen of the best known exponent of what he calls "bacchanalian" planning (p. 136, p. 135 ftn). I believe that one of the virtues of Feldman's mathematical construct is that it demonstrates how different assumptions and postulates (which we would say, are in the last instance extra-economic, evading valuation in economic terms) do lead to an *alternative* solution of the problem of the pace of growth. (Was this the cause of Feldman's doom at the time when the *uniqueness, no-alternative* type of solution adopted in economic policy problems had the status of an axiom? The question is not even touched upon by the author.)

The book is essentially Jasny's personal tribute to a group of economists and an attempt to rescue them from the oblivion into which their names have fallen. (Of the economists whose profiles are drawn—ten specifically classified as mensheviks, and six as neo-narodniks—only one, Vainshtein, who reappeared not long before his death, deservedly attracted attention in the world of economics as an eminent mathematical economist.)

I have spoken of the book as depicting the actors in a tragedy. For it is supremely tragic that the forum in which the economy's historically crucial issues were discussed—and the fate of economists decided—was a criminal court.

If nothing else the reader of Jasny's book will experience this sense of tragedy. In this lies its principal merit.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

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Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casablanca. By Katherine Marshall Johnson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 251. $5.75.)

The quality of the work of documentation, research, and synthesis done by Mrs. Johnson is worth praising. The author has been able to gather the documents, question the responsible persons, and analyze the web of services that ensure the working of this complex administrative setup. This work is certainly worthy of being used by Moroccan students of administration, giving as it does a precise idea of the juridical attributions and the theoretical functions of each of the city's organs. Such readers will become aware of the subtlety of the tutelary rapport that the Ministries, especially the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance, have with the local services of the municipality. The author does not conceal the sense of an evolution which ends by stripping all real authority from the Town Council, the elected assembly for administering, in theory, the city's affairs.

Even if we stick strictly to the author's analysis, we must keep in mind that the administration of a big city like Casablanca requires vast juridical, technical, and financial machinery, extending, in present-day Morocco, structures that had been set up essentially by the French Protectorate. We can certainly perceive that the present demands are not those of colonial times, and that the rhythm of development conceived by foreigners cannot be imposed on the biggest metropolis of the country. But the impression remains that the Moroccan authorities manage the French bureaucratic inheritance competently and endeavor to maintain its spirit. In large part, this impression corresponds to reality, but the description given by the author sometimes conveys the same feeling of inaccuracy and unreality as that conveyed generally by the French Law manuals dealing with the same subjects.

In fact, it seems impossible to have a precise view of the mechanisms of an urban administration without integrating their political functions in the analysis. The juridical system so well observed by Mrs. Johnson often aims to dissuade the persons under its administration from having any recourse to the normal proceedings, and to make them consent to enter a system of patronage which will permit adapting the law to particular cases in exchange for some financial advantages and prestige for the persons in charge of it. Moreover, simple bribery makes possible a kind of participation by subjects in the decisions of the administration, and this is not given by legal procedures or democratic elections or the existence of a party's cells controlling the administration.

At a higher level, the juridical character of the procedures has a yet more important political role. In fact, it enables the Governor of the Prefecture, who has often been in the past a political man of national importance, to ensure a certain form of arbitration of the demands of the social forces represented by the human milieu of the economic metropolitan system. For if the governor's regulatory power is limited, the personal decisions he has to make are numerous and involve large interests. First of all, owing to a custom inherited from the French political administration, he may encourage the fussy and trivial juridical attitude of the Prefecture's officials so as to be in a better position to manage the application of laws and regulations. The regulations on building matters, price control, or industrial plants offer a wide range of possible derogations for a supporter one wants to protect or troublesome interventions for an opponent one wants to force to yield. The alteration of urban plans, the inclusion or exclusion of certain zones in the areas to be built offer important means of pressure. The attribution of public expenditures gives similar advantages.

In these conditions, the Governor seems to appear as the referee between rival groups (Fassi or Souassa trademen, foreign contractors, trade-unions leaders). Troublesome juridical rules and a cumbersome administrative system give him the opportunity to interfere in many affairs, to assert his power based on a flexible and personalized law, rather than over the action of a rational bureaucracy.

The accurate knowledge of the Moroccan administration shown by the author leads me to suppose that she is aware of its real operating mechanisms. It is indeed a subject on which a social inquiry, difficult to carry out, must convey the juridical analysis, if one does not want to give a partial view of the real situation. Evidence is difficult to find, and the subject is politically a ticklish one. But avoiding a statement on the problem is not a solution.

REMY LEVEAU

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The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets. By Ilpyong J. Kim. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Pp. 240. $12.50.)

After the débacle of the "first united front" with the Kuomintang in 1927, remnants of the shattered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retreated to the mountainous borders of Kiangsi province in south central China, and under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung reoriented the revolutionary movement toward a rural strategy. While the formal leadership of the CCP continued to operate fitfully underground in Shanghai until about 1931 and to hatch urban insurrection, the Communist movement existed as a reality only in the "soviet areas"—inkspots of continually changing size and shape on the borders between Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan, Anhwei, Hupei, and Szechwan provinces—which were formally organized into a "Chinese Soviet Republic" in 1931. The Republic survived only briefly, before the victorious Kuomintang armies of General Ch'en Ch'eng swept the Communists out of Kiangsi and onto the "Long March" to Shensi province in northwest China in 1934 and 1935. In the course of his mop-up of the CCP-held regions, General Ch'en collected numerous Communist Party and Soviet Government documents, newspapers, and magazines which constitute rich source materials for research on the CCP in the early 1930s. Professor Kim's book is a study of how the soviet areas were governed and is based on the Ch'en Ch'eng collection (which is now largely available on microfilm in several American libraries).

Among students of the Chinese Communist movement, consideration of the Kiangsi period has tended to focus on a number of key questions: the rise of Mao Tse-tung and his relations with the CCP Central Committee, factionalism in the CCP leadership, the nature of the economic and social program of the CCP in the Soviet areas, and conflict among the CCP leaders over military strategy in response to the Kuomintang's "extermination campaigns." Professor Kim provides useful information and commentary on several of these matters: for example, he is convincing in his conclusion (in opposition to the views of Hsiao Tso-liang) that no single faction dominated either the Party or Government during the Kiangsi period; although his views on military strategy were not followed, Mao Tse-tung was never without influence in nonmilitary matters. Kim is similarly credible in his account of the basic opportunism of the economic policies of Mao as chairman of the Soviet Republic. But none of these matters are Kim's central concern.

Professor Kim's primary theme is the assertion that the CCP in Kiangsi under Mao first developed its distinctive techniques for popular political participation (i.e., the "mass line"), which were further elaborated at Yenan during the war years and remain central to the political style of the People's Republic of China. This is an interesting and plausible hypothesis, but in the body of his work it is less analyzed and proved than advanced by exhortation and repetition. Although he may believe that he is illustrating his hypothesis—and perhaps the Ch'en Ch'eng materials would uphold it—nowhere does Kim present a sustained and documented example of this new kind of politics in action. Instead we are treated to a meandering discussion of Mao's "theories" of administration and organization, the individual sentences and paragraphs of which it would be embarrassing to parse in search of meaning; a confusing description of the various levels of government in the Communist-held areas (in which not even the map of the Soviet areas on p. 33 is keyed to the text); a useful presentation (already referred to) of the leadership structure; an account of mass mobilizational policies and organizational techniques which is schematically interesting but lacks verisimilitude in almost totally ignoring the objective constraints (the Kuomintang attacks and the shifting boundaries of the areas and population under CCP control) on carrying out *any* policy by *any* method; again a schematic account of local government which leaves one wondering how it really did work; and a scanty analysis of cadre training in mass line politics.

Occasionally Professor Kim's own doubts are evident: "The rural population remained passive, if not openly hostile, toward the mobilizational efforts of the central soviet government" (p. 149). "Apparently the CCP often had difficulty in extending its primary organizations at the grass-roots level throughout the soviet area" (p. 170). "No accurate data are available, however, to measure the extent of mass support during the Kiangsi soviet period" (p. 189). It would not be surprising if the origins of Mao's political style were traceable to the Kiangsi soviets, but its later effectiveness depended at least as much upon a favorable domestic and international context in the 1940s—in contrast to the fragility of the CCP's hold on the Soviet areas in the early 1930s—as on the mass line itself. What we need at this point is a careful, comprehensive, and analytical history of the Kiangsi period, which is not primarily concerned with finding the roots of the present in the past.

ALBERT FEUERWERKER
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Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina. By Jeanne Kirkpatrick. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971. Pp. 262. $12.50.)

Professor Jeanne Kirkpatrick has written an interesting, useful, important and somewhat controversial book. Using survey research data obtained by Research Associates in 1965, she has explored a number of interesting hypotheses. Making a distinction between core Peronists (those expressing personal support for Perón) and pro-Peronists (those expressing support for the movement or Peronist objectives) Professor Kirkpatrick has made useful observations on the differences among the Peronist following, on the general strength of the Peronist movement among the electorate, and on the social heterogeneity of the pro-Peronists as compared to the core Peronists during the middle 1960s.

The author's interpretation of the survey results as indicating that "the image of the nation as ruled by the traditional 'oligarchy' for their own interests is dead" (pp. 128–129) is important since Perón set out to accomplish this objective in his first era of rule (1946–1955). It was not generally known that many people believed the old oligarchy was gone and a new one in place outside of guerrilla and guerrilla-supporting circles. Also noteworthy is Professor Kirkpatrick's analysis of Peronist demands: particularly interesting was their strong support for price controls in 1965, a demand Perón responded to in his Social Pact. Other highlights of the study are the good description of where the political center is if one uses a single Left-Right continuum, the necessary relating of Peronism to traditional Argentine politics, the exploration of the problem of identifying an heir to Perón, the evaluation of Peronism as not a profoundly revolutionary movement, and the generally accurate description of recent Argentine political history.

Nonetheless, a number of Professor Kirkpatrick's findings or observations and conclusions are controversial. One of the key objectives of the study was to test the "two cultures" hypothesis regarding Argentina's political culture. Professor Kirkpatrick finds "the absence of major, socially based cultural discontinuities in Argentina" (p. 198). Her conclusion is that it is a "stereotype" to believe there is any geographically based division to the nation's political cultures. The evidence of the March and September 1973 elections confirms, contrary to the author's contention, the continued existence of two cultures, both with Right-Left-Center positions. It is true that the "liberal" tradition is the smaller of the two cultures, having accounted for slightly more than 20 per cent of the electorate in March and for only 12 per cent in September. This reviewer believes that attitudes originally geopolitically and historically based have been abstracted to the level of ideology, have now come to cut across class and regional lines, and have subsequently become dominant (nationalist-populist culture) and subordinate (liberal culture) value systems. Probably Professor Kirkpatrick's failure to identify the two political cultures may be traced to the questionnaire. The questionnaire was not constructed to probe deeply the values associated with the two-culture thesis. For example, *Argentinidad* in the text is associated with anti-foreign and anti-cosmopolitan attitudes (p. 189) but *Argentinidad* is also associated with the values of the liberal tradition as in the writings of José Ingenieros, e.g., *Las Direcciones Filosoficas de la Cultura Argentina.* It is necessary to explore more fully than was done in the book to disprove the two-culture thesis, since both are "nationalistic" (Argentinidad) traditions.

A number of observations are questionable: Perón did not represent a significant change from ascription to achievement (p. 45); indeed his rule was noted for its nepotism and cronyism. Moreover, there was far more conflict between sectors of the middle and working classes than the survey seems to indicate; and there is considerable evidence that Marxism may become the doctrine of a portion of the middle class hostile to the workers. In the treatment of "influentials" no attention was paid to the managers of the state-owned enterprises, and the findings on the newspapers were in part distorted by not including *La Nacion.*

The findings of the study might have been more persuasive if placed in the context of the political situation of the Illia regime. The existence of the Radical Party in power may explain some of the peculiarities of the survey. Other issues raised by the study probably requiring modification are the author's interpretation of Peronist distrust of government and the author's interpretation of earlier Peronism in terms of later Peronism.

Despite my criticisms I consider the Kirkpatrick study provocative and insightful. But it remains, nonetheless, an incomplete investigation and needs the depth and interpretation that only sustained study of the Peronist movement and Argentina can bring.

DAVID C. JORDAN

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Pluralism in Africa. Edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 546. $12.75.)

Tension along ethnic and racial lines continues to plague African states. Therefore the need to ameliorate the resultant difficulties for national order persists. This book seeks to increase our conceptual and empirical understanding of the problem. Despite their individual nuances, the contributors share Furnivall's model of the plural society as well as his inverted emphasis on the effects of its heterogeneous nature on its socioeconomic organization. Their intention, however, is to clarify and generalize his model (p. 448). They de-emphasize the economic factors and perceive the significant explanatory variables to be biological, cultural, and institutional differences; the absence of value consensus; and the rigidity and clarity of group definition. Societal factors are limited to the relative and absolute numbers of population identified by Pierre Van den Berghe and M. G. Smith, and the analyses of variations in the number of plural sections by Van den Berghe and Hilda Kuper.

Among their various solutions to the adverse effects of pluralism is faith in the evolutionary process by which increased functional differentiation would provide new and cross-cutting bases for association. This viewpoint is most strongly expressed in Van den Berghe's advocacy of nonviolence in South Africa. Ali Mazrui envisages a dialectical process which creates a cumulative experience in intergroup conflict resolution; and Smith recommends a uniform mode of incorporation of disparate groups into national life, equal opportunity, and public enforcement of fundamental freedoms. Leo Kuper, however, recognizes the reversible nature of depluralization, which he argues arises from the readiness of politicians to exploit ethnic and racial differences.

Thus the book largely represents the orthodox Western analysis of pluralism, replete with its use of social science jargon. But the products of this perspective which continue to be peddled in the African states have failed significantly to improve the situation. Smith rationalizes this failure by arguing that "to anticipate the smooth development of such societies into nations, or even any rapid, continuous process of modernization within them, is antihistorical and antiempirical in the extreme. We need merely remember Latin America, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Germany, all of which have known independence far longer and under far more favorable conditions" (p. 448). To accept this rationalization is to accept the theory of the inevitability of political instability in Africa. It reflects the failure of the contributors to diagnose the problem adequately.

Their analyses are deficient for two major reasons: (1) they neglect the nature of the socioeconomic organization of society, and (2) they are totally preoccupied with intergroup variables. By focusing on biocultural factors they treat the significant units of social action as though they are innate; as if the socioeconomic organization of society is static, and the economic structure of society is an indifferent condition of sociopolitical action. Since the context for the interaction of the plural sections is excluded from analysis, historical changes in it are ignored. Similarities are identified across the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial societies of Africa irrespective of the differences in their degree of social differentiation, the level of growth of their productive forces, their prevailing relations of production, and the degree of class consciousness of their populations.

While they correctly identify the origin of pluralism in group interaction, the authors fail to investigate the cause and nature of such contact. For example, the relevant significant arena of interaction in contemporary African societies is the urban area. Therefore, factors which define their urban situations are the most crucial for analysis. These are the colonial heritage of the African states, particularly their status as dependent and peripheral appendages of the advanced capitalist nations; their inferior role in the international division of labor; scarcity of goods and services; socioeconomic competition of the kind underlined by Furnivall; inegalitarianism in socioeconomic life; social atomization of the urban population; the pervasive socioeconomic insecurity of the individual; and the low level of class consciousness of the population. By failing to integrate these factors into their analyses, the contributors mystify, rather than clarify Furnivall's pioneering work.

Also, although the authors view processes at the individual level as relevant, they de-emphasize Furnivall's correct observation that capitalist market forces in tropical colonies created conditions of social atomization. Furnivall incorrectly attributes to market relations and colonial domination the success in counteracting the resultant anomie of the individual. Rather, it was ethnic and racial group solidarity that provided the necessary solace. The destructive competition for scarce socioeconomic resources in urban Africa impels the individual to seek allies in order to attain his goals. The low level of class consciousness ensures that these informal alliances follow ethnic and racial lines. Heightened socioeconomic competition is a crucial motivational complex leading to pluralism. Thus the group factors which the authors view as central to analysis are today symptoms rather than causes of pluralism.

A focus on the individual is important for resolving ethnic and racial difficulties in the African states. Given the dominance of capitalist structures in these states, the psychological paradox reflected in Sumner's concept of antagonistic cooperation characterizes group cohesion. Members are still hostile to each other; they have only renounced a part of this hostility because of utilitarian motives and sentiments of actual and putative kinship ties. Cohesion is permanently countered, however, by disruptive forces of antagonism. Egotistic interests remain the most powerful motives and are only somewhat mitigated by group solidarity. Therefore, the individual's identification with ethnic and racial groups can be decreased by increasing his socioeconomic security.

As the experiences of Belgium, Canada, and the United States indicate, this security cannot be achieved by the elimination of scarcity of resources alone. Socioeconomic insecurity is also related to the inequitable distribution of wealth in society. A higher degree of inequality diminishes the certainty of a reasonable share. Fear of being confined to the bottom of the receiving ladder impels the individual to seek the security of ethnic and racial group solidarity. Private ownership together with the profit motive of economic enterprises in capitalist societies encourage inequality. Thus the requisite solution to the adverse effects of pluralism in Africa is a socioeconomic organization which limits the scope and intensity of competition and encourages a high degree of egalitarianism. The strength of the book lies in the breadth and rigor of its analyses; but its explanatory capacity is weak. It is a useful starting point for further examinations of pluralism in Africa.

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White-Collar Unionism in Britain. By Roger Lumley. (London: Methuen, 1973. Pp. 160. $7.50, cloth; $3.25, paper.)

We actually know very little yet about white-collar trade unionism. This at least is clear from this survey of the present state of—and state of knowledge about—white collar unionism in Britain. What we do know is pulled together here in a useful and concise report that will be an invaluable sourcebook for students of British industrial relations, politics, and social structure. Research students will find here up-to-date information on white-collar trade-union growth, structure and patterns of behavior; and will find, in the heavily footnoted chapters, a useful guide to the limited amount of academic work so far completed on this major growth area of British trade unionism.

Yet in his attempt to summarize both existing trade union practice and academic research at the same time, Mr. Lumley performs neither task adequately. As a brief description of white-collar union practice, his report is superficial, and as a result at times misleading. This is particularly true of his account of militancy by teachers' unions, where he reduces complex patterns of organizational motivation to a single preoccupation with the declining status of teaching as a profession (p. 100). Throughout indeed, the chapter on the characteristics of white-collar unionism reads like a collection of union broadsheets, so that in the end it offers little more than a formal catalogue of official bargaining procedures. Serious scholars of white-collar unionism will not find this enough and will be forced to examine the detailed monographs on which this book is based.

Nor is Mr. Lumley sufficiently critical of the academic literature that he marshals and surveys. He makes no attempt to guide the reader through the competing schools of thought on union growth and character, or to tackle systematically the difficult problems of definition and problem-specification that must precede the future progress in white-collar trade-union studies that he seeks. In particular, he uncritically adopts the well-worn argument that it is the particular social position of white-collar workers that best explains the growth and character of the unions that they join. But—as is so often the case in the literature on white-collar unionism—the book does not offer the parallel analysis of manual workers and their unions which alone could validate such an argument; it merely implies (p. 34) that manual workers have different attitudes about their unions—attitudes that are in some unspecified way connected to their different social position. Yet recent work by myself and others (G. S. Bain, D. Coates and V. Ellis, *Social Stratification and Trade Unionism* [London: Heinemann, 1973]) has argued that this easy equation of social position and trade unionism does not hold, and that students of white-collar union growth and character should abandon previous preoccupations with questions of social position. If we are right, Mr. Lumley's report—though specifically produced to guide future research (p. 14)—is more likely simply to reinforce misconceptions that have already dulled the impact of research on various aspects of white-collar unionism; and accordingly American readers who make use of the book's excellent statistical data should treat its nonquantitative sections with a degree of caution.

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The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929. By Adrian Lyttelton. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. Pp. 544. $17.50.)

Fascists have often been accused of pursuing power for its own sake and Lyttelton comes perilously close to this demonic view of Fascism when he describes it as "the creed of a group devoted essentially to the pure aim of seizing power by violence" (p. 42). Fortunately for the book and for the reader, he does not dwell long on such putative motivations. Instead—and this is perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the book—he leads the reader through the complicated and shifting rivalries, alliances, confrontations, and compromises that were the hallmark of Fascist government in Italy. He does so with a wealth of detail and comes up with the most thorough "group analysis" of Fascism available in English. The research is extensive both in the published primary and secondary sources up to about 1970 and in archival collections located in Italy and England.

The range of the author's definition of power is indicated by the chapter headings, which include: Mussolini and His Allies, The Party and the State, The Fascist Economy, Ideology and Culture, and Propaganda and Education. Power in the encompassing sense suggested here must be built up very gradually. It took the Fascists nearly seven years after they seized the government to concentrate such pervasive power in their own hands. The fact that their power was never as absolute as some of them had anticipated cannot obscure the fact that by 1929 a new type of government had emerged in Italy which people throughout the world either admired or detested.

What, according to the author, were the distinctive traits of this new type of government? Lyttelton apparently sees the uniqueness of Fascism in the way it manipulated power, particularly in the manner in which Mussolini imposed and maintained his supremacy, the techniques whereby he won the support of vested interests like the Church, the bureaucracy, and big business, and the adroitness with which he prevented his own followers from challenging his personal rule. The result was a compromise with every vested interest strong enough to resist the more radical aspirations of Fascism but willing to come to terms with what might be called the Mussolinian center, a compromise that was also achieved mainly at the expense of workers, small peasants, and politically expendable Fascists. None of this will strike those who are familiar with recent writings on Fascism as being particularly new. The originality of the work lies rather in the way these themes are developed, in the kind of supporting information uncovered by the author, and in his concern for what was happening at the "intermediate levels of power" (p. 429).

The author also attempts to introduce a comparative perspective, but at this point one begins to have some reservations. The comparative perspective is not as pervasive as the author seems to promise when he writes that the Italian movement "cannot be viewed in correct perspective if the European dimension of Fascism is not kept in mind" (p. 1). The promised European dimension turns out to be mostly Nazi Germany, and the only clear message that comes across is the familiar one that Italian Fascism was the lax and inefficient precursor of German Nazism.

More serious problems affect those chapters that deal with economic policy, ideology, and propaganda. The discussion of economic policy begins with the flat statement that "Fascism had no consistent theory about the economic system" (p. 333). Further on, however, we come across the observation that under government prodding, "organized capitalism replaced market capitalism as the Fascist model of the economy" (p. 360). How are we to reconcile the denial of a Fascist economic theory with the alleged existence of a Fascist economic model? A similar question arises in connection with the author's blanket dismissal of the role of ideology in the exercise of power. "The novelty of Fascism," he writes, "was that it was a political movement which deliberately set out to exploit irrational instincts" (pp. 364–65). What is needed here is an explicit distinction between theory and ideology, recognizing that ideology can appeal to both rational and irrational faculties. Fascist ideology certainly had a rational component when it emphasized the importance of social harmony within the nation. Rightly or wrongly, social harmony was perceived very rationally as a prerequisite for modernization and a stronger national posture. While one may certainly criticize the terms on which the Fascists achieved social reconciliation (and it was certainly not the workers who benefited from it), it seems nevertheless clear that those special interests who came to terms with Fascism did so on the basis of a rational calculation of anticipated gains, not because they were taken in by the Fascist appeal to irrational urges.

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The Untouchables in Contemporary India. Edited by J. Michael Mahar. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1972. Pp. 496. $6.95.)

Let it be said at the outset that while this is primarily a book for South Asia area specialists, it contains descriptive matter and analysis of interest to political scientists concerned with the politics of social stratification and social change.

There can be "dark" corners in an otherwise open society, and untouchability has been and in some ways continues to be one of them in India. So it was a good initiative which brought together under the sponsorship of the Association for Asian Studies in 1967 a group of scholars who had been especially devoting energies to probing various aspects of "the black sin." The present volume is the outcome, though the editor tells us that to the conference papers "other pertinent writings have been added." (Surely it is not pedantic to be irritated by such vagueness? The coyness of authors can usually be understood and sometimes forgiven, that of editors is often needlessly baffling and thus inexcusable.)

A general merit of the volume is its exploitation of several disciplines in order to close in on the problem from different approaches. There is a brief but telling essay by Walter Neale on the untouchable as "marginal laborer," a piece which shows the rigor and elegance of economic analysis at its best; its conclusion is that the bottom of the rural heap of Indian society can only be spared even grimmer effects of its marginality if investment increases fast enough to enhance the demand for labor and/or if the outcastes can exploit better than they have so far done the potential political advantages of their sheer numbers. Contributions from sociologists and anthropologists are too numerous for discussion here; it deserves to be mentioned, however, that Owen Lynch has interesting suggestions to offer on the components into which charismatic leadership (such as that of Ambedkar) can be analyzed; that Adele Fiske had brought to light much inaccessible information on the organizational outcomes, seemingly highly fragmented and minimally politicized, of the untouchables' escape into Buddhism; and that in general the reports from the villages speak of change which is patchy, variable, limited in scale and painful both to the oppressors who have to adjust and to those of the oppressed who see the gains as too tiny.

Fortunately, the two contributions which are of special interest to the political scientist are among the best in the book; they are the most substantial, more than 60 pages each, and they are—not surprisingly, in view of their authors' previous work of distinction—contributions of quality. Lelah Dushkin examines the political operation since independence of the system of "protective discrimination" in favor of the untouchables. That system, as Eleanor Zelliot shows in her historical essay, was in part a legacy of imperial rule, in part the outcome of the contrasted political philosophies and pressures of Gandhi and Ambedkar, the former seeking to arouse the moral conscience of the caste Hindus by preaching their duties, and the latter striving to awaken the political consciousness of the untouchables by teaching their rights. (There seems to be an inconsistency in Gandhi which Zelliot fails to emphasize and Gandhians generally ignore. Gandhi tackled the Indo-British conflict from both ends: he sought to sap the morale and weaken the will of the rulers while building up the self-reliance and courage of the ruled to the end that the unequal relation could simply not continue. In relation to the Harijan problem he acted differently by using philanthropy rather than the whole of *satyagraha:* he worked mainly on the conscience of the elites, hardly at all on giving moral muscle to the oppressed—using half a weapon only, perhaps because in this case he espoused only half the goal.) Central to the system, which, however, includes job reservations in government service, is the special arrangement of political representation involving the reservation of legislative seats for untouchables. Dushkin provides the first overview analysis of the working of this system, drawing attention to the causes and consequences of the shift from double-member constituencies in 1952 and 1957 to single-member constituencies subsequently, to the fact that normally it is caste Hindu voters who determine the winners of the reserved seats, and that, for this and other reasons, Congress rather than the specifically untouchables' Republican Party has been the main beneficiary. The few radical leaders of the untouchables tend to see the whole operation as a clever fraud, a means of social control over the deprived: job reservations fall far short of targets and in any case constitute political castration by depriving the outcaste community of leaders; the reserved seats are comfortable places for puppets of the ruling party. Dushkin without endorsing such a view shows how far there are grounds for bitterness. She considers that plainly protective discrimination, while it provides leading Congress untouchables with bargaining power at times, de-fuses a nasty social problem without solving it and creates fresh divisions among the untouchables themselves. It is a defect in Dushkin's essay that its organization is untidy; it is no defect but a real merit that at a number of points she identifies specific problems calling for research, and it is to be hoped that she, as one of the best qualified, will press on with such research.

The lawyer's contribution by Marc Galanter, beautiful in its precision and order, is concerned with the other side of state action in relation to untouchability: the attempt to remove by law those very disabilities whose existence in Hindu society constitutes the framework of untouchability. A key section of his chapter assesses the effectiveness of the Untouchability (Offences) Act and kindred measures; it makes sorry reading. The state-wise distribution of prosecutions varies bafflingly from state to state. There has also been a decline in prosecutions while the percentage of convictions has fallen and that of acquittals has increased: "there is no doubt that there are more offenses against the Act in a good-sized village in a week than there are prosecutions in all of India in an entire year" (p. 270). The social context conditions the operations of the law to a greater extent than the law can change the social context. Galanter suggests the need for a new kind of administrative agency consisting of both an investigative branch and a tribunal.

It is a commonplace that the Indian political system has done a remarkable job of accommodating demands and containing tensions. This book amply shows just how much there is to do.

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Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data. Edited by Ellen Mickiewicz. (New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp. 225. $14.95.)

The last five years have witnessed an increase in the use of aggregate data in research on the Soviet Union. There are several apparent reasons for this, some having to do with such trends in the field of comparative politics generally, others rooted more specifically in the Soviet situation, especially the growing availability of reasonably reliable social, economic, and politically relevant statistics, coupled with the continuing paucity of other types of information, e.g., survey or event data. Still, the growth in the use of aggregate data on the Soviet Union has not been as dramatic as it might have been, presumably in part because these data are not as readily available as they could and should be to Western scholars.

Consequently, it is easy to agree with Karl Deutsch's statement, in his Foreword to the Mickiewicz handbook, that the book represents an "essential first step"—a "crucial beginning" for a "long journey" (p. xxvii)—toward increased use of aggregate data, both in research focused on the Soviet Union itself, and in cross-national studies including the Soviet Union. Professor Mickiewicz and her collaborators have made an important contribution by demonstrating that a considerable variety of statistical material on the Soviet Union can be easily accumulated.

The book consists of an introduction by Professor Mickiewicz, in which she illustrates how quantitative data can be used to investigate several important issues related to the emergence and management of social cleavages in an industrialized society, followed by nine "chapters" contributed by specialists on various aspects of Soviet society. The chapters deal with demography, agriculture, economic production, health, housing, education, elite recruitment and mobilization, communications, and international interactions. Each consists of a brief—usually two pages—statement characterizing in very general terms the nature of available statistical data on that sector of Soviet society, followed by a series of tables (the average is about 22 tables per chapter) each carefully footnoted to its source. The vast majority of the data are from Soviet sources, although some secondary Western sources have been used. The contributors of these chapters are all respected scholars who have made important research contributions in Soviet studies.

Because the book is the first such handbook on the Soviet Union to be published in English, and because its catalytic and socialization effects should be substantial, we should not be too quick to form unfavorable judgments of it. Further, there is reason to restrain criticism based on what is left out of a collection of data, rather than what is included. But so much more could profitably have been included that it is difficult not to be disappointed with this book.

Perhaps the most fundamental—and puzzling—difficulty is the lack of systematic attention to subnational units. Data for the majority of variables are reported only at the national (all-Union) level. There are exceptions: Henry W. Morton's chapter on "Housing" reports republic-level data more often than not, as does the chapter on "Education." In her introduction, Professor Mickiewicz remarks that ". . . in every section but the one on international interactions, data are available for the union republic level" (p. 4). True; but Stanley H. Cohn's chapter on "Production" includes republic data in one table (of 17), and Warren W. Eason ("Demography") has subnational data in two tables (of 12). Overall, data on subnational units are included for considerably fewer than half of the variables. Yet data at the union-republic level are available for most of these variables, often in the same sources as were used in gathering the all-Union data.

There are at least four reasons why the concentration on the all-Union level, and the accompanying neglect of subnational data, constitute a serious problem. In the first place, there is the simple fact that the Soviet Union is complex and heterogeneous; consequently, an appreciation of the character of that society cannot be gained merely from national-level data, which wash out significant interregional differences. Second, and relatedly, many of the interesting and important questions raised by Professors Deutsch (in the Foreword) and Mickiewicz (in the Introduction) involve within-system variation, and demand within-system data. Third, the presentation of only national-level data for many variables invites problems of ecological inference, difficulties which become less pronounced as one uses data at lower administrative levels, involving a lesser degree of aggregation. Finally, meaningful cross-national research—as well as inquiry focusing on the Soviet Union alone—requires investigation of *between-system differences in within-system relationships* (as suggested by A. Przeworski and H. Teune in *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* [New York: Wiley, 1970]). System-level variables should be used to explain variance in a dependent variable only when other within-system variables leave substantial portions of variance unaccounted for.

The point is not that all-Union data on the Soviet Union are useless, but rather that such data must be used in conjunction with subnational data—at the union-republic level and below—in order to conduct meaningful research, either single-country or cross-national studies. And these subnational data *are* available, commonly at the union-republic level, and sometimes even at the *oblast* level, as can be seen simply by looking at Library of Congress holdings.

A second basic limitation of this handbook is the omission altogether of important elements of social—especially political—activity. Some of these omissions are especially puzzling, since relevant data could have been culled from Western, as well as Soviet, sources. For example, Professor Mickiewicz, in her chapter on "Elite Recruitment and Mobilization," includes virtually no data on the composition of important Party bodies (e.g., the Politburo or the Central Committee). Despite her recognition (p. 159) that "only a small proportion of the Party's membership" serves in centrally-important political roles, she reports only the composition of the CPSU as a whole. (Educational data on lower-level Party secretaries are the exception.) And non-Party (e.g., governmental) bodies are wholly excluded; especially disappointing is the absence of data on the composition of subnational legislative bodies (available, for example, in *Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov,* 2 vols., Moscow, 1967). The chapters on production and demography also omit a substantial number of seemingly interesting variables for which both all-Union and republic-level data might have been included, as a glance at the various editions of *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, Vestnik statistiki,* and *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia* would suggest. A related difficulty is the absence throughout of measures dealing with consumption patterns. And, given the increasing interest in comparative public policy and expenditure analysis, the neglect of subnational budgetary data is unfortunate (see *Mestnye biudzhety SSSR,* Moscow, 1970).

A reasonable response to these first two objections might be that one cannot possibly include all of the potentially relevant statistics now available on the Soviet Union in such a book. Indeed, this consideration raises a third fundamental doubt about the book, especially insofar as it is primarily a collection of aggregate data: Is a bound book really the appropriate outlet for this kind of undertaking? Would not the interests of the relevant community have been better served if the data coverage had been significantly expanded, both vertically and horizontally, and the resulting data collection made available as a magnetic computer tape? For persons who do not have access to data processing facilities, hard-copy versions of selected data could be generated quickly and inexpensively from the tape; the reverse process, incidentally, is neither automatic nor inexpensive.

If the data themselves—in significantly expanded form—could have been made available on magnetic tape, a companion volume might have been published—one of smaller size and greater direct usefulness—in which Professor Mickiewicz and her collaborators could have turned their attention to two critical subjects which are given superficial treatment in the present volume. First, there remains a need for a much more detailed treatment of primary Soviet sources, indicating the substantive range of available data, the societal levels at which given data are reported, and the problems involved in using these data. (The chapters by Roy D. Laird, on agriculture, and Roger E. Kanet, on international interactions, are the only ones to treat such problems in any detail.) Second, relatedly, there is a need for a guide to those Soviet publications that describe and discuss the nature of Soviet statistics-generating and gathering operations. One has the feeling, for example, that a careful reading of the instructions given to census-takers concerning the native language (*rodnoi iazyk*) question might have led Brian Silver ("Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *APSR,* 68 [March, 1974], 45–66) to question the validity of his measure of "national identity." (See *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie statistikov, 1968: stenograficheskii otchet* [Moscow, 1969], p. 601.) A number of important sources dealing with the generation and handling of Soviet statistics need to be reviewed for the Western researcher—e.g., *Istoriia sovetskoi gosudarstvennoi statistiki* (Moscow, 1969); A. I. Yezhov, *Organizatsiia statistiki v SSSR* (Moscow, 1968); and *Sovetskaia statistika za polveka (1917–1967 gg.)* (Moscow, 1970). In short, there is a need for a handbook on the availability and use of Soviet sources of social data.

There are two things about this book which seem to warrant positive response. First, the book demonstrates that a variety of social statistics on the Soviet Union can be easily assembled. The lament that "poor data" preclude systematic, quantitative research on Communist systems, and that work in this area must therefore be judged by less demanding criteria, has become a dubious rationalization. Perhaps the Mickiewicz handbook will speed the disintegration of this already crumbling façade.

Professor Mickiewicz's introduction is the book's other strength. In it, she shows that aggregate data can be used to address important questions attending processes of social change in the Soviet Union; e.g., the impact of changing elements of economic and technological context on the roles of women in Soviet society. At the same time, some of the most interesting parts of the introduction illustrate indirectly the major shortcomings of the data-reporting "chapters" that follow. That is, Professor Mickiewicz understandably uses subnational data in generating explanatory statements about the effects of social and economic context, for interregional differences in rates of social change are usually a good deal more interesting than are overall national (all-Union) trends. Similarly, Professor Mickiewicz makes use of some sample survey data in her introduction, but such data appear nowhere else in the book.

In short, the basic idea behind this volume is laudable. Unfortunately, the nature and depth of the data reported leave a great deal to be desired. Nor is it clear that book form is the appropriate outlet for such data.

(NB: I am grateful to Professors Charles D. Cary and Barclay Ward for bibliographic assistance in the preparation of this review.)

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The Growth of Parliamentary Scrutiny by Committee: A Symposium. By Alfred Morris. (New York: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1970. Pp. 141. $8.00, cloth; $5.50, paper.)

Analysis of British political institutions has directed considerable attention to the relative strength of the cabinet, parliament, and civil service. During the early 1960s critics who feared the decline of parliament advocated, in part, the development of a system of specialist committees as one means of improving the effectiveness of parliament. For various reasons, some select committees were established as an experiment beginning in 1966, and by 1970 many analysts believed that the experience with select committees warranted evaluation.

The symposium edited by Alfred Morris was one of the efforts made to assess the value of select committees. The book contains an introduction and conclusion by Mr. Morris, who is himself a Member of Parliament, and seven essays by Members of Parliament who have been Chairmen or members of select committees. The introduction outlines the background leading to the establishment of select committees and sets forth the major objections raised against them. The Foreword indicates that there are essays both for and against select committees, but this is somewhat misleading as there are six essays which on balance view select committees favorably and one which broadly views them unfavorably in comparison with the functions of the House of Commons as a whole and the relationship of both specialist committees and the House to the government.

The six essays dealing with particular specialist committees review the experience of the select committees on Science and Technology, Agriculture, Overseas Aid, Nationalized Industries, Britain's "Ombudsman," and Race Relations and Immigration. These essays vary in quality. Analysis of the select committees on Agriculture, Science and Technology, the Ombudsman, and Nationalized Industries are the most candid and give the most intricate analysis of the relationships among parliament, the committees, and the civil service. The weakest essays deal with the committees on Overseas Aid and Race Relations. As the author of the essay on the Overseas Aid committee suggested, analysis of this committee is premature considering that it did not make a formal report before the dissolution of parliament and the doctrine of parliamentary privilege prevents the author from discussing outside the Committee either its deliberations or unpublished memoranda. The essay on the Race Relations Committee is an elementary statement of the activities of the committee without much analysis of the intricacies of committee operations.

In general the authors discuss the substantive problems and policies of their respective committees as well as basic institutional problems such as the role of select committees in a political system that does not entail separation of powers between executive and legislature. More specifically, the Members of Parliament discussed problems their committees experienced with terms of reference, procedural obstacles, limited research time, use of subcommittees, staffing, degree of cooperation with the civil service and Ministers, debate of reports in the House, and tenure of the committees themselves. Although many of the Morris symposium authors mention these as problems experienced by their committees, other reports in the literature on this subject may lead the reader to conclude that the Members of Parliament writing for the Morris symposium exhibit a tendency to emphasize the success and minimize the problems and failures of select committees. This tendency is perhaps regrettable considering that the objective of the symposium was to assess the experience of the committees. The responsibility for providing a balanced view of committee experience lies, however, less with the individual authors than with the symposium director. Rather than providing the reader with one assessment of each of six committees, a more insightful and effective symposium might have been organized around a format which would have given the reader several assessments of two or three widely known committees such as Agriculture or Science and Technology. Analysis by both academicians and Members of Parliament would have provided assessments based on first-hand experience as well as academic comparative analysis placing committee experience in perspective.

This symposium is a useful contribution to the evaluation of specialist committees and their place in the relationship between the House of Commons and the cabinet, but the reader would best insure obtaining a balanced view by consulting other analyses recently published in journals, as well as John Mackintosh's brief but insightful paper "Reform of the

House of Commons: The Case for Specialization," an Edinburgh University Press Occasional Paper reprinted in Gerhard Loewenberg's *Modern Parliaments: Change or Decline?* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971).

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Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung. By Lutz Niethammer. (Frankfurt A.M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 1972. Pp. 710. DM 68.)

In the landscape of recent history, the American occupation of Germany is already thoroughly traveled terrain. But where the earlier theses concerning the inconsistencies and failures of American denazification policies have been demonstrated ad nauseam, the present work brings new material and fresh perspectives to bear. Lutz Niethammer's diverse German training in history and political science, combined with extended research in Britain and the United States, is evident in this example of meticulous scholarship.

At the cost of some injustice to his predecessors (e.g., John Gimbel and Gabriel Kolko), Dr. Niethammer attributes four basic deficiencies to previous studies: (1) the assumption that U.S. policies failed, without a thorough investigation of the social and political context in which they were formed; (2) the limited perspective of researchers who based their findings on a biased selection of evidence; (3) the false assumption of a "zero hour" at which the occupation began, which ignores the gradual extension of U.S. control and depreciates the constraints imposed by diverse conditions in German society; and (4) the misplaced emphasis on statistical aggregates showing social structural continuity (e.g., Edinger), rather than on the denazification processes themselves.

Despite its considerable length, this study excludes several related issues, such as the social structure of fascism, the efforts toward positive re-education, and the problems of securing sufficient economic and administrative personnel. The primary focus is on the interaction of social forces and individual personalities in the U.S. and Bavaria, boldly characterized as "a microcosm of German politics." Bavaria was chosen specifically because it was a self-conscious unit, less subject to interregional influences, with a more clearly delineated political infrastructure.

The first three chapters comprise a painstaking, sometimes tedious recounting of the diverse goals of American decision makers, the interim purges, the obstructive alliance of the "non-partisan" Schäffer administration with the Patton command, the rise of the Bavarian parties, and the negotiations leading to the *Befreiungsgesetz,* the statutory basis for the extended phase of denazification. Although his conclusions do not diverge markedly from those of other recent studies, Niethammer's greater access to U.S. military documents permits a clearer assessment of the reciprocal influence of American and Bavarian officials. In discussing the origins of American policy, it is difficult to see where Niethammer has improved on the work of Gimbel, for example. But his ability to integrate German and American perspectives, particularly in the creation of the *Befreiungsgesetz,* is certainly impressive. Nevertheless, this first half of the book is unnecessarily protracted and marred by tiresome refutations of interpretations which, in my view, have already been discredited.

A more valuable contribution appears in the fourth chapter, with its emphasis upon the conflicting expectations of the U.S. command and the Bavarian government over the functions of the denazification tribunals. Because the enabling law included many loopholes and a basic obfuscation of the separate purge and rehabilitation functions, its early application depended heavily on the initiatives of the *Land* "liberation ministers." Niethammer recounts how numerous coalitions were built and shattered, as the Bavarian parties maneuvered to alter the impact of the proceedings, while avoiding the liabilities of "collaboration."

Particular attention is given the Communist attempt to accelerate the exoneration of certain groups to gain electoral advantages. This emphasis had the effect of delaying the cases of more significant Nazi officials, until the tribunals had degenerated into "white-washing" mechanisms. A conservative reaction followed the Communist failure, and attempts to reach a middle ground were preempted by renewed American control. The abrupt termination of U.S. concern is explained in the familiar terms of German economic needs and the pressure of the domestic American coalition forming along the battle lines of the imminent Cold War.

In general, Niethammer attributes the tribunals' abortive experience to: (1) the excessive magnitude of their task, given the shortage of competent German personnel; (2) the basic ambiguities of the *Befreiungsgesetz*· (3) the inconsistent orientations and recruitment criteria employed by successive Bavarian ministers; and (4) the persistent divisions between the U.S. command and the military agencies responsible for implementing policy.

In the final chapter the treatment of individual cases is analyzed by means of a sample taken from records of the Munich District. Detailed reporting of numerous cases is ably employed to illustrate how tribunal proceedings were misused by participants, as well as to support observed patterns of "typically abnormal" mitigating circumstances, which led to reduced charges and nominal penalties in the overwhelming majority of cases. The sample is disaggregated to reveal how tribunal verdicts discriminated among cases according to the level and duration of membership in Nazi organizations, a variety of personal and occupational attributes, and differences in the timing and procedures of adjudication. It is in this aspect that Niethammer's work is most innovative and productive.

Specialists in this question will surely want to consult the methods and findings of these last two chapters. In particular, Niethammer's thorough use of evidence deserves emulation. This book, however, cannot be said to have general significance, because of the author's disinclination to explore the implications of his findings beyond the unique circumstances prevailing in Bavaria in 1945–1949.

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Area Handbook for Algeria. By Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Pp. 401. $5.00.)

This handbook, written primarily for U.S. military personnel, but probably with no mischief intended, offers a competent and useful if unoriginal survey of economic, social, and political trends in Algeria up to March, 1972. It marks a considerable revision and rewriting of its predecessor published in 1965. The chapters on education, economic structure, agriculture, and industry (respectively chapters 8, 13–15) are of special interest to students of political economy, in that they describe some of the regime's most significant choices. Thus, in the field of education, progress toward Arabizing the French system has been limited by the fact that "the existing trained Algerians merely continued the traditional dominance of French in all aspects of the modern sector" (pp. 120–21). Yet to satisfy those segments of public opinion that aspire for national "authenticity" and the resurrection of an Algerian, Arab-Islamic heritage, the Minister of Traditional Education and Religious Affairs has recently accelerated the construction of Islamic secondary schools. In short, "the country seemed to be producing a French-speaking elite and an Arabic-speaking mass" (p. 121).

Despite the regime's commitment to Arab-Islamic culture, it is the French-trained technocratic elite that President Boumedienne has enlisted, together with foreign advisors including some 300 American consultants, to carry out his government's principal priority, rapid industrialization. Forty-five per cent of the six billion dollars to be invested from 1970 to 1973 was earmarked for petroleum, other mining, and the industrial sector (p. 260). Since this handbook was written, the dramatic rise in petroleum revenues may facilitate even more ambitious investment in heavy industry without risking excessive dependence on foreign credits. It remains to be seen whether the necessary skilled workers and cadres can be trained to run and manage the new industries efficiently. It is unlikely, however, that the "rapid and sweeping economic modernization" envisaged by Boumedienne and his advisors depends, as the handbook has it, "on westernization at the expense of Arabization" (p. 218).

Furthermore, the regime embarked in 1970 upon an "agrarian revolution" that is designed not only to remedy glaring inequalities (greater than those of Tunisia or Morocco) in the distribution of land but also to bridge the technological gap between the modern (ex-French, but also some Algerian) and traditional sectors. Unfortunately the handbook omits any discussion of the political implications of this new, long-term commitment. Personal networks linking the Algerian landowners with high officials are not discussed. Rather, the "technocrat" officials are supposed to have "brought their growing influence to bear upon the government" to reform the traditional sector so as to expand the country's market for industrial products (p. 294).

Usually the writers of the handbook are less naive, but, making "no attempt to express any particular point of view," (p. iii) they tend to have political judgments that are bland and bureaucratic, based on the conventional wisdom of various "observers" without citing names or sources. There are no footnotes. Clichés like "one million" killed in the war of independence, Algerians "overcome with deep alienation" (p. 177), and "the old institutions and values" crumbling (p. 151) abound. There is a tantalizing reference on p. 223 to the "active and decisive" role of army officers in local politics in the early 1970s, but no evidence is offered. And what is the political scientist to make of the following remark that by then "the civil servants had been superseded by the technocrats, a more diffuse and less precisely defined group, but nonetheless a politically potent one . . ." (pp. 223–4)? Obviously the technocrats, however they are defined, are important in Algeria, but their influence has not yet been seriously analyzed.

In an introductory but careful way this handbook covers everything from Algeria's political history to contemporary literary trends, Arabic as well as French, and even family planning, about which there is little to say (pp. 88–90). Weaknesses in political interpretations reflect more upon the poverty of scholarship on contemporary Algeria than upon the handbook's authors or any official constraints upon them. It is to be regretted, however, that the huge bibliography is simply a compilation without critical summaries or comments. Jeanne Favret's brilliant article, reprinted in E. Gellner and C. Micaud, *Arabs and Berbers* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972), is not cited; nor is the bi-monthly, *Maghreb-Machrek* (Paris: Documentation française), which, together with *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), only one year of which is cited, is the most useful periodical reference to contemporary Algeria.

CLEMENT HENRY MOORE
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West Malaysia and Singapore: A Selected Bibliography. By Karl J. Pelzer. (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area File Press, 1971. Pp. 394. $15.00.)

According to the compiler's preface this volume "is intended to serve as [a] reference and reading list for students in the Behavioral Sciences . . . , as well as History and the Natural Sciences. . . ." It undoubtedly has served students and practitioners in these disciplines well in the three years since publication, and, while the half-life of a bibliography is usually relatively short, it no doubt will continue to be of assistance in the endless search for pertinent source material. While I have found this bibliography helpful on numerous occasions, using it has also brought out some of its deficiencies. Of course, the criticisms that follow must be considered in perspective. No bibliographical tool is likely to satisfy completely the needs of a particular researcher unless he compiles it himself, and when the reviewer and the compiler are trained in different disciplines, the problem is compounded. Moreover, compiling a bibliography is a tedious and often thankless task, and it is with some hesitation that I venture to criticize any useful research tool. Nevertheless, for the benefit of potential users in the social sciences some deficiencies must be noted.

The bibliography makes no claim to completeness, and almost no published bibliography on a subject as broad as this could be comprehensive, but what were the criteria for selection? Why was Eastern Malaysia (Borneo) excluded? Why was Singapore not covered as thoroughly as Western Malaysia? Why are some (to my mind) marginal University of Singapore M.A. theses included and some significant Ph.D. dissertations from the University of London omitted? If the volume is not to be confined to material in English, why are there so few non-English entries in the entire volume? The compiler plunged into much greater depth in his own discipline (geography), but in other areas there are fewer entries and the categories employed are much broader and vaguer. Is this a legitimate criterion for selection in a bibliography for social scientists? Mention must also be made of the bibliography's selectivity in the information provided. Some entries are very complete, but some are sketchy ("Kuala Lumpur, 1911" does not give the serious researcher much to go on if he wants to obtain a copy of "The Geology and Mining Industries of Ulu Pahang"). Lastly, HRAF should have devised a more usable indexing system for this volume. Unless one has memorized the organization of the book it is necessary to move from the author index to the desired citation by way of the table of contents, and for authors with multiple entries this can be a time-consuming and sometimes frustrating undertaking.

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Decentralisation in Yugoslavia and India. By Nageshwar Prasad. (Varanasi, India: Navchetan Prakashan, 1972. Pp. 330. $6.00.)

This book is an attempt at evaluating the experiments in decentralization of authority in two different societies, Yugoslavia and India. It confines itself, by and large, to the institutional aspects of such experiments and, therefore, tells us only half the story. Being deeply involved in the decentralization movement in India, Nageshwar Prasad, a Sarvodaya (a social philosophy based on Gandhism) theoretician and political worker, was in a position to tell us much more about the effects of such experiments than in fact he has done. Nevertheless, so far as the structural aspects of these experiments are concerned, the author has presented them in great detail and clarity.

Prasad analyzes in depth the different circumstances which stimulated the decentralization movements in Yugoslavia and India. Consequently, the goals which these two societies sought to realize through decentralization remained materially different.

After the rift between Belgrade and Moscow, Prasad tells us, the Yugoslavs went back to the corpus of Marxism-Leninism in search of a political alternative. They looked for a political system which would reject the Russian type of coercive state, secret service, and bureaucracy. Soon they discovered that neither Marx nor Engels nor, indeed, Lenin thought of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" as a permanent phenomenon. Moreover, each of them had something to say about "the withering away of the state" along with the disappearance of the class structure. None, however, was clear about the form of authority which would emerge in a classless society. Marx in particular, Prasad points out, held the short-lived Paris Commune in high esteem and even treated it as a possible model for the reorganization of society. Consequently, the Yugoslavs, in search of an alternate political system, paid great attention to the principles of communal organization implicit in the Paris Commune. Subsequently, Kardelj and Tito viewed "decentralization" as an integral part of "the withering away" process. As Tito put it, "the decentralization . . . is not only profoundly democratic but has inherent in it the seeds of withering away not only of centralism, but of the state in general, as a machine of force" (p. 20). From such a theoretical position the Yugoslavs went on to create a series of institutions by which participation in decision making in industry as well as agriculture became possible.

Prasad points out that the Indian experiment with decentralization, on the other hand, was born out of a difficulty in reaching the targets set forth by India's five-year plans. The committee appointed to report on the problem recommended the creation of popular institutions at different levels of district administration so as to involve people in what was being undertaken by way of development targets. The author notes that in its recommendation the committee took a much wider view of development, equating it with human development through democratic process. Subsequently, the different states of India passed different legislations to create participatory institutions.

According to Prasad, another strand in Indian thinking on decentralization came from Gandhi and his followers. Gandhi had a horror of the coercive modern state. He also intensely disliked the exploitation of rural areas by urban centers. What made them possible, in his opinion, was the over-concentration of technology and the consequent bureaucracy. The only antidote to them, in his opinion, was the diffusion of technology itself so as to create "ever widening, never ascending circles" (p. 195) of self-governing and self-sufficient communities.

Further, Prasad points out that Gandhi's followers, particularly, Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), identified yet another dimension, namely, the party warfare which is implicit in western democracies. JP maintained that democracies which are run with the help of party organizations neither attend to the outstanding problems of the community nor do they refrain from subverting the democratic process itself. JP therefore became, as well as a proponent of decentralization, an advocate of a communitarian partyless democracy.

The weakest portions of this book are those which are devoted to the exploitation of "conflicts" by political parties. Political parties, as a rule, manipulate cleavages wherever they are. But not all cleavages which result in conflicts are deleterious to the community. Quite often conflict is the only idiom through which a community can regenerate itself. In a traditional society such as the Indian the search for human dignity and social justice often expresses itself through what is generally regarded as conflict.

Despite its disproportionate emphasis on the structural aspects of the decentralization movement in Yugoslavia and India, the book has made a significant contribution to the field of comparative government and politics.

A. H. Somjee
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Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. By Robert Presthus. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 372. $16.50.)

To reinforce his point that Canadian political scientists have, in the past, neglected the role of interest groups in Canadian politics, Presthus remarks that even the most authoritative text on Canadian government includes neither a section on interest groups nor index entries for "pressure groups" and "lobbyist." Presthus clearly sees his book as redressing the imbalance. Arguing for an end "to any artificial separation between 'political' leaders in the formal apparatus of government and 'private' elites in the institutional sectors of industry, labour, agriculture, and the rest" (p. 10), Presthus relies upon two major theories in this study of the political behaviour of interest groups and their place in Canadian society.

Interaction theory, resting upon economic as well as psychological propositions, and elite accommodation theory applied to a society allegedly "consociational," combine to provide the framework within which Presthus explains his findings. The data for the study were gathered between 1967 and 1971 from an interview sample of more than 1,100 legislators, bureaucrats, and interest-group directors in Ottawa, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. The presence of no fewer than 103 tables attests both to the volume and to the variety of the data gathered by the author.

In many ways the most useful and informative sections of the book are to be found in chapters 4 and 7—chapters primarily devoted to a description of the aims, functions, organizations, and financing of Canadian interest groups, and to an assessment of the groups' political effectiveness. The author concludes that the personal contact among the legislators, bureaucrats, and directors, as well as the shared normative values and the homogeneous socioeconomic background of the three elites, combine in such a way as to enable the elites to interact productively across a fragmented political culture and to maintain "the solvency of the Canadian nation." Noting the strength of the bureaucracy and the critical role it plays in policy formulation, Presthus's work lends support to Samuel Beer's maxim that "where the power is, there the pressure will be applied."

Apart from its modest contribution to an unexplored area of Canadian politics, the book is a disappointment. For one thing, it need not have been so long: judicious editing would have helped. For another, a careful check of the small, incidental facts would have given the reader more confidence in the work's total reliability. Accommodation is institutionalized, we are told (p. 9), through "the 'rule of proportionality' in appointments to the civil service." *Rule?* In the sense of a clearly defined and strictly adhered to principle? Scarcely. In supporting his claim of proportionality in the civil service, Presthus, in a footnote, cites a quotation from *The Vertical Mosaic* by John Porter (whose version of Canadian culture and society Presthus readily accepts). Yet Porter himself includes that very quotation as part of a larger section on the *under-representation* of French Canadians in the federal civil service.

The reader is told of a Quebec election in 1971 (when it was held, in fact, in 1970) in which the separatist *Parti Quebecois* received support from "some one-third of the electorate" (rather than the 23 per cent of the vote it obtained). He is given the wrong dates for Lester Pearson's government. He is informed that Canada has had sixteen prime ministers, "precisely four" of whom have been French Canadian, when the numbers should be fifteen and three respectively. He winces at the description of British Columbia's Social Credit Government as *socialist*. He twice sees the CMA described as the Canadian Association of Manufacturers. He learns of the "virtually dictatorial power of the Cabinet which can, presumably, in Jenning's [sic] oft-quoted hyperbole 'do anything but turn a man into a woman'" (p. 148). The truth is that the quotation, or at least a reasonable variant of it, was de Lolme's, not Jennings's, and it was directed not at the powers of Cabinet but at the sovereignty of Parliament. Jennings, in fact, took the trouble to point out that de Lolme was in error, for if Parliament declared that men were women, *they would be*—so far as the law was concerned.

Trends are suggested and assertions made without the necessary supporting evidence. Is it true that "regional and subcultural criteria of representation are the *central* premises of appointment" (p. 9), to the Cabinet? That "the Canadian higher civil service is patterned rather closely after the British administrative class" (p. 34)? That Senators perceive their representational role in functional and occupational terms? That Canadian agriculture is an "underorganized" section of society (p. 111)? That "as government's net has spread more widely into new and highly technical areas, its reliance upon [agency-created] liaisons has inevitably increased" (p. 79)? That there are "increasing class tensions" (p. 255), in Quebec? That the property qualification for appointment to the Senate ($4,000) is correctly described as a "substantial" one (p. 27)? Before claims can be made and arguments presented, further information is needed to answer such questions satisfactorily.

Presthus's definition of interest groups as "collectivities organized around an explicit value on behalf of which essentially political demands are made *vis-à-vis* government, other groups, and the general public" (p. 99), makes it difficult to conceive of political activities that could not be cited as "interest group" activities involving elite accommodation. Indeed, at one point we are told that even "parties themselves may be defined as interest groups or congeries of interest groups" (p. 60), although for the most part, a distinction is maintained between parties and interest groups on the grounds that having assumed a formal obligation to run the official apparatus, parties have a legitimacy and power unmatched by private interest groups. If, as the author states, the theory of elite accommodation "relates only peripherally to party government and its ideological dimensions" (p. 60), then doubts may well be expressed about the appropriateness of elite accommodation theory to a study of a developed political culture with a highly institutionalized party system. Indeed, if, as seems to be suggested, party is simply a vehicle for control of office and recruitment of politicians, and if party policy is so indeterminate, and if interest groups are so essential to the operation of the political system, then what possible difference can it make which party is in office?

Elite accommodation in Canadian politics would be better understood provided: (a) more were known of the *nature* of the interest groups' contacts with other elites (the "case study" approach which Presthus uses in studying bureaucrats and directors ought to be no less appropriate in studying legislators, yet for some unstated reason legislators were not given an opportunity to record a case history during the interview as were the other two groups); and (b) the reader had been presented with somewhat more refined data on the 296 legislators in Presthus's sample. Was the legislator a newly elected member or a veteran? Was he from a safe or a competitive seat? These variables may have some bearing on the matter.

Of the non-words currently making the rounds in certain academic circles at least two are to be found in Presthus's work: "channelized" and "prestigeful," the latter appearing no fewer than nine times. Finally, although both are discussed in the book, neither "lobbyist" nor "pressure groups" appears in the index.

JOHN C. COURTNEY
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Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Cabinet and the Shadow Government in British Politics. By R. M. Punnett. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. 500. $17.95.)

Although the idea of a "loyal opposition" has been established in Britain for some time, the existence of a formal Opposition structure, as distinct from largely informal social contacts among leading opposition politicians, dates only from early in the twentieth century. About half a century later, in 1955, Attlee elaborated the structure further by designating Opposition spokesmen who were to speak for the Parliamentary Labour Party on specific topics on a continuing basis. This action went beyond merely perpetuating the existence of a Shadow Cabinet to establish a Shadow Government. Having traced the historical development of this Opposition structure, Professor Punnett discusses its components. He focuses upon the Leader of the Opposition, the selection and composition of the Opposition teams, the organization and activities of the Opposition, and the extent to which Opposition spokesmen specialize in particular subjects. His concluding chapter includes suggestions for improving the Opposition's effectiveness.

Despite the difference in subject matter, Punnett makes several points similar to those of McKenzie in *British Political Parties.* While he does not go as far as McKenzie did in contending that the constitutional system requires a particular form of political organization, he does maintain that the Opposition structure takes the form it does because of the great influence of the British governmental system upon it. Speaking of the behavior of Opposition leaders, for example, he comments (p. 358), "Even in their utterances outside the House [of Commons], Spokesmen recognized the principles of individual and collective responsibility." Furthermore, like McKenzie, he indicates that the Conservative party is more in tune than is Labour with this governmental system. The Conservative Shadow Cabinet tends to function more nearly like the real Cabinet, tends to spend more time discussing policy. The differences between the main parties are not great, but Labour's concern with intraparty democracy does tend to make it behave in opposition less in accord with Government practices than is true of the Conservatives. Thus the transition from opposition to Government requires a greater transformation for Labour than for the Conservatives.

Curiously, Punnett indicates that Heath has been more true to the spirit of Attlee's innovation than has Wilson. The basic thrust of Attlee's action was to depart from the tradition of the amateur and move toward increased professionalism. By appointing as spokesmen those Conservative MPs whose Parliamentary activity already had established them as specialists in some area, Heath strengthened this move. Furthermore, on coming to power, he brought a substantial number of these spokesmen into the Government, usually assigning them the same area of responsibility they had had in opposition. In contrast, Wilson was inclined to designate MPs as spokesmen for areas in which they had not specialized previously. When he became Prime Minister, he included a smaller proportion of these spokesmen in the Government and, even when he did include them, was more likely to assign them to a subject matter different from their responsibility in opposition.

Thus in Punnett's view the Conservatives make better use of their time in opposition to prepare for their return to power. Yet even in the case of the Conservatives, he maintains that the Shadow Government cannot properly be seen as a device to ready a party for a future period in office, but is better understood as primarily a means of enabling the Opposition to criticize the Government more effectively. This point appears to be one of the principal conclusions of this study.

To elaborate Punnett's findings beyond this is difficult, for despite the meticulous nature of his study, it lacks theoretical perspective. Although he tends to introduce each new topic with a series of rhetorical questions, these usually are merely questions of fact and not analytical hypotheses. He fails to explain why his questions are more worth asking than any others; he provides no linkage, no hierarchical ordering, of his questions. The bulk of the book is a collection of rather interesting details. And while one is inclined to believe that having all this information available is useful, yet it never is clear to what purposes the information has been gathered and presented. Had he done no more than clearly state a central thesis, his study would have been strengthened.

Punnett tends to be repetitious and to belabor the obvious at times. Too often one encounters such bromides as, "there is no fixed number of years that constitutes the ideal time for a party to spend in or out of office. Much will depend on the circumstances . . ." (p. 193).

These shortcomings should not obscure, however, what Punnett has accomplished in this book. He obviously has made a thorough study of the available biographies and diaries to collect information on the historical development of the Opposition structure. His use of *Hansard* to ascertain the extent of specialization by opposition spokesmen is an interesting study which helps to clarify the effect upon parliamentary politics of greater formalization of the Opposition. And although confidentiality prevents him from attributing particular comments, he is able to include a good number of useful insights obtained in interviews with several leading political figures. Thus this clearly is a substantial work which is likely to be regarded as a standard source of information concerning the Opposition in British politics.

JORGEN S. RASMUSSEN
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Race and Politics in Urban Malaya. By Alvin Rabushka. (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1973. Pp. 148. $6.50.)

This slender volume breaks new ground in Malaysian studies. The author commissioned the first systematic public opinion poll ever conducted in Malaya on the topics of race and politics. The pioneering survey was completed in early 1967 by Survey Research Malaysia, a private public opinion and market research firm affiliated with Gallup. The study is based upon interviews with randomly selected respondents in 352 households in Kuala Lumpur and 307 in Penang, Malaysia's largest cities. The Malayan city is seen as a microcosm of Malayan multiracialism, and the author seeks to explore the connections between the attitudes of his urban respondents and their political behavior at the local, state, and national tiers of the Malayan polity.

Professor Rabushka uses more than half of his text building a conceptual framework in which to display his data. The frame turns out to be more provocative than the survey portrait itself. The author re-examines F. S. Furnivall's concept of a "plural society," and adapts it into a theoretical model for his analysis. Like most students of Malaysian politics, Rabushka finds that Malaysia fits Furnivall's notion very closely; one finds residentially separated communities, economic specialization by race, uneven distribution of wealth, little intermarriage, and a single dominant political community. Rabushka defines politics in terms of choice and holds the ideal society to be one in which all choices are made in a market situation on the basis of supply and demand. Man is viewed as rational and motivated by self-interest.

The plural society model assumes the following characteristics: intracommunal consensus, intercommunal conflict, perceptual consensus and intense ethnic preferences. With sparse evidence, Rabushka posits these features in the political process of Malaysia's plural society. He observes further that despite racial cooperation both before and after independence, race has grown in salience as a political issue in Malaya as political entrepreneurs have risen to exploit the issue at the expense of the moderate multiracial Alliance coalition. The Government has increasingly resorted to electoral manipulations and the politics of redistribution in order to stay in power.

With this model framework and skeletal overview of the Malaysian political setting, Rabushka turns to his survey data on interracial values and social behavior. He finds that the urban Chinese prefers his own community, is culturally ethnocentric, yet paternalistically tolerant of the Malay, and that he isolates daily money problems as his major political concern. The urban Malay is found to be more outgoing and less culturally self-centered, but also less tolerant toward the Chinese; as with the Chinese, the Malay identifies economic problems as the major political issues.

The data on voter registration, participation, and party preference produce few surprises. Malay registration in both cities is higher than Chinese. In Kuala Lumpur, Chinese vote more (36 per cent) than Malays (31 per cent) but in Penang, Malays (62 per cent) vote more often than Chinese (39 per cent). A huge majority of the Malays choose the dominant United Malay National Organization (UMNO) as their party preference, while only about a fourth of the Chinese picked the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the Chinese component of the ruling Alliance Government.

In his concluding chapter Rabushka suggests that Furnivall was right in his thesis that the races in conflict-prone plural societies can peacefully meet *only* in the marketplace, buying and selling in a laissez-faire exchange economy. Recent Malaysian government attempts to increase the administrative role in the economy can only lead to greater racial conflict. Rabushka prescribes the reduction of the role of government in Malaysian society and greater reliance on an expanding private sector. This provocative thesis is supported only by tendentious evidence and requires more systematic investigation before it can be seriously entertained.

The book's five major findings are very close to trite: ". . . government intervention in a community's cultural affairs may well lead to political turmoil"; "majorities often alter the rules of politics to suit their own ends"; "democracy is not easy to maintain in Malaya"; "multiracial living experiences do not necessarily promote racial tolerance or political unity"; and, ". . . higher levels of education . . . do not ensure political unity or democratic stability" (p. 101).

Unfortunately, this book will fuel the fires of those with antisurvey research bias. For example, in interpreting the responses to a major question in his survey, Rabushka writes: "The results are revealing. First and most important, most of the respondents were unwilling to answer the question" (p. 68). On this base he later (p. 70) confidently reports findings. Moreover, the data analysis is quite primitive. No indicators of correlational strength are provided. The N for Malay respondents is too small for meaningful controls. The book is further marred by overstatement (e.g., "Indians . . . are unimportant in the mainstream of Malayan politics," p. 56) and absurd dicta (e.g., ". . . archaeology is not a rewarding enterprise in Malaya," p. 16) and occasionally error (e.g., the wrong date for the May 10, 1969, General Elections is used throughout the book). Despite its faults, the book is a stimulating addition to the shelves of the Malaysian scholar.

FELIX GAGLIANO

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Politics and the Stages of Growth. By W. W. Rostow. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. 410. $9.50.)

Few books of the 1960s were as influential as Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*. Students of political development were particularly attracted to it, and some of them expressed the hope that Rostow would go on to relate political and economical change more explicitly. This book is Rostow's answer to that challenge: he intends it, as he says, to help create in the study of political development the same kind of common vocabulary and theoretical framework that now, in his view, unite students of economic development (p. 5).

Rostow approaches his task by way of a "framework for a general political system" and nine synoptic case studies (of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, China, Mexico, Turkey, and—in a separate chapter—the United States). His framework, which he intends among other things to fill out the "suggestive empty box" of Eastonian theory (p. 346), serves mainly to direct attention to what Rostow argues are the "three abiding tasks of government," namely security (external defense), welfare and growth, and domestic constitutional order. In the case studies, he attempts to examine how, at each of his well-known stages of economic growth, the respective societies mastered (or failed to master) each of these tasks. The aim of this enterprise, as he puts it, is not the attainment of "neat Newtonian propositions," but rather of "limited scientific generalizations," "the isolation of rough uniformities in types or species of cases" (p. 18).

The results unfortunately do not reach even this modest goal. The case studies cannot be managed on so ambitious a scale in a single book; and they often degenerate into a barebones presentation of tabular data (all too often not comparable cross-nationally) or, worse, into a capsulized rehash of elementary history. To be reminded, for example, that "from 1815 to 1871 France straddled the issues of monarchy versus republicanism, catholicism versus anti-clericalism" (p. 109), or to be told once again the story of the failed German revolution of 1848 (pp. 78–79), quickly becomes a bore, and an irrelevant bore to boot, since these discussions are put into no clear relationship with the few historical generalizations that Rostow advances.

Those generalizations will in any event strike most students as pretty weak tea, much of it warmed over from the earlier book. We are told, for example, that the initial transition away from traditional society has usually been "initiated by some form of intrusion from abroad" (p. 62); that the "preconditions" stage of economic growth is "not usually conducive to democratic practices" (p. 287); or that the "preconditions" and the "take-off" stages contain temptations to "external adventure" and to "power . . . at the expense of less advanced societies" (pp. 63, 103). At a fairly early point, however, Rostow as much as admits that he will not be able to satisfy the hopes of his early admirers. Any "excessively refined linking in time of economic stages and specific political events," he contends, would be "unrealistic" (p. 98); yet some such "refined linking" was exactly what many had hoped for in this work. The failure to achieve it is nonetheless instructive. Rostow's work, it seems to me, offers us two important negative findings of significance.

As he himself concludes in an appendix that deals with other theories of modernization, there is little historical support for the usual sociological definitions of modernization that include such elements as increasing autonomy of subsystems, structural differentiation, and cultural secularization. "In truth," Rostow accurately observes, "a wide variety of social structures, suffused by quite different cultures, has exhibited a capacity to absorb modern science and technology . . ." (p. 343).

Equally valuably, Rostow's historical research tends to demolish one aspect of his own view, namely that the politics of modernizing societies can usefully be viewed as a Manichaen struggle between "pro-" and "anti-" modernizers. Rostow planted this way of looking at transitional politics in his original *Stages of Growth;* and, despite some reservations, he is not inclined to retreat from it now (see page 60). Its influence on political scientists and historians has been great, as, for example, the present debate about whether the German and Italian Fascists were "for" or "against" modernization indicates.

Yet Rostow's own efforts to apply his scheme to concrete history in this book seem to me to establish the general pointlessness of such questions. The Prussian reformers of 1807 represented, as Rostow notes, "a clear modernizing reaction" to Jena (p. 68) in many of their aims; yet they proposed land reforms that would have created a fragmented peasantry on the French model, and only the subversion of these reforms by "reactionary" opponents allowed the subsequent rationalization of Prussian agriculture and the rapid creation of an urban work force. Can we say, even today, who in such a situation really favored modernization? And can we assume that the participants themselves could have answered the question?

"The rhythms of political life," as Rostow muses at one point, "have a timing of their own" (p. 98). Certainly they do not relate to economic development in any of the simple ways early theorists of modernization assumed; nor did those rhythms always take as one of their main themes the question of accelerating or retarding economic change.

These central concerns occupy only part of the book. Roughly its last third, although organized into three chapters, is in reality a series of essays on such diverse problems as American race relations, the origins of the cold war, the problems of contemporary Latin America, and the "youth revolt" of the 1960s. Rostow does not, alas, refrain from expounding here once again his remarkable views on the war in Viet Nam and on Southeast Asia generally, e.g., "Asians knew that their destiny was in the balance . . . would mainland China inherit suzerainty . . . ?" (p. 310). One possible explanation for those views is Rostow's manifest tendency to mistake the utterances of squalid little dictators for popular opinion; this reaches grotesque proportions in his ode to Korea's Park Chung Hee (p. 295). These concluding essays, taken as a whole, have their moments of wit and insight (the sketch of obstacles to Latin American economic growth is particularly penetrating); but they have little to do with each other or with the central subject of the book, and they too often fall into mere sermonizing.

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Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives. Edited by Philippe C. Schmitter. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1973. Pp. 336. $12.50, cloth; $7.50, paper.)

The reader will not find a common theoretical framework in this volume of essays on military rule in Latin America; the five contributors utilize a variety of approaches and methods, and address themselves to distinct problems and hypotheses. Moreover, as the editor of the volume acknowledges, neither the theories nor the methodologies employed are particularly new. And there is a major gap in the coverage: none of the essays systematically focus on the socioeconomic and political structural factors internal to Latin America that may be associated with military rule. Despite these limitations, this is a very informative and interesting volume—one of the best on the topic. A broad range of current issues, particularly those related to Latin America's subordinate position in a hemispheric system dominated by the United States, are thoroughly and competently analyzed.

The volume is divided into three sections. In the first, "Changing Functions of Military Rule," Alain Rouquié analyzes the emergence of reformist military regimes by focusing on the specific historical experiences and roles of two military institutions and their relationships with the "inter-American military system" dominated by the United States. He argues that reformist military regimes have emerged only in countries where traditionally "the army played a hegemonial role" (p. 42) and that their emergence is related to a changing U.S. policy, specifically its willingness to "give up certain sectors [i.e., accept the nationalization of some extractive industries] in order to guarantee others [i.e., manufacturing investments]" (p. 38). Both the military reformers and the U.S. policy makers apparently also share a common concern for the necessity of strengthening the state apparatus in order to direct and control the process of social and economic change. Rouquié's essay proposes a series of complex and persuasive interpretations which merit further research. In particular, his all too brief identification of the socioeconomic and political characteristics common to the countries in which reformist military regimes have appeared needs further elaboration, as does the identification of the class and group interests represented by these regimes, a problem Rouquié never addresses directly.

In the second section, "Consequences of Military Rule and Military Aid," Jerry L. Weaver tests a number of current hypotheses concerning the policies of military governments (their propensity to defend the interests of traditional elites, of the middle classes, or of U.S. investors, and to increase military spending); P. C. Schmitter statistically analyzes the impact of three indigenous factors (gross domestic product, military intervention and political instability), and two exogenous factors (U.S. military aid and "military spending in adjacent 'competing' countries") on the evolution of military budgets.

Although informative and logically developed, Weaver's analysis suffers at times from a reductionism not uncommon in behavioral political science. For example, he addresses himself to José Nun's argument that military regimes in contemporary Latin America fundamentally defend the interests of the middle class. Demonstrating that the policies of military regimes do not favor *all sectors* of the middle class, Weaver dismisses Nun's analysis. In fact, Nun argues that the interests of different sectors of the Latin American middle class are irreconcilable to the point of prohibiting the resolution of conflicts through the democratic process, therefore creating the necessity of military rule to defend the interests of the class as a whole, but not necessarily of all its sectors. While Weaver's concern for clarifying and specifying the concept of middle class is unobjectionable, his operationalization of Nun's hypothesis is hardly satisfactory. Weaver's essay, however, does raise significant issues, and his analyses of those hypotheses that can be quantified more easily are well executed.

Schmitter's essay on military spending is methodologically sophisticated. Utilizing a number of refined statistical techniques, he cogently demonstrates that the primary factor determining the level of domestic military spending in Latin America is the gross domestic product, while U.S. military assistance has a "tendency to raise domestic military spending above levels predicted by gross national product alone" (p. 163), and that military rule has not uniformly resulted in higher military spending (a conclusion corroborated by Weaver). His identification of arms races, however, remains inconclusive, and one of his results is open to serious question: that political instability has no effect on military spending. The index of instability available to Schmitter was so problematic that any results derived from using it are highly dubious.

In the third section, "Future Perspectives for Arms Control and Military Rule," Geoffrey Kemp analyzes the military capabilities of Latin American armed forces for waging international wars, in order to identify the factors that would have to be considered in any negotiations concerning arms control in the area. James R. Kurth elaborates a theory of "international hegemonial systems" to probe the relationship of United States dominance to military rule and underdevelopment. Both essays bring together a wealth of information and material. Kemp's analysis of international military capabilities and strategies is the first of its kind that I have encountered in the academic literature on Latin American armed forces. Kurth, as well as elaborating his own theory, provides a critical review of the major explanatory frameworks that have been used in analyzing the causes and effects of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.

Anyone interested in questions concerning military rule in Latin America or U.S.–Latin American relations will find these essays stimulating and useful reading. The specific methodological techniques as well as the general interpretive schemes developed in the essays, while not entirely new nor uniformly excellent, are utilized in ways that will make this volume valuable to any student of comparative politics with an interest in the military.

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Reflections on the May Fourth Movement. Edited by Benjamin I. Schwartz. A Harvard East Asian Monograph. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 132. $4.50.)

The May 4th Movement, still vivid after sixty years, has long been debated both by its own leaders and by later historians. The pros, such as Mao Tse-tung, think that the movement was the beginning of a real (socialist) revolution in China, whereas the cons, like Hu Shih, deprecated it as being too politically oriented and charged that it badly jeopardized a more meaningful "New Cultural Movement" which was gaining momentum during the period.

Despite their differences in evaluation, however, few have questioned the basic issue of the Movement which, as Chow Tse-tsung has clearly pointed out, was the search for "new thought" to replace the old. Benjamin Schwartz and his collaborators are certainly right in stating that "not one of the famous 'conservatives' of the May Fourth period was really a man who lived wholly within old China or was prepared to defend the traditions of the past with the weapons provided by those traditions" (p. 3). In other words, every noted intellectual of the time was advocating some sort of "new thought" to substitute for the old which had been badly abused by the so-called Confucianists.

Professor Schwartz is also right to view the May 4th Movement not as "a mountain range rising up abruptly out of a flat plain, but simply a somewhat higher range in a long stretch of complex mountainous terrain" (p. 4). Unfortunately, members of his symposium have failed to carry this thesis any further. While recognizing the importance of the "complex mountainous terrain" existing before the "higher range," none of the scholars has attempted to explore the underlying historical relationship between these features of the historical terrain.

From a historical perspective, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the May 4th Movement is the final stage of (to quote a Fairbankian term) "China's response to the West." The so-called "response" was limited to a handful of top intellectuals in the upper class and had been started by the early "barbarian experts" and their immediate successors, with Chang Chih-tung serving as their spokesman. It was only after the failure of their attempt at technological reform that K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen began to promote an overall political restructuring of the nation. The former preferred peaceful means while the latter preached violence.

But the political restructuring work, which was finally completed in 1912 under Sun Yat-sen's spiritual leadership, failed utterly to accomplish the expected goal. The worsening situation in the early Republican period thus led a new generation of intellectuals to take another step. They were convinced now the causes of all China's previous failures lay precisely at the very root of its three-thousand-year old Confucian tradition, i.e., the "old thought." Being unable to explain the traditional evils more scientifically, the May 4th intellectuals, including the most moderate Dr. Hu Shih, appealed to emotion. And their emotionalism, which has been recently revived on the mainland with new vigor, matched comfortably the rising egoism of the modern educated youths who had inherited a long Confucian ideology of sensitivity to national political issues.

Members of the Schwartz symposium do not seem to look seriously into this immediate intellectual background of the May 4th Movement and instead seek only to explain the separate phenomena from a culturalist point of view. Among them, the most ambitious is Dr. Yu-sheng Lin, who produces lengthy passages to explain—quite unnecessarily—orthodox as well as Neo-Confucianist thought. While ignoring the immediate past, Dr. Lin is daring enough to predict the "future" of Chinese liberalism which makes his synthesis more ambiguous than debatable.

In summary, a thoughtful reader will not find much new information or even fresh inspiration from the book though more might have been hoped, considering that the symposium was held at the zenith of a double cultural revolution which was going on simultaneously on both sides of the Pacific.

Aside from the shortcomings of the book, however, one must give Professor Schwartz and his collaborators high credit for assembling such an academic convention at a time when the scholarly world had swung into the confusion of overwhelming revolutionary cries which, as a Chinese rural proverb describes it, sounded like a gathering storm but came down only as little drops of rain. The book under review is undoubtedly one of such refreshing raindrops in a dry thunderstorm.

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Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis. By Robert Jones Shafer. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973. Pp. 397. $15.00.)

To appreciate this book, *Mexican Business Organizations,* one must realize that the author is concerned with those organizations that represent the private business sector in modern Mexico, not with the organization of individual business units. Those who are primarily interested in the internal operations of individual business units will be disappointed with this book; but if they persist long enough to get through the purely historical section, they will find the discussion of how private enterprise represents itself to other sectors, particularly the government, most informative. In this respect, *Mexican Business Organizations* is certainly one of the more important books recently published about Mexico. As indicated by the title, this study traces the history and development of the various organizations that represent the business sector and analyzes their operations. The analysis of these organizations examines not only their structure, but also their programs and doctrine.

The first chapter of this study, "Mexican Society and Private Enterprise," is, as should be, an introductory discussion of some of the prevailing conditions of present-day Mexico. Unfortunately, Professor Shafer tried to accomplish two objectives with his introduction and, as is often the case, fell short of both. On the one hand the first chapter is an attempt to highlight certain social conditions, political and economic characteristics, and interest-group relations. Although the author does quite a good survey, there is little in it for those familiar with the development of modern Mexico. For those not familiar with Mexican development, this short introduction is inadequate to give them the background necessary to appreciate and understand the very detailed examination of business organizations that follows. The author would have been better advised to have concentrated on the second objective, that of indicating the extremely important position and necessary function exercised by formal business organizations in Mexico. The first chapter hints at this aspect in the discussion of interest groups and communications among institutions in Mexican society, but the role played by these organizations is not really made clear until much later in the book.

Although the author does not hesitate to use historical sketches to illustrate particular points in his analysis of the organizations that represent the Mexican business sector, the formal history of their development is given in chapter two. In that chapter the author traces the formation and subsequent changes those organizations underwent as Mexico experienced a dramatic revolution, a period of social reorganization, and finally a period of sustained economic growth.

Among the many interesting historical sections, two ideas stand out as extremely important for an understanding of why Mexico has developed in the particular way it has. The first of these is how business organizations have functioned as a means of communication between the government and the private sector. The foundation on which the use of business organizations for communication purposes was built is clearly described as the author traces the actions of the Minister of Finance Limantour, resulting in the enactment of Mexico's first Law of Chambers. It was this Chambers Law of 1908 which gave business organizations legal recognition and a special set of laws which was to govern their activities. Although the Revolution and post-Revolution changed many aspects, the communication function of these organizations continued and, indeed, was enhanced.

A second important aspect of the development of business organizations highlighted by this section is the flexibility of the Mexican system in responding not only to important economic groups but also to geographic developments. The first of these is illustrated by the formation of the Mexican Association of Bankers (ABM) in 1928 as a civil association not subject to the Chamber Law. The second is illustrated by the formation and subsequent important position of the Employers Confederation (COPARMEX) in 1929 primarily as a response of the Monterrey business community to the labor legislation of that period.

The remainder of the book, chapters three through eight, is intended to analyze how the business organizations function within the structure of the Mexican system. Unfortunately, some parts of these chapters are more concerned with description than analysis. This is particularly true with respect to chapter three, "Organization and Resources," which because of its extremely detailed description is rather dull. In contrast, chapters four and five, in which the author examines the relations between organizations and the government, are both interesting and important. These two chapters do an excellent job of showing how Mexico has developed its own system of communication between the private business sector and the government. The contrast between the Mexican system of indirect communication, such as newspaper advertisements, and the American system of direct communication, through lobbying, is of particular interest in these days of ITT and Watergate. Perhaps the United States could do with a bit more institutionalization of the channels of communication.

Probably because all the programs and functions of business organizations in Mexico are secondary to their relations with the government, chapter six which describes these other functions will be less than absorbing for most readers. Chapter eight, the concluding chapter, does a good job giving the overall structure and showing how the institutional framework fits together.

To be sure, this book has its high and low points as viewed by different interests and, therefore, will attract several groups. Although it is not for the casual reader of Mexican history, it is essential reading for all serious students of either the political processes in Mexico or the operations of the private business sector of that country.

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Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America. By Mauricio Solaun and Michael Quinn. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 228. $8.95.)

Sinners and Heretics is perhaps best seen as a sequel to Johnson's and Lieuwen's analyses of military intervention in Latin American politics written some ten years ago. Judged in relation to its predecessors, this book is a definite step forward, toward an explicit theoretical formulation and systematic use of empirical data. Nevertheless, it is in general both theoretically and methodologically inferior to more recent country-specific studies of the political behavior of Latin American militaries.

In two areas, Professors Solaun and Quinn make a substantial contribution. First, they rightly point out as a source of considerable confusion in the literature the failure to distinguish between interclass and intraclass coups. Military coups may result from intense interclass conflict during periods of increasing political participation and demands for a redistribution of wealth and power *or* from an inability to manage purely political conflicts within the socially dominant groups. Although both the "participation problem" and the "organization problem" are frequently present in varying degrees in any particular coup, most authors have tended to focus exclusively on the factors explaining one type of coup, while denigrating the rather different arguments advanced to explain the other. Whereas studies of intraclass coups have tended to stress relatively static aspects of the Latin American context—political culture, weak electoral mechanisms, and governmental ineffectiveness—those analyzing interclass coups have focused on social mobilization, class conflict and violence, and U.S. intervention. During the period studied, 1943–1967, both types of coup have been common, and the authors argue convincingly for the necessity of integrating the two perspectives in any comprehensive treatment of Latin American coups.

Secondly, the authors incorporate into their analysis a cultural dimension which has been neglected as the study of Latin American politics has increasingly become a subfield of comparative politics. As indicated in the title, there is a peculiar style to political discourse in Latin America, a tendency to view one's opponents as not merely wrong or misinformed, but also as immoral (Sinners) or evil (Heretics) or both. This phenomenon is not restricted to periods of interclass conflict, where fundamental value premises are in question, but also pervades the traditional conflict between those in and out of power. The verbal totalism characteristic of this sectarian view of politics contributes to military intervention directly through the rapid escalation of political conflict into all-or-nothing, life-or-death crises, as well as indirectly through the "diffusion of illegality syndrome" in which over time all political actors and institutions become tainted in the eyes of the military and the participant public. While the authors do not provide a convincing explanation for this phenomenon, merely citing it as evidence of a "non-secular political culture," they have perhaps provided an important clue to the question left unanswered by Huntington—Why is it that so few Latin American countries have been able to develop strong political institutions?

In other respects, *Sinners and Heretics* is less satisfactory. While the distinction drawn between the precipitating (situational) and endemic (structural) causes of military coups is important, little is gained when the precipitants—among them, escalation of interclass or intraclass conflict, problems of governmental effectiveness and illegitimacy, U.S. intervention, personal interests of a leader, and industrial lag—are not mutually exclusive nor comparable units of analysis. In analyzing the structural causes of military intervention, the authors propose a curious amalgam of Huntington's and Almond and Powell's theories of political development, stressing the relationship between participation and organization, the latter variously identified with the capacity for political control, regulative capability, and structural differentiation or complexity of the regime. In postulating an equilibrium between participation and organization as a prerequisite for stability, the authors leave unanswered the question of how these variables could ever be measured to define empirically the equilibrium line or the degree of disequilibrium. Moreover, while "over-participation" may induce pressures to strengthen political organization or reduce mass participation by force, it is less certain that "over-organization" inherently generates pressures for a return to a point of greater equilibrium. From a theoretical point of view, the chief virtue of *Sinners and Heretics* is its reintroduction of the cultural variable to explain why the supposedly greater stability of democratic regimes, as an ideal type, is so seldom realized in Latin America.

As an empirical study of Latin American coups, the book is of limited value. With data drawn primarily from *Time* magazine, the *New York Times, Keesing's Archives,* and the *Hispanic American Report,* there are inevitably many inaccuracies, such as counting the Ecuadorian coup of 1947 as two separate coups. Moreover, the nonsystematic selection of coups to be studied provides a shaky basis at best for any generalizations. Out of a total of 63 coups, 23 of the 36 occurring prior to 1955 were included in the sample, compared with only 7 of the 27 occurring from 1955–1967. This renders meaningless the use of sample data to conclude that "intraclass conflict continued to rival acute interclass conflict as a cause of *golpes* [coups] during the postwar period," (p. 86) or that in cases of interclass conflict, "the military was only slightly more likely to side with the . . . reactionary groups than with the reformers" (p. 87). Finally, there is a deficiency in the logic which evaluates the importance of causal factor X by the percentage of coups studied in which X was judged to be present. By that logic, the desire to issue military manifestos is the most important cause of military coups, since such documents are present in virtually every coup. As the authors note, we are still a long way from a comprehensive theory of military intervention in Latin American politics.

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In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History. By David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. xii, 522. $12.95.)

An understanding of Southeast Asia requires a knowledge of a variety of heterogeneous peoples in numerous unrelated countries: their cultural and historical developments, their social institutions, their religions, their languages and literatures, their systems of education, their economic and social structures, and their political ideas and ideals. To delve into Southeast Asia is to enter civilizations which are, in many instances, a marked change from what we know and have experienced in the West.

Various historians in the '60s endeavored to treat and interpret the entire region of Southeast Asia in their individual works—for example, the books of Hall, Cady, Bastin, Harrison, and Benda. Each contribution was limited because one person endeavored to extend himself beyond his country of specialty to cover the complex history of the entire region.

This book, however, is different. One of the reasons is that each of the six men who carefully researched this work has specialized in a particular geographical area of the region. Also, as each scholar has sufficient linguistic knowledge relating to his area, he has been able to use original source material in the language or languages of that area with which he is associated. Beyond that, this volume is not a traditional symposium in which each writer submits a chapter or chapters on a particular geographical area of the region. Rather, it is a work in which each scholar can take equal pride in the entire production because it was a joint intellectual pursuit. The editor, Associate Professor David Steinberg, has performed a masterful work in welding together the wide range of concepts of his colleagues.

The format of the work is presented in five parts: Part One—The Eighteenth-Century World—depicts the numerous indigenous institutions and manner of living which prevailed in Southeast Asia prior to the advent of the Europeans who imposed technical skills and an exercise of colonial power brought from the West. Within this interesting opening segment one is introduced to the peasant world, the up-land peoples, authority and village society, provincial powers, religious life and leadership, traders and markets, Buddhist kings, Vietnamese emperors, Malay sultans, Javanese kings, and Spanish governors.

Part Two—New Challenges to Old Authority—covering the period from about 1750 to 1875, relates the appearances of various new powerful dynasties with their Southeast Asian leaders—dynasties which altered the power structure in almost every society of the region. This period was characterized by warfare, dynastic changes, population disturbances, and intensive struggles for power and wealth. Concurrently there emerged a commercial and political offensive by Europeans with greedy ambitions fed by the industrial revolution in the West. In time, new economic and social structures, plus new landowning elites, were to emerge all over Southeast Asia. By 1870 nearly all of Southeast Asia, except Thailand, was under European control and management.

Part Three—Framework for Nations—pictures the utter transformation of the region as political dominance by the West was established in the form of strong colonial states. Newly created political states cut across former indigenous lines of political patterns and separate societies with new dominant bureaucratic systems tied to the respective mother countries in the West. Beyond that, an economic change was altering the whole Southeast Asian way of life.

Part Four—Social Change and the Emergence of Nationalism—outlines those elements which brought about radical social change and served as the groundwork for the gradual development of nationalist aspirations that took definite form prior to World War II, with final fulfillment during and after the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. These elements took different form in the various Southeast Asian countries, but essentially had the same impact: urbanization, education, and language serving as channels of social and political change. The intensification of Western domination interfered variously in peasant welfare and social values, thus aggravating episodes of agrarian peasant revolt. The seeds of rising nationalism were found, however, chiefly in the towns, where the new urban elites—influenced by urbanization and Western education—generated nationalist ideas in political organizations which agitated for independent nationhood. It appears that another factor which augmented this embryonic drive of nationalism was the growth of the powerful alien Chinese mercantile communities which permeated almost all Southeast Asian societies.

Part Five—The Preoccupations of Independence—the most stimulating portion of the entire historical account, relates the ironic role which Japan played in eventually destroying the Western colonial era. The British, French, and Dutch all endeavored to reestablish in some form their prewar imperialist controls, only to discover that the momentum of the nationalist movements prevented putting colonial Southeast Asia back together again. It is emphasized that whereas in the immediate postcolonial period the institutions of the Western democracies were adopted or emulated, recently there has been a drifting away from democracy in Southeast Asia because the younger leaders place more emphasis upon economic development than upon constitutional democracy. In this postwar arena one learns of the new trends in population change, urban developments, international politics, education, and the sociocultural change involving religion.

A full twenty per cent of the volume is devoted to an appendix enhancing immeasurably the value of the book: succinct discussion of the Southeast Asian languages; valuable footnotes with precise references; a glossary, arranged alphabetically; and for a Southeast Asia bibliophile, it was a delight to see a full 60 page evaluative bibliography—all arranged and geared to fit each of the preceding 35 chapters; and closing with a most useful index.

The authors are right in their opinion: asserting that "most Westerners are ignorant of and behave irresponsibly toward contemporary Southeast Asian history and the peoples who make it" (p. 342). This work goes a long way to dispel this ignorance and to create an international outlook of a higher order. This work offers a major contribution in understanding Southeast Asia, and places these historians in the front rank of social scientists in this generation.

CECIL HOBBS

Consultant on Southeast Asia
Library of Congress

Das Politische System der Schweiz. Edited by Jürg Steiner with Erwin Bucher, Daniel Frei and Leo Schürmann. (Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1971. Pp. 241, index. DM 19.80.)

Four Swiss have collaborated to produce a book on Switzerland that, while it has some of the feel of a text, actually represents an attempt to bring maverick Helvetia into the House of Modern Social Science. Jürg Steiner, presently at Chapel Hill, and Erwin Bucher (history), Daniel Frei (political science) and Leo Schürmann (public law), all of whom hold posts at Swiss universities, set out to transform the soil of the Swiss political system into "fruitful ground for general theory construction" (p. 9). While this is in part a necessarily descriptive enterprise, particularly in Bucher's dry rehearsal of Swiss history and Schürmann's parochially traditional constitutional section, both Steiner and Frei focus less on Switzerland than on the general propositions they believe the Swiss case precipitates, and the systematic hypotheses such propositions suggest. Steiner, whose contribution on "Political Processes" occupies nearly half the book, offers fifty-eight "propositions" distilling the Swiss political experience with parties, economic groups, voluntary associations and the mass media—all in a rigidly adhered to framework of "articulation and aggregation of interests" and "transformation of interests into [legislative] decisions" (pp. 75–76).

With the exception of the massive study of integration in Switzerland undertaken by Karl Deutsch and Hermann Weilenmann (whose death has apparently postponed publication), and Steiner's own study *Gewaltlose Politik und Kulturelle Vielfalt* (published originally in 1970, available now in a rather unfortunate translation called *Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule,* 1974) from which most of the material in this collaboration has been taken, there are no studies that fasten onto Switzerland as a system model for the testing of comparative hypotheses about input and output functions in legislative systems. The sparse literature available in English includes only text-style descriptions like George Codding, Jr.'s *The Federal Government of Switzerland* and C. J. Hughes's *The Parliament of Switzerland* or thematically specialized case studies like R. C. Brook's prewar *Civic Training in Switzerland,* Hans Kohn's elegant *Nationalism and Liberty: the Swiss Example* and Kenneth McRae's *Switzerland: Example of Cultural Coexistence.* Steiner and his colleagues remedy this oversight. The question is, to what effect and with what rewards?

On the affirmative side, it can be said that among the several small nations that have insisted on their uniqueness and their immunity to the probes of comparative researchers, Switzerland has carried its claims farthest: that is to say, too far. Steiner's attempt to recast its celebrated idiosyncrasies—cultural plurality, religious diversity, maddeningly cross-cutting cleavages, direct democracy, extreme decentralization, communal autonomy and national neutrality—in a systematic language that permits comparison, generalization, and testing can, on this score, only be welcomed. If his rendering of the system model is somewhat laborious, a too-conscious mimicking of the no longer so fashionable Almond-Powell-Easton-Dahl paradigm, it is nonetheless accurate and for the most part aptly deployed. If his use of Swiss materials glosses over substantive controversies in favor of formal processes that lend themselves to comparative generalization, we nonetheless sense that he knows the Swiss scene well, and appreciates the obstacles its peculiarities present to the systematic observer. The overriding theme of his section, which ought to be of genuine interest to comparativists, is that Switzerland's political system depends on participatory processes of *amicabilis compositio* rather than on majority rule—on collaborative consensus rather than pluralistic interest promotion as in other Western democracies. It is this feature of the system that gives to Steiner's otherwise commonplace descriptions and predictable hypotheses their special interest.

On the deficit side, many of these propositions and hypotheses seem trivial, tautological or merely forced: extravagant reformulations in systems language of the least surprising mundanities; as, for example, in the case of the hypothesis (p. 88) that suggests that parties will accept institutions that deter the fall of governments to the degree that they participate proportionally in governmental power (presumably the lesson "don't cut off your nose to spite your face"). Where Steiner is too formalistic, however, his colleagues are there with their more substantive historical and constitutional contributions providing a context, telling us as Schürmann does (pp. 54–55) that "Rousseau is more helpful for the understanding of Swiss institutions than Kant or Hegel," and themselves elaborating this Rousseauean context. Daniel Frei's final essay on Switzerland as part of the international system is particularly useful, for without surrendering the systematic approach urged by Steiner, he manages in just a few pages to put substantive problems of neutrality and nation building in a theoretically universalist context where the interface between internal cultural and ideological issues and external political and historical issues is sharply silhouetted: the place of foreign workers in a multicultural nation fearing for its national integrity, the role of military neutrality in an ideologically committed country, the pressures of international economics on a traditionally independence-oriented state—each of these dilemmas is explored with insight into the peculiarities of Swiss history but also with an eye on the common features of comparative political systems. Steiner has, then, been well-served by the collaborators whom he too has served well. Since comparativists are no longer expected to read un-American languages—(statistics excepted, it is the Esperanto of imperial science)—some publisher might want to consider a translation of this well-conceived little book. They could do worse (and, no doubt, they will).

BENJAMIN R. BARBER

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Journey Between Two Chinas. By Seymour Topping. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972. Pp. 459. $10.00.)

As a young reporter in China during the 1940s, Seymour Topping witnessed the collapse of the Nationalist government and, incidentally, met his wife Audrey, daughter of Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning. Nearly a quarter century later, his father-in-law's personal intercession with Chou En-lai enabled Topping, now Assistant Managing Editor of the *New York Times,* to obtain a visa to return to China. This lengthy volume (431 pages of text and appendices) recounts his impressions of the "two Chinas," twenty years apart, plus those of an interim assignment in Vietnam during the early 1950s.

Topping's account of the battles, political as well as military, preceding the demise of Chiang Kai-shek's government is not new, but it is well told and his tales of conversation with the great and the small of those affected by the momentous events then taking place should command the interest of generalist and specialist alike. Similarly, his glimpses of life in Saigon before Dien Bien Phu are fascinating, though somewhat marred by gratuitous sermonizing. Statements such as "the American purpose in Southeast Asia should be the restoration of peace and respect for borders, and the fostering of a community of independent, self-determining and viable societies" (p. 189) are unhelpful as policy guides for the future and in fact were the very goals that those who led America into the Vietnam war had in mind. This is a minor part of the book, however, and Topping's account moves smoothly and reads well up to this point.

It is with his return to China in the late spring of 1971—after ping-pong diplomacy but before Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking—that originality becomes harder to sustain and the reader's interest may flag. The China specialist will have read many such accounts of guided tours and banquets. The nonspecialist may find Topping's flashback technique confusing, as a trip to a commune recalls the agricultural policies of the past or a visit with a certain leader is rounded out with a summary of the political activities of the last decade.

For the most part, Topping lets the story of his five-week trip tell itself. Skepticism is wielded lightly, as one would expect from one who hopes to strengthen Sino-American contacts from the uncertain basis they rested on at this time. Chinese officials say exactly what they are expected to; the common folk interviewed, generally chosen at random from whatever commune or factory being visited at the time, tell their stories on cue. This woman's father was murdered by the evil landlord before liberation, that man's young sons were conscripted by the KMT and never heard from again—in repetitious and none-too-subtle variations on Mao's dictum, "Remember past bitterness and contrast [it with] present sweetness." In many ways, this Maoist slogan also summarizes Topping's book; there are repeated comparisons drawn between the ragged, starving refugees of the past and the rosy-cheeked, enthusiastic peasants of today. While the comparison is undoubtedly valid in the main, it is perhaps less than completely accurate to describe this as a *Journey Between Two Chinas*—it is more precisely a journey between a China in the final convulsions of transition and a China in a not entirely typical period of stability. One wonders, for example, if the author would have found the same plethora of apple cheeks and smiles during the period of economic crises which followed the failure of the Great Leap Forward or during the struggles which accompanied the Cultural Revolution. Even as Topping was visiting, the drama of Lin Piao's alleged plot to assassinate Mao and Lin's eventual fall from power was being played out. As the Chinese People's Republic's own media have shown, venality and overreaching ambition have not been confined to the Nationalists.

It is somewhat unfair to criticize Topping for not making these points. Good diplomatic relations are not built by highlighting the deficiencies of a country and Topping was, after all, present as guest and journalist, not as political scientist and critic. Moreover, the book is no mere mouthing of official propaganda. Topping has attempted to verify his hosts' claims for the value of acupuncture in curing deafness by speaking to Western medical experts, and his reservations on the value of revolutionary art are clearly, though politely, stated. In addition, he shows himself an acute observer, noting for example that the Anshan steel mills are being supplied with low grade, locally mined ore in contrast to the high quality ore which the Japanese founders of the Anshan complex had hauled to it from Hainan Island, far to the South, thirty years before.

In summary, this is one of the better books of its type. The specialist will find in it little that is new, however, and the generalist, little that he or she could not find elsewhere. The book deserves to be read for what it is—an interesting compendium of recollections.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER
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Hitler's Strategy, 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue. By Martin L. Van Creveld, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 248. $13.95.)

Hitler never considered the Balkans as a central factor in his overall military strategy. Why, then, did he launch the Balkan campaign in 1941? In a well-researched, relatively brief volume, Professor Martin L. Van Creveld has advanced some convincing answers. He tells us that while the Balkans played no central role in Hitler's military thinking, they did provide the Third Reich with vital raw materials. From the beginning, then, Hitler recognized the need to establish a clear German sphere of interest in the Balkans. He hoped this might be done through diplomacy, since a Balkan war would disrupt the flow of raw materials to Germany.

Failure to knock Britain out of the war, and the ultimate abandonment of plans to invade the British Isles forced Hitler to reevaluate his entire strategy, including his plans for the Balkans. Thus in the summer of 1940 he adopted a "peripheral strategy" aimed at forcing Britain out of the war by systematically depriving her of vital positions at Gibraltar, Suez, and the eastern Mediterranean. Under this new strategy, southeastern Europe remained what it had been for Hitler, a source of raw materials. But the Axis occupation of Greece now became the key to expelling the British from the Near and Middle East. Greece became, for a very short time, the focal point of an indirect offense against Britain. Van Creveld argues, contrary to some other accounts, that Hitler had no objections to Mussolini's attack on Greece, until it proved to be a disaster.

By November, 1940, Hitler was becoming more concerned with his projected attack on the Soviet Union. In the context of "Operation Barbarossa," the Balkan situation took on new meaning. The peripheral strategy against Britain gave way to the requirements of the more important conflict with the Soviet Union for the conquest of *Lebensraum*. Whereas Greece had been part of an indirect offense against Britain, it now became little more than a worrisome thorn in Hitler's right flank in the Russian campaign. The entire Balkan area, in fact, had to be made secure so as not to endanger Hitler's advance into Russia. Since Mussolini had bungled the job in Greece and Albania, Hitler felt obliged to send in his own forces. The Greek campaign required the massing of troops in Rumania and Bulgaria, and there was always the threat of Yugoslav and Turkish intervention. A potentially anti-German *coup* in Yugoslavia in March, 1941 convinced Hitler of the need to occupy that country, too. Thus, the Balkan operation, which was nothing more than a protective maneuver to secure the right flank for Hitler's Russian campaign, ultimately involved the commitment of large amounts of manpower and equipment. Van Creveld argues convincingly that such a large-scale commitment was unnecessary; Hitler had overestimated the strength of Yugoslav and Greek opposition.

It has been argued by others that Hitler's Balkan campaign serious delayed the beginning of the Russian invasion, thereby contributing to the ultimate defeat of the Third Reich. Van Creveld maintains that the Balkan campaign had practically no adverse effects on "Operation Barbarossa." The Balkan campaign went much faster than the Germans had expected; many of the divisions originally earmarked for the Balkans never saw action—some were never sent there. If the Russian campaign was delayed, the cause was a general shortage of equipment for Hitler's armies, not the Balkan campaign.

The Balkan campaign was a success, the last of Hitler's successful *Blitzfeldzüge*. It was, as Van Creveld indicates, a totally rational strategy, remarkably free from the ideological and racial theories which often influenced Hitler's reasoning. The author attributes this rational attitude to the fact that, "Greece and Yugoslavia were, after all, only a small item in Hitler's strategy" (p. 183). This book is, nonetheless, an important contribution to the scholarship on the Third Reich, with some particularly good insights into the relationship between Hitler and Mussolini.

DAN P. SILVERMAN
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Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States. By Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971. Pp. 279. $12.50.)

Ever since Warner, Davis, Gardner, and Gardner's *Deep South* (work unfortunately not referred to in this volume), comparison of the position of American blacks with that of Indian harijans (untouchables) has intrigued social scientists. The obvious points of the analogy—both are at the bottom of their respective social hierarchies, they got there by birth, and certain kinds of social interaction have been forbidden between them and the dominant sections of society—have been reported from time to time (see e.g., J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* and H. Isaacs, *India's Ex-Untouchables*). Nevertheless, very little systematic comparative work has, in fact, been carried out.

It is appropriate that one of the outstanding American students of comparative politics should also be one of the first to attempt an analysis of political participation among both groups. Unfortunately, although some of the analyses are ingenious, and although two of the authors are Indian, the book exemplifies the aridity of a student exercise curiously uninformed by an understanding of Indian society and culture, tainted by the projection of American images into an Indian context and by a certain measure of sloppiness. The net effect is analysis in a bell jar, an elaborate game, bound by its own rules and conventions, but not coming to grips with the reality it seeks to understand.

To illustrate these criticisms, let us consider the treatment of only one variable of many—group consciousness. Group consciousness is an important concept in this study because it represents one route to political mobilization, particularly for deprived groups. The authors report that harijans have substantially lower levels of group consciousness than blacks, although they do vote with surprising frequency. Such an assertion entails at least two major problems. The first concerns the nature of Indian society; the second, the peculiar method the authors have chosen to operationalize this crucial concept.

The first problem is that there is no way in which it is reasonable to consider harijans a group as opposed to an aggregate. "Harijan" is a collective label, imposed from outside, that covers hundreds of smaller groups called castes (or jatis). Each of these groups has a strong internal identity. Group in-marriage is prescribed; if there are sufficient numbers, members of each group live together; and if one asks them what they are, they respond with their caste name. As the authors themselves report in the curiously dissociated historical section of the study, some political leaders have tried to forge a shared identity from the experience of abuse and have been unsuccessful.

Any assertion suggesting that these people lack group consciousness, then, must be wide of the mark. Rather, they simply lack the particular group consciousness that the authors are trying to impose upon them. It is about as reasonable to expect a Chamar, a Bauri and a Nattar (all untouchable castes) to consider themselves part of the same group as it is for a Polish American, a Norwegian American and a Lebanese American to identify with each other as fellow "ethnics." (A few in universities probably do so. Those in analogous positions in India probably do so as well.)

In a way, however, this discussion is beside the point, because the operationalization of group consciousness simply does not do what it purports to do. These are the items that comprise the measure:

> In many communities there are groups opposed to each other. Thinking about this community (mention name of local government unit), what are the major groups that oppose each other here?
>
> When you think of your own situation and that of your family what are the problems that concern you most?
>
> What is the most important problem of this community?
>
> Now think about the country as a whole. What are the most important problems facing the United States (India) today?
>
> (And in India) What groups or organizations are most influential in this village/town?

With the exception of the first item, which itself contains a suppressed premise I will discuss below, none of these can be considered a measure of group consciousness where group is defined as one's caste or race. They are measures of tensions, or problems, or sources of conflict, but there is no inherent reason why these tensions or problems ought to be based on ascriptive group membership. Even the first item operates under the assumptions that group consciousness is forged in conflict, which is not always true, and that group consciousness must be consciousness of one's race or caste rather than one's position in the labor force or some other such variable, which is also not always true.

What we see here is more than ignorance about how one takes concepts and uses them across cultures. It is a peculiar chauvinism that projects the current milieu into other settings. *Right now* (as measured in 1970), this measure would probably correlate highly with group consciousness among American blacks, and might even be a good index of it. That is, at the time of the study, American blacks and whites were defined as adversaries, and blacks were in fact highly concerned about their treatment by whites. A black in America can with some justification see race problems as the most important problems in his society today. It is sheer enthnocentrism, however, for a researcher to anticipate that the pattern would be the same in India, where problems of famine, disease, and general survival loom so large. Even when group conflicts occur in India, it is not always easy to see them as caste conflicts. Conflicts between workers and managers or land owners and landless laborers may often—where caste is relevant at all—represent the dominant caste fighting all the others, touchable and otherwise. Politics in Tamilnadu follow this model, where Brahmins and non-Brahmins (which means everybody else) are in conflict. In summary, the authors' operationalization may "work" in American society, but is completely inappropriate elsewhere.

In their charming and disarming introduction, the authors discuss the reasons both for and against comparing caste in India with race in the United States, and judiciously settle for some middle ground. I share that middle ground, but as the above discussion illustrates, comparisons have to be made with sensitivity both about how other societies are organized and how one's perceptions of his own society influence the judgments one makes.

The authors' lack of sensitivity is reflected in another methodological decision, namely, to treat harijans as a homogeneous group and to report what are, in effect, averages. One of the striking features of Indian political life is the enormous range of political participation and effectiveness of different untouchable castes. The Mahars of Maharashtra, for example, have produced important leaders and are a major force in Maharashtrian politics. Other groups, such as the Bauris of Orissa, behave more as low-status groups are expected to. Comparisons among the deprived groups themselves may shed more light on the political process and political participation of deprived groups as a whole than does a method that treats them as homogeneous and undifferentiated. The authors' own findings suggest that this strategy would have been more sensible than the one they chose: "The difference in participation rates between the deprived and dominant groups is relatively small to begin with and disappears when one controls for a composite measure of socioeconomic status . . ." (p. 161). My guess is that comparison of the low participators in the high participation group and the high participators in the low participation group would yield more interesting findings.

The mechanical quality of the analysis is illustrated by the authors' discussion of income differences between the lowest stratum in each country. The authors report: "Eighty-one per cent of harijans are concentrated in the two lowest income levels, as compared to only fifty-three per cent of blacks." Inspection of the relevant table (p. 90), however, reveals that this difference is an artifact of the way they have located the cutting points between income categories. For American society, the two lowest categories have been set so as to include only 20 per cent of the total population; for India, by contrast, the two lowest categories are grouped to contain 60 per cent of all Indians, with five additional categories demarcated for the remaining 40 per cent of the population. The reason for setting the category boundaries as they do is not obvious, and the authors offer no explanation for it. Nonetheless, following the rules involved in such an exercise, the authors even go so far as to report a measure of association, Somers' *D*, for race to income in the U.S. (.38) and caste to income in India (.34). Aside from the fact that this report almost contradicts the verbal statement, the use of a measure of association in such a case strikes me as absolutely pointless, given the way the data are organized. The mechanical trotting out of such measures whenever one has a table to present is one of the more dreary and misleading practices of those playing the data game. (Nowhere in the report do the authors present a discussion of the strengths and limitations of Somers' *D*, although it is the measure of association they rely on most heavily.) This is only one table, and not the most important. But it illustrates a more general problem with the analysis.

All of this work is in the service of building models as a guide to understanding participation in the political process. "The data on white Americans," the authors observe with perfectly straight faces, ". . . fits the normal model fairly well" (p. 215). Blacks follow a "group consciousness" model developed on the basis of responses to the questionnaire items discussed above. But, alas, "it is hard to characterize caste Hindu voting unambiguously in terms of our four models" (p. 224). And, "the path to voting for harijans is a close match to the partisan mobilized model." The reader can only gape at the unself-conscious narrowness of cultural orientation that allows model-building of this type.

It is going outside the framework of the authors' analytic approach to raise one final question, but it seems to me important to raise it nonetheless. This is the question of the validity of interviews with low-status Indians. Historically, Indian villagers have had unfortunate experiences with high-status outsiders who ask questions. I and some of my Indian colleagues have received responses to interview questions that could be roughly paraphrased as: "Please go away. I am an honest and law abiding man. I do my duty as a citizen, and I do not know anything. Please go away." Recognizing that one might have been given that sort of response would enable one to account for many of this study's findings about harijans better than the authors do. They report that harijans vote in surprising numbers, and for the ruling Congress party. But harijans do not know anything, the study reports, and they seldom participate in any political activities besides voting. (A state-by-state breakdown would have been useful here. Did untouchables in Bengal report voting for the Congress or for the Communists?) The authors' explanation that they are mobilized by external forces seems inappropriate. Historically, low-status people—American blacks are one example here—have acted "dumb" and "docile" to avoid trouble. Untouchable respondents may be doing the same. Active political participation in anything besides voting may get them into trouble—even attempting to vote sometimes does—as may telling high-status outsiders (the interviewers) what they really think. Consequently, one cannot assume that because harijans do not report their opinions, they have none. In this context, assuming that observable political activity must result from mobilization from outsiders is an explanation that does not explain, but that may have the consequence of minimizing the extent of harijans' genuine feelings of grievance. Further, it lends support without documentation to the "outside agitator" explanation of political demands so popular with ruling groups.

The authors of this study have commendably attempted systematic analysis of a problem that has intrigued social scientists for the last thirty-five years, and they have provided us with valuable data. Unfortunately, their lack of sensitivity to the issues involved substantially decreases the usefulness of the study.

RICHARD P. TAUB

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Revolucija Koja Teče—Memoari [Memoirs on a Flowing Revolution]. By Svetozar Vukmanović [Tempo]. (Belgrade: Komunist, 1971. 2 vols. Pp. 938. No price indicated.)

The struggle is ended, the bourgeoisie defeated, and the former illegals have stacked their arms and retreated. Enter now from backstage the miscellaneous array of politicians, headquarters men, and arrivistes, all eager to assist their victorious Party. With cunning and duplicity, the representatives of this "papier-mâché world of proletarian revolution" gain control of one echelon after another in the emerging state. The whole process, as General Vukmanović (known in the Party as "Tempo") views it, can have only one outcome: a lost cause, as has been the case with every revolution the Communists have won.

But according to the author, who brings to this study an impressive background, this has not held true in Tito's Yugoslavia. For several decades the general was a leading official of the Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ; formerly the CPY) and, according to Stalin, a "dubious Marxist." He served Tito in a variety of diplomatic, military, and political capacities, and was a member of the Politburo of the CPY.

In 1941, he writes, two difficult tasks faced the Yugoslav Communists: to get their movement organized and to force the class enemy to slip the noose around its own neck. Both struggles claimed the lives of many of the best cadres. Learning very early that the Bolshevik manual on revolution was dated, the rebels had to improvise a new manual under fire. Here Tito's contribution was particularly significant. He profited from the political illiteracy and organizational weaknesses of his enemy, says Vukmanović, and, in particular, from the peculiar policies of the Western allies, who while sponsoring Nationalist Draža Mihailović, were helping Tito's Partisans.

In the account of his stay in Macedonia, 1943–44, Vukmanović offers a classical pattern of Communist penetration into no-man's land. Even though he had only a passing acquaintance with the customs or the language of the people or the terrain, he was sent by Tito to set up Partisan units, to ignite a rebellion against the occupation forces, to neutralize the Četniks, and to settle a score with the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania—not a small assignment. The wonder is that he was so successful on all counts—largely, he says, because of Tito's astute political directives, his own resourcefulness, and the blunders committed by the adversary.

After the victory, as chief political commissar of the People's Army he undertook the transformation of Partisan detachments into a modern army. In his frequent contacts here with Soviet generals, he was appalled by their seeming lack of appreciation of the contribution of foreign Communists to socialist victory. He began to suspect at this point that the Red army had become merely the army of a big power rather than an armed sword of the proletarian revolution.

His next assignment was to the economic front, where he became one of the principals in the building of socialism. Convinced that the only way out of utter chaos lay in transplanting Soviet patterns to Yugoslav soil, he established an impressive network of commissions and consultative bodies, all under the thumb of the Party. The first Five-Year Plan set ambitious goals for collectivization of private farms and for drastic reorganization of every sector of the economy. The statistics, when released, fell far short of convincing the leaders that the country was on the road to recovery. On all sides they saw shortages of basic commodities, empty shelves, inefficient transportation, and insufficient energy to meet growing demands. The peasants were resisting forcible collectivization, while the workers seemed to have as little say as before.

Following the 1948 dispute with Stalin, the CPY found itself forced to build its own road to socialism. The promulgation in June 1950 of the Law on Workers' Councils marked the turning-point. Slowly but relentlessly the worker and the agricultural proletarian acquired the weapons to put the bureaucrat in his place. Now, for the first time, says Vukmanović, Marxism took on a humanistic tinge, with the forces of resistance putting up a stubborn fight. For this reason the revolutionary fire had to be constantly rekindled.

An era of reform and innovation followed that ushered in a series of Yugoslav NEP's. Institutions were changed, business enterprises were reorganized, and the social fabric and the economy were subjected to constant alteration. Through it all the SKJ (CPY) managed somehow to rule politically without governing. In short, it kept the revolution flowing—a situation that still exists in today's world. Vukmanović's reflections in this context are frequently simplistic, his summaries much too sketchy; and he tends to belabor his arguments and to dwell on trivia. He also makes generous use of propaganda in describing the governments achievements.

Nevertheless, his thoughts on the rise and fall of a professional revolutionary merit attention. The Marxist professional, Vukmanović tells us, must be both artisan and artist of revolution; to retain his gains, he must become accomplished in public relations and in intraparty diplomacy. He must be willing to "lock all his personal problems in his attaché case"; and for Vukmanović this involved his acquiescence in the execution of his own brother. In his relations with his party comrades, the author styles himself a Bolshevik. But when they committed serious political sins, he turned promptly against them.

By bringing to light an abundance of data not generally available, General Vukmanović's study makes a valuable contribution to the area expert as well as to the student of East European affairs, and the author's active participation in the events he describes gives his work added value.

Milos Martic

University of California, Berkeley

Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines. By Dov Weintraub, Miriam Shapiro, and Belinda Aquino. (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Academic Press for the Institute of Asian and African Studies of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1973. Pp. 107. $5.00.)

The slim volume is one of a proposed set of case studies on the Comparative Analysis of Processes of Agricultural Development and Modernization. It consists of two rather disjoint parts—a brief chapter presenting a summary of the conceptual structure underlying the entire project and a long chapter on the Philippines. The conceptual chapter is a nearly complete reprinting of an article by Weintraub in *Rural Sociology*. The empirical chapter is drawn mainly from a secondary analysis of data and publications. These two parts are not linked in any persuasive way. Furthermore, the theory itself is not a particularly useful guide to analysis. The empirical chapter, however, is a useful introduction to the literature on the rural Philippines and Philippine politics.

The analytical framework is drawn from Shils's distinction between the center and periphery of a society. This distinction is supposed to be "analytical and not geographical" (p. 15) but "periphery" really means "the rural sector" while the meaning of "center" is less clear; often "center" refers to the activities of the central government, to the shared values of the national elite, to the capital, and so on. The analytical framework leads to five questions: (1) How much does the center care about rural welfare and development; (2) How effective is the center in carrying out its aims; (3) How capable is the rural sector of mobilizing resources for its own development; (4) How much does the rural sector participate in the Center's decision making; and (5) How well integrated into overall national responsibility is the periphery. For a particular country the theory specifies five dichotomies characterizing the country as high or low on each of these characteristics of the two sectors. The profiles are then asserted to relate to prospects for rapid or sustained rural development of one sort or another.

The problem with the analytical construct is that none of the significant variables can be measured in any satisfactory way. How do we know if a country's rural sector is or is not "capable of mobilizing its resources for its own development"? We might measure the proportion of agricultural capital investment generated from rural savings. This is hard to do, and it is not done in this volume. How do we tell if the rural sector exerts a large or small influence on policy making in the center? Analysis of sectoral power relations across countries with quite different political systems is not easy, and this volume doesn't do it. How do we tell if the organization of the rural sector is such as to create "a separate and differentiated collective consciousness"? (p. 16). And so on. Finally, how are we to measure the output of all of this, the rate of rural change, or its pattern, or whatever?

The review of secondary sources on the character of Philippine social and political structure is competently done. Whatever deficiencies are exhibited in this review are drawn directly from the deficiencies of that literature. For example, there is a general tendency to homogenize the "rural Philippines" into a stereotype consistent with common theoretical constructs of a "peasant society." In the stereotyping process all of the sharp and interesting regional variation is lost, the range of economic activity found in rural areas is ignored, the differences between industrial-type sugar production and rice farming are glossed over, and so on. Drawing from secondary sources also makes it impossible for the authors to evaluate the data on which their conclusions are based or to make any adjustments. Since the literature on Philippine politics has focused heavily on the role of the elite and their machinations, we find the same model in Weintraub et al., without any separation of the roles of barrio and national elites and without much real understanding of the ease with which ordinary country people can and do approach the national politicians with their problems and demands.

Despite these shortcomings, however, the empirical section of the book will be useful to those wishing a quick introduction to the basic literature on Philippine politics and society.

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Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. By Alexander Barton Woodside. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 358. $9.95.)

Alexander B. Woodside's *Vietnam and the Chinese Model* is the first serious work of American scholarship on Vietnam in the early nineteenth century. As such, it is a major event in the development of Vietnamese studies in the U.S., along with David G. Marr's *Vietnamese Anticolonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), also published in 1971. Professor Woodside brings to this pioneering task an obvious skill and sensitivity in the portrayal of cultural patterns on the basis of literature and court records of the period. He has an enviable knack for finding the social and cultural significance of even the most obscure regulation. Moreover, he is a gifted student not only of Vietnamese but of Chinese and Japanese language and literature.

It is precisely because of the author's considerable talents that this book is a disappointment. For he has chosen to restrict his inquiry by focusing narrowly on the elite institutions of the Nguyen dynasty—the court, the bureaucracy, and the examination system—and their relationship to the Chinese model. While this approach to the study of Nguyen government has the merit of permitting the author to bring into play his extensive knowledge of both Chinese and Vietnamese political institutions and culture, it also has the effect of taking the government of the Nguyen dynasty out of the social context of that period. Dr. Woodside's analysis relates the adaptation by the Nguyen of Chinese structures and practices to the static features of the Vietnamese landscape—geography, population and its Southeast Asian, as distinct from Sino-Vietnamese cultural background. Perhaps the most constant theme running through the analysis is the impact of the differences in scale between China and Vietnam on Vietnamese borrowing in the administrative and educational spheres.

What is lacking in this analysis is some sense of the main issues which were raised within the society in this period and how the governmental institutions handled them. For it suggests, unintentionally, a degree of harmony and stability which simply did not exist in early nineteenth-century Vietnam. Woodside's failure to put historical flesh on the institutional bones which he describes is certainly not due to a lack of awareness of the broader social context in which the Nguyen dynasty appeared. As he points out in his preface, the Nguyen dynasty began in 1802 after the defeat of the Tay Son Rebellion, a massive social upheaval and civil war which had, for more than twenty years, from 1771 to 1792 "summarized the socioeconomic discontents of the Vietnamese peasantry in a more dramatic and large-scale fashion than ever before. . . ."

The Nguyen dynasty, then, was not reemphasizing the borrowing of institutions from China merely because of the traditional cultural ties between the Vietnamese elite and China. The Nguyen period saw the restoration of conservatism after a long period of social instability and experimentation, marked in particular by a high level of peasant unrest. A very significant pattern of peasant protest, moreover, persisted throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Dr. Woodside has pointed out elsewhere that as many as 105 peasant uprisings are recorded in the eighteen years of Emperor Gia Long's reign from 1802 to 1820. Except for a passing reference to Gia Long's fear of political instability in the villages, however, there is no indication in his analysis of the unresolved social tensions that led the Nguyen dynasty to reassert Confucian values and institutions. Indeed, the Vietnamese peasantry hardly receives more than perfunctory mention in the book.

By defining the main issue in Vietnamese society implicitly as a cultural conflict—Sino-Vietnamese vs. indigenous Southeast Asian—rather than as the concrete social and economic grievances of the peasantry, Dr. Woodside's study cuts itself off from the most important historical themes of the Nguyen period and the most fruitful lines of inquiry for the historian. While the author notes that the Nguyen "probably tried to approach the Chinese model more closely than the emperors of any other Vietnamese dynasty," he does not attempt to explain why this was so. Nor does he seek to explain why the Nguyen dynasty failed so miserably to prepare the country for the onslaught of the French, retreating instead further into the sterility of Confucian institutions just when the challenge of the European should have stimulated intellectual and social reform. Again, there is a suggestion at one point that the emperor's interest in Western technology and ideas was offset by the need to consolidate the bureaucracy's control over potential unruly peasants. But the point is not explored.

This is a criticism, of course, of the book which the author did *not* write. It was not his intention to explore the broader issues of early nineteenth-century Vietnamese history, but rather to write "comparative institutional history." Nevertheless, the narrow conceptual focus of that approach, whatever its value, does not seem worthy of Dr. Woodside's capabilities or of the pioneering work on this period.

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The Taiping Revolutionary Movement. By Jen Yu-wen. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. 616. $19.50.)

The great Taiping Rebellion (1851–64) for at least the past forty years has been a subject of unusual interest to Chinese and Western scholars. The publication of Taiping documents and Imperialist memoirs in the 1930s and the availability of files of the British Parliamentary Papers and the North China Herald provided solid documentary underpinning. When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they adopted the Taipings and assigned to them the role of pioneering peasant revolutionaries. The 100th anniversary of the Rebellion in 1951 was officially celebrated. In the 1960s the world of Western scholarship saw the publication of sophisticated syntheses in English. Three of these deserve mention: Franz Michael's *The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents,* 3 vols. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966–71); Ssu-yü Teng's *The Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); and Vincent Shih's *The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967). The appearance in 1973 of Jen Yu-wen's *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement* now caps the climax; it is hard to imagine the appearance for some time to come of another study of comparable value.

Mr. Jen has been a worker in the lore of the Rebellion for more than fifty years. In that time he has so mastered the detail and the totality of the movement that he can write a history of it from the rebel point of view. His publications in Chinese include four collections of source materials, three scholarly articles, and seven books, culminating in his three volume *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih* (Complete history), 1960. Fortunately the late Professor Mary Wright of Yale encouraged Jen to condense his multi-volume Chinese studies and form this new one volume synthesis in English.

A number of Jen's new findings interest me. For one thing, while the Taipings were confirmed iconoclasts so far as Taoism and Buddhism were concerned, they did not persecute

Catholics. At the Heavenly Palace in Nanking there were female servants but *no* eunuchs. The polygamy indulged in by the highest *wangs* at Nanking, though often criticized as inconsistent with the monogamy decreed for the rank and file, is shown to be consonant with Chinese and also Old Testament ideas of the privileges due those of high rank. Mr. Jen shows that the Taipings did not neglect trade, exporting raw silk and tea, expanding international waterborne trade, and striving to maintain free trade. He has a detailed description of their evenhanded, equal treatment of women, of the experiment at segregation of the sexes, and of female warriors and leaders.

In his discussion of Taiping theology, Jen has particular praise for their modification of the Ten Commandments as a monument of rebel creativity. Taiping neglect of Christian love and the burden of Christ's message he ascribes to the pre-eminent influence of Liang A-fa's *Good Words to Admonish the Age;* Taiping treatment of the gospel was influenced by the social and cultural milieu, the needs of the revolutionary movement, and a residual reverence for the truths of Confucianism.

Jen gives full consideration to the strengths and abilities of well-known imperialist opponents such as Tseng Kuo-fan. At the same time, he supplies full notice of the exploits of many other imperialist commanders. Tseng's cruelty appals him. Chinese jealousy of Tseng at the Manchu court was always strong. Also, Taiping treatment of the Chinese people after the capture of their cities was always far better than that of their opponents.

Relations with foreigners were damaged not only by Taiping arrogance and religiosity, but also by abysmal ignorance and the lack of good interpreters. After 1860 doubt of whether the Taipings could win strengthened the foreigners' decision to intervene. In these last years of resistance Hung Jen-kan played a major role as a military leader in relieving pressure on Nanking as well as that of a modernizing reformer.

Historians have previously said that Hung Hsiu-ch'üan committed suicide a month before the fall of Nanking in July 1864. But Jen has persuasive evidence for his death of illness. He ranks Hung among the great patriots of Chinese history, refusing offers of partition with the Ch'ing dynasty and staunch in his faith in the Chinese and in the Taiping religion.

So far as his broad conclusions are concerned, Mr. Jen insists that he is dealing not just with a rebellion but with a genuine revolutionary movement that planned to replace the ruling dynasty, to install a new ideology, to change the system of land tenure, and to alter the social structure. Nor was it a peasant movement nourished on class antagonism. Apparently Taiping leaders had contempt for the farmer's lot and did not glorify the peasant class, contrary to Marxian interpretations. The Revolution is properly viewed as a precursor with an "evolutionary relationship" to the nationalistic Chinese Revolution of 1911–12.

The reader of this work will notice a preponderance of detailed military narrative which reflects incessant fighting. The loss of life and substance through combat and pillage was by all accounts catastrophic. The Taipings never knew peace; so the opportunity to put their land reform or Hung Jen-kan's progressive, Western ideas into practice never came. But their warlike work did demonstrate to Chinese of Sun Yat-sen's generation that the Manchus could be outfought, that a way to their overthrow was possible. Their example was heeded.

There is one conspicuous flaw in an otherwise admirable achievement. The campaign maps on pages 566–574, while helpful, are not numerous enough to assist readers of the narrative, who will search in vain for many key locations.

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The Imperial Republic. By Raymond Aron. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.)

Raymond Aron, as was de Tocqueville, is a rare Frenchman who admires the United States and is mesmerized by the problem of its destiny. Tocqueville was awed by America's *social* influence upon his world; Aron, now, by its *imperial* influence. Tocqueville deemed the prevalence of the former to be inevitable; Aron sees the prevalance of the latter as necessary. A national culture influences its environment to the extent of its dynamism, but imperial influence—entailing the exertion of political power to maintain some system of order—requires will and determination.

Aron now tackles the formidable task of evaluating the American record in the last quarter-century. He says: "Grounds for outrage abound in our times the reader will pardon my sparing use of a commodity of which the supply exceeds the demand" (p. xxi). The commodity Aron supplies instead is a formidable display of political history, economic analysis, strategic doctrine and practice—and of the views and interpretations of innumerable commentators and pundits over three decades. This makes for a dense, discursive, and elliptical book. The reader who most easily will absorb what he writes will be one who already knows much of what Aron knows.

Allusions on nearly every page of this complex book help to bring one's mind into accord with assertions about prerevisionist historical reality. Here are some: Soviet-American rivalry began, he argues, almost as soon as World War II ended; but it was the Korean War, endorsed and fueled by Stalin, which marked the beginning of the American cold-war military phase. It was the Europeans who asked for NATO, and who asked for Eisenhower to lead it, rather than the United States which imposed the institution and the man on them. The commencement of the political Cold War in 1947 coincided with the partition of Europe, rather than with any serious Western challenge to that partition. The Cold War—some revisionists to the contrary—served to obscure the U.S.'s conversion from universalist dreams to the reality of spheres of influence. American diplomacy gradually resigned itself to, or determined on, resistance and hostility to the Soviet Union, rather than the mounting of a deliberate offensive against it. Stalin, who out of fear of Hitler had betrayed that fear by cunning reticence and caution, had no such fears of the Western leaders he confronted—despising "what seemed to him a mixture of hypocrisy, weakness and blindness" (p. 42).

Accepting the adage that who controls the past controls the future, Aron in the second half of his book locks horns with revisionists and especially economic determinists to influence the perception of that past. Far from contesting the question of America's economic ascendancy of the world economy, Aron praises it. The twenty-five year (1947–72) phase of post-war economic and monetary experience Aron perceives as an unmitigated triumph of American purpose. None of the economic nightmares which obsessed World War II policy planners materialized; they were deterred. There was no worldwide depression, no widespread reversion to strict national autarky, no mass unemployment, no collapse of capitalism; instead, he says, there was sustained economic growth, and a growth rate of international trade exceeding the internal growth of national economies.

Aron would explain this success as largely due to American liberal trade doctrine and practice, and the successful use of the dollar as new surrogate for gold and the pound sterling as the international unit of exchange. If an interdependent world market economy would exist and flourish, it would flourish under the umbrella of a dominant American economic system.

We are left—in Aron's line of argument—in a strange impasse on the question of American economic imperialism: how far can we "explain" America's international political conduct on economic grounds? As to the New Left charge that the United States is the great predator of Third World resources and the great exploiter of their economies, Aron notes the obvious fact that it is the advanced economies of Europe and Japan which consume far more of those resources than does a more self-reliant United States. Moreover, American investment capital displays a striking preference for developed societies rather than for poor countries. The neo-Leninist charge of the necessary "law of capitalism" to explain the linkage between U.S. military force and U.S. overseas investments gains little credibility when one notices that other advanced capitalist and mixed economies have not chosen to imitate America's imperial activities, and most have gone out of the business of imperialism entirely.

Bowdlerized New Left theories to Aron, are absurd: the United States did not spend $28 billion per year on the Vietnam War in order to protect non-existent Indochinese tin mines; a foreign policy determined by economics in the Middle East would have required the abandonment of Israel. Is it American capitalists who today protest Nixon's economic détente with the Soviet Union and China? Such protest now arises, rather, from a peculiar common-law marriage of Senator Jackson's strategic *Realpolitik*, the idealism of a few intellectuals, and the objections of organized labor.

Yet an overwhelming "fact" is suggested by Aron's line of reasoning and marshalling of evidence: The American concern of a benign international environment *includes* a deep commitment to principles of an international market economy—and these fly in the face of the state-trading practices of the Communist world. The political economy of freedom does not segregate politics from economics.

Perhaps the core of Aron's analysis concerns his evaluation of the nature, meaning, and consequences of the American policy of containment. He approves of the policy and considers it to have been a success. That the policy came to be extended from its original zone of application—Europe and the Middle East—to both China and the Soviet Union in Asia, Aron would say was not a decision imposed by the United States, but was a consequence of Soviet and Chinese aggression. The Soviet-fueled North Korean attack in 1950 came at a point in time when the United States was on the verge of wholly abandoning Chiang Kai-shek and recognizing the new Communist regime. Washington had deliberately redrawn its strategic perimeter to exclude Korea and the whole Asian mainland. The aggression, when it came, elevated Korea to global significance. In the eyes of America's European allies, it tested the credibility of America's guarantees. Also, since no Japanese government would have tolerated a Soviet-dominated Korea, America as Japan's protector did not choose to do so either. That the aggression was widely perceived in Washington as a concerted Sino-Soviet test of America's imperial will-to-resist, may some day prove to be untrue; but policy makers hardly can wait patiently for historians to supply the full story.

When Aron judges the whole record of containment, the persistent reader comes across some perplexing contradictions which arise not so much from the author as from the very ambiguous world of détente. "The United States," he writes, "has achieved its proximal goal of containing the expansion of Communist control almost everywhere" (p. 149). But then, he says, the United States has not been able "to prevent the Soviet Union from hoisting itself to an equal level of military power. . . . There was only one global power in 1947; today there are two" (p. 149).

If there are indications now that the Soviet Union uses détente as an occasion to press forward its production and deployment of ever-greater strategic and conventional forces on land, sea, and air space, the obvious question arises whether they intend to transform strategic parity into clear strategic superiority. But in the West generally it is assumed that the essential nature of détente reduces the need for military strength. The most obvious question which a realist might ask is: In what ways can one now safely choose to distinguish between the "fact" of successful containment (defined as the checking of "Communist control") and the fact of the continuing sheer outward thrust of the Soviet Union's strategic presence and capabilities? Maybe a "new" U.S.S.R. of Brezhnev's successors may convince itself of the futility of the quest for strategic superiority, as it already appears to have abandoned its quest for the global triumph of its home-grown Socialism. Aron suggests no easy answer to this very difficult problem. What he does suggest obliquely, is that, while the objective elements in the superpower relationship have not changed very much since the early 1960s, "the question is whether the will power of one or the two states capable of playing a world-wide imperial role is slackening" (p. 149). He is enough of a skeptic to acknowledge that, just as the much-touted American world supremacy in the Kennedy time was "apparent," so the American reputational collapse occasioned by Vietnam was merely "spectacular." He adds (p. 72) that "however sensational the sudden changes of fortune may have seemed at the time, they may perhaps merit no more than a few paragraphs in the accounts given by historians in the future—unless, of course, they prove to be indicative of the destiny of the American Republic and its incapacity to master the tendency to veer between crusading and withdrawal."

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Die Berlin-Frage, 1949–1955. By Dennis L. Bark. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Band 36, 1972. Pp. xiv, 544. DM 96.)

Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945–1970. By Hans Herzfeld. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Band 38, 1973. Pp. xxiv, 666. DM 118.)

Through its archival and publishing programs, the Historical Commission of Berlin has made an unusually noteworthy contribution to scholarship on Berlin. It has sponsored careful scholarly studies on numerous historical topics as well as an historical atlas that expands from year to year; and its multivolume chronicle of the first postwar decade (to be continued, one hopes), two volumes of sources and documents, and a 1012-page bibliography provide a wealth of information on modern Berlin.

The two volumes reviewed here are the Historical Commission's first to deal exclusively with the international political situation of postwar Berlin. Hans Herzfeld, dean of Berlin historians, has analyzed its development in his long-awaited study of *Berlin in World Politics, 1945–1970*. His treatment, primarily chronological, emphasizes the formative period up to 1949. Thorough and thoughtful chapters deal with wartime planning and indecision, the confusion and clashes that ensued when the wartime allies actually began their occupation of defeated Germany and realized how much their aims differed, the breakdown of interallied unity, and the Soviet blockade of Berlin followed by the West's airlift. By the end of 1949 separate governments had been created in East and West Germany, and West Berlin's anomalous position between the two became clear—even if not officially recognized until more than two decades later in the quadripartite and inter-German agreements of 1971–1972.

The latter half of Herzfeld's study analyzes the pushing and shoving between East and West that characterized these two decades. Crises punctuated the era: the uprising in East Berlin and the GDR in June 1953, the "ultimatum crisis" that began in November 1958, the construction of the Berlin wall in August 1961. But more important for West Berlin was the fact that the new status quo became ever firmer. The prospects for a reunited Germany, with Berlin as its capital, diminished as each day went by.

Of particular interest is Herzfeld's attention to the interaction between policy and perceptions in the West. In the continuing Berlin crises—which are not over yet—how writers have defined the situation has made an important difference, for better or worse, to actual Western policies. Although some stoked the fires of the cold war, the more dominant trend was toward coming to terms with the post-1949 status quo, in effect preparing public and policy makers alike for its ultimate acceptance.

Dennis L. Bark's *The Berlin Question, 1949–1955* is a more detailed analysis of the critical years when West Berliners and others began to realize that ending the blockade had not been as unqualified a Western success as they had at first proclaimed. The first inkling came at the Paris foreign ministers conference just days after the transit routes were reopened. In the ensuing months the major powers no less than the FRG and GDR hardened their positions, trading propaganda and charges of perfidy rather than making the mutual concessions that would be required to move toward the announced goal of reunification. The June 1953 uprising merely confirmed Western fears that the Soviet Union had no intention of relinquishing its control in Germany. Meanwhile, the FRG was negotiating on both the economic and political fronts to regain its place in the sun—albeit a West European sun only. By 1955 the FRG was tied firmly to NATO, the GDR to the Warsaw Pact, and the division of Germany and Berlin was sealed.

The isolation enjoyed by West Berlin in 1949 did not dissolve during these years, but simply assumed different proportions. The city's leaders not only had to ward off subtle and not-so-subtle efforts by the East to dominate aspects of life in West Berlin, such as transit travel to the FRG or the transportation network in West Berlin itself. They also faced a serious danger from the West—to be forgotten. Some West Germans, their attention riveted on their own political and economic reconstruction, simply put West Berlin and its problems out of their minds. Others were reluctant to invest too heavily in the city's uncertain future. A few, harboring longstanding hostility to Berlin and what it had stood for, consciously sought to write it off. Concurrently, new patterns of communication, traffic, provision of such services as water and sewage, and attitudes were entrenching the political split between east and west within Berlin itself.

The task of West Berlin's leaders, then, grew ever more complex. They had to govern a city of two and a quarter million citizens, create and maintain jobs for its working force (a third of whom had been unemployed in the early 1950s), retard infrastructural developments that cemented the city's east-west spit, and, above all, strengthen the West's commitment to both the defense of West Berlin and its viability within the framework of the West German political system. The task on both the international and local level had, in the words of Henry A. Kissinger, turned into "a struggle to capture the symbols which move humanity" (Bark, p. 523).

However valuable these two volumes are for students of world politics and Berlin alike, make no mistake about one thing: Both are conservative in style of scholarship (e.g., atheoretical, with virtually no "hard" data) and, more importantly, in tone. If we ask what motivated Soviet leaders and such men as Walter Ulbricht to undertake the extraordinary and even dangerous policies they did toward the West, Germany, and Berlin, it may be comfortable to accept a traditional cold-war response such as their hunger for power and territorial expansion in the guise of ideology. The analytic task then is merely to document Eastern perfidy and Western steadfastness or indecisiveness.

But if we respond that ideology was the primary motivating factor—that Stalin, Ulbricht, and their associates were willing to take risks to realize their vision of a better world—then we must ask a second and equally critical question: Given this desire, and given the West's power and obstinance, then how *should* the East have proceeded to accomplish its goal? Both Herzfeld and Bark, and indeed most writers to date on the Berlin problem, are so convinced that the first answer is more nearly the truth that they neglect to explore seriously the far-reaching implications of the second. Those interested in investigating both approaches will nonetheless find ample food for thought in these volumes.

It is regrettable that the publisher's pricing policy—at spring 1974 exchange rates, the volumes cost $48 and $39, respectively—has put these important studies virtually out of the financial reach of individual scholars.

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The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925. By James Barros. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Pp. xiii, 143. $6.50.)

The League of Nations' handling of the Greco-Bulgarian incident, which occurred three days after the signing of the Locarno Pacts, is often cited as one of the most important successes of that organization. Following the cessation of hostilities, the affair was finally brought to a close when Greece reluctantly accepted the findings of the International Commission of Inquiry and made reparations to Bulgaria on February 15 and March 1, 1926.

In the opening chapter Professor Barros interestingly suggests that what started as a simple frontier incident—the death of a Greek border sentry—escalated into a serious conflict because of faulty intelligence on the Greek side, and distorted messages on the scale of the Bulgarian attack sent by local Greek commanders to Athens. The subsequent three chapters deal with the difficulties the Great Powers (Britain, France, Italy) had in assessing the changing military situation; the increasing coordination of their policies aimed at moderating the actions of the Greek government and urging Bulgaria not to take the offensive; and, against the background of the deteriorating military situation, the transference of the question to the League Council.

The Council, convened on October 26 under the acting presidency of Aristide Briand, reiterated the request for orders to be given for the withdrawal of the respective forces and the completion of this operation within sixty hours. In addition, mediation initiatives were undertaken by Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. Briand seems to have regarded the latter efforts, however, as an attempt "to mask the League's action" (p. 79). Later discussions in the Council centered on the possibility of League sanctions—the withdrawal of chiefs of diplomatic misions and a naval demonstration at Piraeus—against Greece. But the growing diplomatic pressure on Greece proved sufficient to bring about a cessation of hostilities on October 28. The remaining part of chapter five is concerned with the work of the Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir Horace Rumbold and the problem of indemnities. The League Secretariat's discussion of the legality of sanctions is contained in the appendices, which are followed by a bibliographical note and short index.

This book is undoubtedly impressive in its detail and draws heavily on *inter alia* British, Greek, Italian and League archival material. Not all the available archival material has been used, and secondary sources, including press citations from the main parties, have been omitted from the text. Methodologically the concentration on governmental and diplomatic exchanges is made at the expense of any significant treatment of the internal influences on Greek and Bulgarian policies and the wider significance of the Balkans in the international politics of this period. An introductory chapter dealing with, for example, the relationship of the *Komitadjis* to the Bulgarian government, Greek political and economic difficulties under the Pangalos regime, and the interests of the Powers in the Balkan region would have been helpful. We learn little also of the practical effects of the Treaty of Neuilly on Bulgarian military capabilities. Considering too the primary focus of the book, the role of the League Secretary-General and the reasons that the Pangalos regime accepted the League Council resolution warrant fuller and more systematic treatment.

Nevertheless, this book is an excellent reconstruction of the positions and policies of the Great Powers. In particular the attitudes and initiatives of British diplomatic personnel are given detailed and valuable elucidation. In short, Professor Barros has provided us with a specialist book on the policies of the main European Powers over the Greco-Bulgarian incident rather than on the intricacies of relationships among minor Balkan powers.

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The Cambodian Incursion—Legal Issues. Edited by Donald T. Fox. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971. Pp. xiii, 89. $7.50.)

This small book contains the May 1970 proceedings of the Fifteenth Hammarskjöld Forum of the Special Committee on the Lawyer's Role in the Search for Peace of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The book's editor (Chairman of the Special Committee) wisely includes also a pertinent Documentary Supplement (p. 55) and well-balanced Selected Bibliography (p. 79).

Leaving aside the editor's foreword, which clarifies that the Forum took place before the ill-fated Cooper-Church and Hatfield-McGovern amendments, the Forum's proceedings determined the book's ordering. A contextually oriented introduction by NYU law professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld begins the book, making the point—too wistfully—that "international law, which many thought dead at least as regards the security of the great powers, suddenly seems to have revived" (p. 1). Then follows, first, a constitutional debate between Assistant Attorney General (now Supreme Court Justice) William H. Rehnquist and NYU Law Dean Robert B. McKay, and then an international law debate between former State Department Legal Advisor John R. Stevenson and Harvard law professor (erstwhile Legal Advisor) Abram Chayes (with Rehnquist-Stevenson and McKay-Chayes speaking, respectively, for and against the Administration). Rebuttals followed by floor discussion, including statements by Columbia international law professors Friedmann, Gardner, and Henkin, conclude the volume.

Regarding the constitutional law debate (pp. 4–23), both Messrs. Rehnquist and McKay agree that the United States may engage in hostilities without a declaration of war, and, further, that the designation of the President as Commander-in-Chief grants a power of "substantive authority" (the single power on which the Administration based its decision to cross the Cambodian frontier). Their disagreements, to quote Dean McKay, "relate only to the definition of the limits of Presidential power" (p. 16); and in terms of both precedent and policy, Dean McKay emerges the more persuasive. Except possibly in relation to the President's power to determine how ongoing hostilities shall be conducted, none of Mr. Rehnquist's cited precedents appear sufficiently apposite. And as for the conduct-of-hostilities issue, Dean McKay's basic policy argument—that "major" foreign policy decisions never should be taken without congressional approval, particularly in the absence of substantial popular consensus—is compelling. Unless one considers the much-criticized Gulf of Tonkin Resolution conclusive, no such approval (let alone consultation) was secured in this case. On the other hand, given the obvious interpretative problems involved, wisdom dictates heeding Professor Henkin's counsel that "we cannot afford to deal with Presidential error by curtailing Presidential power. We have to elect better Presidents" (pp. 54–55).

Regarding the international law debate (pp. 24–41), judgments ultimately must hinge on whether one accepts Washington's legal position vis-à-vis the conflict in South Vietnam itself. Explicit consideration of this broad and factually complex issue, however, was deliberately eschewed in favor of the narrower question of whether the Cambodian operation met the requirements of prior "armed attack," recipient-government "invitation" or "consent," and plurilateral "consultation," as variously distilled from the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the SEATO Pact, the UN Charter, and other sources. Predictably, Mr. Stevenson answers in the affirmative and Mr. Chayes in the negative—the former stressing North Vietnam's long history of "continuing armed attack" from the Cambodian sanctuary (pp. 26–27), the latter turning this same history to advantage his thesis that American policy was born not out of "instant and overwhelming" threat, but out of "convenience" (pp. 39–40). Despite the legal and political acumen of Messrs. Stevenson and Chayes, however, their debate parses too heavily into nice lawyers' arguments. One has to read too much between their parries and thrusts of "necessary self-defense" and "proportionality" to see that they really are debating about how wisely to husband a legal order which seeks, albeit timorously, to advance the common inclusive interest of limiting justifications for armed force. And on this plane, it is difficult to fault Mr. Chayes. "Suddenly," he sardonically notes, alluding to Prince Sihanouk's downfall and citing former Defense Secretary Laird, "there opened up an opportunity in the change of government in Cambodia to do something that *we* thought would help *us*" (pp. 44–45, emphasis added).

Such, then, is the essence of this small book, appropriately dedicated to the late Quincy Wright. Although students interested in greater detail should consult a later, similar symposium partially reproduced in the January 1971 issue of the *American Journal of International Law* (Vol. 65, No. 1), it is a welcome addition to the literature. A tantalizing question remains, however: why does the title carry the word "incursion" (the Rehnquist-Stevenson term) rather than the word "invasion" (the McKay-Chayes term)?

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Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964–1971. By Laszlo Gorgey. International Relations Series Number Three. Published on behalf of the Institute for International Studies, University of South Carolina. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1972. Pp. 191. $8.50.)

Professor Gorgey's first book is a conventional historian's account focusing on the evolution of West Germany's Eastern policy from 1964–1971, therefore not including the subsequent developments between Bonn and her

Eastern European neighbors, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, in the last four years.

Mr. Gorgey's analysis proceeds from a traditional and sound point of view about the geopolitical strengths and limitations of Germany's foreign policy: "Germany occupies a strategic central position in Europe. This fact of geography, both a curse and a blessing, has inevitably had a major impact on the political thinking of the German nation" (p. 3). Traditionally, this middle position has led to a policy that tried to preserve a balance between relations with the East and those with the West, either by abstaining from commitments or through alliances with one side. In the interest of "national security," Germany has also embarked on conquests, both East and West, from her pivotal central position.

In the aftermath of World War II, West Germany, under Chancellor Adenauer's leadership, sought to reestablish itself as a power by exclusive alliances with the Western allies. "The cost of an exclusively Western-oriented policy was *immobilisme* toward the Soviet bloc, more particularly toward the Eastern European countries . . . the inflexibility of Germany's Eastern policy in this period is attributable not only to Chancellor Adenauer, but to the Soviet Union as well (p. 5). Whatever the causes, Adenauer's policy failed to move toward German reunification or even to the more limited goal of a better accommodation with Bonn's Eastern neighbors.

The opening chapters deal particularly effectively with the difficulties of overcoming the Adenauer legacy. Professor Gorgey tells us that succeeding governments found it necessary to make more fluid a foreign policy that had become frozen under slogans such as "the policy of strength" and misguided dogma such as the Hallstein Doctrine. Changes in these policies had, moreover, to be worked cautiously so as not to alarm Bonn's Western allies, who themselves, particularly during the brief Kennedy Administration, appeared to seek a *rapprochement* with Moscow that downgraded West Germany's security and ostensible reunification priorities.

Professor Gorgey points out that the Hallstein Doctrine, under which the Federal Republic threatened to break off diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized the Pankow regime, was a particularly rigid and even hidebound initiative. While threatening to alienate Third World countries and, more than subtly, threatening the principal Western allies as well, the Doctrine proved to be a holding operation at best for these purposes, while strangling West Germany's conceivable opening to the East.

The author points out that under Erhard, Kiesinger, and then successfully under Brandt, German governments proceeded to circumvent the Hallstein Doctrine and finally to repudiate it *de facto*. The principal thrusts included a rapid expansion of trade with East European neighbors, a deliberately conceived economic policy, with political goals in view, and, at the same time, an assertion of "moral responsibility" according to which West Germany had to accept responsibility for the territorial consequences of the War and had to place the welfare of the East German people above doctrinaire legalisms.

In the process of ending her political isolation from Eastern neighbors, West Germany sought to establish what Mr. Gorgey calls "a new consensus" among its domestic political constituencies and tendencies. The several chapters devoted to the redirection of the principal political parties in this process are unnecessarily superficial; in particular, the evolution of S.P.D. leadership is treated too lightly, and the discussion of the German rightwing is too brief to be useful. Indeed, the interrelationship of domestic with foreign policies receives unsophisticated treatment in this volume.

In the remaining chapters of this book, Mr. Gorgey traces the halting evolution of a new Eastern policy in which he emphasizes the limitations placed upon these initiatives. His fundamental convictions from which the analysis proceeds are stated in his conclusions:

> At the same time Bonn's Eastern policy must be carried out within the context of the West's policy of *détente,* for which the outlook is grim. The Western powers seem to ignore the fact that differences between their systems and the communist states are not a matter of nuance. They are fundamental. Not only the tactics but the overall strategy of Soviet foreign policy have changed in the last fifty-three years. Today the Kremlin seeks to achieve its goals by indirect means, by maneuvering its opponents into a series of partial political capitulations (p. 172).

From this series of assertions, it is easy to understand why Mr. Gorgey is convinced that the division of Germany into two states will continue indefinitely, and therefore also why Bonn's new Eastern policy "is very likely to suffer serious setbacks in the future" (p. 171); this also accounts for his description of the cumulative impact of the new Eastern policy as being of secondary importance, if not inconsequential.

I respect Mr. Gorgey's account of events but wonder about the accuracy and consequences of his analysis. There is, after all, little question that, especially under Chancellor Brandt, the Federal Republic achieved a position of genuine strength as a Western partner and also as a pivotal power between East and West. Granted that its maneuverability is susceptible to limitations that can be imposed by the Soviet Union or the United States, the emergence of China as a nuclear power gives new dimensions to a balance that Germany can maintain or exploit. A new Rapallo is not in sight; and Brandt has played his role with a greater sense of responsibility than Gustav Stresemann before him. But the opportunities for West Germany in the East are not exclusively of its own making, and successive governments in Bonn might play a more adventurous role if opportunities were to come their way.

It is therefore perilous to hold that this or forthcoming Soviet regimes are so incessantly driven by ideological messianism that they would reduce the chances of attaining immediate objectives out of dogmatic fervor, for fright of a Germany which, even if reunited, would not pose the threat an emergent China does today.

GERALD FREUND
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International Organization: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography. By Michael Haas. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 944. $35.00.)

In this bibliography Michael Haas offers scholars in the international organization field an extensive (nearly 8000 entries) reference work compiling the literature on international institutions of the ancient and contemporary worlds. This work brings together in a useful way references covering several disciplines and languages and including guides to libraries, periodicals, bibliographies, textbooks, and documentary sources.

Perhaps the most outstanding aspect of this bibliography is its organization, which features a chronological, functional, and geographical breakdown, as well as a separate author and subject index. Another particularly useful aspect is the treatment of separate chapters of books as articles, permitting them to be organized under the specific subject with which they deal. In addition, the book is well laid out with large, well-spaced entries in large type which are numbered and indexed individually as well as by pages.

Of the few shortcomings, some are created by the nature of the enterprise rather than by error or oversight. It is testimony to the growing interest and activity in the field of international organization (and the cut-off date of December 1965) that much of the very interesting literature on regional organization and integration is not included. Although interdisciplinary and multilingual, the bibliography is heavily weighted toward history and political science studies in the English language, with only a token representation of the extensive literature in French, for example. Another curious omission from bibliographical references is the *Peace Research Abstracts* compiled by the Canadian Peace Research Institute which is an important source in the field of international organization.

These flaws, however, do not greatly reduce the utility of a reference work which should benefit those for whom it is intended.

W. ANDREW AXLINE
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Turkestan zwischen Russland und China. By Baymirza Hayit. (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1971. Pp. 414. Hf 120.–.)

At a time when Russian and Chinese statesmen quarrel over the boundaries of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, one loses sight of the fact that their states include lands which ethnically and culturally are neither Russian nor Chinese. Part of the vast region of Central Asia, which was carved up by the Tsarist and Manchu governments and retained by the Communist regimes, was once known as Turkestan, after the Turkic peoples inhabiting it. China conquered Eastern Turkestan between 1755 and 1765; she referred to it simply as Hsi-ju (the Western Region) until 1884 when she made of it a Chinese province by the name of Sinkiang or Hsin-chiang (the New Frontier). Russia subjected Western Turkestan between 1717 and 1895. Western Turkestan existed briefly as an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, but was divided up in 1924 into the republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizstan—all within the framework of the U.S.S.R. As a result, Soviet writers and in their wake American and English specialists using Russian sources, now commonly speak of "Central Asia and Kazakhstan." But Dr. Hayit, a believer in the unity of the Turkic peoples, retains the traditional name of Turkestan.

Dr. Hayit holds a German Ph.D., yet he was born and raised in what is now the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. While serving in the Red Army during the Second World War, he was captured by the Germans and made a member of the Turkestan Legion (later renamed the National Army of Turkestan), which was part of the Wehrmacht, and worked in the National-Turkestan Unity-Committee in Berlin.

Hayit begins his study with the breakup of the Turkestan empire following the death of Timur (Tamerlane) in the fifteenth century (chap. 1). He continues with a description of the independent states of Turkestan on the eve of Russian expansion (chap. 2). He traces the development of early Russo-Turkestan relations, with emphasis on the eighteenth century, when diplomatic missions were exchanged between Russia on one hand and Bukhara and Khiva on the other hand and when the Tsarist government successfully incited the various steppe peoples against each other (chap. 3). He examines in detail the forty-two-year war between Russia and Turkestan, which was capped in 1895 by the Pamir Agreement by which Great Britain recognized the new Russian frontier (chap. 4). Hayit then turns to the struggle between China and East Turkestan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (chap. 5). He reverts to the administration of Turkestan by the Tsarist regime (chap. 6) and to the national struggle for independence in the region, notably the ill-fated uprising of 1916 (chap. 7). The author depicts the impact of the Russian revolution of 1917 on Turkestan (chap. 8), the establishment of various national republics in Turkestan between 1917 and 1924 (chap. 9), and the continued national struggle for independence during the Soviet period (chap. 10). Turning once more to Eastern Turkestan, Hayit delves into the consequences of the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the proclamation in 1933 of the Turk-Islamic Republic of East Turkestan, which was set upon by Chinese and Russian forces (chap. 11). The book concludes with a discussion of the domination of the "pseudo-national states" of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan by Moscow (chap. 12).

As will be seen from the above outline, more attention is devoted to Russian than to Chinese relations with Turkestan. This has been dictated partly because of the author's inability to read Chinese. Nevertheless, his study is monumental. The result of years of research in libraries and institutes in Turkey, Pakistan, Germany, England, and the United States, it is based on hundreds of books and articles in Uzbek, Tatar, Turkmen, Turkish, Russian, French, German, and English.

Dr. Hayit's scholarly and heavily documented history, published under the auspices of the Institute for the Study of Turkish Culture at Ankara, is girded with nationalism. He begins with a quotation from Mir 'Ali Shir Navayi, a fifteenth-century Uzbek poet: "Though a people may consist of hundreds or thousands of tribes, mine will always remain one Turkish nation" (p. iv). Linking the past with the present, Dr. Hayit observes in his final paragraph:

> The world at large knows already that Russia and China, each for itself, strive to extend their spheres of influence to all of Turkestan; the Russians want to drive the Chinese out of Eastern Turkestan, the Chinese the Russians out of Western Turkestan. In the question of the sole domination of Turkestan, Communism released in these powers their original imperialistic instinct. Turkestan stands between these rival powers alone and weak in every respect, without giving up its national will for survival (p. 353).

To Russian and Chinese scholars Hayit's activities and background will appear hostile. Yet his outlook is no more biased than their own. For too long, Western historians writing about Central and Inner Asia have perpetuated Russian and Chinese versions of history because they were able to read only Russian or Chinese. Hayit's book provides a much-needed corrective.

GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN
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Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911. By Michael H. Hunt. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 281. $12.50.)

Michael Hunt has written an extraordinary first book: a model study of relations between China and the United States that renders obsolete two generations of uni-archival work. Professor Hunt's subject is conceived imaginatively as an investigation of why these two countries failed to cooperate between 1895 and 1911 despite a mutual interest in containing Russian and Japanese expansion in Manchuria. He focuses his analysis on Chinese efforts to regain control over their northeastern provinces and American efforts to preserve the Open Door—to preserve opportunities for the expansion of American economic interests in Manchuria.

With impressive use of Chinese sources, primary and secondary, Hunt constructs dialogues and evidences of bureaucratic competition and compromises among the Chinese such as are common to only the best analyses of the American decision-making process. Chinese figures are portrayed, warts and all, as clearly as their American counterparts. Familiar American figures—Hay, Rockhill, Root, Theodore Roosevelt, Knox, and Taft—appear in familiar poses, but at long last, there is a sensible devaluing of Willard Straight's currency. In a brilliant appendix Hunt explains how historians can inflate the importance of minor figures, like Straight, who leave large and literate manuscript collections. Corroborating evidence for Hunt's interpretation of Straight can be found in the papers of Roger S. Greene and Thomas W. Lamont, two collections opened recently at Harvard.

Longstanding estimates of the bungling and ignorance of American officials are further substantiated by evidence in Chinese sources—evidence of an incredible ignorance of Chinese politics and society that made sound policy all but impossible. Unable to speak or read Chinese, representatives of the United States in China reported on the country with the accuracy of the blind men describing the elephant in the famous Indian fable. Hunt also scores the arrogance of Americans, especially Rockhill, in their paternalistic approaches to helping China. Few Americans seemed able to believe that the Chinese were capable of planning for their own defense; that the Chinese might know best what had to be done to save Manchuria for China and for American economic opportunity. Rockhill was unquestionably sympathetic to Chinese aspirations, but had his own program and succeeded in obstructing Chinese efforts.

On the Chinese side, Hunt provides an elaborate analysis of Yüan Shih-k'ai's policies in 1905, indicating more clearly than ever before why he had such a good reputation in American circles—why the United States was so receptive to his leadership in 1912 and 1913. Central to the plans of Yüan and his coterie was the establishment of a development bank in Manchuria to facilitate railroad construction. Overestimating the financial power of the United States, the Chinese hoped to draw Americans into this project. When private capital was slow to appear, the Chinese hoped in vain that Boxer indemnity funds remitted by the United States might be used. T'ang Shao-i's trip to Washington on the eve of the Root-Takahira agreement was part of the effort to gain American support for Chinese plans in Manchuria. Hunt's criticism of the American government for rejecting T'ang's overtures seems too harsh, however, and might benefit from a broader perspective—a sense of the greater importance of improving Japanese-American relations at that point in time. Too often Hunt's analysis of Roosevelt's actions reflects Howard Beale's errors, especially in the discussion of Roosevelt and the anti-American boycott of 1905. He may also exaggerate the importance of T'ang's failure in explaining the subsequent fall of Yüan.

Hunt presents an interesting discussion of Straight's efforts to create anti-Japanese sentiment in Washington and notes Roger Greene's initial success in undermining Straight's campaign. At the same time he takes Huntington Wilson's post–Pearl Harbor memoir too seriously as evidence of his anti-Japanese attitude during the years of the Taft Administration. Richard Eppinga's recent biography of Huntington Wilson argues persuasively that Wilson was driven by an intense nationalist fervor rather than by hostility to the Japanese. The continued rise of Greene while Wilson's "activists" were shaping East Asian policy might also suggest that Wilson was not engaged in an anti-Japanese vendetta. But this is a minor complaint and must not obscure the fact that the book is important—and very well written.

WARREN I. COHEN

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Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921. By Aaron S. Klieman. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. 322. $10.00.)

The allocation of Middle Eastern mandates by the Paris Peace Conference ostensibly provided a balanced compromise between French and British territorial aspirations in the former Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and wartime promises of national recognition to Arabs and Jews on the other. The compromise proved unsatisfactory. During the summer of 1920 the Arabs mounted a series of uprisings against Western tutelage in Syria and Mesopotamia. For the French, the answer to this unrest lay in a tough and bloody suppression of Feisal's Syrian kingdom, and the establishment of a de facto protectorate for the Levant. It was a surgical approach that proved less feasible for the British. Bedevilled by a festering Irish rebellion, the relentless infiltration of Soviet agents through Turkey and Iran, and clamorous domestic pressures for demobilization and economic retrenchment, London sensed that the long-range solution to Middle Eastern unrest was to placate Arab sensibilities in a way that would insure peace, order, and above all economy in the Fertile Crescent. It was to devise a formula for this complex and involuted problem that, in March, 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill summoned Britain's military and civilian proconsuls in Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia to an urgent conference in Cairo.

Dr. Klieman, an Israeli scholar currently teaching at Tel Aviv University, has assiduously plumbed the archives of Britain's Public Record Office, as well as an extensive range of private papers and memoirs, to provide us with a solid and probably definitive account of that historic Cairo conclave. With admirable thoroughness, he has clarified the manner in which Churchill and his advisers appeased Arab nationalism by putting Feisal, a refugee from Damascus, on the throne in Baghdad, and Abdullah, a hitherto underrated Hashemite claimant, on the emiral throne of a newly created Transjordan. The formula worked, by and large. The extent to which it met Britain's salient concern for economy is made clear in the author's fine summary analysis of steadily reduced expenditures during the remainder of the 1920s. At the same time, Dr. Klieman's rigorous investigation of primary sources offers some choice revelations. Feisal, reputedly "elected" by a "representative" collection of Iraqi sheikhs and notables, in fact was jammed down the throats of the Iraqi nation by Sir Percy Cox and the threat of British fire-power; his principal competitor, Sayyid Talib, was forcibly deported afterward. Abdullah, miraculously appearing in the Transjordanian desert as a "last-minute" answer to the lawlessness of east Palestine, actually was regarded as a potential British client well before the opening of the Cairo Conference. The Zionists, presumably content with their national home west of the River Jordan, in truth had been continually encouraged by Balfour and Curzon to press their demands for the Transjordanian hinterland, and were altogether outraged by the loss of this fertile and spacious territory.

The book's weaknesses are almost as considerable as its virtues, however, and bespeak the volume's doctoral dissertation origins. The Cairo Conference was after all but a single brief episode in three years of British policy reformulation in the Middle East, and it resolved only the very narrow issues of Mesopotamian and Transjordanian unrest. Yet to this three-week assemblage are erroneously attributed far-reaching and portentous decisions that affected the future of Zionism in Palestine, Arab-Jewish and Anglo-French confrontations in the Levant, even British policy in the Suez and in the oil sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. The social and economic background of Arab nationalism is not so much as touched upon, nor does the breath of human interest emerge from a flat, one-dimensional sequence of diplomatic memoranda and *pour-parlers*. Even so, Dr. Klieman's study is a diligent and useful contribution to the emerging historiography of Britain's well-intentioned, but ultimately doomed, stewardship of the Middle East's seething cauldron of nationalities and religious communities.

HOWARD M. SACHAR
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American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia Over Reparations. By Bruce Kuklick. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 286. $9.50.)

In a closely reasoned and erudite diplomatic history, the author shows the primacy of economic strategies in U.S. plans for postwar Germany. He argues convincingly that the State Department's intransigent and uncompromising stand on reparations despite Yalta and before and after the Potsdam Conference was the primary cause for the partition of Germany and the Cold War confrontation that followed. Deploring the weakness of political theory without an historical dimension, Professor Kuklick uses a full range of government documents, memoirs of policy makers—Hull, Welles, Morgenthau, Harriman and Byrnes—and many less well-known sources to demonstrate how U.S. reparations policy reflected an economic and political world view, long espoused and promoted by the State Department. He defines this *Weltanschauung* as "multilateralism" and in a penetrating analysis shows how the State Department's position triumphed at Potsdam in 1945, causing the breakdown of U.S.-Russian cooperation over Germany and partition.

In an Appendix on Revisionist Historiography, the author eschews the conventional approach of orthodox historians—George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Robert Osgood—who interpreted U.S. foreign policy in terms of the antithesis of "ideals" and "self-interest," conflicts between legalistic moralism and political realism (p. 238). Contrary to this historical interpretation, Kuklick maintains that we tend to see the world and see it whole, with ideology and interests as inseparable. The author argues convincingly that such ambitious goals as "multilateralism," international morality, and U.S. politico-economic supremacy were at best unrealistic and at worst based on a gross overestimation of U.S. strategic strength and a total misconception of the goals and power capabilities of other powers, Great Britain and Russia in particular. Thus over-optimistic American policy makers based strategy on a number of false assumptions: a belief in the success of postwar reconstruction under President Wilson, a belief in Russian weakness after both World Wars I and II, an overestimation of the British challenge to American power and a belief in the absolute righteousness of the American cause.

But when the American design was thwarted, Communist Russia easily replaced Nazi Germany as the embodiment of evil treachery. The USSR was not only held responsible for problems the U.S. faced all over the world, but it was also regarded as a totalitarian enemy with whom there was no common ground. A whole new generation of diplomats at the State Department accepted Secretary Hull's special interpretation of the history of the interwar years (1919–1939) characterized by: remnants of isolationism, high Republican tariffs and European tariffs, and quotas—all resulting in economic autarchy, decline of world trade, chronic unemployment, and worldwide depression. Economic misery brought the dictators to power in Europe, weakened democracy around the world and contributed to the growth of economic autarchy and spheres of influence in international politics—the very antithesis of Wilson's 14 Points. Hull was firmly convinced that "unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair competition with war" (p. 12).

Within the framework of multilateralism, the author argues the following theses: First, the "Morgenthau plan" was neither unrealistic nor pro-Communist, but in accord with State's priority for the expansion of American commercial influence. Second, in implementing multilateral principles at Yalta and Potsdam, U.S. decision makers actually insured that a multilateral world would not be realized. The irony is that they overestimated their own strength and underestimated that of Russia. Finally, State's concept of a world political-economic system precluded an American compromise on the German issue, where the U.S. was largely in control and where great power agreement may have been possible. Professor Kuklick suggests that any four-power agreement on Germany or Berlin would be difficult at best, and therefore if the Allies were to agree on a modus vivendi, some degree of Soviet influence would have to extend throughout Germany.

The author concludes this sophisticated diplomatic history with a trenchant critique of the State Department's formulation and implementation of American foreign policy during and after World War II. He finds that in far too many instances that policy was not based on consensus or a logical rationale—but owed its shape rather to rivalries between State, Treasury, and War Departments or to personal animosities and individual idiosyncrasies or administrative inefficiency. Even worse, decision-making often resulted from ignorance of facts or avoidable misunderstandings with other powers or without knowledge of past commitments. Yet at the same time, Kuklick correctly notes that our foreign policy has not been a mere history of chaos.

Professor Kuklick finds a key to understanding American foreign affairs from 1939 to 1946 in the multilateral concept of an international politico-economic system as the single most important thread through the tangled maze of great-power strategies. Élites in State, Treasury, and War Departments all believed that only an expansion of U.S. foreign trade could bring America domestic prosperity. Increased exports to the USSR would somehow compensate for U.S. losses entailed by the "deindustrialization" of Germany. Washington naively assumed that under America's concept of a multilateral, international politico-economic system, small nations would have security, parity, and equality with large nations, as suggested in the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941, especially the clause providing for equal access of all nations and peoples to foreign markets and essential raw materials. Had not the United States given up intervention in Latin America? Secretary Hull maintained that Americans must give Russia "a concrete example of how we thought she should act" (p. 228). The author correctly notes that eventually Truman, Harriman and other elites at State, Treasury and War concurred in this approach along with its assumptions.

The author concludes that the Potsdam decisions for zonal autonomy and against Russian reparations from the Western zones, except for a mere trickle, meant that American desires for a multilateral globe were ruled out. This was the main turning point of the postwar era, which fixed the fate of Germany. Professor Kuklick's book is a highly intelligent and critical analysis, based on meticulous research—with more than 400 footnote references to standard sources and less well-known materials—combined with a clear, lucid style that will hold the reader's attention. The book is indexed with a bibliographical note appendix.

The author's major thesis is elaborated in a brilliant introduction, a compact conclusion and the appendix on revisionist historiography and is ably supported by nine sweeping chapters with sufficient detail for students of German history and politics as well as the average reader. A highly intelligent and balanced book, it is less polemical and therefore more useful than other works on this complex subject.

JOHN W. KELLER

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L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une première expérience de parlementarisme international. By Charles Melchior de Molènes. (Paris: Editions Roudil, 1971. Pp. 774. Fr. 75.00.)

On May 5–6, 1974, the Council of Europe celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary with special observances in many of the 17 member countries and a solemn session of the Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg. These events passed almost unnoticed amid the excitement of a presidential election in France, a crisis in the Common Market caused by the Labor government's demands for renegotiation of Britain's ties, the Italian government's efforts to adopt emergency import restrictions, and the mounting vituperation between the United States and Europe. Its founders had intended that the Council of Europe play a vital political role in shaping the future of the continent, yet in just twenty-five years that body has become virtually moribund. Why did that happen, and what, if anything, can be done to revive its elan?

M. de Molènes, long an active militant in the European integration movement, provides a partial answer to those questions in this massive book. He surveys the doctrinal, institutional, and political foundations of the Council of Europe and describes the evolution of its relations with the European Parliament of the EEC and the Assembly of the Western European Union which together form the parliamentary arm of the European integration movement. Relying on a vast array of quotations from officials, scholars, and public figures, the author recounts the origins of the Council of Europe, stresses its devotion to the ideal of a "liberal and humanistic" community, and describes the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. These accounts contain much that is of interest. For example, de Molènes cites writings by Pierre Dubois (a 13th-century legalist), Sully, William Penn, Kant, Rousseau, the Encyclopedists, Bentham, and a host of more contemporary figures to show that the European Movement has its roots in medieval history, Enlightenment philosophy and a humanistic, Catholic culture.

A review of the early sessions of the Consultative Assembly shows how it contributed to the formation of the Coal and Steel Community, the elaboration of a European Charter of Human Rights, and other milestones on the path to greater integration. De Molènes emphasizes the structural problems that beset the Council as a result of the decision to combine parliamentary forms of representation with traditional diplomatic practices. The Consultative Assembly, composed of 140 parliamentarians elected by their respective national parliaments, exercises extensive deliberative powers. Its resolutions, however, are only advisory; final decisions are made by the Committee of Ministers which is made up of civil servants delegated by the various Foreign Ministries. Indirectly elected and with no control over the decisions of the Committee of Ministers, the Consultative Assembly has been unable to command the attention of either national governments or public opinion.

Moreover, with the formation of the Western European Union and the Common Market, questions of military security and economic welfare have become the special province of those organizations. Hence, although it is the only representative body that includes delegates from all the non-communist countries in Europe (except Spain and Greece), the Consultative Assembly has found even its range of deliberation reduced to what are essentially legal, administrative, cultural, and social problems.

These structural problems are further compounded by the conflicting attitudes of the member governments. De Molènes offers a critique of German, Swiss, Belgian, and French approaches to European integration, paying special attention to the views of the federalists, the Académie Française, and the Holy See, as well as to the relations between the Council of Europe and the countries of North and South America and various international organizations. These conflicting viewpoints and competing priorities further complicate the process of integration as embodied in the Strasbourg Assembly.

In his determination to cast a very wide net that will gather as many shades of opinion as possible into the European integration movement, de Molènes fails to set out clearly what must surely be the most important cause of the present disarray and the greatest barrier to future improvement: the lack of agreement among governments on long-run goals. For some, Europe is seen as a region characterized by a laissez-faire economy capable of continued growth, at the cost of continued economic and military dependence on the United States. A second group views Europe as a potential third superpower capable of rivalling the United States and the Soviet Union or of dividing the world in collusion with them, at the cost of a massive increase in armaments and in the risk of military confrontations.

A third group envisions a vaguely "socialist" society aiming at increased welfare and greater economic equality at the cost of limiting growth in the economy, increasing the size of the bureaucracy, and accepting higher levels of political and military insecurity.

These alternatives emerge only dimly from the mass of quotations with which the author overwhelms his reader, but they are essential to the explanation of the current situation. Given the uncertainty about long-run goals, it is inevitable that the multitude of conflicting immediate interests will prevent any meaningful action within a parliamentary body that lacks effective leadership. To the extent that such divisions mirror the cleavages of domestic opinion within some of the larger states, the possibility of reaching meaningful agreements in the Committee of Ministers becomes still more remote. Without agreement among the three principal governments of Western Europe on a common vision of the future, there is little to be expected from a quasi-parliamentary regional body that tends to amplify the divisions within and among the member states.

By attempting to show the broad scope of the European movement, rather than to present clearly the differences that divide it, the author is led to seek remedies by tinkering with the institutions. This approach frustrates the reader rather than advancing the debate about what sort of Europe should be sought. Despite its confusing style of argument and the rather anodyne conclusions, this book contains much that will interest American students of European integration.

D. Bruce Marshall

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The Challenge of Hunger: A Program for More Effective Foreign Aid. By I. W. Moomaw. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. viii, 222. $5.95.)

The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline. By Gunnar Myrdal. (New York: Random House, 1970. Pp. xviii, 518. $8.95.)

Although the two books were written nine and five years ago, respectively, the two challenges mentioned in their titles—hunger and world poverty—could scarcely be more current, for both darken the horizon of human history ever more ominously as the decade of the 'seventies unfolds. Both authors must be applauded for their farsighted concern with these overarching problems, the dreadful significance of which is still ignored by most people, including a depressing proportion of the academic community and of major world leaders.

Unfortunately the second book so eclipses the first that little else can be said about the two together. Indeed the book by Dr. Moomaw is so anecdotal, so excruciatingly detailed on utterly trivial points, and so naive in its unquestioning faith in the potential efficacy of development assistance to actually produce development that it is difficult not to overlook the basically sound insights it occasionally offers. Persons with experience in the field of development may find the book of some interest for the comparisons it can generate, for Dr. Moomaw has obviously had long and intimate exposure to development assistance programs all over the world, but it is far too careless in its generalizations to be useful to the uninitiated.

Professor Myrdal's, on the other hand, is one of those rare books which everyone—student, teacher, citizen, politician, bureaucrat, military man—could profit from reading. Although its author, in Kenneth Boulding's words, "may very well be the world's top social scientist" and is an economist to boot, the book is innocent of equations, charts, graphs, and even tables; total reliance being placed on clear, well-organized prose, carefully defined concepts, and straightforward explication of all assumptions and value premises.

Intended to be both a summary and a continuation of his massive three-volume work *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations,* to which it is exhaustively cross-referenced, *The Challenge of World Poverty* is primarily a book of policy conclusions and recommendations—as its subtitle suggests, *A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline.*

Basically that program consists of a multipronged attack on the severe inequalities which have made marginal men and women of the vast majority of the inhabitants of the less developed countries. Thus, while making birth control available to all, restructuring the direction and content of education, rationalizing public administration, and generating expanded levels of aid from the industrialized countries are all essential elements of his development program, the *sine qua non* of success, according to Myrdal, is effective land reform through which the masses can be provided with the opportunity and the incentive to strive for improvement of their productivity, their land, and themselves. In short, Myrdal makes it unavoidably apparent that the most formidable barrier to development is social injustice.

Several themes recur like litanies, sometimes rather tiresomely, throughout this wise and compassionate book. One is the criticism of what Myrdal has dubbed the biased "postwar approach to economic planning, with its evasion of the problems of attitudes, institutions, and the productivity consequences of very low levels of living, and its diplomatic tendency to avoid awkward problems and remain overoptimistic" (p. 120). He is particularly harsh with his fellow economists on this score, chiding them for their uncritical transference of models developed in the industrialized countries to the crucially distinct milieux of the less developed regions and their refusal to speak out against the corruption and distorted priorities characteristic of the "soft states" in the Third World. In a similar vein he deplores their willingness to make use of the woefully unreliable statistics currently available on LDCs. Political scientists, of course, are equally vulnerable to both these charges.

Other frequently repeated themes of particular interest to political scientists are those dealing with the passivity of the poverty-stricken masses, the relative lack of pressure from below for needed reforms, the monopoly of power held by the upper classes, and the need for political leadership willing to challenge that monopoly in the interests of the masses if development is to occur. These themes indicate the extent to which this book is a classic example of political economy, for time and again the economic factors in the development process are shown to be determined by the realities of power, and solutions to development problems are revealed as dependent on political will.

Contrapuntally two other important themes are interwoven throughout the book. One deals with the absolute necessity that the major responsibility for development programs be shouldered by the LDCs themselves—that they alone can alter their institutions and arrange their priorities in the ways necessary. Nevertheless, in case after case, the second theme documents the delays, failures, perennial postponements, and skewed policy outcomes which have thus far characterized almost all governmental responses to the challenges of development in LDCs, particularly perhaps in the polities attempting to emulate the liberal, pluralistic, democratic politics of Western industrialized countries. Myrdal reluctantly but honestly, albeit belatedly and almost in passing, recognizes that authoritarian regimes may prove more able to carry out the necessary reforms than would democratic regimes (p. 436). In a trenchant critique he blames the West and particularly the United States for "gross misjudgment of facts and betrayal of ideals," resulting in conditions under which "the awakening of the masses and their becoming conscious of their interests and prepared to fight for radical reforms needed for development shall happen in a world political constellation where *they find themselves projected into a movement of national Communism* (p. 435, his emphasis). This is the legacy of our having been so "readily prepared to condone the absence of reforms in underdeveloped countries, or the perversion of reforms, preferring stability—in fact, a sort of continuation of colonial practices" (p. 436).

In my view, only the sort of development efforts outlined by Myrdal hold forth any reasonable hope for improving the lot of the majority of mankind, for only such measures as he proposes can possibly create conditions under which presently wasted human productive potential can be actualized and family size motivations can be reduced, thus eventually defusing the population bomb—although not before it will have wreaked unparalleled havoc. Unfortunately, however, the prospects for the necessary redistribution of opportunities are practically nil, given the selfishness, shortsightedness, and disproportionate power of privileged elites within both the LDCs and the so-called developed countries.

The degree of enhanced understanding of the problems of development to be gained from a careful perusal of *The Challenge of World Poverty* can only be hinted at in a brief review. Suffice it to say that its straightforward clarity, rationality, honesty, and humanitarianism as well as its unstintingly critical approach to evidence and to accepted theories make reading it a refreshing, instructive, and even inspiring intellectual experience. For students of development there is, of course, no substitute for actual fieldwork, but this book provides a useful surrogate until such an opportunity presents itself.

I cannot recommend too highly that this book be read by all social scientists, both neophytes and more experienced specialists long caught up in the constraining refinements of their disciplinary subfields. If it could be read and its wisdom learned by every literate member of the world's increasingly interdependent yet dichotomized population, the outlook for the quality of life of future generations would be far brighter than in fact it is.

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Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration. By Robert E. Osgood et al. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. vii, 350. $14.50, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

Robert Osgood and his colleagues at Johns Hopkins embarked in 1967 upon a series of quadrennial reviews of American foreign relations at the end of each presidential administration. Thus *Retreat from Empire?* is Volume II of *America and the World;* Volume I appeared in 1970.

A high standard of analysis is sustained throughout this symposium, from a set of perspectives not very distant from those of the first Nixon administration itself (except perhaps on Vietnam, which, however, is rather loftily transcended by the grander geopolitical foci of these authors' attention). Their preoccupation is with the implications of the Nixon Doctrine, or Nixon Strategy as Robert Osgood prefers to designate it in his masterly introductory essay: "military retrenchment without political disengagement" (p. 9). The question mark at the end of the book's title refers to a sense that as America's troops "retreat," the bonds of her "empire" are being modified—but how much? The answer that rightly pervades the book is "not very much, at least not yet, and not in the intention of the Nixon Administration." The emperor has been so overdressed for so long that he can now get along without a good many of his clothes and still, a little less pretentiously, remain emperor. Most of the authors welcome the disrobing; all of them regard it as inevitable; yet none of them would rejoice to see it complete. The adroit circumspectness of this Nixon/Kissinger striptease receives wide approbation among them. Writing in 1972, none showed revulsion from the idea of a second Nixon administration; most of them rather optimistically saw opportunity in it for the (usually modest) revisions of choreography that each desired.

Reading the book in 1974 one is incidentally struck by the authors' inattention to the implications for foreign policy of the potentially vulnerable thinness and factitiousness of Nixon's general domestic support. The authors did deal with manifestations of these qualities in the possibly brittle support that particular Nixon foreign policies were receiving. But the personal ascendancy of Nixon/Kissinger in the American domestic arena overall was unanimously taken for granted by these writers. McGovernism was casually dismissed, Watergate unmentioned. Of course? It is indeed easy to say "of course"; but what we now know of the "plumbers," their origins and aftermath, establishes a link from foreign to domestic policy in the first Nixon administration that shifts back to ensnare some foreign policy in the second Nixon administration in ways that one wishes at least one of these political scientists had considered worth speculating upon. By 1972, McGovern and other critics had already sounded an alarm at some of these tendencies, and the authors do devote loving care to dissecting some much less plausible possibilities overseas.

A broader objection one might raise to the book, also related to the domestic setting of American foreign relations, is that the authors avoid coming to grips with the radical school, notably the economic determinist critiques of American foreign policy; there is little evidence of attentiveness, much less of readiness to incorporate ideas. Perhaps more fundamental is the fact that only one of the authors, David Calleo, shows himself fully at home in both economic and political analysis of any school; Benjamin Rowland comes close but seems somewhat more comfortable with the economic than the political; none of the others evinces much more than a perfunctory concern with economic influences. Arguably this weighting toward power politics was appropriate for the analysis of world affairs in the generation after Munich; certainly in that era the conventions of American political science prescribed power political, not economic emphases. But the slighting of the economic dimensions has become increasingly challengeable, and *Retreat from Empire?* does not do as much as it might do to right the balance.

Yet there is much in the book of great value. The essay by Calleo is, I think, one of the most powerful succinct statements an American has yet made of the thesis that the United States should retreat gradually from its empire in Western Europe and Japan (as all the authors see Nixon tending to do in other parts of the world). The two essays by Osgood, which are the other best papers in the book, gingerly approach a similar recommendation in a finely balanced argument, but Osgood never quite declares a committed judgment. Together the three papers provide an elegant dialectic. Part of the difference that remains between the authors on this major topic clearly rests on personal style and temperament: Osgood is more conservatively cautious, Calleo more enthusiastically venturesome. Another part of the difference might lie in Calleo's possibly keener regard for European civilization per se, and in his sense that America does not deserve to dominate it indefinitely. But a more prominent difference is Calleo's emphasis on the way United States military deployments in Europe and Japan put the advanced capitalist countries under economic strains that he considers eventually unbearable; rather than waiting until the wonderful one-hoss shay of international economic patching breaks down suddenly, the United States ought to be devolving power and responsibility, military and even nuclear, now. Osgood skirts this economic line of argument. And even Calleo, I think, fails to substantiate a probability of economic disaster quite so high as to be obligatorily an overriding consideration even in the minds of those who (like Nixon/Kissinger) regard other kinds of concerns as balanced heavily against American withdrawal.

Of the authors in this symposium, the most thoroughly committed against withdrawals is George Liska. Despite a mysteriously opaque and elliptical presentation, so bare of path markers that one apprehends the argument with the frustration and mounting excitement of one deciphering hieroglyphics, the effort is ultimately well rewarded. The reader finds the puzzle fits together in an ingenious brief for facilitating the survival of the fittest regimes in the Third World by Great Power condonement of interstate as well as intrastate conflicts among them; Liska urges that we foster the emergence of a hierarchy of states, in which strengthened Middle Powers will oversee their respective regions, buffering for the Great Powers. Liska finds this new "possibility at once melancholy and reassuring" (p. 343) as a foothold on the slippery slope of Nixon's retreat from Liska's 1967 vision of *Imperial America.* "Realism can merge with resignation" (p. 343) in advocacy of the new formula for meeting "the need to integrate a bothersome but indispensable third world into a 'new' American global policy before the void created by the 'liquidation' of the Vietnam war has evolved into a dangerous vacuum of purpose underneath the diplomatic conference tables of the great" (p. 340). In thus modifying his own brand of neo-imperialism Liska has of course not chosen to go far enough to mollify most of his past critics. (Could the arcane presentation be itself designed to trap them into at least exposing themselves to all his argument? Not likely; the wide audience the argument deserves would be better held by the less compressed and more lucid presentation it receives in his recent *States in Evolution.*) Meanwhile, even as it stands here, Liska's incisive iconoclasm again performs well its perennial function of stimulating the imagination of open-minded specialists on international affairs.

Robert Tucker's essay on American opinion and foreign policy in the first Nixon administration also merits special commendation, for the breadth, insight, and judiciousness with which it traces Nixon/Kissinger success in the domestic interplay of ideas and power with foreign policy elites and arousable publics. His theme is the restabilization of a hegemonial permissive consensus, likely to last at least until and unless the traumatized youth of the 1960s reach middle-aged power.

Francis Rourke's essay supplements Tucker's like a competently fact-filled and useful appendix. Benjamin Rowland's performs a similar function for Calleo's, tracing political economy in U.S.-Latin American relations. Laurence Martin's analysis of military strategic concerns is thorough but rather ephemeral. Herbert Dinerstein's speculations on Russia and China seem less fully digested than the other essays in the book. Yet the contributions of these four authors, while less distinguished than those of Osgood, Calleo, Liska, and Tucker, uphold a sufficiently high standard to confirm the worth of the volume as a whole and advance the incipient quadrennial series of which it is a part.

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Peace, War, and Numbers. Edited by Bruce M. Russett. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972. Pp. 352. $17.50.)

Commissioned in the spring of 1969, most of the eleven papers in this volume were read at the September 1970 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles, and were then revised for publication and prefaced with an introduction. They were intended to be a "sampling" of "recent social science research on war," the paper writers being instructed to develop specific hypotheses about the causes or conduct of international violence, to test these with actual data about international behavior, and to indicate the relevance of the findings for theory and for policy.

A short review written several years later cannot do justice to the work of the score of authors represented in this volume, the more so since several of the papers are no more than progress reports of elaborate and extended research undertakings. But the review of such a collection can, it is hoped, throw some light on some common characteristics, the strengths and the weaknesses, of some recent research on war and peace.

The volume itself, rather than being a "sampling," is more nearly the product of one "invisible college" in this field (of the fourteen contributors, five hold, or have held, appointments at Yale; four have had training at Stanford, and four are connected with Michigan). Its strength undoubtedly lies in the care the authors take in presenting and analyzing their material. It is not just that the editor's instructions have been closely heeded but it is also plain that the authors are in the habit of being commendably careful and precise about delimiting a researchable hypothesis, crisply marshalling some well-organized data, and assessing the findings in a spirit of caution and circumspection. These are good pieces of work even if there is a certain sameness about them: three out of four papers principally rely upon some form of bivariate or multivariate analysis (as the result of which the volume is liberally sprinkled with correlation coefficients and the like, more than a thousand of them), and there is also much reliance on some common data sources even while (to my taste) not enough raw data are presented directly to the reader so that he might attempt his own interpretations; but the overall impression is clearly one of serious and persevering work informed by firm method.

Matters become less clear, however, when we move from methodology to results. On the crucial matter of war causation no new or convincing findings really emerge. Singer, Bremer, and Stukey test two alternative theories, asking whether parity among Great Powers, or else preponderance of one Great Power over others (that is, a high degree of concentration), is more likely to conduce to war, and others take up similar themes. But as Hanson and Russett point out in an analytical introduction, "neither theory has very general predictive power . . . further research on appreciably more refined hypotheses will be required." In need of refinement might be the concept of "concentration," and analogies from industrial organization could be useful here; one also wonders if the introduction of a distinction between land and sea power might not reveal more pronounced tendencies toward preponderance than the complete aggregation of data. Wallace's analysis of the relationship of the onset of war to status inconsistency appears more promising, but here one wonders about the ease with which the concept has been indexed by the distribution of diplomatic missions. Attention is paid to the attributes of nations, but then who doubts that power, the degree of economic development, or the character of the political regime have an important bearing on foreign policy?

An interesting if unpremeditated general finding common to several of the papers is "the great stability in patterns of conflict and cooperation over time" (p. 16). For instance, J. D. Sullivan finds that the most important indicator of common alignment was past alignment, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld notices a tendency on the part of most states to maintain existing levels of foreign conflict. Jeffrey Milstein identifies a persisting, action–reaction system of violence in the Middle East since 1948. All these could be evidence of a general "law of social inertia," but it could also be that massive organizations engaged in international operations find it particularly difficult to maintain the flexibility that is required for coping with the changing environment. "This emphasis on the structural properties of the national system, the global international system, and of conflict sub-systems should sober us," write Hanson and Russett (p. 17) but suggest no further implications of this thought for theory or policy.

But if structural questions are indeed so important, then we are entitled to ask why the volume as a whole does not more thoroughly examine them. This shortcoming is due in part to weaknesses in conceptualization and imaginative theory building. The knowledge enterprise, it must be remembered, does not consist solely or even predominantly, of hypothesis testing. A shining research design is no guarantee of insight, of explanatory, or predictive power; arguably, it might even be counterproductive. For it tends to inhibit, as well as guide, imagination, innovation, serendipity; it leaves no room for the leap into the unexpected. Thus powerful tools may be employed to search for correlations between tired concepts. Or else crucial concepts remain vague: for instance, that of "Great Power" has at least five operational definitions in the volume.

Puzzling, too, is the reluctance of empirical researchers to test their analytical constructs not against their own (rather excessively standardized and narrow) data but, on the principle that data may also be found outside data banks, also against external reality and in the plain light of common sense. The number of wars or alliances being, as it is, rather small—only a few score wars per one hundred years—statistics on such a limited universe are not all that is needed for full understanding. Yet nowhere in the book is there a discussion of a single war or conflict as an event in its own right, either for its own sake or even by way of illustration. To coin a phrase and mix metaphors, wars, when used only as machine-fodder, will maintain their dignity, and refuse to yield understanding. The authors also display a marked resistance to illustrating the concepts they are using, even if these may be novel or unfamiliar. J. D. Sullivan, for instance, writes a whole paper on informal alignment (essentially an artifact of a data-collection system) without once giving a concrete example of such a structure. While replete with empirical data (extending, in four papers, into the nineteenth century and, for the others, for shorter or longer periods since 1945) the volume nevertheless seems remote from historical reality.

To me this suggests that some recent work on war and international behavior may have suffered from premature specification. Some of it may have brought powerful mechanical procedures to bear on concepts or data not yet refined enough to withstand such treatment. The global society, which is the only one we have, is not just a collection of homogeneous and substitutable elements or compartments; it is a complex system informed by an organic unity of pattern that has structure, persistence, and a life cycle all its own, and one that exhibits, if you will, interdependence. Particular care must be taken not to parcel out this unity into a multitude of ill-fitting even if easily manipulable boxes, for its properties might be lost in the process of cutting up. That is why the true service of this volume might indeed lie in unexpectedly pointing out the tendency toward stability and continuity in world political arrangements.

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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. By I. M. Sinclair, C.M.G. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1973. Pp. 145. Index. $6.00.)

At its first session in 1949 the United Nations International Law Commission placed the law of treaties high on its agenda as a subject of study for codification. This book by one of the legal advisers of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain quickly reviews the work of the Commission up to 1968 and then analyzes with consummate skill the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Students of international law will find in this volume an objective, tightly structured exposition of the "treaty on treaties," which was open for signature on 23 May 1969 at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties. The Convention covers, *inter alia,* how treaties are concluded and enter into force, how treaties are to be applied, interpreted, amended, or modified, and how treaties become invalid, or may be terminated or suspended in their operation. These matters had long been largely governed by customary international law and early in the deliberations of the International Law Commission it was felt that an expository code would be sufficient, but later the Commission recommended and the Vienna conference adopted a multilateral treaty. The Convention not only codifies rules with extensive precedent and doctrine behind them, but also contains some "progressive development" of international law [Article 9 (2)].

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, although comprehensive in its scope, has many restrictions in its applicability. Only written agreements between States are covered by the Convention. Moreover, the rules of the Convention are not generally retroactive, but in large measure they are operative unless the treaty itself should provide other rules. Do treaties come into force upon signature by the parties if the articles are silent about the need for ratification or other confirmation? The Convention has not resolved this knotty issue. Finally, the customary international rules relating to treaties in cases of State succession and State responsibility, and the effect of the outbreak of hostilities upon treaties have not been treated by the Convention.

One of the most useful parts of this very competent technical study of the evolving law of treaties deals with those rules not clearly and universally acknowledged, but alleged to be emerging international norms now ready for the legal cachet of the Vienna Convention. In this tendentious area the Convention posits that the objection by one State to reservations made to a treaty by another State does not preclude entry into force between the objecting State and the reserving State unless a contrary intention has been stated by the objecting State; that a State must refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty when that State has agreed to enter into negotiations and is engaged in such negotiations; and that treaties are invalid for a violation of manifest and fundamental internal law.

Another important issue on the law of treaties has been the effect of "coercion" upon a party. States have hesitated to upset the legal fiction of consent that made treaties of peace viable. The drafters of the Vienna Convention were convinced that a norm of international law had been created over time that coercion could be grounds for the invalidity of a treaty, but it remains a slippery political concept for the law to define.

The chapter on *ius cogens* is of the greatest value. Obviously drawn from municipal law, if not natural law, and the notion of acts being null when contrary to public policy, *ius cogens* is a peremptory norm of international law from which States are not permitted to derogate by treaty. Considerable apprehension was expressed by States about this sweeping advance into the unchartered waters of the law of nations. Only a definition of a peremptory norm "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole" somewhat allayed fears.

The study closes with a good review of the protracted negotiations that finally led to a political compromise through which parties to a dispute on the issue of *ius cogens* may submit that dispute directly to the International Court of Justice if after twelve months no solution has been reached under the Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, unless the parties have agreed to arbitration. But for other disputes, the machinery established by the Convention was a great disappointment for those hoping for stronger third-party settlement devices.

In all, Mr. Sinclair's study is indispensable to a contemporary reading list on the law of treaties. Sadly the book itself does not contain the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which is dreadfully inconvenient in perusing such an otherwise splendid analysis by a legal craftsman who was present at the birth of this far-reaching treaty on treaties. If and when thirty-five states deposit instruments of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Convention will be in force.

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Appeal To Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment. By Herbert K. Tillema. (New York: Thomas A. Crowell Co. 1973. Pp. 260. $3.95, paper.)

Professor Herbert K. Tillema has attempted to explicate the puzzles of American military intervention in a methodical and insightful study. The author defines overt military intervention as "the open and direct use of military force by one country against another" (p. 3). Overt military intervention comes in four varieties as discussed by Tillema and applied to selected case studies: (1) deployment of combat-ready units by the U.S. to another country; (2) naval bombardment of another country; (3) aerial bombing or firing missiles; (4) close combat support for another country's forces in battle. The author isolates four cases of American overt military intervention since World War II as crucibles for the development of theory about the cause of intervention: the Korean War, the Lebanon crisis, the Dominican intervention, and Vietnam.

The thesis argued by Tillema is that United States overt military intervention is a "rare event" and that the explanatory puzzle is the *absence* of intervention in numerous cases of possible entanglement, rather than the presence of overt military intervention in any case. A theory of restraints on intervention is proposed as the structure of insights required for understanding this set of processes. The casual reader is likely to underestimate the importance of this reformulation of the problem. Tillema asks us to concentrate on the doughnut rather than the hole, and challenges us to account for the *refusal* of decision makers to intervene with overt military force in response to crisis and threats. The emphasis on restraints against intervention reveals the atypicality of that event as a matter of historical fact, despite the expressed concerns of many writers that American forces are used too often too soon and in a manner that is operationally too detached from political objectives.

The author categorizes the restraints against overt military intervention as restraints inherent in the international system, in the elite decision-making process, and in the "shared moral values" of foreign policy makers. His theory is stated with deceptive simplicity as follows: "On those occasions when a Communist threat was thought to exist and when none of the other restraints was operative, intervention has followed. In the absence of a perceived Communist threat or when one or more of the other restraints have operated, overt military intervention has not occurred" (p. 179). In formal terms, the necessary condition for overt military intervention is the perception of Communist threat against a previously non-Communist country, and the sufficient conditions involve the absence of any perceived restraints.

The reader should consult the text itself for refinements of these generalizations, for the author almost tediously recapitulates and specifies the various dimensions within each category of restraint. The intuitive sensitivity of this analysis will be obvious to students of defense and military policy, and the book can be recommended strongly on those grounds. Additional tidbits are provided by the first appendix, which cross-classifies instances of American nonintervention with the author's checklist of restraints operating in each case.

I do have three methodological reservations: First, the logical entrapment of case-study analysis, in which the categories are derived from the cases and then validated by reference to the cases, is not completely transcended in the study. Second, the issue of the threshold separating overt military intervention from covert involvement is resolved only arbitrarily by the author, who acknowledges the elusive character of this problem (pp. 188–189). This raises enormous difficulties when the character of the intervention can change drastically *after* the initial commitment; intervention theory and escalation theory become hopelessly intertwined for analytic purposes.

Third, the author makes numerous assertions which can only be verified by evidence about the perceptions of decision makers, and the relative paucity of data about shared perceptions within decision making groups is a severe handicap. For predictive purposes, the entire theory of restraints reduces itself to a set of assumptions about the *perceptions* of restraints by national leaders. Tillema has derived a great deal from the existing literature on this subject, but his and earlier studies only reinforce the need for more intensive microanalytic investigations of foreign policy decision making. In terms of its own scope and objectives, however, this study succeeds in parsimonious conceptualization of previously underformulated subject matter, and it will be instructive for specialists as well as stylistically acceptable for general readers.

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INDEX TO VOLUME LXIX

Aaron, Henry J. *Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing Policies?* Reviewed by Joseph L. Stevens. 1437

Abadan-Unat, Nermin. Review of Joseph S. Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization in the Middle East*. 349

The ABC of Communism (1966 and 1969 editions). N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky. Reviewed by Stephen F. Cohen. 1421

The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969. Brian Porter, ed. Reviewed by Max Beloff. 387

About Behaviorism. By B. F. Skinner. Reviewed by Peter G. Stillman in *The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought*. 202

Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union. United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Reviewed by John S. Reshetar, Jr. 1093

Achen, Christopher H. *Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response*. 1218

Adams, Nina S. and Alfred W. McCoy, eds. *Laos: War and Revolution*. Reviewed by Joseph J. Zasloff. 1095

Adelson, Joseph. Review of Howard Tolley, Jr., *Children and War*. 288

After Yalta. Lisle A. Rose. Reviewed by Robert James Maddox. 735

The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914–1970. Robert Sobel. Reviewed by Jonathan Hughes. 1457

Aggregate Economic Variables and Votes for Congress: A Rejoinder. Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer. 1266

Agor, Weston H., ed. *Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence, Analyses for Nine Countries*. Reviewed by Kenneth L. Karst. 1461

Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines. Dov Weintraub, Miriam Shapiro, and Belinda Aquino. Reviewed by John E. Koehler. 1515

Ahmed, Bashiruddin, Sidney Verba, and Anil Bhatt. *Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States*. Reviewed by Richard P. Taub. 1511

Aichinger, Alan. Review of Manfred Knapp, *Die Stimme Amerikas: Auslandspropaganda der USA unter der Regierung John F. Kennedys*. 379

Albinski, Henry S. *Canadian and Australian Politics in Comparative Perspective*. Reviewed by Hugh G. Thorburn. 715

Alexander, Robert J. *Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre*. Reviewed by Harry Kantor. 1462

Latin American Political Parties. Reviewed by Lars Shoultz. 1052

Allardt, Erik and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*. Reviewed by J. M. Power. 291

Allen, R. E. *Communication* in reply to criticism of his review of Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates* (December, 1973). 198

Allensworth, Don T. and R. Robert Linowes. *The Politics of Land Use: Planning, Zoning, and the Private Developer*. Reviewed by Joseph L. Stevens. 1437

Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe. Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood. 859

Almond, Gabriel A., Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds. *Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development*. Reviewed by Fred W. Riggs. 293

Alper, Benedict S. and Jerry F. Boren. *Crime: International Agenda*. Reviewed by Richard N. Swift. 359

Altbach, Philip G. Review of Seymour Martin Lipset, *Rebellion in the University*. 1452

Alvarez, David J. Review of Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy*. 1098

Ambroz, Oton. *Realignment of World Power: The Russo-Chinese Schism Under the Impact of Mao Tse-tung's Last Revolution, Vols. I and II*. Reviewed by Gaston J. Sigur. 1463

American–East Asian Relations: A Survey. Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. Reviewed by Frank E. Rogers. 384

American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China, 1949–1969. Foster Rhea Dulles. Reviewed by James Chieh Hsiung. 368

The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History. Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 288

American Labor History and Comparative Labor Movements: A Selected Bibliography. James C. McBrearty, ed. Reviewed by G. David Garson. 1040

American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash wih Russia over Reparations. Bruce Kuklick. Reviewed by John W. Keller. 1528

The American Political Science Association. *Political Science and State and Local Government*. Reviewed by Ira Sharkansky. 1439

American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of American Statesmanship. Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens, eds. Reviewed by Charles S. Hyneman. 241

Anderson, Charles W. Review of Kenneth N. Medhurst, *Government in Spain: The Executive at Work*. 334

Andriole, Stephen J. Review of Robert D. Nye, *Conflict Among Humans: Some Basic Psycho-*

logical and Social-Psychological Considerations 251
The Anglo-Soviet Accord. Richard H. Ullman. Reviewed by Stephen R. Graubard. 736
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. *Public Policy Toward Environment 1973: A Review and Appraisal.* Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017
Anthony, John Duke, Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. *Area Handbook for Algeria.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495
Antonovsky, Aaron and Alan Arian. *Hopes and Fears of Israelis: Consensus in a New Society.* Reviewed by Ben Halpern. 716
Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment. Herbert K. Tillema. Reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala. 1537
Appleton, Sheldon. Review of Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai.* 1466
Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Robert J. Alexander. Reviewed by Harry Kantor. 1462
APSA Presidential Address, 1975: *Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science.* Avery Leiserson. 175
APSA Presidential Address, 1975: *Introduction.* Samuel C. Patterson 172
Aquino, Belinda, Dov Weintraub, and Miriam Shapiro. *Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines.* Reviewed by John E. Koehler. 1515
Arcelus, Francisco and Allan H. Meltzer. *Aggregate Economic Variables and Votes for Congress: A Rejoinder.* 1266
The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections. 1232
Area Handbook for Algeria. Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495
Area Handbook for Ceylon. Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker, James L. Perlmutter, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandan. Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085
Area Handbook for Israel. Harvey H. Smith and others. Reviewed by Myron J. Aronoff. 347
Arian, Alan and Aaron Antonovsky. *Hopes and Fears of Israelis: Consensus in a New Society.* Reviewed by Ben Halpern. 716
Arian, Alan, ed. *The Elections in Israel—1969.* Reviewed by Gerald M. Pomper. 294
Armstrong, John A. *The European Administrative Elite.* Reviewed by Alfred Diamant. 1053
Aronoff, Myron J. Review of Harvey H. Smith and others, *Area Handbook for Israel.* 347
Aron, Raymond. *The Imperial Republic.* Reviewed by Paul Seabury. 1518
Arvon, Henri. *Marxist Esthetics.* Helen Lane, trans. Reviewed by Alfred G. Meyer. 238
Ashcraft, Norman. *Colonialism and Underdevelopment: Processes of Political Economic Change in British Honduras.* Reviewed by Roland H. Ebel. 1956
Asher, Herbert B. Review of Jonathan P. Hawley and Sven Groennings, eds., *To Be a Congressman: The Promise and the Power.* 1031
The Asian Alliance: Japan and the United States Policy. Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur. Reviewed by J. A. A. Stockwin. 386
Atencingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido. David Ronfeldt. Reviewed by Donald L. Herman. 1089
Aubrey, Robert T. Review of Robert Jones Shafer, *Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis.* 1505
The Austrian Example. Kurt Waldheim. Ewald Osers, trans. Reviewed by Nicholas A. Sims. 1116
Avant, Gayle. Review of Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality.* 999
Averch, Harvey A., John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton. *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines.* Reviewed by Mohd. A. Nawawi. 1464
Awasthi, A., ed. *Municipal Administration in India.* Reviewed by Benjamin N. Schoenfeld. 1057
Axline, W. Andrew. Review of Michael Haas, *International Organization: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography.* 1525
Ayal, Eliezer B. Review of Eduardo Lachica, *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt.* 323
Ayres, Robert L. *Development Policy and the Possibility of a "Livable" Future for Latin America.* 507

Baar, Carl. Review of Leland D. Baldwin, *Reframing the Constitution: An Imperative for Modern America.* 1439
Bacchus, William I. Review of Richard Burt and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., *Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy, 1947–1971: An Annotated Bibliography.* 1441
Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. *Power and Its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey Debnam.* 900
Back to Africa: A History of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Richard West. Reviewed by Edgar S. Efrat. 354
Badgley, John. Review of Frank N. Trager, *Burma: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography.* . . . 1093
Baines, John M. Review of Stefan A. Halper and John R. Serling, eds., *Latin America: Dynamics of Social Change.* 309
Baker, Jean H. *The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870.* Re-

viewed by David Curtis Skaggs. 1019

Balbus, Isaac D. *The Dialectics of Legal Repression: Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts*. Reviewed by George F. Cole. 263

Baldwin, Leland D. *Reframing the Constitution: An Imperative for Modern America*. Reviewed by Carl Baar. 1439

Balfour: A Political Biography. Sidney H. Zebel. Reviewed by Joel M. Fisher. 358

Bandyopadhyaya, Jayantanuja. *Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi, Perspectives on Social Transformation*. Reviewed by Francis G. Hutchins. 1058

Banks, Arthur S. Review of Henry Barbera, *Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War*. 1465

Baratz, Morton S. and Peter Bachrach. *Power and Its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey Debnam*. 900

Barbera, Henry. *Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War*. Reviewed by Arthur S. Banks. 1465

Barber, Benjamin R. *Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement, and Politics in Rawls*. 663

  Review of Alex Karmel, *Guillotine in the Wings: A New Look at the French Revolution and Its Relevance to America Today*. 1000

  Review of Jürg Steiner, ed., with Erwin Bucher, Daniel Frei and Leo Schürmann, *Das Politische System der Schweiz*. 1508

Bardach, Eugene. *The Skill Factor in Politics: Repealing the Mental Commitment Laws in California*. Reviewed by Garry D. Brewer. 1020

Barghoorn, Frederick C. Review of Gayle Durham Hollander, *Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin*. 312

Bark, Dennis, L. *Die Berlin-Frage, 1949–1955*. Reviewed by Richard L. Merritt. 1520

Barnaby, Frank. Review of Evan Luard, ed., *The International Regulation of Civil Wars*. 382

Barrea, Jean. Review of David Owen Kieft, *Belgium's Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small Power Diplomacy*. 321

Barros, James. *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925*. Reviewed by R. P. Barston. 1522

Barston, R. P., ed. *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. Reviewed by Timothy M. Shaw. 360

Barston, R. P. Review of James Barros, *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925*. 1522

Bartlett, Randall. *Economic Foundations of Political Power*. Reviewed by James M. Buchanan. 702

Basic Documents of African Regional Organization. Louis B. Sohn, ed. Reviewed by Thomas M. Franck. 1109

Bastid, Marianne. Review of Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*. 1472

Baumann, Carol Edler. *The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism*. Reviewed by Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. 730

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Between Class and Elite: The Evolution of the British Labour Movement*. Reviewed by J. M. Winter. 295

Baum, Lawrence. Review of Betty H. Zisk, *Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street*. 290

Baxandall, Lee, ed. *Sex-Pol: Essays, 1929–1934*. Wilhelm Reich. Reviewed by Arnold A. Rogow. 1006

Beck, Nathaniel. *The Paradox of Minimax Regret*. 918

Behaviorism and Skinner's Social Commentary: Letting Science Catch up to Ideology? Rejoinder to "Comment" by B. F. Skinner. Meredith W. Watts. 230

Belgium's Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small Power Diplomacy. David Owen Kieft. Reviewed by Jean Barrea. 321

Bellush, Jewel and Stephen M. David. *Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-making*. Reviewed by Paul Kantor. 1440

Beloff, Max. Review of Brian Porter, ed., *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969*. 387

Benderly, Beryl Lieff, Richard F. Nyrop, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker, James L. Perlmutter, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandam. *Area Handbook for Ceylon*. Reviewed by Robert K. Kearney. 1085

Benderly, Beryl Lieff, Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. *Area Handbook for Algeria*. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495

The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies. Fred I. Greenstein. 1371

Bennett, Gordon. Review of Jean Esmein, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution*. W. J. F. Jenner, trans. 305

Bennett, Gordon A. and Ronald N. Montaperto. *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai*. Reviewed by Sheldon Appleton. 1466

Bent, Alan. *Escape From Anarchy*. Reviewed by John Rehfuss. 1022

Bentham, Jeremy. *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*. T. L. S. Sprigge (*Vols. I and II*) and I. R. Christie (*Vol. III*), eds. Reviewed by Ian Budge. 1433

Benveniste, Guy. *The Politics of Expertise*. Reviewed by Harvey M. Sapolsky. 238

Berg, Alan with Robert J. Muscat. *The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in National Development*. Reviewed by Marvin Lieberman. 1096

Die Berlin-Frage, 1949–1955. Dennis L. Bark. Reviewed by Richard L. Merritt. 1520

Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945–1970. Hans Herz-

feld. Reviewed by Richard L. Merritt. 1520
Berman, Marshall. *Communication*: "The Authentic Rousseau." 971
Berndt, R. M. and P. Lawrence, eds. *Politics in New Guinea.* Reviewed by Peta Colebatch. 1467
Bernholz, Peter. *Logrolling and the Paradox of Voting: Are They Really Logically Equivalent? A Comment.* 961
Between Class and Elite: The Evolution of the British Labour Movement. Zygmunt Bauman. Reviewed by J. M. Winter. 295
Beyond Freedom and Dignity. B. F. Skinner. Reviewed by Peter G. Stillman in *The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought.* 202
B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior. Meredith W. Watts. 214
Bhatia, Krishan. *The Ordeal of Nationhood: A Study of India Since Independence, 1947–1970.* Reviewed by S. P. Varma. 1059
Bhatt, Anil, Sidney Verba, and Bashiruddin Ahmed. *Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States.* Reviewed by Richard P. Taub. 1511
Bibliographic Control of Microforms. Felix Reichmann and Josephine M. Tharpe. Reviewed by John Brown Mason. 343
Binder, Leonard, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba and Myron Weiner. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development.* Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development.* 979
Bitsaxis, Evan. *Welfare Versus Freedom.* Reviewed by William M. Leiter. 1420
Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American and the American Jew. Robert G. Weisbrod and Arthur Stein. Reviewed by Joyce Gelb. 289
Black Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration. James C. Harvey. Reviewed by Gary Orfield. 1032
Black Politics in Philadelphia. Miriam Ershowitz and Joseph Zikmund, eds. Reviewed by Fred J. Foley, Jr. 270
Bland, Randall W. *Private Pressure on Public Law: The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall.* Reviewed by J. W. Peltason. 1022
Blondel, Jean. *Comparative Legislatures.* Reviewed by Lawrence C. Dodd. 1469
Bloom, Allan. *Communication:* "The Authentic Rousseau.". 972
Communication on the review of Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates* (December, 1973). 197
Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political Philosophy. 648
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. Review of Henry Owen, ed., *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy.* 1105
Bloom, Howard S. and H. Douglas Price. *Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession.* 1240
Boardman, Eugene. Review of Jen Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement.* 1517
Bohmer, David A. Review of David Curtis Skaggs, *Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753–1776.* 1456
Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825. J. Valerie Fifer. Reviewed by James M. Malloy. 306
The Bolshevik Seizure of Power. S. P. Melgunov. Sergei G. Pushkarev, ed. Reviewed by Herbert J. Ellison. 1083
Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks. Edward O. Laumann. Reviewed by Andrew M. Greeley. 711
Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964–1971. Laszlo Gorgey. Reviewed by Gerald Freund. 1523
Boren, Jerry F. and Benedict S. Alper. *Crime: International Agenda.* Reviewed by Richard N. Swift. 359
Borg, Dorothy. Review of James M. McCutcheon, compiler, *China and America: A Bibliography of Interactions, Foreign and Domestic.* 1103
Borzeix, Jean-Marie. *Mitterand lui-même.* Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406
Bowman, Larry W. *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State.* Reviewed by Barry M. Schutz. 1060
Boyd, Carolyn P. Review of Pierre Broué and Emile Témime, *The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain.* Tony White, trans. 297
Boyle, John H. Review of Paul K. T. Sih, ed., *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927–1937;* and Arthur N. Young, *China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic Record, China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945,* and *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937–1945.* 344
Boyum, Keith O., Samuel Krislov, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Shaefer, and Susan O. White, eds. *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach.* Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman. 1450
Brams, Steven J. and Morton D. Davis. *Comment on "Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College.* 155
Brandl, John E. Review of David Wall, eds., *Chicago Essays in Economic Development.* 729
Brant, Charles S. Review of Mahmood Mamdani, *The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste and Class in an Indian Village.* 330
Breit, Peter K. Review of Gaines Post, Jr., *The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy.* 1087
Brewer, Garry D. Review of Eugene Bardach,

The Skill Factor in Politics: Repealing the Mental Commitment Laws in California. 1020

British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919–1939. Ian M. Drummond. Reviewed by Zara Steiner. 304

Brittain, John A. *The Payroll Tax for Social Security.* Reviewed by Juanita M. Kreps. 264

Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics.* Reviewed by Alastair Buchan. 731

Brofoss, Karl-Erik, Tore Hansen, and Andrew T. Cowart. *Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting.* 543

Bronfenbrenner, Martin. Review of Martha F. Loutfi, *The Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid;* and Wilbur F. Monroe, *Japan: Financial Markets and the World Economy.* 329

Brook, David. Review of Jean-Pierre Cot, *International Conciliation.* 366

Brookfield, H. C. *Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific.* Reviewed by R. J. May. 718

Broué, Pierre and Emile Témime. *The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain.* Tony White, trans. Reviewed by Carolyn P. Boyd. 297

Brown, Bernard E. Review of Martin Harrison and Philip M. Williams, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic.* 356

Bruegel, J. W. *Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German Minority: Problem and British Appeasement Policy.* Reviewed by Frank Munk. 1097

Buchan, Alastair. Review of Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics.* 731

Buchanan, Bruce, II. Review of David G. Winter, *The Power Motive.* 1013

Buchanan, James M. Review of Randall Bartlett, *Economic Foundations of Political Power.* 702

Budge, Ian. Review of T. L. S. Sprigge, ed., *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham (Vols. I and II)*; and I. R. Christie, ed., *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham (Vol. III).* 1433

Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting. Andrew T. Cowart, Tore Hansen, and Karl-Erik Brofoss. 543

Buganda in Modern History. D. A. Low. Reviewed by Claude E. Welch, Jr. 1081

Buhite, Russell D. *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by David J. Alvarez. 1098

Bukharin, N. and E. Preobrazhensky. *The ABC of Communism (1966 edition)*; and *The ABC of Communism (1969 edition).* Reviewed by Stephen F. Cohen. 1421

Bukharin, Nikolai. *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology;* and *Imperialism and World Economy.* Reviewed by Stephen F. Cohen. 1421

The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940–1944. Frederick B. Chary. Reviewed by Nissan Oren. 1063

Bull, Hedley. Review of F. H. Hinsley, *Nationalism and the International System.* 374

Bullock, Charles S., III. and Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. *Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences.* Reviewed by Alan H. Schechter. 283

Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study. Martin Harry Greenberg. Reviewed by Clarence E. Thurber. 1476

Burma: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography. Frank N. Trager. Reviewed by John Badgley. 1093

Burt, Richard and Geoffrey Kemp, eds. *Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy, 1947–1971: An Annotated Bibliography.* Reviewed by William I. Bacchus. 1441

Butterfield, Fox, Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, and E. W. Kenworthy. *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times.* Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation.* 675
Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685

Caiden, Naomi and Aaron Wildavsky. *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries.* Reviewed by William W. Siffin. 1061

Caldwell, Lynton K. *In Defense of Earth.* Reviewed by J. E. S. Fawcett. 361

The Cambodian Incursion—Legal Issues. Donald T. Fox, ed. Reviewed by Burns H. Weston. . . 1522

Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College. Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 141

Campbell, John Creighton. Review of Guy Lord, *The French Budgetary Process.* 1080

Canadian and Australian Politics in Comparative Perspective. Henry S. Albinski. Reviewed by Hugh G. Thorburn. 715

Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory. John C. Harsanyi. 594

Cannon, Mark W., R. Scott Fosler, and Robert Witherspoon. *Urban Government for Valencia, Venezuela.* Reviewed by Daniel H. Levine. . . . 298

Caporaso, James A. Review of Jung-Gun Kim and John M. Howell, *Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests.* 376

Carras, Mary C. *The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra.* Reviewed by Marcus F. Franda. 299

Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States. Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt. Reviewed by Richard P. Taub. 1511

Caughey, John. Review of Bernard W. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian*. 1049
Cavanaugh, Gerald J. Review of Ronald L. Meek, ed. and trans., *Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics*. 250
The Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Russia in the Caribbean Part One*. Reviewed by Hoon M. Chung. 1099
The Challenge of Hunger: A Program for More Effective Foreign Aid. I. W. Moomaw. Reviewed by Richard L. Clinton. 1531
The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline. Gunnar Myrdal. Reviewed by Richard L. Clinton. 1531
Champlin, John R. Review of Carl Cohen, *Democracy*. 239
Chandler, David P., David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, and Tom R. Roff. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History.* Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507
Change and the Future International System. David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler, eds. Reviewed by Charles F. Hermann. 1110
Chapman, John W. and J. Roland Pennock, eds. *Coercion. Nomos XIV, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.* Reviewed by P. H. Partridge. 252
Chapman, John W. *Rawls's Theory of Justice*. 588
Chapman, Richard Allen. *Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family*. 76
Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science. APSA Presidential Address, 1975. Avery Leiserson. 175
Chary, Frederick B. *The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940–1944.* Reviewed by Nissan Oren. 1063
Chauhan, R. S. *The Political Development in Nepal, 1950–1970: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity.* Reviewed by Pashupati Shumshere J. B. Rana. 300
Cheetham, Russell J., Allen C. Kelley, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. *Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History.* Reviewed by Gustav Ranis. 1425
Chen, Jack, *New Earth: The story of an early collective farm in East China's Chekiang Province in the 1949–56 period.* Reviewed by John F. Melby. 719
Chertoff, Mordecai S. and Michael Curtis, eds. *Israel: Social Structure and Change.* Reviewed by Gary S. Schiff. 1064
Chicago Essays in Economic Development. David Wall, ed. Reviewed by John E. Brandl. 729
Chilcote, Ronald H., ed. *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies.* Reviewed by Iêda Siqueira Wiarda. 301
Chilcote, Ronald H. Review of Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, ed., *Social Change in Angola*. 1478
Children and War. Howard Tolley, Jr. Reviewed by Joseph Adelson. 288
The Chilean Road to Socialism. Dale L. Johnson, ed. Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 316
The Chilean Road to Socialism. J. Ann Zammit, ed. Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 316
China and America: A Bibliography of Interactions, Foreign and Domestic. James M. McCutcheon, compiler. Reviewed by Dorothy Berg. 1103
China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945. Arthur N. Young. Reviewed by John H. Boyle. 344
China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis. Hungdah Chiu, ed. Reviewed by Allen S. Whiting. 363
China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic Record. Arthur N. Young. Reviewed by John H. Boyle. 344
China's Population-Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949–1969. H. Yuan Tien. Reviewed by J. B. R. Whitney. 727
China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies. Jerome Alan Cohen. Reviewed by Arthur A. Stahnke. 364
China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937–1945. Arthur N. Young. Reviewed by John H. Boyle. 344
The Chinese Cultural Revolution. Jean Esmein. W. J. F. Jenner, trans. Reviewed by Gordon Bennett. 305
Chiu, Hungdah, ed. *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis.* Reviewed by Allen S. Whiting. 363
Christie, I. R., ed. *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham* (*Vol. III*). Reviewed by Ian Budge. 1433
Chung, Hoon M. Review of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Russia in the Caribbean, Part One*. 1099
Church, William F. *Richelieu and Reason of State.* Reviewed by John B. Wolf. 719
Cimbala, Stephen J. Review of Herbert K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment*. 1537
The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. *State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness.* Reviewed by William J. Keefe. 1442
The City and Political Psychology. Claude S. Fischer. 559
The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy. Gaines Post, Jr. Reviewed by Peter K. Breit. 1087
Clark, John P. *On Anarchism in an Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists*. 162
  Rejoinder to "Comment" by Isaac Kramnick. 169
Clark, Jerry N., Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Roger C. Schaefer, and Susan O.

White, eds. *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach.* Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman. 1450

Clefs pour le socialisme. Didier Motchane. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406

Clemens, Walter C. *The Superpowers and Arms Control: From Cold War to Interdependence.* Reviewed by Ralph Sanders. 732

Cleveland, William L. Review of C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism.* 1470

Clinton, Richard L. Review of I. W. Moomaw, *The Challenge of Hunger: A Program for More Effective Foreign Aid;* and Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline.* 1531

Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing. John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina. 920

Coates, David. Review of Roger Lumley, *White-Collar Unionism in Britain.* 1487

Coercion. Nomos XIV, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. Reviewed by P. H. Partridge. 252

Coffey, J. I. Review of William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling, eds., *European Security and the Atlantic System.* 373

Cohen, Carl. *Democracy.* Reviewed by John R. Champlin. 239

Cohen, Jerome Alan. *China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies.* Reviewed by Arthur A. Stahnke. 364

Cohen Orantes, Isaac. *Regional Integration in Central America.* Reviewed by Gail R. Sherman. 365

Cohen, Ronald. Review of T. N. Tamuno, *The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914.* 351

Cohen, Stephen F. Review of Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* and *Imperialism and World Economy;* and N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (*1966 edition*) and *The ABC of Communism* (*1969 edition*). 1421

Cohen, Warren I. Review of Michael H. Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* 1526

Coke, James G. and John J. Gargan, eds. *Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio.* Reviewed by Douglas Gatlin. 271

Colantoni, Claude S., Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook. *Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College.* 141

  Rejoinder to "Comment" by Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis. 157

Colebatch, Peta. Review of R. M. Berndt and P. Lawrence, eds., *Politics in New Guinea.* 1467

Cole, George F. *Politics and the Administration of Justice.* Reviewed by Nolan E. Jones. 1024

  Review of Isaac D. Balbus, *The Dialectics of Legal Repression: Black Rebels Before the American Criminal Courts.* 263

Coleman, James S., Leonard Binder, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development.* Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development.* 979

The College and Community Development: A Socio-economic Analysis for Urban and Regional Growth. Julian Martin Laub. Reviewed by Harold E. Quinley. 277

Collier, David and Richard E. Messick. *Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption.* 1299

Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific. H. C. Brookfield. Reviewed by R. J. May. 718

Colonialism and Underdevelopment: Processes of Political Economic Change in British Honduras. Norman Ashcraft. Reviewed by Roland H. Ebel. 1056

Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout. Douglas D. Rose. 124

Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections." Saul Goodman and Gerald H. Kramer. 1255

Comment on "Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College." Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis. 155

Comment on Clark's "On Anarchism in an Unreal World." Isaac Kramnick. 168

Comment on Rae's "The Limits of Consensual Decision." Gordon Tullock. 1295

Comment on Watts's "B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior." B. F. Skinner. 228

Common Cause. *1972 Congressional Campaign Finances.* Reviewed by Nelson W. Polsby. . . . 265

Communication by Allen, R. E. in reply to criticism of his review of Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates* (December, 1973). 198

Communication by Berman, Marshall: "The Authentic Rousseau." 971

Communications by Bloom, Allan: "The Authentic Rousseau." 972

  On the review of Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socrates* (December, 1973). 197

Communication by Corsi, Jerome R.: "B. F. Skinner and Values." 1401

Communication by Dawson, Philip on review of his book *Provincial Magistrates and Revolutionary Politics in France, 1789–1795* (June, 1974). 575

Communication by Dexter, Lewis Anthony on "unconventional writers and conventional referees." 572

Communication by Eckstein, Harry in reply to comment on his article "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry" (December, 1973). 195

Communication by Ginther, Konrad in reply to criticism of his review of Thomas O. Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Post-war Europe* (June, 1974). 584

Communication by Godschalk, David R.: "More on Participation." 1043

Communication by Goldstone, Jack A.: "Subcommittee Chairmanships in the House of Representatives." 970

Communication by Hill, Larry B. in reply to comments on his article "Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy" (September, 1974). 581

Communication by Holsti, Ole R. in reply to criticism of his article "International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows" (March, 1974). 187

Communication by Hutcheson, Richard G. III: "The Inertial Effect of Incumbency and Two-Party Politics: Elections to the House of Representatives from the South, 1952–1974." 1399

Communication by Johnson, David Bruce in reply to comments on his and J. R. Gibson's article "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa" (March, 1974). 579

Communication by Kassiola, Joel on Stephen G. Salkever, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics" (March, 1974). 572

Communication by Kennington, Richard in reply to criticism of his review of Patrick Riley, *Political Writings of Leibniz* (March, 1974). 191

Communication by Marenin, Otwin on Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry" (December, 1973). 193

Communication by May, Judith V.: "More on Participation." 1404

Communication by Morris, Bernard S.: "More on New Theories of Revolution." 1403

Communication by Murphy, Jeffrie G. in reply to criticism of his review of Ernest van den Haag, *Political Violence and Civil Disobedience* (March, 1974). 577

Communication by Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. on Ole R. Holsti, "International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows" (March, 1974). 186

Communication by Pomper, Gerald L. on Philip Converse, "Comment on Burnham's 'Theory and Voting Research' " (September, 1974). 575

Communication by Riley, Patrick on review of his book *Political Writings of Leibniz* (March, 1974). 189

Communication by Salkever, Stephen in reply to criticism of his article "Virtue, Obligation, and Politics" (March, 1974). 574

Communication by Schlesinger, Thomas O. on the review of his book *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe* (June, 1974). 583

Communication by Schnall, David J. on D. B. Johnson and J. R. Gibson, "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa" (March, 1974). 579

Communication by Spafford, Duff on Peter Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Voting" (June, 1974). 576

Communication by Stillman, Peter G.: "B. F. Skinner and Values." 1402

Communication by Stratford, Michael C. on Glenn Tinder, "Transcending Tragedy: The Idea of Civility" (June, 1974). 973

Communication by Thayer, Frederick C. on Larry B. Hill, "Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy" (September, 1974). 580

Communication by Thies, Wallace J.: "More on the Pentagon Papers.". 1403

Communication by Tinder, Glenn in reply to criticism of his article "Transcending Tragedy: The Idea of Civility" (June, 1974). 975

Communication by van den Haag, Ernest on the review of his book *Political Violence and Civil Disobedience* (March, 1974). 576

Communication by Woddis, Jack: "More on New Theories of Revolution." 1403

Communist Penetration of the Third World. Edward Taborsky. Reviewed by Bernard P. Kiernan. 1111

The Communist Tide in Latin America: A Selected Treatment. Donald L. Herman, ed. Reviewed by Herbert S. Dinerstein. 1067

Community and Regional Planning: Issues in Public Policy. Melvin R. Levin. Reviewed by Jay S. Goodman. 1039

Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research. Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke, eds. Reviewed by Jerome M. Gilison. 1075

Comparative Legislatures. Jean Blondel. Reviewed by Lawrence C. Dodd. 1469

Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach. Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Schaefer, and Susan O. White, eds. Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman. 1450

The Concept of Representation. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. Reviewed by Carl J. Friedrich. 1005

Conflict Among Humans: Some Basic Psychological and Social-Psychological Considerations. Robert D. Nye. Reviewed by Stephen J. Andriole. 251

Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests. Jung-Gun Kim and John M. Howell. Reviewed by James A. Caporaso. 376

Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela.

Daniel H. Levine. Reviewed by John D. Martz. 326

Conflits et Coopération entre les Etats, 1971: Prélude à un nouvel ordre international. Jean Meyriat, ed. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber. 1104

Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence. Kenneth W. Grundy. Reviewed by Thomas Karis. . . . 1101

Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy, 1947–1971: An Annotated Bibliography. Richard Burt and Geoffrey Kemp, eds. Reviewed by William I. Bacchus. 1441

The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State. Richard Sisson. Reviewed by Stanley A. Kochanek. 346

Connelly, Thomas L. and Archer Jones. *The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy.* Reviewed by James E. Sefton. 265

Connor, Walter D. *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism.* Reviewed by Peter Grothe. 302

Conroy, Hilary and T. Scott Miyakawa. *East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation.* Reviewed by George DeVos. 303

Constitutional Rights of College Students: A Study in Case Law. Richard C. Ratliff. Reviewed by Richard J. Richardson. 282

Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: a Longitudinal Study of Two Generations. M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi. 1316

Control: The Basis of Social Order. Paul Sites. Reviewed by Philip H. Melanson. 257

Corporate Power and Social Change: The Politics of the Life Insurance Industry. Karen Orren. Reviewed by J. David Cummins. 1043

Corsi, Jerome R. *Communication:* "B. F. Skinner and Values." 1401

Cort, Ann S., Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Newton B. Parker, James L. Perlmutter, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandan. *Area Handbook for Ceylon.* Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085

Cot, Jean-Pierre. *International Conciliation.* Reviewed by David Brook. 366

Courtney, John C. Review of Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics.* . . 1497

Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication. Austin Sarat and Joel B. Grossman. 1200

Cover, William W., Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. *Area Handbook for Algeria.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495

Cowart, Andrew T., Tore Hansen, and Karl-Erik Brofoss. *Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting.* 543

Cranston, Maurice. *What Are Human Rights?* Reviewed by Vernon Van Dyke. 367

Crime: International Agenda. Benedict S. Alper and Jerry F. Boren. Reviewed by Richard N. Swift. 359

Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Develment. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. A review essay on volume VII in the series "Studies in Political Development"—Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development.* 979

Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner. Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development.* . . 979

Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development. Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds. Reviewed by Fred W. Riggs. 923

The Critique of Domination. Trent Schroyer. Reviewed by Paul Thomas. 255

The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholic and Buddhists in Vietnam. Piero Gheddo. Charles Underhill Quinn, trans. Reviewed by Allan E. Goodman. 306

Cuba, Castro, and Revolution. Jaime Suchlicki, ed. Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 310

Culture and the Radical Conscience. Eugene Goodheart. Reviewed by Stanley Rosen. 242

Cummins, J. David. Review of Karen Orren, *Corporate Power and Social Change: The Politics of the Life Insurance Industry.* 1043

Cunningham, Frank. *Objectivity in Social Science.* Reviewed by A. James Gregor. 995

Current, Richard N. Review of Peter Kolchin, *First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction.* . . 276

Curtis, Michael and Mordecai S. Chertoff, eds. *Israel: Social Structure and Change.* Reviewed by Gary S. Schiff. 1064

Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy. J. W. Bruegel. Reviewed by Frank Munk. 1097

Daily Life in Revolutionary China. Maria Antonietta Macciocchi. Reviewed by Philip E. Ginsburg. 1082

Dakin, Douglas, M. R. Lambert, and W. N. Medlicett, eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939.* Reviewed by Gary B. Ostrower. 385

Dalzell, Robert F., Jr. *Daniel Webster and the Trial of American Nationalism, 1843–1852.* Reviewed by Kenneth E. Shewmaker. 708

D'Amato, Anthony. Review of Philip C. Jessup, *The Price of International Justice.* 375

Daniel, Robert L. Review of Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919.* 315

Daniels, Robert V. Review of Richard B. Day, *Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation.* 720

Daniel Webster and Jacksonian Democracy. Sydney Nathans. Reviewed by Kenneth E. Shewmaker. 708

Daniel Webster and the Trial of American Nationalism, 1843–1952. Robert F. Dalzell, Jr. Reviewed by Kenneth E. Shewmaker. 708

David Easton and the Invisible Hand. J. S. Sorzano. 91

David, Stephen M. and Jewel Bellush. *Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-making.* Reviewed by Paul Kantor. 1440

Davies, A. F. *Essays in Political Sociology.* Reviewed by J. M. Power. 291

Davies, J. Clarence, III. Review of Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, *Public Policy Toward Environment 1973: A Review and Appraisal;* Harry G. Johnson, *Man and His Environment;* and Grahame J. C. Smith, Henry J. Steck, and Gerald Surette, *Our Ecological Crisis.* 1017

Davis, Abraham L. *The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of Social Science Data.* Reviewed by James Eisenstein. 266

Davis, J. Ronnie and Eric M. Uslaner. *The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities.* 929

Davis, Morton D. and Steven J. Brams. *Comment on "Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College."* 155

Davis, Rufus. Review of J. E. Richardson, *Patterns of Australian Federalism.* 1088

Dawn, C. Ernest. *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism.* Reviewed by William L. Cleveland. 1470

Dawson, Philip. *Communication* on review of his book *Provincial Magistrates and Revolutionary Politics in France, 1789–1795* (June, 1974). 575

Day, Richard B. *Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation.* Reviewed by Robert V. Daniels. 720

Debnam, Geoffrey. *Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz.* 889
Rejoinder to "Comment" by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. 905

Decentralisation in Yugoslavia and India. Nageshwar Prasad. Reviewed by A. H. Somjee. 1496

Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls. Eric A. Nordlinger. Reviewed by Betty H. Zisk. 280

Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design. Oscar Newman. Reviewed by Vincent Ostrom. 279

Le Défi démocratique. George Marchais. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406

Democracy. Carl Cohen. Reviewed by John R. Champlin. 239

Democracy and Disobedience. Peter Singer. Reviewed by John Plamenatz. 257

Denton, Frank H., Harvey A. Averch, and John E. Koehler, *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines.* Reviewed by Mohd. A. Nawawi. 1464

Denzer, Horst, ed. *Jean Bodin: Verhandlungen der Internationalen Bodin Tagung in München.* Reviewed by Patrick Riley. 996

Derman, William. *Serfs, Peasants and Socialists: A Former Serf Village in the Republic of Guinea.* Reviewed by Victor D. Du Bois. 1471

Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. Edward R. Tufte. 812

Deutsch, Karl W. and Manfred Kochen. Review of Lennart Lundquist, *Means and Goals of Political Decentralization.* 1429

Deutsch, Karl W. Review of UNESCO, ed., *Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences.* 1010

Deutsch, Kenneth L. Review of Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests.* 245

Development Policy and the Possibility of a "Livable" Future for Latin America. Robert L. Ayres. 507

Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism. Walter D. Connor. Reviewed by Peter Grothe. 302

Devine, Donald J. *The Political Culture of the United States.* Reviewed by Glenn R. Parker. 267

DeVos, George. Review of Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, *East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation.* 303

Dexter, Lewis Anthony. *Communication* on "unconventional writers and conventional referees." 572

The Dialectics of Legal Repression: Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts. Isaac D. Balbus. Reviewed by George F. Cole. 263

Diamant, Alfred. Review of John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite.* 1053

Dianying, Electric Shadows: An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China. Jay Leyda. Reviewed by Martin King Whyte. 1078

Dickinson, Joel R. Review of Joseph S. Wholey et al., *Federal Evaluation Policy: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs.* 1460

Dienes, C. Thomas. *Law, Politics and Birth Control.* Reviewed by John R. Schmidhauser. 268

The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory:

Toward a Postbehavioral Science of Politics. Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. Reviewed by Eugene J. Meehan. 260

Dimock, Marshall E. Review of Peter Kobrak, *Private Assumption of Public Responsibilities: The Role of American Business in Urban Manpower Programs.* 275

Dinerstein, Herbert S. Review of Donald L. Herman, ed., *The Communist Tide in Latin America: A Selected Treatment.* 1067

The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism. Carol Edler Baumann. Reviewed by Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. . . 730

Dissent and the State in Peace and War: An Essai on the Grounds of Public Morality. Morton K. Kaplan. Reviewed by Geoffrey Stern. 318

Divine, Donna Robinson. Review of Georges Sorel, *The Illusions of Progress.* Translated by John and Charlotte Stanley. 259

Dobney, Frederick J. Review of Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945.* 282

Dobson, Douglas and Douglas St. Angelo. *Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics.* 481

Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association. William E. Steslicke. Reviewed by Nobutaka Ike. 348

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, eds. Reviewed by Gary B. Ostrower. 385

Documents on International Affairs, 1963. D. C. Watt, James Mayall, and Cornelia Navari, eds. Reviewed by Robert C. Gray. 1118

Dodd, Lawrence C. Review of Jean Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures.* 1469

Doh, Joon Chien. *The Planning—Programming—Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies.* Reviewed by Allan Schick. 1443

The Dominican Intervention. Abraham F. Lowenthal. Reviewed by N. Gary Holten. 1102

Donagan, Alan. Review of J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against.* 706

Downs, Anthony and M. Leanne Lachman. Review of Harvey Luskin Molotch, *Managed Integration: Dilemmas of Doing Good in the City.* 1042

Downs, Anthony. *Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America.* Reviewed by Harlan Hahn. 1444

Drachkovitch, Milorad and Branko Lazitch. *Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I.* Reviewed by Thomas Fiddick. 324

Dreijmanis, John. Review of Klemens von Klemperer, *Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis.* 728

Dreyer, June Teufel. Review of Seymour Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas.* 1510

Drummond. Ian M. *British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919–1939.* Reviewed by Zara Steiner. 304

Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History. Allen C. Kelley, Jeffrey G. Williamson, and Russell J. Cheetham. Reviewed by Gustav Ranis. 1425

Du Bois, Victor D. Review of William Derman, *Serfs, Peasants and Socialists: A Former Serf Village in the Republic of Guinea.* 1471

Ducheneaux, Karen and Kirke Kickingbird. *One Hundred Million Acres.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1028

Duffar, Jean. *Les Forces Politiques en Thailande.* Reviewed by David A. Wilson. 1066

Dugard, John. *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United Nations.* Reviewed by Christian P. Potholm. 1099

Dulles, Foster Rhea. *American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China, 1949–1969.* Reviewed by James Chieh Hsiung. 368

Durden, Robert F. *The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on Emancipation.* Reviewed by Michael Perman. 269

The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra. Mary C. Carras. Reviewed by Marcus F. Franda. 299

The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848. Francis E. Mineka, ed. Reviewed by Joseph Hamburger. 1430

East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation. Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa. Reviewed by George DeVos. 303

Ebel, Roland H. Review of Norman Ashcraft, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment: Processes of Political Economic Change in British Honduras.* 1056

Eckstein, Harry. *Communication* in reply to comment on his article "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry" (December, 1973). 195

Economic Foundations of Political Power. Randall Bartlett. Reviewed by James N. Buchanan. . . 702

Edelman, Murray. Review of Claus Mueller, *The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation.* 1432

Education and Modernization in the Middle East. Joseph S. Szyliowicz. Reviewed by Nermin Abadan-Unat. 349

Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organization, Society, and Policy. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, eds. Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. 1090

The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections. Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer. 1232
Efrat, Edgar S. Review of Richard West, *Back to Africa: A History of Sierra Leone and Liberia.* 354
Ehrmann, Henry W. Review of Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944.* 338
Eisenstein, James. Review of Abraham L. Davis, *The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of Social Science Data.* 266
Elazar, Daniel J. Review of Yonathan Shapiro, *Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897–1930.* 284
The Elections in Israel—1969. Alan Arian, ed. Reviewed by Gerald M. Pomper. 294
Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. Robert Presthus. Reviewed by John C. Courtney. 1497
Ellison, Herbert J. Review of S. P. Melgunov, *The Bolshevik Seizure of Power.* Sergei G. Pushkarev, ed. 1083
Elvin, Mark. *The Pattern of the Chinese Past.* Reviewed by Marianne Bastid. 1472
Emmerson, John K. Review of Frank C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy.* 733
An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition!: Organizing the Politics and Economics of Survival. Frederick Thayer. Reviewed by David Vogel. 1049
Engerman, Stanley L. and Robert William Fogel. *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* and *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods, a Supplement.* Reviewed in *Time on the Cross: Two Views.*
  I. Stanley Lebergott. 697
  II. Seymour Mandelbaum. 700
Enokson, Stephen N., Jae-On Kim, and John R. Petrocik. *Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components.* 107
Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter Amerikanischer Besatzung. Lutz Niethammer. Reviewed by C. Bradley Scharf. 1494
Environmental Issues: Pollution and Economics. L. G. Hines. Reviewed by Harold Sprout. . . 1448
Environmental Policy: Concepts and International Implications. Albert E. Utton and Daniel H. Henning, eds. Reviewed by Walter A. Rosenbaum. 1113
Epstein, Leon D. Review of Granada Television, *The State of the Nation: Parliament.* 308
Ershowitz, Miriam and Joseph Zikmund, eds. *Black Politics in Philadelphia.* Reviewed by Fred J. Foley, Jr. 270
Escape From Anarchy. Alan Bent. Reviewed by John Rehfuss. 1022
Esmein, Jean. *The Chinese Cultural Revolution.* W. J. F. Jenner, trans. Reviewed by Gordon Bennett. 305
Essays in Political Sociology. A. F. Davies. Reviewed by J. M. Power. 291
The Ethical Voter. R. E. Goodin and K. W. S. Roberts. 926
The European Administrative Elite. John A. Armstrong. Reviewed by Alfred Diamant. . . 1053
European Democracy Between the Wars. Karl J. Newman. Kenneth Morgan, trans. Reviewed by C. B. Robson. 336
European Security and the Atlantic System. William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling, eds. Reviewed by J. I. Coffey. 372
L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une première expérience de parlementarisme international. Charles Melchior de Molènes. Reviewed by D. Bruce Marshall. 1530
Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game. Guillermo Owen. 947
The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis. Z. A. Jordan. Reviewed by Timothy O'Hagan. 1424
The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. Charles Wendell. Reviewed by Majid Khadduri. 353
The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914. T. N. Tamuno. Reviewed by Ronald Cohen. 351

Factions No More: Attitudes to Party in Government and Opposition in Eighteenth-Century England. J. A. W. Gunn. Reviewed by Nannerl O. Keohane. 243
Fairlee, Lyndelle D. Review of Alfred Morris, *The Growth of Parliamentary Scrutiny by Committee: A Symposium.* 1493
Falk, Richard A., ed. *The Vietnam War and International Law. Vol. 3: The Widening Context.* Reviewed by Charles H. McLaughlin. . . 369
Falk, Richard A. *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival.* Reviewed by Don C. Piper. 370
Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès. Robert Soucy. Reviewed by William R. Tucker. 1009
Fawcett, J. E. S. Review of Lynton K. Caldwell, *In Defense of Earth.* 361
Federal Evaluation Policy: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs. Joseph S. Wholey et al. Reviewed by Joel R. Dickinson. 1460
Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. Richard Simeon. Reviewed by W. L. White. 724
Feld, Werner, J. *Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups.* Reviewed by Edward L. Morse. 372

Fellman, David. Review of Julius Goebel, Jr., *The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. I, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801.* 1445

Ferejohn, John A. and Morris P. Fiorina. *Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing.* . . 920

Feuerwerker, Albert. Review of Ilpyong J. Kim, *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets.* 1484

Fickett, Lewis P., Jr. Review of B. R. Nanda, ed., *Socialism in India.* 335

Fiddick, Thomas. Review of Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I.* 324

Fifer, J. Valerie. *Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825.* Reviewed by James M. Malloy. 306

Figliola, Carl L. Review of Frederick W. Marks III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution.* 1041

Fiorina, Morris P. and John A. Ferejohn. *Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing.* . . 920

First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction. Peter Kolchin. Reviewed by Richard N. Current. 276

Fischer, Claude. *The City and Political Psychology.* 559

Fisher, Joel M. Review of Sidney H. Zebel, *Balfour: A Political Biography.* 358

Fishkin, James. *Justice and Rationality: Some Objections to the Central Argument in Rawls's Theory.* 615

Fiszman, Joseph R. Review of Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter, *In the Name of Tomorrow: Life Underground in Poland.* 319

Fitch, John S., III. Review of Mauricio Solaun and Michael Quinn, *Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America.* 1506

Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Review of Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro;* and Jaime Suchlicki, ed., *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution.* 310

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Review of Shmuel Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905.* 721

5 Public Philosophies of Walter Lippmann. Benjamin F. Wright. Reviewed by James Lare. 1014

Flanagan, Scott C., Gabriel A. Almond, and Robert J. Mundt, eds. *Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development.* Reviewed by Fred W. Riggs. 293

Fletcher, William C. *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970.* Reviewed by Roger Hamburg. 1100

Fogel, Robert William and Stanley L. Engerman. *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* and *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods, a Supplement.* Reviewed in *Time on the Cross: Two Views.*
I. Stanley Lebergott. 697
II. Seymour Mandelbaum. 700

Foley, Fred J., Jr. Review of Miriam Ershowitz and Joseph Zikmund, eds., *Black Politics in Philadelphia.* 270

Les Forces Politiques en Thailande. Jean Duffar. Reviewed by David A. Wilson. 1066

Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia. Jon M. Reinhardt. Reviewed by Justus M. van der Kroef. 389

Fosler, R. Scott, Robert Witherspoon, and Mark W. Cannon. *Urban Government for Valencia, Venezuela.* Reviewed by Daniel H. Levine. 298

Foster, Granville J. Review of Harvey S. Perloff, ed., *The Future of the United States Government.* 1044

The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy. Ernest N. Paolino. Reviewed by Robert E. May. 713

Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921. Aaron S. Klieman. Reviewed by Howard M. Sachar. . 1527

Fox, Donald T., ed. *The Cambodian Incursion—Legal Issues.* Reviewed by Burns H. Weston. . 1522

Fox, William T. R. and Warner R. Schilling, eds. *European Security and the Atlantic System.* Reviewed by J. I. Coffey. 373

Franck, Thomas M. Review of Louis B. Sohn, ed., *Basic Documents of African Regional Organization.* 1109

Franda, Marcus F. *Radical Politics in West Bengal.* Reviewed by Ashis Nandy. 1473
Review of Mary C. Carras, *The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra.* 299

Frank, Andre Gunder. *Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment: Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America.* Reviewed by Arturo Valenzuela. 1475

Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948.* Reviewed by Earl Latham. 1024

The French Budgetary Process. Guy Lord. Reviewed by John Creighton Campbell. 1080

Freund, Gerald. Review of Laszlo Gorgey, *Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964–1971.* 1523

Friedgut, Theodore H. Review of William Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the U.S.S.R.* 726

Friedman, Leon and Burt Neuborne. *Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Legality of the War in Vietnam.* Reviewed by C. Herman Pritchett. 271

Friedrich, Carl J. *The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda.* Reviewed by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. 240
  Review of Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation.* 1005
Frisch, Morton J. and Richard G. Stevens, eds. *American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of American Statesmanship.* Reviewed by Charles S. Hyneman. 241
Frolich, Norman. *The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions.* 943
From Confederation to Nation: The American Constitution, 1835–1877. Bernard Schwartz. Reviewed by Hans L. Trefousse. 714
From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism. C. Ernest Dawn. Reviewed by William L. Cleveland. . . 1470
From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development. Clyde R. Ingle. Reviewed by Jean F. O'Barr. 1069
Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Cabinet and the Shadow Government in British Politics. R. M. Punnett. Reviewed by Jorgen S. Rasmussen. . 1499
Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911. Michael H. Hunt. Reviewed by Warren I. Cohen. 1526
Fuchs, Estelle and Robert Havighurst. *To Live on This Earth.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1028
Funston, Richard. *The Supreme Court and Critical Elections.* 795
The Future of the United States Government. Harvey S. Perloff, ed. Reviewed by Granville J. Foster. 1044

Gagliano, Felix. Review of Alvin Rabushka, *Race and Politics in Urban Malaya.* 1500
Galai, Shmuel. *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905.* Reviewed by Sheila Fitzpatrick. 721
Gallagher, Matthew P. and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* Reviewed by John R. Thomas. 722
Gargan, John J. and James G. Coke, eds. *Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio.* Reviewed by Douglas Gatlin. 271
Garson, G. David. Review of James C. McBrearty, ed., *American Labor History and Comparative Labor Movements: A Selected Bibliography.* 1040
Gatlin, Douglas. Review of James G. Coke and John J. Gargan, eds., *Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio.* 271
Gelb, Joyce. Review of Arthur Stein and Robert G. Weisbrod, *Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American and the American Jew.* 289
Germino, Dante. Review of Nicola Matteucci, *Il Liberalismo in un Mondo in Trasformazione.* 1002
Gheddo, Piero. *The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam.* Charles Underhill Quinn, trans. Reviewed by Allan E. Goodman. 306
Gilison, Jerome M. Review of Allan Kornberg, ed., *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective;* and Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Walhke, eds., *Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research.* 1075
Gilmour, C. Edwin. Review of Harlan Hahn, *Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics of Change.* 1447
Ginsburg, Philip E. Review of Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, *Daily Life in Revolutionary China.* 1082
Ginther, Konrad. *Communication* in reply to criticism of his review of Thomas O. Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe* (June, 1974). 584
Glyn, Andrew. Review of Michal Kalecki, *Selected Essays in Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy.* 246
Godschalk, David R. *Communication:* "More on Participation." 1403
Godwin, R. Kenneth. Review of Population Research Center, The University of Texas, *International Population Census Bibliography: Europe.* 1086
Goebel, Julius, Jr. *The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. I, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801.* Reviewed by David Fellman. 1445
Goffman, Erving. *Strategic Interaction.* Reviewed by George H. Quester. 997
Goldman, Sheldon. *Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited.* . . . 491
Goldstone, Jack A. *Communication:* "Subcommittee Chairmanships in the House of Representatives." 970
Gombin, Richard. *Les Origines du Gauchisme.* Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1423
Goodheart, Eugene. *Culture and the Radical Conscience.* Reviewed by Stanley Rosen. 242
Good, I. J. and Lawrence S. Mayer. *Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?* 916
Goodin, R. E. and K. W. S. Roberts. *The Ethical Voter.* 926
Goodman, Allan E. Review of Piero Gheddo, *The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam,* Charles Underhill Quinn, trans.; and Stephen T. Hosmer, *Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future.* 306
Goodman, Jay S. Review of Melvin R. Levin, *Community and Regional Planning: Issues in Public Policy.* 1039
Goodman, Saul and Gerald H. Kramer. *Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congres-*

sional Elections." 1255

Gorgey, Laszlo. *Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964–1971*. Reviewed by Gerald Freund. 1523

Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the U.S.S.R. William Taubman. Reviewed by Theodore H. Friedgut. 726

Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937. Hungmao Tien. Reviewed by Allen B. Linden. 352

Government in Spain: The Executive at Work. Kenneth N. Medhurst. Reviewed by Charles W. Anderson. 334

Granada, Television. *The State of the Nation: Parliament*. Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 308

Graubard, Stephen R. Review of Richard H. Ullman, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord*. 736

The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on Emancipation. Robert F. Durden. Reviewed by Michael Perman. 269

Gray, Robert C. Review of D. C. Watt, James Mayall, and Cornelia Navari, eds., *Documents on International Affairs, 1963*. 1118

The Great Jackass Fallacy. Harry Levinson. Reviewed by Edward R. Padgett. 1001

Greeley, Andrew M. Review of Edward O. Laumann, *Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks*. 711

Greenberg, Martin Harry. *Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study*. Reviewed by Clarence E. Thurber. 1476

Greenstein, Fred I. *The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies*. 1371

Gregor, A. James. Review of Frank Cunningham, *Objectivity in Social Science*. 995

Griffith, Kathryn. *Judge Learned Hand and the Role of the Federal Judiciary*. Reviewed by Robert G. Seddig. 1029

Groennings, Sven and Jonathan P. Hawley, eds. *To Be a Congressman: The Promise and the Power*. Reviewed by Herbert B. Asher. 1031

Grossman, Joel B. and Austin Sarat. *Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication*. 1200

Grossman, Joel B. Review of Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Schaefer, and Susan O. White, eds., *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. 1450

Grothe, Peter. Review of Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism*. 302

The Growth of Parliamentary Scrutiny by Committee: A Symposium. Alfred Morris. Reviewed by Lyndelle D. Fairlie. 1493

Grundy, Kenneth W. *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence*. Reviewed by Thomas Karis. 1101

Grupp, Fred W., Jr. and Alan R. Richards. *Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making*. 850

Guidoni, Pierre. *Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste*. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay*. 1406

Guillotine in the Winds: A New Look at the French Revolution and Its Relevance to America Today. Alex Karmel. Reviewed by Benjamin R. Barber. 1000

Gunn, J. A. W. *Factions No More: Attitudes to Party in Government and Opposition in Eighteenth-Century England*. Reviewed by Nannerl O. Keohane. 243

Gunn, John. Review of Heinrich Winnik, Rafael Moses, and Mortimer Ostow, *Psychological Bases of War*. 1436

Gwyn, William B. Review of Paul Smith, *Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his Articles in the Quarterly Review, 1860–1883*. 258

Haas, Michael. *International Organization: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography*. Reviewed by W. Andrew Axline. 1525

Habermas, Jürgen. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Reviewed by Kenneth L. Deutsch. 245

Haefele, Edwin T. *Representative Government and Environmental Management*. Reviewed by Gordon Tullock. 1031

Hahn, Harlan. Review of Anthony Downs, *Opening up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America*. 1444

Urban-Rural Conflict: *The Politics of Change*. Reviewed by C. Edwin Gilmour. 1447

Halperin, Maurice. *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro*. Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 310

Halpern, Ben. Review of Aaron Antonovsky and Alan Arian, *Hopes and Fears of Israelis: Consensus in a New Society*. 717

Halper, Stefan A. and John R. Serling, eds. *Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change*. Reviewed by John M. Baines. 309

Hamburger, Joseph. Review of Francis E. Mineka, ed., *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848;* and Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, eds., *The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849–1873*. 1430

Hamburg, Roger. Review of William C. Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970*. 1100

Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data. Ellen Mickiewicz, ed. Reviewed by William A. Welsh. 1490

Handel, Michael I. *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine: Occasional Papers in International Affairs Number 30*. Reviewed by Don Peretz. 1067

Hansen, Susan Blackall. *Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence*. 1181

Hansen, Tore, Andrew T. Cowart, and Karl-Erik

Brofoss. *Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting*. 543
Harris, H. W. Review of Hans Kelsen, *The Pure Theory of Law* and *What is Justice: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science*. . . . 1427
Harrison, Martin and Philipp M. Williams. *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*. Reviewed by Bernard E. Brown. 356
Harsanyi, John C. *Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory*. 594
Harvey, David. *Social Justice and the City*. Reviewed by Philip B. Lyons. 998
Harvey, James C. *Black Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration*. Reviewed by Gary Orfield. 1032
Havighurst, Robert and Estelle Fuchs. *To Live on This Earth*. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1028
Hawkins, Brett W. *Politics and Urban Policies*. Reviewed by Martin Shefter. 273
Hawley, Jonathan P. and Sven Groennings, eds. *To Be a Congressman: The Promise and the Power*. Reviewed by Herbert B. Asher. 1031
Hayes, Paul M. *Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling*. Reviewed by Thomas Chr. Wyller 1477
Hayit, Baymirza. *Turkestan zwischen Russland und China*. Reviewed by George Alexander Lensen. 1525
Heginbotham, Stanley J. Review of Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, eds., *Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organization, Society and Policy*. 1090
Heidenheimer, Arnold J. Review of Carl J. Friedrich, *The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda*. 240
Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, ed. *Social Change in Angola*. Reviewed by Ronald H. Chilcote. . . . 1478
Heineman, Robert. Review of J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*. 254
Henning, Daniel H. and Albert E. Utton, eds. *Environmental Policy: Concepts and International Implications*. Reviewed by Walter A. Rosenbaum. 1113
Herman, Donald L., ed. *The Communist Tide in Latin America: A Selected Treatment*. Reviewed by Herbert S. Dinerstein. 1067
Herman, Donald L. Review of David Ronfeldt, *Atencingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido*. 1089
Hermann, Charles F. Review of Martin Sattler and David S. Sullivan, eds., *Change and the Future International System*. 1110
The Heroic Image in Chile: Arturo Prat, Secular Saint. William F. Sater. Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar. 1092
Herzberg, Donald G. Review of David Lebedoff, *Ward Number Six*. 277
Herzfeld, Hans. *Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945–1970*. Reviewed by Richard L. Merritt. 1520
Hill, Larry B. *Communication* in reply to comments on his article "Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy" (September, 1974). 581
Hilton, Gordon. Review of Michael David Wallace, *War and Rank among Nations*. 391
Hines, L. G. *Environmental Issues: Pollution and Economics*. Reviewed by Harold Sprout. 1448
Hinsley, F. H. *Nationalism and the International System*. Reviewed by Hedley Bull. 374
Hinton, William. *Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University*. Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 374
Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste. Pierre Guidoni. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay*. 1406
Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology. Nikolai Bukharin. Reviewed by Stephen F. Cohen. 1421
History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought. Maurice Mandelbaum. Reviewed by George Armstrong Kelly. 247
Hitler's Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–30. Herbert S. Levine. Reviewed by Kenneth R. Nelson. 327
Hitler's Strategy, 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue. Martin L. Van Creveld. Reviewed by Dan P. Silverman. 1511
Hobbes's Doctrine of Method. J. Weinberger. . . 1336
Hobbs, Cecil. Review of David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler, *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*. 1507
Hoffman, Abraham. *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929–1939*. Reviewed by George C. Kiser. 1033
Hollander, Gayle Durham. *Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin*. Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn. 312
Holsti, K. J. *Underdevelopment and the "Gap" Theory of International Conflict*. 827
Holsti, Ole R. *Communication* in reply to criticism of his article "International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows" (March, 1974). . 187
Holten, N. Gary. Review of Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*. 1102
Holt, Robert T. and John E. Turner. *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development*. A review essay on volume VII in the series "Studies in Political Development"—Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sydney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Politi-*

cal Development. 979

Honecker and the New Politics of Europe. Heinz Lippmann. Helen Sebba, trans. Reviewed by Robert McGeehan. 1079

Hopes and Fears of Israelis: Consensus in a New Society. Aaron Antonovsky and Alan Arian. Reviewed by Ben Halpern. 716

Hopkins, Mark W. *Mass Media in the Soviet Union.* Reviewed by David E. Powell. 314

Horn, Robert C. Review of W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis, 1964–72.* 380

Horwitz, Henry, ed. *The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691–1693.* Reviewed by W. J. Jones. 314

Horwitz, Robert H. Review of John W. Yolton, ed., *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives.* .. 1015

Hosmer, Stephen T. *Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future.* Reviewed by Allan E. Goodman. 306

Hovannisian, Richard G. *The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919.* Reviewed by Robert L. Daniel. 315

Howell, John M. and Jung-Gun Kim. *Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests.* Reviewed by James A. Caporaso. 376

Hsieh, Alice Langley. Review of William Hinton, *Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University.* 374

Hsiung, James Chieh. Review of Foster Rhea Dulles, *American Foreign Policy Towards Communist China, 1949–1969.* 368

Hughes, Jonathan. Review of Robert Sobel, *The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914–1970.* ... 1457

The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. Eduardo Lachica. Reviewed by Eliezer B. Ayal. 323

Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University. William Hinton. Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 374

Hunt, Michael H. *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* Reviewed by Warren I. Cohen. 1526

Hurst, James Willard. *The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays.* Reviewed by Marvin R. Summers. 1449

Hutcheson, Richard G., III. *Communication:* "The Inertial Effect of Incumbency and Two-Party Politics: Elections to the House of Representatives from the South, 1952–1974." ... 1399

Hutchins, Francis G. *India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement.* Reviewed by Raghavan Iyer. 1479
  Review of Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi, Perspectives on Social Transformation.* 1058

Hutchinson, John. *The Imperfect Union: A History of Corruption in American Trade Unions.* Reviewed by James C. McBrearty. 709

Hutt, Allen, *The Post-War History of the British Working Class.* Reviewed by J. M. Winter. .. 295

Hyman, Harold M. *A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution.* Reviewed by Donald Allen Robinson. 274

Hyneman, Charles S. Review of Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens, eds., *American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of American Statesmanship.* 241

Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis. Klemens von Klemperer. Reviewed by John Dreijmanis. 728

Ike, Nobutaka. Review of William E. Steslicke, *Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association.* 348

Illich, Ivan. *Tools for Conviviality.* Reviewed by Gayle Avant. 999

The Illusions of Progress. Georges Sorel. Translated by John and Charlotte Stanley. Reviewed by Donna Robinson Divine. 259

Immigrants from India in Israel: Planned Change in an Administered Community. Gilbert Kushner. Reviewed by Stephen Oren. 322

The Impact of Reform Movements on Social Policy Change: The Case of Social Insurance. Daniel S. Sanders. Reviewed by Alfred J. Kohn. 714

The Imperfect Union: A History of Corruption in American Trade Unions. John Hutchinson. Reviewed by James C. McBrearty. 709

Imperialism and Revolution: An Essay for Radicals. Bernard S. Morris. Reviewed by Robert G. Wesson. 1003

Imperialism and World Economy. Nikolai Bukharin. Reviewed by Stephen F. Cohen. 1421

The Imperial Republic. Raymond Aron. Reviewed by Paul Seabury. 1518

In Defense of Earth. Lynton K. Caldwell. Reviewed by J. E. S. Fawcett. 361

Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution. Frederick W. Marks III. Reviewed by Carl L. Figliola. 1041

India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement. Francis G. Hutchins. Reviewed by Raghavan Iyer. 1479

Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America. Christopher Jencks et al. Reviewed by Frederick M. Wirt 1034

Ingle, Clyde R. *From Village to State to Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development.* Reviewed by Jean F. O'Barr. 1069

Ingrams, Doreen, compiler and annotator. *Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict.* Reviewed by Norman Rose. 1480

In the Name of Tomorrow: Life Underground in

Poland. Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter. Reviewed by Joseph R. Fiszman. 319
In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History. David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler. Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507
The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions. Norman Frohlich. 943
Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay? Adam Przeworski. 49
Interest Groups and Political Integration: The 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark. Peter M. Leslie. 68
International Conciliation. Jean-Pierre Cot. Reviewed by David Brook. 366
International Environmental Action: A Global Survey. Thomas W. Wilson, Jr. Reviewed by Pauline K. Marstrand. 738
International Manual on Collective Bargaining for Public Employees. Seymour P. Kaye and Arthur I. Marsh, eds. Reviewed by Harry F. Stark. 320
International Organization: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography. Michael Haas. Reviewed by W. Andrew Axline. 1525
International Population Census Bibliography: Europe. Population Research Center, The University of Texas. Reviewed by R. Kenneth Godwin. 1086
The International Regulation of Civil Wars. Evan Luard, ed. Reviewed by Frank Barnaby. 382
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook. Reviewed by Benjamin Walter. 1007
Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions? Lawrence S. Mayer and I. J. Good. 916
Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies. Fuad Jabber. Reviewed by Jacob Reuveny. 1481
Israel: Social Structure and Change. Michael Curtis and Mordecai S. Chertoff, eds. Reviewed by Gary S. Schiff. 1064
Israel's Political-Military Doctrine: Occasional Papers in International Affairs Number 30. Michael I. Handel. Reviewed by Don Peretz. 1067
Iyer, Raghavan. Review of Francis G. Hutchins, *India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement.* 1479

Jabber, Fuad. *Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies.* Reviewed by Jacob Reuveny. 1481
Jaguaribe, Helio. *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study.* Reviewed by Alexander W. Wilde. 1070
Jancar, Barbara. Review of Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz, *Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968–69; Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era.* 340
Jansson, Bo, Leif Lewin and Dag Sörbom. *The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968.* Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 328
Japan: Financial Markets in the World Economy. Wilbur F. Monroe. Reviewed by Martin Bronfenbrenner. 329
Japan's Foreign Policy. Frank C. Langdon. Reviewed by John K. Emmerson. 733
Japan in World Politics. Young C. Kim, ed. Reviewed by Theodore McNelly. 377
Jasny, Naum. *Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered.* Reviewed by Alfred Zauberman. 1482
Jean Bodin: Verhandlungen der Internationalen Bodin Tagung in München: Horst Denzer, ed. Reviewed by Patrick Riley. 996
Jencks, Christopher et al. *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America.* Reviewed by Frederick M. Wirt. 1034
Jennings, M. Kent and Richard G. Niemi. *Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: a Longitudinal Study of Two Generations.* 1316
Jessup, Philip C. *The Price of International Justice.* Reviewed by Anthony D'Amato. 375
John Locke: Problems and Perspectives. John W. Yolton, ed. Reviewed by Robert H. Horwitz. 1015
Johnson, A. Ross. *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945–1953.* Reviewed by Fred Warner Neal. 1071
Johnson, Dale L., ed. *The Chilean Road to Socialism.* Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 316
Johnson, David Bruce. *Communication* in reply to comments on his and J. R. Gibson's article "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa" (March, 1974). 579
Johnson, Grant, and The Politics of Reconstruction. Martin E. Mantell. Reviewed by Phillip S. Paludan. 712
Johnson, Harry G. *Man and His Environment.* Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017
Johnson, Katherine Marshall. *Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casablanca.* Reviewed by Remy Leveau. 1483
Jones, Archer and Thomas L. Connelly. *The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy.* Reviewed by James E. Sefton. 265
Jones, G. W. Review of Bernard Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade, *Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States.* 343
Jones, Nolan E. Review of George F. Cole, *Politics and the Administration of Justice.* 1024
Jones, W. J. Review of Henry Horwitz, ed., *The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691–1693.* 314
Jordan, David C. Review of Jeanne Kirkpatrick,

Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina. 1485
Jordan, Z. A. *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis.* Reviewed by Timothy O'Hagen. 1424
Joshua, Wynfred. *Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance.* Reviewed by Ronald L. Tammen. 733
Journey Between Two Chinas. Seymour Topping. Reviewed by June Teufel Dreyer. 1510
Judge Learned Hand and the Role of the Federal Judiciary. Kathryn Griffith. Reviewed by Robert G. Seddig. 1029
Justice as Fairness: For Groups? (a review essay contributing to a symposium on John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*). Vernon Van Dyke. 607
Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political Philosophy. Allan Bloom. 648
Justice and Rationality: Some Objections to the Central Argument in Rawls's Theory. James Fishkin. 615
Justice in South Africa. Albie Sachs. Reviewed by Pierre L. van den Berghe. 724
Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement, and Politics in Rawls. Benjamin R. Barber. 663

Kahin, George McT. *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation.* A review of *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition; United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense;* and Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times.* 675
Kahn, Alfred J. Review of Daniel S. Sanders, *The Impact of Reform Movements on Social Policy Change: The Case of Social Insurance.* 714
Kalecki, Michal. *Selected Essays in Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy.* Reviewed by Andrew Glyn. 246
Kantor, Harry. Review of Robert J. Alexander, *Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrine of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre.* 1462
Kantor, Paul. Review of Jewel Bellush and Stephen M. David, *Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-making.* 1440
Kaplan, Morton A. *Dissent and the State in Peace and War: An Essai on the Grounds of Public Morality.* Reviewed by Geoffrey Stern. 318
Karis, Thomas. Review of Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence.* 1101
Karmel, Alex. *Guillotine in the Wings: A New Look at the French Revolution and Its Relevance to America Today.* Reviewed by Benjamin R. Barber. 1000
Karsov, Nina and Szymon Szechter. *In the Name of Tomorrow: Life Underground in Poland.* Reviewed by Joseph R. Fiszman. 319
Karst, Kenneth L. Review of Weston H. Agor, ed., *Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence, Analyses for Nine Countries.* 1461
Kassiola, Joel. *Communication* on Stephen G. Salkever, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics" (March, 1974). 572
Katzman, Martin T. *The Political Economy of Urban Schools.* Reviewed by Earl J. Reeves. 710
Kaye, Seymour P. and Arthur I. Marsh, eds. *International Manual on Collective Bargaining for Public Employees.* Reviewed by Harry F. Stark. 320
Kearney, Robert N. *The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).* Reviewed by W. Howard Wriggins. 1073
  Review of Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker, James L. Perlmutter, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandan, *Area Handbook for Ceylon.* 1085
Keefe, William J. Review of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, *State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness.* 1442
Keller, John W. Review of Bruce Kuklick, *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations.* 1528
Kelley, Allen C., Jeffrey G. Williamson, and Russell J. Cheetham. *Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History.* Reviewed by Gustav Ranis. 1425
Kelly, George Armstrong. Review of Maurice Mandelbaum, *History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought.* 247
Kelsen, Hans. *The Pure Theory of Law* and *What is Justice: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science.* Reviewed by H. W. Harris. 1427
Kemp, Geoffrey and Richart Burt, eds. *Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy, 1947–1971: An Annotated Bibliography.* Reviewed by William I. Bacchus. 1441
Kennington, Richard. *Communication* in reply to criticism on his review of Patrick Riley, *Political Writings of Leibniz* (March, 1974). 191
Kenworthy, E. W., Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, and Fox Butterfield. *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times.* Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation.* 675
  Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685
Keohane, Nannerl O. Review of J. A. W. Gunn, *Factions No More: Attitudes to Party in Government and Opposition in Eighteenth-Century England.* 243
  Review of Michael Walzer, ed., *Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI.* 1012
Khadduri, Majid. Review of Charles Wendell,

The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. . . . 353
Kickingbird, Kirke and Karen Ducheneaux. *One Hundred Million Acres.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1028
Kieft, David Owen. *Belgium's Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small Power Diplomacy.* Reviewed by Jean Barrea. 321
Kiernan, Bernard P. Review of Edward Taborsky, *Communist Penetration of the Third World.* 111
Kim, Ilpyong J. *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets.* Albert Feuerwerker. 1484
Kim, Jae-On, John R. Petrocik, and Stephen N. Enokson. *Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components.* . . 107
Kim, Jung-Gun and John M. Howell. *Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests.* Reviewed by James A. Caporaso. 376
Kim, Roy U. T. Review of John Yin, *Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War.* 392
Kim, Young C., ed. *Japan in World Politics.* Reviewed by Theodore McNelly. 377
Kintner, William R. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s.* Reviewed by Alton H. Quanbeck. 378
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne. *Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina.* Reviewed by David C. Jordan. 1485
Kiser, George C. Review of Abraham Hoffman, *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929–1939.* 1033
Klaren, Peter F. *Modernization, Discoloration, and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870–1932.* Reviewed by Terry L. McCoy. 1074
Klieman, Aaron S. *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921.* Reviewed by Howard M. Sachar. 1527
The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption. Reviewed by Austin Sarat. 1036
Knapp, Manfred. *Die Stimme Amerikas: Auslandspropaganda der USA unter der Regierung John F. Kennedys.* Reviewed by Alan Aichinger. 379
Knowledge and Human Interests. Jürgen Habermas. Reviewed by Kenneth L. Deutsch. 245
Kobrak, Peter. *Private Assumption of Public Responsibilities: The Role of American Business in Urban Manpower Programs.* Reviewed by Marshall E. Dimock. 275
Kochanek, Stanley A. Review of Richard Sisson, *The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State.* 346
Kochen, Manfred and Karl W. Deutsch. Review of Lennart Lundquist, *Means and Goals of Political Decentralization.* 1429
Koehler, David H. *Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence.* 954
Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: Rejoinder. 967
Koehler, John E., Harvey A. Averch, and Frank H. Denton. *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines.* Reviewed by Mohd. A. Nawawi. 1464
Koehler, John E. Review of Dov Weintraub, Miriam Shapiro, and Belinda Aquino. *Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines.* 1515
Kolchin, Peter. *First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction.* Reviewed by Richard N. Current. 276
Kornberg, Allan, ed. *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective.* Reviewed by Jerome M. Gilison. 1057
Kramer, Gerald H. and Saul Goodman. *Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections."* 1255
Kramnick, Isaac. *Comment on Clark's "On Anarchism in an Unreal World."* 168
Kreps, Juanita M. Review of John A. Brittain, *The Payroll Tax for Social Security.* 264
Krislov, Samuel, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Schaefer, and Susan O. White, eds. *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach.* Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman. 1450
Kuklick, Bruce. *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations.* John W. Keller. 1528
Kulski, W. W. *The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis, 1964–72.* Reviewed by Robert C. Horn. 380
Kuper, Leo and M. G. Smith, eds. *Pluralism in Africa.* Reviewed by Okwudiba Nnoli. 1486
Kushner, Gilbert. *Immigrants from India in Israel: Planned Change in an Administered Community.* Reviewed by Stephen Oren. 322
Kvavik, Robert B. Review of Leif Lewin, Bo Jansson, and Dag Sörbom, *The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968.* 328

Labor Legislation from an Economic Point of View. Gustavo R. Velasco. Reviewed by Bernard Samoff. 707
Lachica, Eduardo. *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt.* Reviewed by Eliezer B. Ayal. 323
Lachman, M. Leanne and Anthony Downs. Review of Harvey Luskin Molotch, *Managed Integration: Dilemmas of Doing Good in the City.* 1042
Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education.* Reviewed by Allan P.

Sindler. 1038

Lambert, M. E., W. N. Medlicott, and Douglas Dakin, eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939.* Reviewed by Gary B. Ostrower. 385

Lambton, Ann K. S. *The Persian Land Reform (1962–1966).* Reviewed by G. H. Razi. 324

Langdon, Frank C. *Japan's Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by John K. Emmerson. 733

Laos: War and Revolution. Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds. Reviewed by Joseph J. Zasloff. 1095

LaPalombara, Joseph, Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development.* Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development.* . . . 979

Laponce, J. A. *Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions.* 11

Lare, James. Review of Benjamin F. Wright, *5 Public Philosophies of Walter Lippman.* 1014

The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849–1873. Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley, eds. Reviewed by Joseph Hamburger. 1430

Latham Earl. Review of Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948:* and Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism.* 1024

Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change. Stefan A. Halper and John R. Serling, eds. Reviewed by John M. Baines. 309

Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence, Analyses for Nine Countries. Weston H. Agor, ed. Reviewed by Kenneth L. Karst. 1461

Latin American Political Parties. Robert J. Alexander. Reviewed by Lars Shoultz. 1052

Laub, Julian Martin. *The College and Community Development: A Socio-economic Analysis for Urban and Regional Growth.* Reviewed by Harold E. Quinley. 277

Laumann, Edward O. *Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks.* Reviewed by Andrew M. Greeley. 711

Laurens, André and Thierry Pfister. *Les nouveaux communistes.* Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406

Law, Politics and Birth Control. C. Thomas Dienes. Reviewed by John R. Schmidhauser. 268

Lawrence, P. and R. M. Berndt, eds. *Politics in New Guinea.* Reviewed by Peta Colebatch. . . . 1467

Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences. Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock III. Reviewed by Alan H. Schechter. 283

The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays. James Willard Hurst. Reviewed by Marvin R. Summers. 1449

Lazitch, Branko and Milorad M. Drachkovitch. *Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I.* Reviewed by Thomas Fiddick. 324

Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897–1930. Yonathan Shapiro. Reviewed by Daniel J. Elazar. 284

Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina. Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Reviewed by David C. Jordan. 1485

The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925. James Barros. Reviewed by R. P. Barston. 1522

Lebedoff, David. *Ward Number Six.* Reviewed by Donald G. Herzberg. 277

Lebergott, Stanley. *Time on the Cross: Two Views. I.* A review essay on Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* and *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods, a Supplement.* 697

Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States. Bernard Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade. Reviewed by G. W. Jones. 343

Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. Allan Kornberg, ed. Reviewed by Jerome M. Gilison. 1075

Leiserson, Avery. APSA Presidential Address, 1975: *Charles Merriam, Max Weber and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science.* 175

Leiter, William M. Review of Evan Bitsaxis, *Welfare Versus Freedom.* 1420

Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I. Milorad Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch. Reviewed by Thomas Fiddick. 324

Lensen, George Alexander. Review of Baymirza Hayit, *Turkestan zwischen Russland und China.* 1525

Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation. Richard B. Day. Reviewed by Robert V. Daniels. 720

Leslie, Peter M. *Interest Groups and Political Integration: The 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark.* 68

Leveau, Remy. Review of Katherine Marshall Johnson, *Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casablanca.* 1483

Levesque, Terrence J., Claude S. Colantoni, and Peter C. Ordeshook. *Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College.* 141

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis. 157

Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family. Richard Allen Chapman. 76

Levine, Daniel H. *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela.* Reviewed by John D. Martz. . . . 326

Review of Mark W. Cannon, R. Scott Fosler, and Robert Witherspoon, *Urban Government* *for Valencia, Venezuela.* 298

Levine, Herbert S. *Hitler's Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–30.* Reviewed by Kenneth R. Nelson. 327

Le Vine, Victor T. Review of Virginia Thompson, *West Africa's Council of the Entente.* ... 1112

Levin, Melvin R. *Community and Regional Planning: Issues in Public Policy.* Reviewed by Jay S. Goodman. 1039

Levinson, Harry. *The Great Jackass Fallacy.* Reviewed by Edward R. Padgett. 1001

Lewin, Leif, Bo Jansson, and Dag Sörbom. *The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968.* Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 328

Leyda, Jay. *Dianying, Electric Shadows: An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China.* Reviewed by Martin King Whyte. 1078

Il Liberalismo in un Mondo in Trasformazione. Nicola Matteucci. Reviewed by Dante Germino. 1002

The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905. Shmuel Galai. Reviewed by Sheila Fitzpatrick. 721

Lieberman, Marvin. Review of Alan Berg, *The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in National Development.* 1096

Lieber, Nancy I. *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* Review of Pierre Guidoni, *Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste;* Didier Motchane, *Clefs pour le socialisme;* André Laurens and Thierry Pfister, *Les nouveaux communistes; Programme commun de gouvernement: Parti socialiste, Parti communiste, Mouvement des radicaux de gauche;* François Mitterand, *La Rose au poing* and *Ma part de vérité;* Jean-Marie Borzeix, *Mitterand lui même;* and George Marchais, *Le Défi démocratique.* 1406

Lieber, Nancy I. and Robert J. Lieber. Review of Jean Meyriat, ed., *Conflicts et Coopération entre les Etats, 1971: Prélude à un nouvel ordre international.* 1104

Lieber, Robert J. and Nancy I. Lieber. Review of Jean Meyriat, ed., *Conflits et Coopération entre les Etats, 1971; Prélude à un nouvel ordre international.* 1104

Lieber, Robert J. *Theory and World Politics.* Reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes. 381

The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought. Peter G. Stillman. Review of B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Science and Human Behavior,* and *Walden Two.* 202

The Limits of Consensual Decision. Douglas W. Rae. 1270

Linden, Allen B. Review of Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937.* 352

Lindley, Dwight N. and Francis E. Mineka, eds. *The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849–1873.* Reviewed by Joseph Hamburger. 1430

Linowes, R. Robert and Don T. Allensworth. *The Politics of Land Use: Planning, Zoning, and the Private Developer.* Reviewed by Joseph L. Stevens. 1437

Lippmann, Heinz. *Honecker and the New Politics of Europe.* Helen Sebba, trans. Reviewed by Robert McGeehan. 1079

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. *Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education.* Reviewed by Allan P. Sindler. 1038

Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Rebellion in the University.* Reviewed by Philip G. Altbach. 1452

Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street. Betty H. Zisk. Reviewed by Lawrence Baum. 290

Lockwood, Bert B., Jr. Review of Carol Edler Baumann, *The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism.* 730

Logrolling and the Paradox of Voting: Are They Really Logically Equivalent? A Comment. Peter Bernholz. 961

Lord, Guy. *The French Budgetary Process.* Reviewed by John Creighton Campbell. 1080

Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his Articles in the Quarterly Review, 1860–1883. Paul Smith. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 258

Loutfi, Martha F. *The Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid.* Reviewed by Martin Bronfenbrenner. 329

Love, Joseph L. *Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882–1930.* Reviewed by Riordan Roett. 329

Low, D. A. *Buganda in Modern History.* Reviewed by Claude E. Welch, Jr. 1081

Lowenthal, Abraham F. *The Dominican Intervention.* Reviewed by N. Gary Holten. 1102

Luard, Evan, ed. *The International Regulation of Civil Wars.* Reviewed by Frank Barnaby. 382

Lumley, Roger. *White-Collar Unionism in Britain.* Reviewed by David Coates. 1487

Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment: Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America. Andre Gunder Frank. Reviewed by Arturo Valenzuela. 1475

Lundquist, Lennart. *Means and Goals of Political Decentralization.* Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch and Manfred Kochen. 1429

Lyons, Philip B. Review of David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City.* 998

Lyttelton, Adrian. *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929.* Reviewed by Roland Sarti. 1488

McBrearty, James C., ed. *American Labor History and Comparative Labor Movements: A Selected Bibliography.* Reviewed by G. David Garson. 1040

McBrearty, James C. Review of John Hutchinson, *The Imperfect Union: A History of Corruption in American Trade Unions.* 709

Macciocchi, Maria Antonietta. *Daily Life in Revolutionary China.* Reviewed by Philip E. Ginsburg. 1082
McCormick, James M. Review of Jaan Pennar, *The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension, 1917–1972.* 387
McCoy, Alfred W. and Nina S. Adams, eds. *Loas: War and Revolution.* Reviewed by Joseph J. Zasloff. 1095
McCoy, Terry L. Review of Peter F. Klaren, *Modernization, Dislocation and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party,* 1870–1932. 1074
McCutcheon, James M., compiler. *China and America: A Bibliography of Interactions, Foreign and Domestic.* Reviewed by Dorothy Borg. 1103
McGeehan, Robert. Review of Heinz Lippman, *Honecker and the New Politics of Europe.* Helen Sebba, trans. 1079
McGowan, Patrick J. and Robert M. Rood. *Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 859
McLaughlin, Charles H. Review of Richard A. Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law. Vol. 3: The Widening Context.* 369
McLennan, Barbara N. Review of D. J. M. Tate, *The Making of Modern Southwest Asia, Volume I: The European Conquest.* 351
McManus, Edgar J. Review of Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820.* 1454
McNelly, Theodore. Review of Young C. Kim, ed., *Japan in World Politics.* 377
McWilliams, Wilson Cary. Review of Geoffrey Smith, *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, The New Deal and the Coming of World War II.* 286
Madan, T. N. Review of David G. Mandelbaum, *Society in India. Vol. 1: Continuity and Change; Vol. 2: Change and Continuity.* 331
Maddox, Robert James. Review of Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta.* 735
Mahar, J. Michael, ed. *The Untouchables in Contemporary India.* Reviewed by W. H. Morris-Jones. 1489
Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences. Edited by UNESCO. Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch. 1010
The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Volume I: The European Conquest. D. J. M. Tate. Reviewed by Barbara N. McLennan. 351
Malbin, Michael J. Review of Robert Shogan, *A Question of Judgment: The Abe Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court.* 285
Malloy, James M. Review of J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825.* 306
Mamdani, Mahmood. *The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste and Class in an Indian Village.* Reviewed by Charles S. Brant. 330
Managed Integration: Dilemma of Doing Good in the City. Harvey Luskin Molotch. Reviewed by M. Leanne Lachman and Anthony Downs. 1042
Mandelbaum, David G. *Society in India. Vol. 1: Continuity and Change; Vol. 2: Change and Continuity.* Reviewed by T. N. Madan. 331
Mandelbaum, Maurice. *History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought.* Reviewed by George Armstrong Kelly. 247
Mandelbaum, Seymour. *Time on the Cross: Two Views. II.* A review essay on Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* and *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods, a Supplement.* 700
Mangone, Gerard J. Review of I. M. Sinclair, C. M. G., *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.* 1536
Man and His Environment. Harry G. Johnson. Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017
Manley, John F. Review of David Price, *Who Makes the Laws?* 1453
Mann, Seymour Z. Review of Charles Sacrey, *The Political Economy of Urban Poverty.* 1455
Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. I. William Zartman, ed. Reviewed by John Waterbury. 357
Mantell, Martin E. *Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction.* Reviewed by Phillip S. Paludan. 712
Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi, Perspectives on Social Transformation. Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya. Reviewed by Francis G. Hutchins. 1058
Ma part de vérité. François Mitterand. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406
Marchais, George. *Le Défi démocratique.* Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406
Marenin, Otwin. *Communication* on Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," (December, 1973). 193
Marks, Frederick W., III. *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution.* Reviewed by Carl L. Figliola. 1041
Marsh, Alan. *The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain.* . . 21
Marshall, D. Bruce. Review of Charles Melchoir de Molènes, *L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une première expérience de parlementarisme international.* 1530
Marsh, Arthur I. and Seymour P. Kaye, eds. *International Manual on Collective Bargaining for Public Employees.* Reviewed by Harry F. Stark. 320
Marstrand, Pauline K. Review of Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., *International Environmental Action: A Global Survey.* 738

Martic, Milos. Review of Svetozar Vukmanović (Tempo), *Revolucija Koja Teče—Memoari* (*Memoirs on a Flowing Revolution*). 1514

Martz, John D. Review of Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela*. . . . 326

Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism: The Struggle for a New Consciousness. Stanley Pierson. Reviewed by Fred Reid. 704

Marxist Esthetics. Henri Arvon. Helen Lane, trans. Reviewed by Alfred G. Meyer. 238

Mason, John Brown. Review of Felix Reichmann and Josephine M. Tharpe, *Bibliographic Control of Microforms*. 343

Massey, Joseph A. *The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority*. 31

Massialas, Byron, ed. *Political Youth, Traditional Schools: National and International Perspectives*. Reviewed by Frank A. Pinner. 291

Mass Media in the Soviet Union. Mark W. Hopkins. Reviewed by David E. Powell. 314

Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response. Christopher H. Achen. 1218

Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds. Reviewed by J. M. Power. 291

The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines. Harvey A. Averch, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton. Reviewed by Mohd. A. Nawawi. . . 1464

Matteucci, Nicola. *Il Liberalismo in un Mondo in Trasformazione*. Reviewed by Dante Germino. 1002

Maximin Justice and an Alternative Principle of General Advantage (a review essay contributing to a symposium on John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*). Douglas W. Rae. 630

Mayall, James, D. C. Watt, and Cornelia Navari, eds. *Documents on International Affairs, 1963*. Reviewed by Robert C. Gray. 1118

Mayer, Lawrence S. and I. J. Good. *Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?* 916

May, Ernest R. and James C. Thomson, Jr. *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey*. Reviewed by Frank E. Rogers. 384

Mayer, Thomas. *Permanent Income, Wealth, and Consumption*. Reviewed by Lester D. Taylor. . 249

May, Judith V. *Communication*: "More on Participation." 1404

May, R. J. Review of H. C. Brookfield, *Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific*. 718

May, Robert E. Review of Ernest N. Paolino, *The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U. S. Foreign Policy*. 713

Means and Goals of Political Decentralization. Lennart Lundquist. Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch and Manfred Kochen. 1429

Medhurst, Kenneth N. *Government in Spain: The Executive at Work*. Reviewed by Charles W. Anderson. 334

Medlicott, W. N., Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*. Reviewed by Gary B. Ostrower. 385

Meehan, Eugene J. Review of Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., *The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory: Toward a Postbehavioral Science of Politics*. 260

Meek, Ronald L., ed. and trans. *Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics*. Reviewed by Gerald J. Cavanaugh. 250

Meier, Kenneth John. *Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis*. 526

Melanson, Philip H. Review of Paul Sites, *Control: The Basis of Social Order*. 257

Melby, John F. Review of Jack Chen, *New Earth: The Story of an early collective farm in China's Chekiang Province in the 1949–1956 period*. 719

Melgunov, S. P. *The Bolshevik Seizure of Power*. Sergei G. Pushkarev, ed. Reviewed by Herbert J. Ellison. 1083

Meltzer, Allan H. and Francisco Arcelus. *Aggregate Economic Variables and Votes for Congress: A Rejoinder*. 1266
  The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections. 1232

Menshikov, S. *Millionaires and Managers*. Reviewed by Lynn Turgeon. 278

Merritt, Richard L. Review of Dennis L. Bark, *Die Berlin-Frage, 1949–1955*; and Hans Herzfeld, *Berlin in der Weltpolitik, 1945–1970*. 1520

Messick, Richard E. and David Collier. *Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption*. 1299

Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis. Robert Jones Shafer. Reviewed by Robert T. Aubey. 1505

Meyer, Alfred G. Review of Henri Arvon. *Marxist Esthetics*. Helen Lane, trans. 238

Meyriat, Jean, ed. *Conflits et Coopération entre les Etats, 1971: Prélude à un nouvel ordre international*. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber. 1104

Michael, Franz and Gaston J. Sigur. *The Asian Alliance: Japan and the United States Policy*. Reviewed by J. A. A. Stockwin. 386

Mickiewicz, Ellen, ed. *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data*. Reviewed by William A. Welsh. 1490

Mickiewicz, Ellen. Review of William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization*. . . 337

Middleton, Drew. *Retreat from Victory: A Critical Appraisal of American Foreign and Military Policy from 1920 to the 1970's*. Reviewed by F. S. Northedge. 735

Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives. Philippe C. Schmitter, ed. Reviewed by Liisa North. 1502

Millionaires and Managers. S. Menshikov. Reviewed by Lynn Turgeon. 278
Mineka, Francis E. and Dwight N. Lindley, eds. *The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849–1873.* Reviewed by Joseph Hamburger. 1430
Mineka, Francis E., ed. *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848.* Reviewed by Joseph Hamburger. 1430
The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority. Joseph A. Massey. 31
Mitterand, François. *La Rose au poing* and *Ma part de vérité.* Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* . . 1406
Mitterand lui-même. Jean Marie Borzeix. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406
Miyakawa, T. Scott and Hilary Conroy. *East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation.* Reviewed by George DeVos. 303
Modelski, George. Review of Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers.* 1534
Models, Measurement and Sources of Error: Civil Conflict in Black Africa. Mary B. Welfling. . . . 871
Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870–1932. Peter F. Klaren. Reviewed by Terry L. McCoy. 1074
Modern Organizational Theory: Contextual, Environmental, and Socio-Cultural Variables. Anany R. Negandhi, ed. Reviewed by Henry Zentner. 1003
Molènes, Charles Melchior de. *L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une première expérience de parlementarisme international.* Reviewed by D. Bruce Marshall. 1530
Molotch, Harvey Lushkin. *Managed Integration: Dilemmas of Doing Good in the City.* Reviewed by M. Leanne Lachman and Anthony Downs. 1042
Monroe, Wilbur F. *Japan: Financial Markets and the World Economy.* Reviewed by Martin Bronfenbrenner. 329
Montaperto, Ronald N. and Gordon A. Bennett. *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai.* Reviewed by Sheldon Appleton. 1466
Moomaw, I. W. *The Challenge of Hunger: A Program for More Effective Foreign Aid.* Reviewed by Richard L. Clinton. 1531
Moore, Clement Henry. Review of Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker and Suzanne Teleki, *Area Handbook for Algeria.* 1495
A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution. Harold M. Hyman. Reviewed by Donald Allen Robinson. 274
Morris, Alfred. *The Growth of Parliamentary Scrutiny by Committee: A Symposium.* Reviewed by Lyndelle D. Fairlie. 1493
Morris, Bernard S. *Communication:* "More on New Theories of Revolution." 1403
Imperialism and Revolution: An Essay for Radicals. Reviewed by Robert G. Wesson. 1003
Morris-Jones, W. H. Review of J. Michael Mahar, ed., *The Untouchables in Contemporary India.* 1489
Morse, Edward L. Review of Werner J. Feld, *Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups.* 372
Moses, Rafael, Heinrich Winnink, and Mortimer Ostow. *Psychological Bases of War.* Reviewed by John Gunn. 1436
Motchane, Didier. *Clefs pour le socialisme.* Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406
Mueller, Claus. *The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation.* Reviewed by Murray Edelman. 1432
Mundt, Robert J., Scott C. Flanagan and Gabriel A. Almond, eds. *Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development.* Reviewed by Fred W. Riggs. 293
Municipal Administration in India. A. Awasthi, ed. Reviewed by Benjamin N. Schoenfeld. . . 1057
Munk, Frank. Review of J. W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy;* and Eugen Steiner, *The Slovak Dilemma.* 1097
Murphy, Jeffrie G. *Communication* in reply to criticism of his review of Ernest van den Haag, *Political Violence and Civil Disobedience* (March, 1974). 577
Myrdal, Gunnar. *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline.* Reviewed by Richard L. Clinton. 1531
The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste and Class in an Indian Village. Mahmood Mamdani. Reviewed by Charles S. Brant. . . . 330

Nanda, B. R., ed. *Socialism in India.* Reviewed by Lewis P. Fickett, Jr. 335
Nandy, Ashis. Review of Marcus F. Franda, *Radical Politics in West Bengal.* 1473
Narain, Iqbal. *Twilight or Dawn: The Political Change in India.* Reviewed by Baldev Raj Nayar. 1084
Natanson, Maurice, ed. *Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz.* Reviewed by Guy E. Swanson. 703
Nathans, Sydney. *Daniel Webster and Jacksonian Democracy.* Reviewed by Kenneth E. Shewmaker. 708
Nationalism and the International System. F. H. Hinsley. Reviewed by Hedley Bull. 374

Navari, Cornelia, D. C. Watt, and James Mayall, eds. *Documents on International Affairs, 1963*. Reviewed by Robert C. Gray. 1118

Nawawi, Mohd. A. Review of Harvey A. Averch, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton, *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines*. . . . 1464

Nayar, Baldev Raj. Review of Iqbal Narain, *Twilight or Dawn: The Political Change in India*. 1084

Neal, Fred Warner. Review of A. Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case*, 1945–1953. 1071

Negandhi, Anant R., ed. *Modern Organizational Theory: Contextual, Environmental, and Socio-Cultural Variables*. Reviewed by Henry Zentner. 1003

Nelson, Kenneth R. Review of Herbert S. Levine, *Hitler's Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–30*. 327

The Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid. Martha F. Loutfi. Reviewed by Martin Bronfenbrenner. 329

Neuborne, Burt and Leon Friedman. *Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Legality of the War in Vietnam*. Reviewed by C. Herman Pritchett. 271

New Earth: *The Story of an early collective farm in East China's Chekiang Province in the 1949–56 period*. Jack Chen. Reviewed by John F. Melby. 719

Newman, Karl J. *European Democracy Between the Wars*. Kenneth Morgan, trans. Reviewed by C. B. Robson. 336

Newman, Oscar. *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*. Reviewed by Vincent Ostrom. 279

The Next Phase in Foreign Policy. Henry Owen, ed. Reviewed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield. 1105

Niemi, Richard G. and M. Kent Jennings. *Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: a Longitudinal Study of Two Generations*. 1316

Niethammer, Lutz. *Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter Amerikanischer Besatzung*. Reviewed by C. Bradley Scharf. 1494

1972 *Congressional Campaign Finances*. Common Cause. Reviewed by Nelson W. Polsby. 265

Nnoli, Okwudiba. Review of Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa*. 1486

Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz. Geoffrey Debnam. 889

Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups. Werner J. Feld. Reviewed by Edward L. Morse. 372

Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm. Paul R. Schulman. . . 1354

Nordlinger, Eric A. *Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls*. Reviewed by Betty H. Zisk. 280

Northedge, F. S. Review of Drew Middleton, *Retreat from Victory: A Critical Appraisal of American Foreign and Military Policy from 1920 to the 1970's*. 735

North, Liisa. Review of Philippe C. Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives*. 1502

Les nouveaux communistes. André Laurens and Thierry Pfister. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay*. 1406

Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance. Wynfred Joshua. Reviewed by Ronald L. Tammen. 733

The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in National Development. Alan Berg with Robert J. Muscat. Reviewed by Marvin Lieberman. 1096

Nye, Robert D. *Conflict Among Humans: Some Basic Psychological and Social-Psychological Considerations*. Reviewed by Stephen J. Andriole. 251

Nyrop, Richard F., Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker, James L. Perlmutter, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandan. *Area Handbook for Ceylon*. Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085

Nyrop, Richard F., John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. *Area Handbook for Algeria*. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495

O'Barr, Jean F. Review of Clyde R. Ingle, *From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development*. 1069

Objectivity in Social Science. Frank Cunningham. Reviewed by A. James Gregor. 995

Odom, William E. *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization*. Reviewed by Ellen Mickiewicz. 337

O'Hagan, Timothy. Review of Z. A. Jordan, *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis*. 1424

Old-Age Politics in California: From Richardson to Reagan. Jackson K. Putnam. Reviewed by Frank A. Pinner. 1045

The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. I, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. Julius Goebel, Jr. Reviewed by David Fellman. . . . 1445

On Anarchism in an Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists. John P. Clark. 162

On the Apparent Paradox of Participation: A New Proposal. Gerald S. Strom. 908

One Hundred Million Acres. Kirke Kickingbird and Karen Ducheneaux. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1028

Opening Up the Suburbs: An Urban Strategy for America. Anthony Downs. Reviewed by Har-

lan Hahn. 1444
Oppenheimer, Joe. *Some Political Implications of "Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence:" A Comment.* 963
The Ordeal of Nationhood: A Social Study of India Since Independence, 1947–1970. Krishan Bhatia. Reviewed by S. P. Varma. 1059
Ordeshook, Peter C., Claude S. Colantoni, and Terrence J. Levesque. *Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College.* 141
Rejoinder to "Comment" by Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis. 157
Ordeshook, Peter C. and William H. Riker. *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory.* Reviewed by Benjamin Walter. 1007
Oren, Nissan. Review of Frederick B. Chary, *The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940–1944.* 1063
Oren, Stephen. Review of Gilbert Kushner, *Immigrants from India in Israel: Planned Change in an Administered Community.* 322
Orfield, Gary. Review of James C. Harvey, *Black Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration.* 1032
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. *Toward Central Government Computer Policies.* Reviewed by Wesley G. Skogan. 1085
Les Origines du Gauchisme. Richard Gombin. Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1423
The Ormée of Bordeaux: A Revolution during the Fronde. Sal Alexander Westrich. Reviewed by Charles Tilly. 355
Orren, Karen. *Corporate Power and Social Change: The Politics of the Life Insurance Industry.* Reviewed by J. David Cummins. 1043
Osgood, Robert E. et al. *Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration.* Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield. 1533
Ostow, Mortimer, Heinrich Winnik and Rafael Moses. *Psychological Bases of War.* Reviewed by John Gunn. 1436
Ostrom, Vincent. Review of Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design.* 279
Ostrower, Gary B. Review of W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939.* 385
The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States. R. P. Barston, ed. Reviewed by Timothy M. Shaw. 360
Our Ecological Crisis. Grahame J. C. Smith, Henry J. Steck, and Gerald Surette. Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017
Owen, Guillermo. *Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.* 947
Owen, Henry, ed. *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield. 1105
Padgett, Edward R. Review of Harry Levinson, *The Great Jackass Fallacy.* 1001
Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict. Doreen Ingrams, compiler and annotator. Reviewed by Norman Rose. 1480
Paludan, Phillip S. Review of Martin E. Mantell, *Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction.* 712
Paolino, Ernest N. *The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U. S. Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Robert E. May. 713
The Paradox of Minimax Regret. Nathaniel Beck. 918
The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment. Stephen V. Stephens. 914
The Paradox of Not Voting for Oneself. Gordon Tullock. 919
The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities. Eric M. Uslaner and J. Ronnie Davis. 929
Parker, Glenn R. Review of Donald J. Devine, *The Political Culture of the United States.* 267
Parker, Newton B., Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, James L. Perlmutter, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandan. *Area Handbook for Ceylon.* Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085
Parker, Newton B., Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, and Suzanne Teleki. *Area Handbook for Algeria.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495
The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691–1693. Henry Horwitz, ed. Reviewed by W. J. Jones. 314
Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence. Susan Blackall Hansen. 1181
Partridge, P. H. Review of J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Coercion. Nomos XIV, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.* 252
Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics. Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo. 481
The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda. Carl J. Friedrich. Reviewed by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. 240
Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy. Russell D. Buhite. Reviewed by David J. Alvarez. 1098
The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Mark Elvin. Reviewed by Marianne Bastid. 1472
Patterns of Australian Federalism. J. E. Richardson. Reviewed by Rufus Davis. 1088
Patterson, Samuel C. *Introduction to APSA Presidential Address, 1975.* 172
Review of James A. Robinson, ed., *State Legislative Innovation: Case Studies of Wash-*

ington, Ohio, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, and California. 1047
Patterson, Samuel C. and John C. Wahlke, eds. *Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research*. Reviewed by Jerome M. Gilison. . . 1075
Paxton, Robert O. *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944*. Reviewed by Henry W. Ehrmann. 338
The Payroll Tax for Social Security. John A. Brittain. Reviewed by Juanita M. Kreps. 264
Peace, War, and Numbers. Bruce M. Russett, ed. Reviewed by George Modelski. 1534
Pelikan, Jiri, ed. *The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968*. Reviewed by Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. 339
Peltason, J. W. Review of Randall W. Bland, *Private Pressure on Public Law: The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall*. 1022
Pelzer, Karl J. *West Malaysia and Singapore: A Selected Bibliography*. Reviewed by Robert O. Tilman. 1496
Pennar, Jaan. *The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension, 1917–1972*. Reviewed by James M. McCormick. 387
Pennock, J. Roland and John W. Chapman, eds., *Coercion. Nomos XIV, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy*. Reviewed by P. H. Partridge. 252
The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation. George McT. Kahin. A review of *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of the United States Decision-making in Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition; United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense;* and Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times*. . 675
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition, 4 vols. Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation*. 675
  Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685
The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times. Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield. Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation*. 675
  Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685
Peretz, Don. Review of Michael I. Handel, *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine: Occasional Papers in International Affairs Number 30*. . . . 1067
Peritore, N. Patrick. *Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology*. . . . 132
Perlmutter, James L. Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker, Rinn-Sup Shinn, and Mary Shivanandan. *Area Handbook for Ceylon*. Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085
Perloff, Harvey S. ed. *The Future of the United States Government*. Reviewed by Granville J. Foster. 1044
Permanent Income, Wealth, and Consumption. Thomas Mayer. Reviewed by Lester D. Taylor. 249
Perman, Michael. Review of Robert F. Durden, *The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on Emancipation*. 269
The Persian Land Reform, 1962–1966. Ann K. S. Lambton. Reviewed by G. H. Razi. 324
Petrocik, John R., Jae-On Kim, and Stephen N. Enokson. *Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components*. . 107
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. *Communication* on Ole R. Holsti, "International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows" (March, 1974). 186
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and William R. Kintner, eds. *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s*. Reviewed by Alton H. Quanbeck. 378
Pfister, Thierry and André Laurens. *Les nouveaux communistes*. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay*. 1406
Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz. Maurice Natanson, ed. Reviewed by Guy E. Swanson. 703
Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw. *Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968–69; Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era*. Reviewed by Barbara Jancar. 340
  Review of Jiri Pelikan, ed. *The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968*. 339
Pierce, Roy. Review of Richard Gombin, *Les Origines du Gauchisme*. 1423
Piereson, James E. Review of Martin Tolchin and Susan Tolchin, *To the Victor . . . : Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House*. 1459
Pierson, Stanley. *Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism: The Struggle for a New Consciousness*. Reviewed by Fred Reid. 704
Pinner, Frank A. Review of Byron Massialas, ed., *Political Youth, Traditional Schools: National and International Perspectives*. 333
  Review of Jackson K. Putnam, *Old-Age Politics in California:* From Richardson to Reagan. 1045
Piper, Don C. Review of Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival*. 370

Pippin, Larry L. Review of Daniel A. Sharp, ed., *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru*. 1108

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. *The Concept of Representation*. Reviewed by Carl J. Friedrich. 1005

Plamenatz, John. Review of Peter Singer, *Democracy and Disobedience*. 257

Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries. Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky. Reviewed by William W. Siffin. 1061

The Planning—Programming—Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies. Joon Chien Doh. Reviewed by Allan Schick. 1443

Pluralism in Africa. Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds. Reviewed by Okwudiba Nnoli. 1486

Pocock, J. G. A. *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*. Reviewed by Robert Heineman. 254

Polenberg, Richard. *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945*. Reviewed by Fredrick J. Dobney. 282

Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio. John J. Gargan and James G. Coke, eds. Reviewed by Douglas Gatlin. 271

The Political Culture of the United States. Donald J. Devine. Reviewed by Glenn R. Parker. 267

Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study. Helio Jaguaribe. Reviewed by Alexander W. Wilde. 1070

The Political Development in Nepal, 1950–1970: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity. R. S. Chauhan. Reviewed by Pashupati Shumshere J. B. Rana. 300

The Political Economy of Urban Poverty. Charles Sackrey. Reviewed by Seymour Z. Mann. 1455

The Political Economy of Urban Schools. Martin T. Katzman. Reviewed by Earl J. Reeves. 710

Political Science and State and Local Government. The American Political Science Association. Reviewed by Ira Sharkansky. 1439

Political Youth, Traditional Schools: National and International Perspectives. Byron G. Massialas, ed. Reviewed by Frank A. Pinner. 333

Politics and the Administration of Justice. George F. Cole. Reviewed by Nolan E. Jones. 1024

The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Robert N. Kearney. Reviewed by W. Howard Wriggins. 1073

The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets. Ilpyong J. Kim. Reviewed by Albert Feuerwerker. 1484

The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy. Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones. Reviewed by James E. Sefton. 265

The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation. Claus Mueller. Reviewed by Murray Edelman. 1432

The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870. Jean H. Baker. Reviewed by David Curtis Skaggs. 1019

The Politics of Expertise. Guy Benveniste. Reviewed by Harvey M. Sapolsky. 238

Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay. Nancy I. Lieber. Review of Pierre Guidoni, *Histoire du nouveau parti socialiste;* Didier Motchane, *Clefs pour le socialisme;* André Laurens and Thierry Pfister. *Les nouveaux communistes; Programme commun de gouvernement: Parti socialiste, Parti communiste, Mouvement des radicaux de gauche;* François Mitterand, *La Rose au poing and Ma part de vérité;* Jean-Marie Borzeix, *Mitterand lui-même*, and George Marchais, *Le Défi démocratique*. 1406

The Politics of Land Use: Planning, Zoning, and the Private Developer. R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth. Reviewed by Joseph L. Stevens. 1437

Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History. J. G. A. Pocock. Reviewed by Robert Heineman. 254

The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power. David Wise. Reviewed by Francis E. Rourke. 1051

The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes. Thomas A. Spragens Jr. Reviewed by Herbert W. Schneider. 262

Politics in New Guinea. R. M. Berndt and P. Lawrence, eds. Reviewed by Peta Colebatch. 1467

Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State. Larry W. Bowman. Reviewed by Barry M. Schutz. 1060

Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy. Stephen P. Strickland. Reviewed by Jerry L. Weaver. 1458

Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic. Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. Reviewed by Bernard E. Brown. 356

Politics and the Stages of Growth. W. W. Rostow. Reviewed by Ronald Rogowski. 1501

Politics and Urban Policies. Brett W. Hawkins. Reviewed by Martin Shefter. 273

Das Politische System der Schweiz. Jürg Steiner, ed. with Erwin Bucher, Daniel Frei and Leo Schürmann. Reviewed by Benjamin R. Barber. 1508

Polsby, Nelson W. Review of Common Cause, *1972 Congressional Campaign Finances*. 265

Pomper, Gerald M. *Communication* on Philip E. Converse, "Comment on Burnham's 'Theory and Voting Research' " (September, 1974). 575
  Review of Alan Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel—1969*. 294

Population Research Center, The University of Texas. *International Population Census Bibliography: Europe*. Reviewed by R. Kenneth Godwin. 1086

Porter, Brian, ed. *The Aberystwyth Papers: In-*

ternational Politics, 1919–1969. Reviewed by Max Beloff. 387

Porter, Gareth. Review of Alexander Barton Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.* 1516

Position Classification: A Behavioral Analysis for the Public Service. Jay M. Shafritz. Reviewed by David T. Stanley. 1048

Post, Gaines, Jr. *The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Peter K. Breit. 1087

The Post-War History of the British Working Class. Allen Hutt. Reviewed by J. M. Winter. 295

Potholm, Christian, P. Review of John Dugard, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United Nations.* 1099

Powell, David E. Review of Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union.* 314

Power, J. M. Review of Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology;* and A. F. Davies, *Essays in Political Sociology.* 291

Power and Its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey Debnam. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. 900

The Power Motive. David G. Winter. Reviewed by Bruce Buchanan II. 1013

Prasad. Nageshwar. *Decentralisation in Yugoslavia and India.* Reviewed by A. H. Somjee. 1496

Preobrazhensky, E. and N. Bukharin. *The ABC of Communism (1966 edition);* and *The ABC of Communism (1969 edition).* Reviewed by Stephen F. Cohen. 1421

Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption. David Collier and Richard E. Messick. 1299

Presthus, Robert. *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics.* Reviewed by John C. Courtney. 1497

Price, David. *Who Makes the Laws?* Reviewed by John F. Manley. 1453

Price, H. Douglas and Howard S. Bloom. *Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession.* 1240

The Price of International Justice. Philip C. Jessup. Reviewed by Anthony D'Amato. 375

The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory. Joseph A. Schlesinger. 840

Pritchett, C. Herman. Review of Leon Friedman and Burt Neuborne, *Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Legality of the War in Vietnam.* 271

Private Assumption of Public Responsibilities: The Role of American Business in Urban Manpower Programs. Peter Kobrak. Reviewed by Marshall E. Dimock. 275

Private Pressure on Public Law: The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall. Randall W. Bland. Reviewed by J. W. Peltason. 1022

Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education. Everett Carll Ladd., Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset. Reviewed by Allan P. Sindler. 1038

Programme commun de gouvernement: Parti socialiste, Parti Communiste, Mouvement des radicaux de gauche. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406

Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies. Ronald H. Chilcote, ed. Reviewed by Iêda Siqueira Wiarda. 301

Przeworski, Adam. *Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?* 49

Psychological Bases of War. Heinrich Winnik, Rafael Moses, and Mortimer Ostow. Reviewed by John Gunn. 1436

Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968–69; Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era. Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz. Reviewed by Barbara Jancar. 340

Public Policy Toward Environment 1973: A Review and Appraisal. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017

The Public Sector in the Mixed Economy. Merlyn Rees. Reviewed by Leonard Tivey. 342

Punnett, R. M. *Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Cabinet and the Shadow Government in British Politics.* Reviewed by Jorgen S. Rasmussen. 1499

The Pure Theory of Law. Hans Kelsen. Reviewed by H. W. Harris. 1427

Putnam, Jackson K. *Old-Age Politics in California: From Richardson to Reagan.* Reviewed by Frank A. Pinner. 1045

Pye, Lucian W. Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development.* Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development.* 979

Quanbeck, Alton H. Review of William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s.* 378

Quester, George H. Review of Erving Goffman, *Strategic Interaction.* 997

A Question of Judgment: The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court. Robert Shogan. Reviewed by Michael J. Malbin. 285

Quinley, Harold E. Review of Julian Martin Laub, *The College and Community Development: A Socio-economic Analysis for Urban and Regional Growth*. 277

Quinn, Michael and Mauricio Solaun. *Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America*. Reviewed by John S. Fitch III. 1506

Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling. Paul M. Hayes. Reviewed by Thomas Chr. Wyller. 1477

Rabushka, Alvin. *Race and Politics in Urban Malaya*. Reviewed by Felix Gagliano. 1500

Race and Politics in New York City: Five Studies in Policy-making. Jewel Bellush and Stephen M. David. Reviewed by Paul Kantor. 1440

Race and Politics in Urban Malaya. Alvin Rabushka. Reviewed by Felix Gagliano. 1500

Radical Politics in West Bengal. Marcus F. Franda. Reviewed by Ashis Nandy. 1473

Rae, Douglas W. *The Limits of Consensual Decision*. 1270
  Maximin Justice and an Alternative Principle of General Advantage (a review essay contributing to a symposium on John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*). 630
  Rejoinder to "Comment" by Gordon Tullock. 1298

Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. Review of Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*. 1115

Rana, Pashupati Shumshere J. B. Review of R. S. Chauhan, *The Political Development in Nepal, 1950–1970: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity*. 300

Ranis, Gustav. Review of Allen C. Kelley, Jeffrey G. Williamson, and Russell J. Cheetham, *Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History*. 1425

Rasmussen, Jorgen S. Review of R. M. Punnett, *Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Cabinet and the Shadow Government in British Politics*. 1499

Rathjens, G. W. Review of Carl Vansant, *Strategic Energy Supply and National Security*. 1115

Ratliff, Richard C. *Constitutional Rights of College Students: A Study in Case Law*. Reviewed by Richard J. Richardson. 282

Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. Reviewed in *Justice: A Spectrum of Responses to John Rawls's Theory*, a symposium comprising
  John W. Chapman, *Rawls's Theory of Justice*. 588
  John C. Harsanyi, *Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory*. 594
  Vernon Van Dyke, *Justice as Fairness: For Groups?* 607
  James Fishkin, *Justice and Rationality: Some Objections to the Central Argument in Rawls's Theory*. 615
  Douglas Rae, *Maximin Justice and an Alternative Principle of General Advantage*. 630
  Allan Bloom, *Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political Philosophy*. 648
  Benjamin R. Barber, *Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement, and Politics in Rawls*. 663

Rawls's Theory of Justice. John W. Chapman. 588

Razi, G. H. Review of Ann K. S. Lambton. *The Persian Land Reform, 1962–1966*. 324

Realignment of World Power: The Russo-Chinese Schism Under the Impact of Mao Tse-tung's Last Revolution, Vols. I and II. Oton Ambroz. Reviewed by Gaston J. Sigur. 1463

Rebellion in the University. Seymour Martin Lipset. Reviewed by Philip G. Altbach. 1452

Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai. Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto. Reviewed by Sheldon Appleton. 1466

Rees, Merlyn. *The Public Sector in the Mixed Economy*. Reviewed by Leonard Tivey. 342

Reeves, Earl J. Review of Martin T. Katzman, *The Political Economy of Urban Schools*. 710

Reflections on the May Fourth Movement. Benjamin I. Schwartz, ed. Reviewed by T. K. Tong. 1504

Reframing the Constitution: An Imperative for Modern America. Leland D. Baldwin. Reviewed by Carl Baar. 1439

Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860. Richard Slotkin. Reviewed by Frederick W. Turner III. 705

Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI. Edited with an introduction by Michael Walzer. Reviewed by Nannerl O. Keohane. 1012

Regional Integration in Central America. Isaac Cohen Orantes. Reviewed by Gail R. Sherman. 365

Rehfuss, John. Review of Alan Bent, *Escape From Anarchy*. 1022

Reichmann, Felix and Josephine M. Tharpe. *Bibliographic Control of Microforms*. Reviewed by John Brown Mason. 343

Reich, Wilhelm. *Sex-Pol: Essays, 1929–1934*. Lee Baxandall, ed. Reviewed by Arnold A. Rogow. 1006

Reid, Fred. Review of Stanley Pierson, *Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism: The Struggle for a New Consciousness*. 704

Reinhardt, Jon M. *Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia*. Reviewed by Justus M. van der Kroef. 389

Reischauer, Edwin O. *Toward the 21st Century: Education for a Changing World*. Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 1107

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Gordon Tullock. Douglas Rae. 1298

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Isaac Kramnick. John P. Clark. 169
Rejoinder to "Comment" by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. Geoffrey Debnam. 905
Rejoinder to "Comment" by Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis. Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 157
Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970. William C. Fletcher. Reviewed by Roger Hamburg. 1100
Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis. Kenneth John Meier. 526
Representative Government and Environmental Management. Edwin T. Haefele. Reviewed by Gordon Tullock. 1031
The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919. Richard G. Hovannisian. Reviewed by Robert L. Daniel. 315
Reshetar, John S., Jr. Review of United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union.* 1093
Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration. Robert E. Osgood et al. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield. 1533
Retreat from Victory: A Critical Appraisal of American Foreign and Military Policy from 1920 to the 1970's. Drew Middleton. Reviewed by F. S. Northedge. 735
Reuveny, Jacob. Review of Fuad Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies.* 1481
Revolucija Koja Teče—Memoari (Memoirs on a Flowing Revolution). Svetozar Vukmanović (Tempo). Reviewed by Milos Martic. 1514
The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain. Pierre Broué and Emile Témime. Tony White, trans. Reviewed by Carolyn P. Boyd. 297
R. H. Tawney and His Times. Ross Terrill. Reviewed by Alan Ryan. 1435
Richards, Alan R. and Fred W. Grupp, Jr. *Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making.* 850
Richardson, J. E. *Patterns of Australian Federalism.* Reviewed by Rufus Davis. 1088
Richardson, Richard J. Review of Richard C. Ratliff, *Constitutional Rights of College Students: A Study in Case Law.* 282
Richelieu and Reason of State. William F. Church. Reviewed by John B. Wolf. 719
Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War. Henry Barbera. Reviewed by Arthur S. Banks. 1465
Riggs, Fred W. Review of Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development.* 293
Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook. *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory.* Reviewed by Benjamin Walter. 1007
Riley, Patrick. *Communication* on review of his book *Political Writings of Leibniz* (March, 1974). 189
Review of Horst Denzer, ed., *Jean Bodin: Verhandlungen der Internationalen Bodin Tagung in München.* 996
Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882–1930. Joseph L. Love. Reviewed by Riordan Roett. 329
The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro. Maurice Halperin. Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 310
Roberts, K. W. S. and R. E. Goodin. *The Ethical Voter.* 926
Robinson, Donald Allen. Review of Harold M. Hyman, *A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution.* 274
Robinson, Donald L. *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820.* Reviewed by Edgar J. McManus. 1454
Robinson, James A., ed. *State Legislative Innovation: Case Studies of Washington, Ohio, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, and California.* Reviewed by Samuel C. Patterson. 1047
Robson, C. B. Review of Karl J. Newman, *European Democracy Between the Wars.* 336
Rodgers, Harrell R., Jr. and Charles S. Bullock III. *Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences.* Reviewed by Alan H. Schechter. 283
Roett, Riordan. Review of Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882–1930.* 329
Roff, Tom R., David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, and David P. Chandler. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History.* Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507
Rogers, Frank E. Review of Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey.* 384
Rogow, Arnold A. Review of Wilhelm Reich, *Sex-Pol: Essays, 1929–1934.* Lee Baxandall, ed. 1006
Rogowski, Ronald. Review of W. W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth.* 1501
Rokkan, Stein and Erik Allardt, eds. *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology.* Reviewed by J. M. Power. 291
Ronfeldt, David. *Atencingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido.* Reviewed by Donald L. Herman. 1089
Rood, Robert M. and Patrick J. McGowan. *Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 859
Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753–1776. David Curtis Skaggs. Reviewed by David A. Bohmer. 1456

Rose, Douglas D. *Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout.* 124

Rose, Lisle A. *After Yalta.* Reviewed by Robert James Maddox. 735

Rosenbaum, Walter A. Review of Albert E. Utton and Daniel H. Henning, eds., *Environmental Policy: Concepts and International Implications.* 1113

Rose, Norman. Review of Doreen Ingrams, compiler and annotator, *Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict.* 1480

Rosen, Stanley. Review of Eugene Goodheart, *Culture and the Radical Conscience.* 242

La Rose au poing. François Mitterand. Reviewed by Nancy I. Lieber in *Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay.* 1406

Rostow, W. W. *Politics and the Stages of Growth.* Reviewed by Ronald Rogowski. 1501

Rourke, Francis E. Review of David Wise, *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power.* 1051

Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, eds. *Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organization, Society, and Policy.* Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. 1090

Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber and Lloyd I. Rudolph, eds. *Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organization, Society and Policy.* Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. 1090

Rummel, R. J. Review of J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* 390

Russett, Bruce M., ed. *Peace, War, and Numbers.* Reviewed by George Modelski. 1534

Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples. Wayne S. Vucinich, ed. Reviewed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. 1115

Russia in the Caribbean, Part One. The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Reviewed by Hoon M. Chung. 1099

Ryan, Alan. Review of Ross Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times.* 1435

Sachar, Howard M. Review of Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921.* 1527

Sachs, Albie. *Justice in South Africa.* Reviewed by Pierre L. van den Berghe. 724

Sackrey, Charles. *The Political Economy of Urban Poverty.* Reviewed by Seymour Z. Mann. 1455

St. Angelo, Douglas, and Douglas Dobson. *Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics.* 481

Salkever, Stephen. *Communication* in reply to criticism of his article "Virtue, Obligation and Politics" (March, 1974). 574

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. Reviewed by Alton H. Quanbeck. 378

Samoff, Bernard. Review of Gustavo R. Velasco, *Labor Legislation from an Economic Point of View.* 707

Sanders, Daniel S. *The Impact of Reform Movements on Social Policy Change: The Case of Social Insurance.* Reviewed by Alfred J. Kahn. 714

Sanders, Ralph. Review of Walter C. Clemens, *The Superpowers and Arms Control: From Cold War to Interdependence.* 732

Sapolsky, Harvey M. Review of Guy Benveniste, *The Politics of Expertise.* 238

Sarat, Austin and Josel B. Grossman. *Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication.* 1200

Sarat, Austin. Review of *The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption.* 1036

Sarti, Roland. Review of Adrian Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929.* 1488

Sater, William F. *The Heroic Image in Chile: Arturo Prat, Secular Saint.* Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar. 1092

Sattler, Martin J. and David S. Sullivan, eds. *Change and the Future International System.* Reviewed by Charles F. Hermann. 1110

Schaefer, Roger C., Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, and Susan O. White, eds. *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach.* Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman. 1450

Scharf, C. Bradley. Review of Lutz Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter Amerikanischer Besatzung.* 1494

Schechter, Alan H. Review of Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock III, *Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Social Consequences.* 283

Schick, Allan. Review of Joon Chien Doh, *The Planning—Programming—Budgeting System in Three Federal Agencies.* 1443

Schiff, Gary S. Review of Michael Curtis and Mordecai S. Chertoff, eds., *Israel: Social Structure and Change.* 1064

Schilling, Warner R. and William T. R. Fox, eds., *European Security and the Atlantic System.* Reviewed by J. I. Coffey. 373

Schlesinger, Joseph A. *The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory.* 840

Schlesinger, Thomas O. *Communication* on the review of his book *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe* (June, 1974). 583

Schmidhauser, John R. Review of C. Thomas Dienes, *Law, Politics and Birth Control.* 268

Schmitter, Philippe, C., ed. *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives.* Reviewed by Liisa North. 1502

Schnall, David. *Communication* on D. B. John-

son and J. R. Gibson, "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa" (March, 1974). 579
Schneider, Herbert W. Review of Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., *The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes*. 262
Schoenfeld, Benjamin N. Review of A. Awasthi, ed. *Municipal Administration in India*. 1057
Schoultz, Lars. Review of Robert J. Alexander, *Latin American Political Parties*. 1052
Schroyer, Trent. *The Critique of Domination*. Reviewed by Paul Thomas. 255
Schulman, Paul R. *Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm*. 1354
Schumacher, E. F. *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered*. Reviewed by Harold Sprout. 1448
Schutz, Barry M. Review of Larry W. Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State*. 1060
Schwartz, Benjamin I., ed. *Reflections on the May Fourth Movement*. Reviewed by T. K. Tong. 1504
Schwartz, Bernard. *From Confederation to Nation: The American Constitution, 1835–1877*. Reviewed by Hans L. Trefousse. 714
Schwartz, Bernard and H. W. R. Wade. *Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States*. Reviewed by G. W. Jones. 343
Science and Human Behavior. B. F. Skinner. Reviewed by Peter G. Stillman in *The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought*. 202
Seabury, Paul. Review of Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic*. 1518
The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968. Jiri Pelikan, ed. Reviewed by Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. 339
Seddig, Robert G. Review of Kathryn Griffith, *Judge Learned Hand and the Role of the Federal Judiciary*. 1029
Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian. Bernard W. Sheehan. Reviewed by John Caughey. 1049
Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism. Athan Theoharis. Reviewed by Earl Latham. 1024
Sefton, James E. Review of Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, *The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy*. . . 265
The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929. Adrian Lyttelton. Reviewed by Roland Sarti. 1488
Selected Essays in Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy. Michal Kalecki. Reviewed by Andrew Glyn. 246
Serfs, Peasants and Socialists: A Former Serf Village in the Republic of Guinea. William Derman. Reviewed by Victor D. Du Bois. 1471
Serling, John R. and Stefan A. Halper, eds. *Latin America: Dynamics of Social Change*. Reviewed by John M. Baines. 309
Sex-Pol: Essays, 1929–1934. Wilhelm Reich. Lee Baxandall, ed. Reviewed by Arnold A. Rogow. 1006
Shafer, Robert Jones. *Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analysis*. Reviewed by Robert T. Aubey. 1505
Shafritz, Jay M. *Position Classification: A Behavioral Analysis for the Public Service*. Reviewed by David T. Stanley. 1048
The Shameful Blight: The Survival of Racial Discrimination in Voting in the South. Washington Research Project. Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 289
Shapiro, Miriam, Dov Weintraub, and Belinda Aquino. *Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines*. Reviewed by John E. Koehler. 1515
Shapiro, Yonathan. *Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897–1930*. Reviewed by Daniel J. Elazar. 284
Sharkansky, Ira. Review of The American Political Science Association, *Political Science and State and Local Government*. 1439
Sharp, Daniel A., ed. *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru*. Reviewed by Larry L. Pippin. 1108
Shaw, Timothy M. Review of R. P. Barston, ed. *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. 360
Sheehan, Bernard W. *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian*. Reviewed by John Caughey. 1049
Sheehan, Neil, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times*. Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation*. 675
Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685
Shefter, Martin. Review of Brett W. Hawkins, *Politics and Urban Policies*. 273
Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing Policies? Henry J. Aaron. Reviewed by Joseph L. Stevens. 1437
Sherman, Gail R. Review of Isaac Cohen Orantes, *Regional Integration in Central America*. 365
Shewmaker, Kenneth E. Review of Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., *Daniel Webster and the Trial of American Nationalism, 1843–1852*; and Sydney Nathans, *Daniel Webster and Jacksonian Democracy*. 708
Shinn, Rinn-Sup, Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker,

James L. Perlmutter, and Mary Shivanandan. *Area Handbook for Ceylon.* Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085

Shivanandan, Mary, Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, Ann S. Cort, Newton B. Parker, James L. Perlmutter, and Rinn-Sup Shinn. *Area Handbook for Ceylon.* Reviewed by Robert N. Kearney. 1085

Shogan, Robert, *A Question of Judgment: The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court.* Reviewed by Michael J. Malbin. 285

Shoultz, Lars. Review of Robert J. Alexander, *Latin American Political Parties.* 1052

Siffin, William W. Review of Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries.* 1061

Sigmund, Paul E. Review of Dale L. Johnson, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism;* and J. Ann Zamit, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism.* . . 316

Sigur, Gaston J. and Franz Michael. *The Asian Alliance: Japan and the United States Policy.* Reviewed by J. A. A. Stockwin. 386

Sigur, Gaston J. Review of Oton Ambroz, *Realignment of World Power: The Russo-Chinese Schism Under the Impact of Mao Tse-tung's Last Revolution, Vols. I and II.* 1463

Sih, Paul K. T., ed., *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927–1937.* Reviewed by John H. Boyle. 344

The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain. Alan Marsh. 21

Silverman, Dan P. Review of Martin L. Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy, 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue.* 1511

Simeon, Richard. *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada.* Reviewed by W. L. White. 724

Sims, Nicholas A. Review of Kurt Waldheim, *The Austrian Example.* Ewald Osers, trans. 1116

Sinclair, I. M., C. M. G. *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.* Reviewed by Gerard J. Mangone. 1536

Sindler, Allan P. Review of Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education.* 1038

Singer, J. David and Melvin Small. *The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* Reviewed by R. J. Rummel. 390

Singer, Peter. *Democracy and Disobedience.* Reviewed by John Plamenatz. 257

Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America. Mauricio Solaun and Michael Quinn. Reviewed by John S. Fitch III. 1506

Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War. John Yin. Reviewed by Roy U. T. Kim. 392

Sisson, Richard, *The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State.* Reviewed by Stanley A. Kochanek. 346

Sites, Paul. *Control: The Basis of Social Order.* Reviewed by Philip H. Melanson. 257

Skaggs, David Curtis. Review of Jean H. Baker, *The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870.* 1019
Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753–1776. Reviewed by David A. Bohmer. 1456

The Skill Factor in Politics: Repealing the Mental Commitment Laws in California. Eugene Bardach. Reviewed by Garry D. Brewer. 1020

Skinner, B. F. *About Behaviorism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Science and Human Behavior,* and *Walden Two.* Reviewed by Peter G. Stillman in *The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought.* 202
Comment on Watts's "B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior." . . 228

Skogan, Wesley G. Review of Organization for Co-operation and Development, *Toward Central Government Computer Policies.* 1085

Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820. Donald L. Robinson. Reviewed by Edgar J. McManus. 1454

Slotkin, Richard. *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860.* Reviewed by Frederick W. Turner III. 705

The Slovak Dilemma. Eugen Steiner. Reviewed by Frank Munk. 1097

Smail, John R. W., David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History.* Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507

Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. E. F. Schumacher. Reviewed by Harold Sprout. 1448

Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. *The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* Reviewed by R. J. Rummel. 390

Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams. *Utilitarianism: For and Against.* Reviewed by Alan Donagan. 706

Smith, Geoffrey. *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, The New Deal and the Coming of World War II.* Reviewed by Wilson Cary McWilliams. 286

Smith, Grahame J. C., Henry J. Steck, and Gerald Surette. *Our Ecological Crisis.* Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017

Smith, Harvey H. and others. *Area Handbook for Israel.* Reviewed by Myron J. Aronoff. 347

Smith, Hedrick, Neil Sheehan, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times.* Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation.* 675

Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685
Smith, M. G. and Leo Kuper, eds. *Pluralism in Africa.* Reviewed by Okwudiba Nnoli. 1486
Smith, Paul. *Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his Articles in the Quarterly Review, 1860–1883.* Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 258
Sobel, Robert. *The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business, 1914–1970.* Reviewed by Jonathan Hughes. 1457
Social Change in Angola. Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, ed. Reviewed by Ronald H. Chilcote. 1478
Socialism in India. B. R. Nanda, ed. Reviewed by Lewis P. Fickett, Jr. 335
Social Justice and the City. David Harvey. Reviewed by Philip B. Lyons. 998
Society in India. Vol. I: Continuity and Change; Vol. 2: Change and Continuity. David G. Mandelbaum. Reviewed by T. N. Madan. 331
Sohn, Louis B., ed. *Basic Documents of African Regional Organization.* Reviewed by Thomas M. Franck. 1109
Solaun, Mauricio and Michael Quinn. *Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America.* Reviewed by John S. Fitch III. 1506
Some Political Implications of "Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence:" A Comment. Joe Oppenheimer. 963
Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology. N. Patrick Peritore. 132
Somjee, A. H. Review of Nageshwar Prasad, *Decentralisation in Yugoslavia and India.* 1496
Sörbom, Dag, Bo Jansson, and Leif Lewin. *The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968.* Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 328
Sorel, Georges. *The Illusions of Progress.* Translated by John and Charlotte Stanley. Reviewed by Donna Robinson Divine. 259
Sorzano, J. S. *David Easton and the Invisible Hand.* 91
Soucy, Robert. *Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès.* Reviewed by William R. Tucker. 1009
The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United Nations. John Dugard. Reviewed by Christian P. Potholm. 1099
Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. Reviewed by John R. Thomas. 722
Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered. Naum Jasny. Reviewed by Alfred Zauberman. 1482
Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin. Gayle Durham Hollander. Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn. 312
The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis, 1964–72. W. W. Kulski. Reviewed by Robert C. Horn. 380
The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization. William E. Odom. Reviewed by Ellen Mickiewicz. 337
Spafford, Duff. *Communication* on Peter Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Voting" (June, 1974). 576
Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions. J. A. Laponce. 11
Spielman, Karl F., Jr. and Matthew P. Gallagher. *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* Reviewed by John R. Thomas. 722
Spragens, Thomas A., Jr. *The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory: Toward A Postbehavioral Science of Politics.* Reviewed by Eugene J. Meehan. 260
The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes. Reviewed by Herbert W. Schneider. 262
Sprigge, T. L. S., ed. *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham (Vols. I and II).* Reviewed by Ian Budge. 1433
Sprout, Harold. Review of L. G. Hines, *Environmental Issues: Pollution and Economics;* and E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful; Economics as if People Mattered.* 1448
Stahnke, Arthur A. Review of Jerome Alan Cohen, *China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies.* 364
Stanley, David T. Review of Jay M. Shafritz, *Position Classification: A Behavioral Analysis for the Public Service.* 1048
Stark, Harry F. Review of Seymour P. Kaye and Arthur I. Marsh, eds., *International Manual on Collective Bargaining for Public Employees.* 320
State Legislative Innovation: Case Studies of Washington, Ohio, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, and California. James A. Robinson, ed. Reviewed by Samuel C. Patterson. 1047
State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. Reviewed by William J. Keefe. 1442
The State of the Nation: Parliament. Granada Television. Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 308
Steck, Henry J., Grahame J. C. Smith, and Gerald Surette. *Our Ecological Crisis.* Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017
Stein, Arthur and Robert G. Weisbrod. *Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American and the American Jew.* Reviewed by Joyce Gelb. 289
Steinberg, David Joel, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History.* Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507

Steiner, Eugen. *The Slovak Dilemma.* Reviewed by Frank Munk. 1097
Steiner, Jürg, ed. with Erwin Bucher, Daniel Frei and Leo Schürmann. *Das Politische System der Schweiz.* Reviewed by Benjamin R. Barber. 1508
Steiner, Zara. Review of Ian M. Drummond, *British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919–1939.* 304
Stephens, Stephen V. *The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment.* 914
Stern, Geoffrey. Review of Morton A. Kaplan, *Dissent and the State in Peace and War: An Essai on the Grounds of Public Morality.* 318
Steslicke, William E. *Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association.* Reviewed by Nobutaka Ike. 348
Stevens, Joseph L. Review of Henry J. Aaron, *Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing Policies?*; and R. Robert Linowes and Don T. Allensworth, *The Politics of Land Use: Planning, Zoning, and the Private Developer.* 1437
Stevens, Richard G. and Morton J. Frisch, eds. *American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of American Statesmanship.* Reviewed by Charles S. Hyneman. 241
Stillman, Peter G. *Communication:* "B. F. Skinner and Values." 1402
The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought. Review of B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Science and Human Behavior,* and *Walden Two.* 202
Die Stimme Amerikas: Auslandspropaganda der USA unter der Regierung John F. Kennedys. Manfred Knapp. Reviewed by Alan Aichinger. 379
Stockwin, J. A. A. Review of Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, *The Asian Alliance: Japan and the United States Policy.* 386
Strategic Energy Supply and National Security. Carl Vansant. Reviewed by G. W. Rathjens. 1115
Strategic Interaction. Erving Goffman. Reviewed by George H. Quester. 997
Stratford, Michael C. *Communication* on Glenn Tinder, "Transcending Tragedy: The Idea of Civility" (June, 1974). 973
The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927–1937. Paul K. T. Sih, ed. Reviewed by John H. Boyle. 344
Strickland, Stephen P. *Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy.* Reviewed by Jerry L. Weaver. 1458
Strom, Gerald S. *On the Apparent Paradox of Participation: A New Proposal.* 908
Suchlicki, Jaime, ed. *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution.* Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. . . 310
Sullivan, David S. and Martin J. Sattler, eds. *Change and the Future International System.* Reviewed by Charles F. Hermann. 1110
Summers, Marvin R. Review of James Willard Hurst, *The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays.* 1449
The Superpowers and Arms Control: From Cold War to Interdependence. Walter C. Clemens. Reviewed by Ralph Sanders. 732
The Supreme Court and Critical Elections. Richard Funston. 795
Surette, Gerald, Grahame, J. C. Smith, and Henry J. Steck. *Our Ecological Crisis.* Reviewed by J. Clarence Davies III. 1017
Svensson, Frances. Review of Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History.* 288
Review of Estelle Fuchs and Robert Havighurst, *To Live on This Earth*; and Kirke Kickingbird and Karen Ducheneaux, *One Hundred Million Acres.* 1028
Swanson, Guy E. Review of Maurice Natanson, ed., *Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz.* 703
The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968. Leif Lewin, Bo Jansson, and Dag Sörbom. Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 328
Swift, Richard N. Review of Benedict S. Alper and Jerry F. Boren, *Crime: International Agenda.* 359
Szechter, Szymon and Nina Karsov. *In the Name of Tomorrow: Life Underground in Poland.* Reviewed by Joseph R. Fiszman. 319
Szyliowicz, Joseph S. *Education and Modernization in the Middle East.* Reviewed by Nermin Abadan-Unat. 349
Review of Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign *Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics.* 737

Taborsky, Edward. *Communist Penetration of the Third World.* Reviewed by Bernard P. Kiernan. 1111
The Taiping Revolutionary Movement. Jen Yu-wen. Reviewed by Eugene Boardman. 1517
Tamman, Ronald L. Review of Wynfred Joshua, *Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance.* . . 733
Tamuno, T. N. *The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914.* Reviewed by Ronald Cohen. 351
Tate, D. J. M. *The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Volume I: The European Conquest.* Reviewed by Barbara N. McLennan. 351
Taubman, William. *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the U.S.S.R.* Reviewed by Theodore H. Friedgut. 726
Taub, Richard P. Review of Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt, *Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States.* 511

Taylor, Lester D. Review of Thomas Mayer, *Permanent Income, Wealth, and Consumption.* 249

Teleki, Suzanne, Richard F. Nyrop, John Duke Anthony, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, and Newton B. Parker. *Area Handbook for Algeria.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1495

Television, Granada. *The State of the Nation: Parliament.* Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 308

Témime, Emile and Pierre Broué. *The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain.* Tony White, trans. Reviewed by Carolyn P. Boyd. 297

Terrill, Ross. *R. H. Tawney and His Times.* Reviewed by Alan Ryan. 1435

Tharpe, Josephine M. and Felix Reichmann. *Bibliographic Control of Microforms.* Reviewed by John Brown Mason. 343

Thayer, Frederick C. *Communication* on Larry Hill, "Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy" (September, 1974). 580

An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition!: Organizing the Politics and Economics of Survival. Reviewed by David Vogel. 1049

Theoharis, Athan. *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism.* Reviewed by Earl Latham. 1024

A Theory of Justice. John Rawls. Reviewed in *Justice: A Spectrum of Responses to John Rawls's Theory*, a symposium comprising
  John W. Chapman, *Rawls's Theory of Justice.* 588
  John C. Harsanyi, *Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory.* 594
  Vernon Van Dyke, *Justice as Fairness: For Groups?* 607
  James Fishkin, *Justice and Rationality: Some Objections to the Central Argument in Rawls's Theory.* 615
  Douglas Rae, *Maximin Justice and an Alternative Principle of General Advantage.* 630
  Allan Bloom, *Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Politidal Philosophy.* 648
  Benjamin R. Barber, *Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement and Politics in Rawls.* 663

Theory and World Politics. Robert J. Lieber. Reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes. 381

Thies, Wallace J. *Communication:* "More on the Pentagon Papers." 1403

This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival. Richard A. Falk. Reviewed by Don C. Piper. 370

Thomas, John R. Review of Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U. S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* 722

Thomas, Paul. Review of Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination.* 255

Thompson, Kenneth W. Review of Edwin O. Reischauer, *Toward the 21st Century: Education for a Changing World.* 1107

Thompson, Virginia. *West Africa's Council of the Entente.* Reviewed by Victor T. Le Vine. 1112

Thomson, James C., Jr. and Ernest R. May. *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey.* Reviewed by Frank E. Rogers. 384

Thorburn, Hugh G. Review of Henry S. Albinski, *Canadian and Australian Politics in Comparative Perspective.* 715

Thurber, Clarence E. Review of Martin Harry Greenberg, *Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study.* 1476

Tien, Hung-mao. *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937.* Reviewed by Allen B. Linden. 352

Tien, H. Yuan. *China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949–1969.* Reviewed by J. B. R. Whitney. 727

Tillema, Herbert K. *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment.* Reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala. 1537

Tilly, Charles. Review of Sal Alexander Westrich, *The Ormée of Bordeaux: A Revolution during the Fronde.* 355

Tilman, Robert O. Review of Karl J. Pelzer, *West Malaysia and Singapore: A Selected Bibliography.* 1496

Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery and *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods, a Supplement.* Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman. Reviewed in *Time on the Cross: Two Views.*
  I. Stanley Lebergott. 697
  II. Seymour Mandelbaum. 700

Time on the Cross: Two Views. Review essays on Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* and *Time on the Cross: Evidence and Methods, a Supplement.*
  I. Stanley Lebergott. 697
  II. Seymour Mandelbaum. 700

Tinder, Glenn. *Communication* in reply to criticism of his essay "Transcending Tragedy: The Idea of Civility" (June, 1974). 975

Tivey, Leonard. Review of Merlyn Rees, *The Public Sector in the Mixed Economy.* 342

To Be a Congressman: *The Promise and the Power.* Sven Groennings and Jonathan P. Hawley, eds. Reviewed by Herbert B. Asher. 1031

Tolchin, Martin and Susan Tolchin. *To the Victor . . . : Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House.* Reviewed by James E. Piereson. 1459

Tolchin, Susan and Martin Tolchin. *To the Victor . . . : Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House.* Reviewed by James E. Piereson. 1459

To Live on This Earth. Estelle Fuchs and Robert

Havighurst. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. . 1028

Tolley, Howard, Jr. *Children and War.* Reviewed by Joseph Adelson. 288

Tong, T. K. Review of Benjamin I. Schwartz, ed., *Reflections on the May Fourth Movement.* 1504

Tools for Conviviality. Ivan Illich. Reviewed by Gayle Avant. 999

Topping, Seymour. *Journey Between Two Chinas.* Reviewed by June Teufel Dreyer. . . 1510

To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, The New Deal and the Coming of World War II. Geoffrey Smith. Reviewed by Wilson Cary McWilliams. 286

To the Victor . . . : Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House, Martin Tolchin and Susan Tolchin. Reviewed by James E. Piereson. 1459

Toward Central Government Computer Policies. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Reviewed by Wesley G. Skogan. 1085

Toward the 21st Century: Education for a Changing World. Edwin O. Reischauer. Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 1107

Trager, Frank N. *Burma: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography.* Reviewed by John Badgley. 1093

The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945–1953. A Ross Johnson. Reviewed by Fred Warner Neal. 1071

Trefousse, Hans L. Review of Bernard Schwartz, *From Confederation to Nation: The American Constitution 1835–1877.* 714

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Internal Security, 1946–1948. Richard M. Freeland. Reviewed by Earl Latham. 1024

Tucker, William R. Review of Robert Soucy, *Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès.* 1009

Tufte, Edward R. *Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections.* 812

Tullock, Gordon. *Comment on Rae's "The Limits of Consensual Decision."* 1295

The Paradox of Not Voting for Oneself. 919

Review of Edwin T. Haefele, *Representative Government and Environmental Management.* 1031

Turgeon, Lynn. Review of S. Menshikov *Millionaires and Managers.* 278

Turgot on Progress, Sociology, and Economics. Ronald L. Meek, ed. and trans. Reviewed by Gerald J. Cavanaugh. 250

Turkestan zwischen Russland und China. Baymirza Hayit. Reviewed by George Alexander Lensen. 1525

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics. Edward Weisband. Reviewed by Joseph S. Szyliowicz. 737

Turner, Frederick W., III. Review of Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860.* 705

Turner, John E. and Robert T. Holt. *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development.* A review essay on volume VII in the series "Studies in Political Development"—Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development.* 979

Twilight or Dawn: The Political Change in India. Iqbal Narain. Reviewed by Baldev Raj Nayar. 1084

Ullman, Richard H. *The Anglo-Soviet Accord.* Reviewed by Stephen R. Graubard. 736

Underdevelopment and the "Gap" Theory of International Conflict. K. J. Holsti. 827

UNESCO, ed. *Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences.* Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch. 1010

The United States Department of Defense. *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam;* and *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense.* Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation.* 675

Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685

United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. *Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union.* Reviewed by John S. Reshetar, Jr. 1093

The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of Social Science Data. Abraham L. Davis. Reviewed by James Eisenstein. 266

United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, 12 vols. Reviewed by George McT. Kahin in *The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation.* . . 675

Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield in *What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers?* 685

Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Legality of the War in Vietnam. Leon Friedman and Burt Neuborne. Reviewed by C. Herman Pritchett. 271

The Untouchables in Contemporary India. J. Michael Mahar, ed. Reviewed by W. H. Morris-Jones. 1489

Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929–1939. Abraham Hoffman. Reviewed by George C. Kiser. 1033

Urban Government for the Prefecture of Casa-

blanca. Katherine Marshall Johnson. Reviewed by Remy Leveau. 1483
Urban Government for Valencia, Venezuela. Mark W. Cannon, R. Scott Fosler, and Robert Witherspoon. Reviewed by Daniel H. Levine. 298
Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics of Change. Harlan Hahn. Reviewed by C. Edwin Gilmour. 1447
U. S. Foreigh Policy and Peru. Daniel A. Sharp, ed. Reviewed by Larry L. Pippin. 1108
Uslaner, Eric M. and J. Ronnie Davis. *The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities*. 929
The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension, 1917–1972. Jaan Pennar. Reviewed by James M. McCormick. 387
Utilitarianism: For and Against. J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. Reviewed by Alan Donagan. 706
Utton, Albert E. and Daniel H. Henning, eds. *Environmental Policy: Concepts and International Implications*. Reviewed by Walter A. Rosenbaum. 1113

Valenzuela, Arturo. Review of Andre Gunder Frank, *Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment: Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America*. 1475
Van Creveld, Martin L. *Hitler's Strategy, 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue*. Reviewed by Dan P. Silverman. 1511
van den Berghe, Pierre L. Review of Albie Sachs, *Justice in South Africa*. 724
van den Haag, Ernest. *Communication* on the review of his book *Political Violence and Civil Disobedience* (March, 1974). 576
van der Kroef, Justus M. Review of John M. Reinhardt, *Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia*. 389
Van Dyke, Vernon. *Justice as Fairness: For Groups?* (a review essay contributing to a symposium on John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*). 607
  Review of Maurice Cranston, *What Are Human Rights?* 367
Vansant, Carl. *Strategic Energy Supply and National Security*. Reviewed by G. W. Rathjens. 1115
Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making. Fred W. Grupp, Jr. and Alan R. Richards. 850
Varma, S. P. Review of Krishan Bhatia. *The Ordeal of Nationhood: A Social Study of India Since Independence, 1947–1970*. 1059
Velasco, Gustavo R. *Labor Legislation from an Economic Point of View*. Reviewed by Bernard Samoff. 707
Verba, Sidney, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt. *Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States*. Reviewed by Richard P. Taub. 1511
Verba, Sidney, Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, and Myron Weiner. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development*. . . . 979
Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944. Robert O. Paxton. Reviewed by Henry W. Ehrmann. 338
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. I. M. Sinclair, C. M. G. Reviewed by Gerard J. Mangone. 1536
Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future. Stephen T. Hosmer. Reviewed by Allan E. Goodman. 306
Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. Alexander Barton Woodside. Reviewed by Gareth Porter. 1516
The Vietnam War and International Law. Vol. 3: The Widening Context. Richard A. Falk, ed. Reviewed by Charles H. McLaughlin. 369
Vogel, David. Review of Frederick Thayer, *An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition!: Organizing the Politics and Economics of Survival*. 1049
von Klemperer, Klemens. *Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis*. Reviewed by John Dreijmanis. 728
von Lazer, Arpad. Review of William F. Sater, *The Heroic Image in Chile: Arturo Prat, Secular Saint*. 1092
Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession. Howard S. Bloom and H. Douglas Price. 1240
Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components. Jae-On Kim, John R. Petrocik, and Stephen N. Enokson. 107
Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence. David H. Koehler. 954
Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: Rejoinder. David H. Koehler. 967
Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited. Sheldon Goldman. 491
Vucinich, Wayne S., ed. *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*. Reviewed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. 1115
Vukmanović, Svetozar (Tempo). *Revolucija Koja Teče—Memoari* (*Memoirs on a Flowing Revolution*). Reviewed by Milos Martic. 1514

Wade, H. W. R. and Bernard Schwartz. *Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States*. Reviewed by G. W. Jones. 343

The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook. J. David Singer and Melvin Small. Reviewed by R. J. Rummel. 390

Wahlke, John C. and Samuel C. Patterson, eds. *Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research*. Reviewed by Jerome M. Gilison. 1075

Walden Two. B. F. Skinner, Reviewed by Peter G. Stillman in *The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought*. 202

Waldheim, Kurt. *The Austrian Example*. Ewald Osers, trans. Reviewed by Nicholas A. Sims. 1116

Wallace, Michael David. *War and Rank among Nations*. Reviewed by Gordon Hilton. 391

Walter, Benjamin. Review of William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory*. 1007

Walton, Hanes, Jr. Review of the Washington Research Project, *The Shameful Blight: The Survival of Racial Discrimination in Voting in the South*. 289

Walzer, Michael, ed. *Regicide and Revolution: Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI*. Reviewed by Nannerl O. Keohane. 1012

Ward Number Six. David Lebedoff. Reviewed by Donald G. Herzberg. 277

War and Politics. Bernard Brodie. Reviewed by Alastair Buchan. 731

War and Rank among Nations. Michael David Wallace. Reviewed by Gordon Hilton. 391

War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945. Richard Polenberg. Reviewed by Frederick J. Dobney. 282

Washburn, Wilcomb E., ed. *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History*. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 288

Washington Research Project. *The Shameful Blight: The Survival of Racial Discrimination in Voting in the South*. Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 289

Waterbury, John. Review of I. William Zartman, ed. *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib*. 357

Watt, D. C., James Mayall, and Cornelia Navari, eds. *Documents on International Affairs, 1963*. Reviewed by Robert C. Gray. 1118

Watts, Meredith W. *Behaviorism and Skinner's Social Commentary: Letting Science Catch Up to Ideology? Rejoinder to "Comment" by B. F. Skinner*. 230
  B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior. 214

Weaver, Jerry L. Review of Stephen P. Strickland, *Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy*. 1458

Weinberger, J. *Hobbes's Doctrine of Method*. 1336

Weiner, Myron, Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucien W. Pye, and Sidney Verba. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. Reviewed by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in *Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development*. 979

Weintraub, Dov, Miriam Shapiro, and Belinda Aquino. *Agrarian Development and Modernization in the Philippines*. Reviewed by John E. Koehler. 1515

Weisband, Edward. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*. Reviewed by Joseph S. Szyliowicz. 737

Weisbrod, Robert G. and Arthur Stein. *Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American and the American Jew*. Reviewed by Joyce Gelb. 289

Welch, Claude E., Jr. Review of D. A. Low, *Buganda in Modern History*. 1081

Welfare Versus Freedom. Evan Bitsaxis. Reviewed by William M. Leiter. 1420

Welfling, Mary B. *Models, Measurement and Sources of Error: Civil Conflict in Black Africa*. 871

Welsh, William A. Review of Ellen Mickiewicz, ed., *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data*. 1490

Wendell, Charles. *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid*. Reviewed by Majid Khadduri. 353

Wesson, Robert G. Review of Bernard S. Morris. *Imperialism and Revolution: An Essay for Radicals*. 1003

West Africa's Council of the Entente. Virginia Thompson. Reviewed by Victor T. Le Vine. 1112

Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of Robert E. Osgood et al., *Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration*. 1533
  What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers? A review of *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition; United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense;* and Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times*. 685

West Malaysia and Singapore: A Selected Bibliography. Karl J. Pelzer. Reviewed by Robert O. Tilman. 1496

Weston, Burns H. Review of Donald T. Fox, ed., *The Cambodian Incursion—Legal Issues*. 1522

West, Richard. *Back to Africa: A History of Sierra Leone and Liberia*. Reviewed by Edgar S. Efrat. 354

Westrich, Sal Alexander. *The Ormée of Bordeaux: A Revolution during the Fronde*. Reviewed by Charles Tilly. 355

What Are Human Rights? Maurice Cranston. Reviewed by Vernon Van Dyke. 367

What is Justice: Justice, Law, and Politics in the

Mirror of Science. Hans Kelsen. Reviewed by H. W. Harris. 1427

What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers? H. Bradford Westerfield. A Review of *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition; United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense;* and Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times*. 685

White-Collar Unionism in Britain. Roger Lumley. Reviewed by David Coates. 1487

White, Susan O., Samuel Krislov, Keith O. Boyum, Jerry N. Clark, Roger C. Schaefer, eds. *Compliance and the Law: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. Reviewed by Joel B. Grossman. 1450

White, W. L. Review of Richard Simeon. *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada*. 724

Whiting, Allen S. Review of Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*. 363

Whitney, J. B. R. Review of H. Yuan Tien, *China's Population-Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949–1969*. 727

Wholey, Joseph S. et al. *Federal Evaluation Policy: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs*. Reviewed by Joel R. Dickinson. 1460

Who Makes the Laws? David Price. Reviewed by John F. Manley. 1453

Whyte, Martin King. Review of Jay Leyda, *Dianying, Electric Shadows: An Account of Films and the Film Audience in China*. 1078

Wiarda, Iêda Siqueira. Review of Ronald H. Chilcote, ed., *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies*. 301

Wildavsky, Aaron and Naomi Caiden. *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries*. Reviewed by William W. Siffin. 1061

Wilde, Alexander W. Review of Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study*. 1070

Williams, Bernard and J. J. C. Smart. *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. Reviewed by Alan Donagan. 706

Williamson, Jeffrey G., Allen C. Kelley, and Russell J. Cheetham. *Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History*. Reviewed by Gustav Ranis. 1425

Williams, Philip M. and Martin Harrison. *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic*. Reviewed by Bernard E. Brown. 356

Wilson, David A. Review of Jean Duffar. *Les Forces Politiques en Thailande*. 1066

Wilson, Thomas W., Jr. *International Environmental Action: A Global Survey*. Reviewed by Pauline K. Marstrand. 738

Winnik, Heinrich, Rafael Moses, and Mortimer Ostow. *Psychological Bases of War*. Reviewed by John Gunn. 1436

Winter, David G. *The Power Motive*. Reviewed by Bruce Buchanan II. 1013

Winter, J. M. Review of Zygmunt Bauman, *Between Class and Elite: The Evolution of the British Labour Movement;* and Allen Hutt, *The Post-War History of the British Working Class*. 295

Wirt, Frederick M. Review of Christopher Jencks et al., *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America*. 1034

Wise, David. *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power*. Reviewed by Francis E. Rourke. 1051

Witherspoon, Robert, Mark W. Cannon, and R. Scott Fosler. *Urban Government for Valencia, Venezuela*. Reviewed by Daniel H. Levine. 298

Woddis, Jack. *Communication:* "More on New Theories of Revolution." 1403

Wolf, John B. Review of William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*. 719

Woodside, Alexander Barton. *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Reviewed by Gareth Porter. 1516

Woodside, Alexander, David Joel Steinberg, David Wyatt, John R. W. Smail, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*. Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507

Wriggins, W. Howard. Review of Robert N. Kearney, *The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)*. 1073

Wright, Benjamin F. *5 Public Philosophies of Walter Lippmann*. Reviewed by James Lare. 1014

Wyatt, David, David Joel Steinberg, John R. W. Smail, Alexander Woodside, Tom R. Roff, and David P. Chandler. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*. Reviewed by Cecil Hobbs. 1507

Wyller, Thomas Chr. Review of Paul M. Hayes, *Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling*. 1477

Yin, John. *Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War*. Reviewed by Roy U. T. Kim. 392

Yolton, John W., ed. *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives*. Reviewed by Robert H. Horwitz. 1015

Young, Arthur N. *China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic Record: China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945*; and *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937–1945*. Reviewed by John H. Boyle. 344

Yu-wen, Jen. *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement*. Reviewed by Eugene Boardman. 1517

Zammit, J. Ann, ed. *The Chilean Road to Socialism.* Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 316
Zartman, I. William, ed. *Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib.* Reviewed by John Waterbury. 357
Zasloff, Joseph J. Review of Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., *Laos: War and Revolution.* 1905
Zauberman, Alfred. Review of Naum Jasny, *Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered.* 1482
Zebel, Sidney H. *Balfour: A Political Biography.* Reviewed by Joel M. Fisher. 358
Zentner, Henry. Review of Anant R. Negandhi, ed., *Modern Organizational Theory: Contextual, Environmental, and Socio-Cultural Variables.* 1003
Zikmund, Joseph and Miriam Ershowitz, eds. *Black Politics in Philadelphia.* Reviewed by Fred J. Foley, Jr. 270
Zinnes, Dina A. Review of Robert J. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics.* 381
Zisk, Betty H. *Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street.* Reviewed by Lawrence Baum. . . . 290
Review of Eric A. Nordlinger, *Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls.* 280

The American Political Science Review

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CONTENTS

Number 1–March 1975

Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions. *J. A. Laponce* 11
The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain. *Alan Marsh* 21
The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority. *Joseph A. Massey* 31
Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay? *Adam Przeworski* 49
Interest Groups and Political Integration: The 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark. *Peter M. Leslie* 68
Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family. *Richard Allen Chapman* 76
David Easton and the Invisible Hand. *J. S. Sorzano* 91
Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individualistic Components. *Jae-On Kim, John R. Petrocik and Stephen N. Enokson* 107
  Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout. *Douglas D. Rose* 124
Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology. *N. Patrick Peritore* 132
Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College. *Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook* 141
  Comment. *Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis* 155
  Rejoinder. *Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque and Peter C. Ordeshook* 157
On Anarchism in an Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists. *John P. Clark* 162
  Comment. *Isaac Kramnick* 168
  Rejoinder. *John P. Clark* 169
APSA Presidential Address 171
  Introduction. *Samuel C. Patterson* 172
  Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science. *Avery Leiserson* 175
Communications 186
Editorial Comment 199
Book Reviews and Essays 202
The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought. *Peter G. Stillman* 202
B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior. *Meredith W. Watts* 214
  Comment. *B. F. Skinner* 228
  Rejoinder. *Meredith W. Watts* 230

Number 2–June 1975

Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics. *Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo* 481
Voting Behavior on the U. S. Courts of Appeals Revisited. *Sheldon Goldman* 491
Development Policy and the Possibility of a "Livable" Future for Latin America. *Robert L. Ayres* 507
Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis. *Kenneth John Meier* 526
Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting. *Andrew T. Cowart, Tore Hansen, and Karl-Erik Brofoss* 543
The City and Political Psychology. *Claude S. Fischer* 559
Communications 572
Editorial Comment 585
Book Reviews and Essays 588
  Justice: A Spectrum of Responses to John Rawls's Theory 588
    Rawls's Theory of Justice. *John W. Chapman* 588
    Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? *John C. Harsanyi* 594
    Justice as Fairness: For Groups? *Vernon Van Dyke* 607
    Justice and Rationality: Some Objections to the Central Argument in Rawls's Theory. *James Fishkin* 615
    Maximin Justice and an Alternative Principle of General Advantage. *Douglas Rae* 630
    Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political Philosophy. *Allan Bloom* 648
    Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement and Politics in Rawls. *Benjamin R. Barber* 663
The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation. *George McT. Kahin* 675
What Use Are Three Versions of the Pentagon Papers? *H. Bradford Westerfield* 685
Time on the Cross: Two Views. *Stanley Lebergott* 697
  Seymour Mandelbaum 700

Number 3–September 1975

The Supreme Court and Critical Elections. *Richard Funston* 795
Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. *Edward R. Tufte* 812
Underdevelopment and the "Gap" Theory of International Conflict. *K. J. Holsti* 827
The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory. *Joseph A. Schlesinger* 840
Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making. *Fred W. Grupp, Jr. and Alan R. Richards* 850
Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe. *Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood* 859
Models, Measurement and Sources of Error: Civil Conflict in Black Africa. *Mary B. Welfling* 871
Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz. *Geoffrey Debnam* 889
Comment. *Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz* 900
Rejoinder. *Geoffrey Debnam* 905
Participation, Coalitions, Vote Trading 908
On the Apparent Paradox of Participation: A New Proposal. *Gerald S. Strom* 908
The Paradox of Not Voting: Comment. *Stephen V. Stephens* 914
Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions? *Lawrence S. Mayer and I. J. Good* 916
The Paradox of Minimax Regret. *Nathaniel Beck* 918
The Paradox of Not Voting for Oneself. *Gordon Tullock* 919
Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing. *John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina* 920
The Ethical Voter. *R. E. Goodin and K. W. S. Roberts* 926
The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities. *Eric M. Uslaner and J. Ronnie Davis* 929
The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions. *Norman Frohlich* 943
Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game. *Guillermo Owen* 947
Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence. *David H. Koehler* 954
Comment. *Peter Bernholz* 961
Comment. *Joe Oppenheimer* 963
Rejoinder. *David H. Koehler* 967
Communications 970
Editorial Comment 976
Book Review and Essays 995
Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development. *Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner* 979

Number 4–December 1975

Editorial Comment 1177
Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence. *Susan Blackall Hansen* 1181
Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication. *Austin Sarat and Joel B. Grossman* 1200
Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response. *Christopher H. Achen* 1218
The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections. *Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer* 1232
Comment. *Howard S. Bloom and H. Douglas Price* 1240
Comment. *Saul Goodman and Gerald H. Kramer* 1255
Rejoinder. *Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer* 1266
The Limits of Consensual Decision. *Douglas W. Rae* 1270
Comment. *Gordon Tullock* 1295
Rejoinder. *Douglas W. Rae* 1298
Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption. *David Collier and Richard E. Messick* 1299
Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations. *M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi* 1316
Hobbes's Doctrine of Method. *J. Weinberger* 1326
Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm. *Paul R. Schulman* 1354
The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies. *Fred I. Greenstein* 1371
Communications 1399
Book Review and Essays 1406
Politics of the French Left: A Review Essay. *Nancy I. Lieber* 1406
Index to Volume LXIX 1539

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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